A plan, but only on paper
Cyril Almeida
WELL, whaddya know. The PML-N and the MQM, disillusioned lovers who fall into each others arms occasionally, are at it again. There will be a strong opposition now, and it will try and rope in other wayward souls like the JUI-F cohort.
Well, good for them. As yet, nobody thinks the government is going anywhere anytime soon, so let the sound and fury commence. If the governing (!) coalition is rickety, the opposition is even more so.
Fun as they may be, the opposition manoeuvres have a bit of a sideshow quality to them.
The main attraction is AZ. Many are even wondering if the accidental president is the greatest politician the country has ever seen. Not only is Zardari set to do the impossible drag a party with little over one-third the seats in the National Assembly to the finish line but there is increasing speculation that his strategy for the next election may just win him and his buddies a second term.
The strategy is reasonably straightforward: small vs big. Get the small provinces on the PPP or its allies side, then puncture the Sharifs Fortress Punjab to the extent of a handful of seats and maybe a similar number for the PML-Q.
The small vs big conspiracy is usually an easy sell and with the 18th Amendment and new NFC award under its belt, the PPP
can reasonably boast of its ability to get the smaller provinces their due share from the federation.
Punjab is a whole lot trickier, though, which is why the Zardari camp has fewer ambitions there. By keeping the PML-Q on its side whether through a seat-adjustment formula or ensuring a three-way fight the PPP hopes to at least make inroads into the PML-Ns strongholds.
Ultimately, the game is of 272 the directly elected National Assembly seats and just a handful of Punjabs 148 seats could get Zardari to 51 per cent.
On paper at least, the Zardari strategy looks good. Many of the assumptions are reasonable and conform to conventional wisdom on electoral campaigns.
The problem is, elections arent fought or won on paper.
Come election cycle, a whole range of variables, sitting quietly on the sidelines, biding their time, will come into play, rendering the election outcome far more unpredictable than the Zardari camp appears to believe.
For one, the Zardari camp seems to view its principal opponents as a static force. Sure, Nawaz Sharif in particular has a go-it-alone tendency that can often be relied on to produce politically damaging outcomes for the PML-N. But here we are, a year and change before the next election is expected and Sharif is already manoeuvring into position the first plank of a Sindh strategy.
Rule no. 1 in politics: never assume your opponent will stand still.
Another problem: Zardaris paranoia has prevented him from touring the country, meeting the local powerbrokers and pressing the flesh. Summoning people to the presidency is no substitute for going to where the decisions in a patronage-drive, first-past-the-post electoral system are made on the ground.
It really is remarkable how it works. Local influential X is unhappy with local ally Y because of some property dispute involving Z and come election time wont support the PPP because it didnt listen to him on time. Or provincial representative A has to contend with new, go-getter contender B and doesnt quite know how to counter the groundswell of support on his own, so is overwhelmed come election time because help from the centre arrived too late.
In the Pakistani context, all elections really are local, relying on coalitions of local support that must be stitched together carefully and frequently examined for stresses and strains.
True, Zardaris no-show on the regional circuit or lack of a solid team in the provinces has been matched by Sharifs indifference, meaning the powerbrokers at the constituency level have not been won over by the other side yet. But incumbency hangs heavier and the expectations are greater. For the local and sub-regional powerbrokers, the disillusionment with the present set-up may be greater than the wariness of one led by the PML-N.
Perhaps most fatal of all, Zardari seems to regard the electorate the same way he does a roomful of politicians: acquiring 51 per cent is simply a matter of making the right deal.
It works brilliantly with politicians, who are always looking for a deal. If you know Pervaiz Elahi, you know how much he loves his son and how neither he nor Moonis has any appetite for spending any time in jail. Political martyrs the present generation of Chaudhries are not. So Zardari makes the deal.
But the electorate doesnt quite function that way. First of all, even where the deal is made funnelling hundreds of billions of rupees towards the rural sector via support prices, for example the impact isnt so straightforward. Stuff like ballooning agricultural input prices, electricity supply that is sporadic at best and rural gains that are concentrated in the hands of the few will tend to undercut whatever the goodwill and political support the support-price regime, the income-support programme and the Watan Card scheme are supposed to engender.
It goes beyond that, however. Patronage-driven, susceptible to manipulation and emotional as the electorate may be, it isnt deaf, dumb and blind.
In 2002, in an election that was spectacularly illegitimate, the PPP still won 62 of the 272 directly elected seats. In 2008, the PPP bumped up that figure up to just 94 and this after a spectacular homecoming for BB and then an assassination that convulsed the nation.
Set aside the intricacies and perversities and apparently convoluted logic of electoral politics for a minute, and ask yourself a simple question.
After five years of the one of the most wretched spells of government ever, after slinking close to the military and pushing away the only other major political party, after shortages galore and soaring prices, after presiding over an orgy of allegations of corruption and aloofness and incompetence, what dark powers could possibly drag an electorate to return this government to power?
Zardaris plan may look good on paper. But everything else suggests it will be shredded come election time.
The writer is a member of staff.
