Why is the US so scared of Haqqani?

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Why is the US so scared of Haqqani? Developing a win-win strategy for the Americans so that they can exit in 2011





The story of US-Haqqani relationship is a story of fickle friends and fickle friendhships

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The US propaganda machinery is on again. Its latest mouthpiece The New York Times works on leaks from the Washington Press Corp which is often handed sensite information by officials in the White House and elsewhere. This practice has routinely been used by the White House and other agencies to plant stories in major American newspapers. The WMD episode is a classic example where the leaks were actually misinformation sent to them by those who wanted certain results. Both the Washington Post and the New York Times led the charge which provided the justification for the war on Iraq. Both newspapers where working with faulty data and inaccurate reporting. Both newspapers apologized several years after the fact. Bob Woodward in his serialized rendering of the Bush years clearly described the Bush subterfuge. Both newspapers are at it againin Pakistan, in Iran and in Yemen. One cant fight city hall. This is the way it is.
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The new US boogeyman is the Haqqani clanand only dead bodies will quench their thirst for blood of the man who once fought on the side of America, and defeated the USSR in Afghanistan. The elder Haqqani was once invited to the White House by President Reagan. The US-Haqqani relationship is a story of fickle friends and fickle friendships.

1.The networks aging leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani, was a respected commander and key U.S. and Pakistani ally in resisting the Soviet Union after its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Haqqani even visited the Reagan White House.
2.In 1992, three years after the Soviet withdrawal, Haqqani and others seized power in Afghanistan with U.S. approval. In the 1980s and 1990s, Haqqani also hosted Saudi fighters including Osama bin Laden. That hospitality is believed to extend to al-Qaida and other foreign fighters on both sides of the border today.
3.The Haqqanis story is one of shifting alliances in Afghanistans long history of war and foreign occupation, and one that underscores the difficulty of sorting friend from foe in the current conflict.
4.The Haqqanis pledge allegiance to Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar and have a history of links to Pakistani intelligence. But ultimately, they feel beholden to no one but themselves, said Kamran Bokhari, an analyst with Stratfor, a U.S-based global intelligence firm.
5.Over the years, as Pakistan has been caught in a juggling act between dealing with its own insurgency and the U.S., people like the Haqqanis have become increasingly independent, Bokhari said. The Haqqanis goal is to work with whoever is willing to work with them.
6.After the Taliban seized power in the mid-1990s, it made Haqqani a government minister. Following the Islamist regimes ouster he was again offered Cabinet posts this time by Afghan President Hamid Karzai. But he decided to focus on ridding Afghanistan of Western troops.
7.Haqqani, believed to be in his 60s or older, is said to be too ill to do much now, and his son Sirajuddin has taken over the network.

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expand on its gains in South Waziristan and drive into North Waziristan to tackle the Haqqani network a wing of the Taliban that views U.S. and NATO-led troops in Afghanistan as its principal target the Pakistani military is now focusing its attention on driving Taliban militants from their strongholds in the surrounding tribal regions of Kurram, Orakzai and Khyber.


One reason Pakistan has refused to go after the Haqqani network, a senior Pakistani official says, is that it doesnt have the manpower to fight concentrations of militants on multiple fronts. Pakistani troops are deployed in the Swat Valley, from which they drove out Taliban fighters in a large offensive in the summer. An additional 30,000 troops are winding down major operations in South Waziristan, the Pakistani Talibans primary hub.


Many of those fighters fled to nearby tribal regions, such as Kurram and Orakzai, which is why the Pakistani military has stepped up airstrikes in those areas to prevent militants from establishing new bases. Earlier this month, Prime Minister Yusaf Raza Gillani said the armys next major deployment of ground troops may target Orakzai.The Los Angeles Times.By Alex Rodriguez December 28, 2009

The autonomous Afghan Taliban faction whose leader was once a U.S. ally is now considered a serious threat to American and NATO troops in Afghanistans east and operates on both sides of the border with Pakistan.

