Josey Joseph. Most special operations undertaken by India have been disastrous, and it still does not have capabilities to execute the kind of operation that the US did in Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden, experts said.
Several experts in Special Forces said a complete lack of political vision and shortsighted policies including unwanted expansion of the SF ranks have all bogged down the Indian Special Forces. Army has the largest number of SFs, while Navy, IAF, NSG and Research and Analysis Wing all have components of men trained to do operations with strategic aims.
I cannot think of a single operation that serves as an example of SF operation at a strategic level, said Lt Gen R K Nanavatty, who has been involved in planning aspects of Indian Special Forces and has been studying the subject for years. We are not capable for a variety of reasons. Political understanding of special operations is very important then only you can commit money, time and technology for nurturing such a force, Nanavatty said. Special Operations today are controlled by men who do not understand them, he added.
We do not have the capability to carry out an operation of the kind that the US SEALs did in Abbottabad, Nanavatty said. We have very good people but not necessary capabilities, he added.
Lt Gen P C Katoch, a former SF officer and a leading expert on Special Operations, said major operations by Indian troops have at various stages demonstrated what was wrong with them. There are problems of intelligence, logistics etc. Our SF forces are doing what conventional troops can do and there is an overall lack of political willpower to nurture the capability with long term vision, said Katoch, who led an SF unit in Sri Lanka with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in the 80s and has also been involved in planning of Indian SFs. Our men are ready, but minus intelligence, support etc, Katoch pointed out.
One of the most daring operations by India was to capture the LTTE leadership including V Prabhakaran from Jaffna University in October 1987. The operation ended disastrously with several Indian troops being killed. The lack of hard intelligence, committed helicopter support etc have had no impact on the way we further groomed our SF troops, said an officer.
General Katoch pointed out that many of the mistakes of 1987 were there to be seen in November 2008 in Mumbai when NSG commandos were deployed to take on the Pakistani terrorists. In 1999, a team of NSG commandos tailed hijacked IC814 aircraft to the Gulf region but returned. They couldnt also think of carrying out a surgical operation in Kandahar for a host of reasons including lack of airlift and political will.
Such problems have plagued most major SF operations attempted by Indian agencies. But within their limited capabilities, Indian SFs have done some brilliant operations too, many argue. We have some of the finest SF personnel, said a senior Army officer.
Experts, both within and outside, are calling for the government to quickly set up a Special Forces Command, integrate all aspects of such a capability and put it all under the direct supervision of the prime minister.
-via The Times of India
Several experts in Special Forces said a complete lack of political vision and shortsighted policies including unwanted expansion of the SF ranks have all bogged down the Indian Special Forces. Army has the largest number of SFs, while Navy, IAF, NSG and Research and Analysis Wing all have components of men trained to do operations with strategic aims.
I cannot think of a single operation that serves as an example of SF operation at a strategic level, said Lt Gen R K Nanavatty, who has been involved in planning aspects of Indian Special Forces and has been studying the subject for years. We are not capable for a variety of reasons. Political understanding of special operations is very important then only you can commit money, time and technology for nurturing such a force, Nanavatty said. Special Operations today are controlled by men who do not understand them, he added.
We do not have the capability to carry out an operation of the kind that the US SEALs did in Abbottabad, Nanavatty said. We have very good people but not necessary capabilities, he added.
Lt Gen P C Katoch, a former SF officer and a leading expert on Special Operations, said major operations by Indian troops have at various stages demonstrated what was wrong with them. There are problems of intelligence, logistics etc. Our SF forces are doing what conventional troops can do and there is an overall lack of political willpower to nurture the capability with long term vision, said Katoch, who led an SF unit in Sri Lanka with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in the 80s and has also been involved in planning of Indian SFs. Our men are ready, but minus intelligence, support etc, Katoch pointed out.
One of the most daring operations by India was to capture the LTTE leadership including V Prabhakaran from Jaffna University in October 1987. The operation ended disastrously with several Indian troops being killed. The lack of hard intelligence, committed helicopter support etc have had no impact on the way we further groomed our SF troops, said an officer.
General Katoch pointed out that many of the mistakes of 1987 were there to be seen in November 2008 in Mumbai when NSG commandos were deployed to take on the Pakistani terrorists. In 1999, a team of NSG commandos tailed hijacked IC814 aircraft to the Gulf region but returned. They couldnt also think of carrying out a surgical operation in Kandahar for a host of reasons including lack of airlift and political will.
Such problems have plagued most major SF operations attempted by Indian agencies. But within their limited capabilities, Indian SFs have done some brilliant operations too, many argue. We have some of the finest SF personnel, said a senior Army officer.
Experts, both within and outside, are calling for the government to quickly set up a Special Forces Command, integrate all aspects of such a capability and put it all under the direct supervision of the prime minister.
-via The Times of India