[email protected]
Cyril Almeida
WELL, whaddya know. The PML-N and the MQM, disillusioned lovers who fall into each others arms occasionally, are at it again. There will be a strong opposition now, and it will try and rope in other wayward souls like the JUI-F cohort.
Well, good for them. As yet, nobody thinks the government is going anywhere anytime soon, so let the sound and fury commence. If the governing (!) coalition is rickety, the opposition is even more so.
Fun as they may be, the opposition manoeuvres have a bit of a sideshow quality to them.
The main attraction is AZ. Many are even wondering if the accidental president is the greatest politician the country has ever seen. Not only is Zardari set to do the impossible drag a party with little over one-third the seats in the National Assembly to the finish line but there is increasing speculation that his strategy for the next election may just win him and his buddies a second term.
The strategy is reasonably straightforward: small vs big. Get the small provinces on the PPP or its allies side, then puncture the Sharifs Fortress Punjab to the extent of a handful of seats and maybe a similar number for the PML-Q.
The small vs big conspiracy is usually an easy sell and with the 18th Amendment and new NFC award under its belt, the PPP
can reasonably boast of its ability to get the smaller provinces their due share from the federation.
Punjab is a whole lot trickier, though, which is why the Zardari camp has fewer ambitions there. By keeping the PML-Q on its side whether through a seat-adjustment formula or ensuring a three-way fight the PPP hopes to at least make inroads into the PML-Ns strongholds.
Ultimately, the game is of 272 the directly elected National Assembly seats and just a handful of Punjabs 148 seats could get Zardari to 51 per cent.
On paper at least, the Zardari strategy looks good. Many of the assumptions are reasonable and conform to conventional wisdom on electoral campaigns.
The problem is, elections arent fought or won on paper.
Come election cycle, a whole range of variables, sitting quietly on the sidelines, biding their time, will come into play, rendering the election outcome far more unpredictable than the Zardari camp appears to believe.
For one, the Zardari camp seems to view its principal opponents as a static force. Sure, Nawaz Sharif in particular has a go-it-alone tendency that can often be relied on to produce politically damaging outcomes for the PML-N. But here we are, a year and change before the next election is expected and Sharif is already manoeuvring into position the first plank of a Sindh strategy.
Rule no. 1 in politics: never assume your opponent will stand still.
Another problem: Zardaris paranoia has prevented him from touring the country, meeting the local powerbrokers and pressing the flesh. Summoning people to the presidency is no substitute for going to where the decisions in a patronage-drive, first-past-the-post electoral system are made on the ground.
It really is remarkable how it works. Local influential X is unhappy with local ally Y because of some property dispute involving Z and come election time wont support the PPP because it didnt listen to him on time. Or provincial representative A has to contend with new, go-getter contender B and doesnt quite know how to counter the groundswell of support on his own, so is overwhelmed come election time because help from the centre arrived too late.
In the Pakistani context, all elections really are local, relying on coalitions of local support that must be stitched together carefully and frequently examined for stresses and strains.
True, Zardaris no-show on the regional circuit or lack of a solid team in the provinces has been matched by Sharifs indifference, meaning the powerbrokers at the constituency level have not been won over by the other side yet. But incumbency hangs heavier and the expectations are greater. For the local and sub-regional powerbrokers, the disillusionment with the present set-up may be greater than the wariness of one led by the PML-N.
Perhaps most fatal of all, Zardari seems to regard the electorate the same way he does a roomful of politicians: acquiring 51 per cent is simply a matter of making the right deal.
It works brilliantly with politicians, who are always looking for a deal. If you know Pervaiz Elahi, you know how much he loves his son and how neither he nor Moonis has any appetite for spending any time in jail. Political martyrs the present generation of Chaudhries are not. So Zardari makes the deal.
But the electorate doesnt quite function that way. First of all, even where the deal is made funnelling hundreds of billions of rupees towards the rural sector via support prices, for example the impact isnt so straightforward. Stuff like ballooning agricultural input prices, electricity supply that is sporadic at best and rural gains that are concentrated in the hands of the few will tend to undercut whatever the goodwill and political support the support-price regime, the income-support programme and the Watan Card scheme are supposed to engender.
It goes beyond that, however. Patronage-driven, susceptible to manipulation and emotional as the electorate may be, it isnt deaf, dumb and blind.
In 2002, in an election that was spectacularly illegitimate, the PPP still won 62 of the 272 directly elected seats. In 2008, the PPP bumped up that figure up to just 94 and this after a spectacular homecoming for BB and then an assassination that convulsed the nation.
Set aside the intricacies and perversities and apparently convoluted logic of electoral politics for a minute, and ask yourself a simple question.
After five years of the one of the most wretched spells of government ever, after slinking close to the military and pushing away the only other major political party, after shortages galore and soaring prices, after presiding over an orgy of allegations of corruption and aloofness and incompetence, what dark powers could possibly drag an electorate to return this government to power?
Zardaris plan may look good on paper. But everything else suggests it will be shredded come election time.
The writer is a member of staff.
[email protected]