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The U.S. wants Pakistan to expel the network from its North Waziristan sanctuary, especially as 30,000 more U.S. troops head to Afghanistan. But Pakistani officials say taking on the network now is too risky; the killings have helped turn North Waziristan into an intelligence black hole at a time when Pakistans army is stretched thin fighting insurgents elsewhere.

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Some critics suspect Pakistan is simply making excuses because it wants to use the Haqqanis as a future asset to influence Afghanistan and stay ahead of its bigger regional rival, India, after the Americans withdraw. Others say Pakistan is wise to avoid antagonizing a group whose primary focus remains Afghanistan.

Some suspect that the Haqqanis retain their links with Pakistans main spy service, Inter-Services Intelligence, though the ISI denies this. India and Afghanistan claim there were Pakistani fingerprints on the July 2008 bombing of Indias embassy in Kabul, which the U.S. alleges was one of several audacious Haqqani operations in Afghanistan. Pakistan has denied any role. The New York Times. Haqqani Network Challenges US-Pakistan Relations. By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS Published: December 29, 2009, Filed at 3:18 p.m. ET

There is a total lack of understanding of the complexities on the ground inside the FATA region. The US policy of bomb, and destroy has not worked for the past decadeinstead the policies push the fighters into the FATA region, and then into major Pakistani cities.

Haqqani has maintained strong ties with Pakistan despite Islamabads alliance with Washington. Now believed to be in his late 50s, he has handed over control of his network to his son, Sirajuddin. Hussain said the Haqqanis run a fighting force of about 5,000 that splits its time between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Haqqanis alliance with Taliban commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur, also based in North Waziristan, further complicates Pakistans strategy in the area. Bahadur agreed to not interfere with the armys operations in South Waziristan against the rival Pakistani Taliban faction led by Hakimullah Mahsud. A military push into North Waziristan now might be viewed by Bahadur as a betrayal of that agreement. The Los Angeles Times.By Alex Rodriguez December 28, 2009

Anne Gernan of the Associated press is fed the some baloney and continues to harp on a guitar with one string on which one can only sing one song Do more.

ISLAMABAD Pakistan will not go as far as Washington wants, and theres nothing the U.S. can do about it: Thats the sobering reality as the U.S. tries to persuade a hesitant Pakistan. Persuading Pakistan becomes harder task. ANNE GEARAN Associated Press. Posted December 26, 2009 at 8:47 p.m.

The Haqqani network is thought to make much of its money through kidnappings, extortion and other crime in at least three eastern Afghan provinces.


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Haqqanis people ask for money from contractors working on road construction. They are asking money or goods from shopkeepers, said Khaki Jan Zadran, a tribal elder from Paktia province. District elders and contractors are paying money to Afghan workers, but sometimes half of the money will go to Haqqanis people.

Rahimullah Yousafzai, a Pakistani journalist who interviewed Sirajuddin Haqqani in 2008, said he feels the burden of following in his fathers footsteps.

Sirajuddin has fought, but not as much as his father, Yousafzai said. Jalaluddin Haqqani could operate openly in Pakistan. Siraj has to stay underground all the time. Its a very dangerous existence for him. He was telling me they have lost 30 members of the family.

Pakistani officials insist they consider the Haqqanis a threat, but that mounting a concerted effort against them now is too risky.

Pakistans army is already waging offensives against groups that target the Pakistani state, and has skipped over those like the Haqqanis that are more focused on Afghanistan.

The U.S. hadnt had any luck nabbing either the father or the son even though both are believed to spend most of their time in Afghanistan.

The Pakistani officials spoke on condition of anonymity citing the sensitivity of the issue.

The U.S. has also launched missile strikes on Haqqani targets, including one in September 2008 that reportedly killed a sister of Jalaluddin Haqqani and possibly other relatives, and the U.S. military says some of the new American troops arriving in Afghanistan will land in Haqqani territory. The New York Times. Haqqani Network Challenges US-Pakistan Relations. By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS Published: December 29, 2009, Filed at 3:18 p.m. ET


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Differences of opinion. US Pakistani interests partially congruent
The New York Times is more stinging in its coverage of the Haaqni network and Pakistans role in it. The LA Times, delivers the same message, but with finesse. The Bharati papers will jump all over this bandwagon with the Hindu being the msot liberaland Rediff News the most virulently abusive of Pakistan.

First we would like to consolidate and stabilize, and not get into something that overstretches us, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The bigger reason for Pakistans reluctance to cooperate, however, lies in the governments ardent belief that the Haqqani network, led by Afghan commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son, Sirajuddin, does not pose a direct threat to Pakistan.

Instead, a friendly relationship with the Afghan Taliban is seen by many Pakistanis as a valuable hedge against Pakistans archrival, India, meddling in Afghanistan. Pakistanis also view the Haqqanis and the rest of the Afghan Taliban as crucial players in Afghanistans future once the U.S. pulls out. At that point, Pakistan would prefer the Taliban as an ally and not a foe.


The Americans will leave in 18 months, and the Taliban wont be defeated. If Pakistan has earned the hostility of the Afghan Taliban, it will be in trouble, said Javed Hussain, a retired brigadier and a former special forces commander. This concern of Pakistans is genuine. We cannot afford to earn the wrath of the Taliban and the Haqqani group. The LA Times.

The Interior Ministry official said missile strikes are the best way to target the Haqqanis, but argued that Pakistan should be given the technology to do the job itself.

I think Pakistan is very clear about its strategy now. It would like to remove all armed terror groups from its soil, he said.

Other observers were more skeptical, noting that the Pakistanis are likely thinking about the future, beyond the U.S. troop surge, to the days when the Americans are gone and they still have to live with whatever is left of the Haqqanis.

The Pakistanis also probably see the Haqqanis as a key component of any potential peace deal with the Taliban, some said.

I think that the Pakistanis would like to wait and see, Yousafzai said. Because they would see if the new American strategy is working and whether theyre going to stay the course. The New York Times. Haqqani Network Challenges US-Pakistan Relations. By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS Published: December 29, 2009, Filed at 3:18 p.m. ET. Associated Press writers Munir Ahmad in Islamabad and Amir Shah in Kabul contributed to this report.


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US Pakistani interests congruent

President Zardari has made it clear to the Americans that he will not continue the war on terror on the US timetable. This when a chagrined General Majeed took Admiral Mullen to task on why the US forces along the border has suddenly been withdrawn in the midst of an operation in South Waziristan.

Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari has resisted a direct appeal from President Obama for a rapid expansion of Pakistani military operations in tribal areas and has called on the United States to speed up military assistance to Pakistani forces and to intervene more forcefully with India, its traditional adversary.

In a written response to a letter from Obama late last month, Zardari said his government was determined to take action against al-Qaeda, the Taliban and allied insurgent groups attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistanfrom the border area inside Pakistan. But, he said, Pakistans efforts would be based on its own timeline and operational needs.

The message was reinforced Monday by Pakistans military chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, who told Gen. David H. Petraeus, the head of the U.S. Central Command, that the United States should not expect a major operation in North Waziristan in the coming months, according to a senior U.S. defense official. North Waziristan, one of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas on the Afghan border, is a sanctuary for the Afghan Taliban.

The letters between the two leaders, while couched in diplomatic niceties and pledging mutual respect and increased cooperation against insurgents, reflect ongoing strains in a relationship that is crucial to both countriesZardari did not mention India by name in his three-page letter to Obama, which sources reviewed for The Washington Post on the condition that no direct quotes be used. But he made repeated reference to Pakistans core interests, unresolved historical conflicts and conventional imbalances. He called on Obama to push Pakistans neighbors toward diplomatic rapprochement. India broke off direct talks with Pakistan last year after terrorist attacks in Mumbai.By Karen DeYoung and Griff Witte, Washington Post Staff Writers, Wednesday, December 16, 2009

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The US sees the Haqqani Network as the most potent of the 38 insurgent groups that are fighting the US forces in Afghanistan. The 2011 Exit strategy depends on the removal of the Haqqani Network. The Pakistani strategy should be a win-win strategy for America and Paksitan. The Sunnis in Iraq stopped fighting the Americans because they knew that the US would leave if Faluja was quieted down. A frontal confrontation with America is not advised. It is not certain whether the American media is correct in claiming that North Waziris are harboring the Haqqanis. It is not cast in stone that whatever the CIA says is correct. Most of the time the CIA is wrong. However there needs to be some finesse on the part of smart thinking Pakistanis. If the Haqqanis are present in Paksitan, it is in the best interest of Pakistan and the Haqqanis to give the Pakistani army some respite. It is better to ask send the right amount of forces into North Waziristan and request the Haqqanis to move their network elsewhere. Hafiz Gul Bahadur has to be taken into confidence. A nuanced approached has to be developed, so that the Americans keep away their drones and stick to their 2011 exit strategy.

A non-lethal move into North Waziristan would be the ideal situation for Pakistan.
 

longliveIK

MPA (400+ posts)
oh,i guessed about Hussain Haqqani,
i already little bit know about this,but now i got many more points,thanks 4 share very informational post,
 
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American NGO, what they are doing in REAL inside pakistan??

American NGO Covers For Blackwater In Pakistan?

Reports suggest Pakistan has expelled a US Blackwater mercenary, but Pakistanis ask, 'Who rules our streets, the Pakistani government or the Americans?' And who let them in?



In May, a US diplomat was caught arranging a meeting between a suspected Indian spy and senior Pakistani officials in the privacy of her house. In June when Pakistani officials confronted Washington with evidence that terrorists in Pakistan were using sophisticated American weapons, US media quickly leaked stories about American weapons missing from the US-trained Afghan army. And now reports confirm that the dirty secret arm of the US government the mercenaries of Blackwater have infiltrated sensitive regions of Pakistan. Blackwater works as an extension of the US military and CIA, taking care of dirty jobs that the US government cannot associate itself with in faraway strategic places. The question: Who let them in? And who deported one of them, if at all?


ISLAMABAD, PakistanThree weeks ago a group of concerned Pakistani citizens in Peshawar wrote to the federal interior ministry to complain about the suspicious activities of a group of shadowy Americans in a rented house in their neighborhood, the upscale University Town area of Peshawar.



A NGO calling itself Creative Associates International, Inc. leased the house. CAII, as it is known by its acronym, is a Washington DC-based private firm. According to its Web site, the company describes itself as "a privately-owned non-governmental organization that addresses urgent challenges facing societies today Creative views change as an opportunity to improve, transform and renew "



The description makes no sense. It is more or less a perfect cover for the American NGO's real work: espionage.



The incorporated NGO is more of a humanitarian front that alternates sometimes for undercover US intelligence operations in critical regions, including Angola, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Gaza, and Pakistan. Of the 36 new job openings, the company's Web site shows that half of them are in Pakistan today. Pakistan is also at the heart of the now combined desperate effort by the White House-military-CIA to avert a looming American defeat in Afghanistan by shifting the war to its next-door neighbor.



In Peshawar, CAII, opened an office to work on projects in the nearby tribal agencies of Pakistan. All of these projects, interestingly, are linked to the US government. CAII's other projects outside Pakistan are also linked to the US government. In short, this NGO is not an NGO. It is closely linked to the US government.



In Peshawar, CAII told Pakistani authorities it needed to hire security guards for protection. The security guards, it turns out, were none other than Blackwater's military-trained hired guns. They were used the CAII cover to conduct a range of covert activities in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province.



The infamous Blackwater private security firm operates as an extension of the US military and CIA, taking care of dirty jobs that the US government cannot associate itself with in faraway strategic places. Blackwater is anything but a security firm. It is a mercenary army of several thousand hired soldiers.



Pakistani security officials apparently became alarmed by reports that Blackwater was operating from the office of CAII on Chinar Road, University Town in Peshawar. The man in charge of the office, allegedly an American by the name of Craig Davis according to a report in Jang, Pakistan's largest Urdu language daily, was arrested and accused of establishing contacts with 'the enemies of Pakistan' in areas adjoining Afghanistan. His visa has been cancelled, the office sealed, and Mr. Davis reportedly expelled back to the United States.



It is not clear when Mr. Davis was deported and whether there are other members of the staff expelled along with him. When I contacted the US Embassy over the weekend, spokesman Richard Snelsire's first reaction was, "No embassy official has been deported." This defensive answer is similar to the guilt-induced reactions of US embassy staffers in Baghdad and Kabul at the presence of mercenaries working for US military and CIA.



I said to Mr. Snelsire that I did not ask about an embassy official being expelled. He said he heard these reports and 'checked around' with the embassy officials but no one knew about this. "It's baseless."



So I asked him, "Is Blackwater operating in Pakistan, in Peshawar?"



"Not to my knowledge." Fair enough. The US embassies in Baghdad and Kabul never acknowledged Blackwater's operations in Iraq and Afghanistan either. This is part of low-level frictions between the diplomats at the US Department of State and those in Pentagon and CIA. The people at State have reportedly made it clear they will not acknowledge or accept responsibility for the activities of special operations agents operating in friendly countries without the knowledge of those countries and in violation of their sovereignty. Reports have suggested that sometimes even the US ambassador is unaware of what his government's mercenaries do in a target country.



Official Pakistani sources are yet to confirm if one or more US citizens were expelled recently. The government is also reluctant in making public whatever evidence there might be about Blackwater operations inside Pakistan. But it is clear that something unusual was happening in the Peshawar office of an American NGO. There is also strong suspicion that Blackwater was operating from the said office.



There are other things happening in Pakistan that are linked to the Americans and that increase the chances of Blackwater's presence here.



These include:



1. One of the largest US embassies or military and intelligence command outposts in the world is being built in Islamabad as I write this at a cost of approximately one billion US dollars. This is the biggest sign of an expansion in US meddling in Pakistan and a desire to use this country as a base for regional operations. Interestingly, US covert meddling inside Pakistan and nearby countries is already taking place, including in Russia's backyard, in Iran, and in China's Xinjiang.



2. A large number of retired Pakistani military officers, academics and even journalists have been quietly recruited at generous compensations by several US government agencies. These influential Pakistanis are supposed to provide information, analysis, contacts and help in pleading the case for US interests in the Pakistani media, in subtle ways. Pakistanis would be surprised that some prominent names well known to television audiences are in this list.



3. CIA and possibly Blackwater have established a network of informers in the tribal belt and Balochistan; there have also been reports of non-Pakistanis sighted close to sensitive military areas in the country. Considering the intensity and frequency of terrorist acts inside Pakistan in the past four years, there is every possibility that all sorts of saboteurs are having a field day in Pakistan.



4. Members of separatist and ethnic political parties have been cultivated by various US government agencies and quietly taken for visits to Washington and the CENTCOM offices in Florida.





The possibility of the existence of mercenary activities in Pakistan is strengthened by the following events:



5. Pakistani officials have in recent months collected piles of evidence that suggests that terrorists wreaking havoc inside Pakistan have been and continue to receive state of the art weapons and a continuous supply of money and trainers from unknown but highly organized sources inside Afghanistan. A significant number of these weapons is of American and Israeli manufacture. Indians have also been known to supply third-party weapons to terrorists inside Pakistan.



6. Some Pakistani intelligence analysts have stumbled on circumstantial evidence that links the CIA to anti-Pakistan terror activities that may not be in the knowledge of all departments of the US government. One thing is for sure, that CIA's operations in Afghanistan are in the hands of dangerous elements that are prone to rogue-ish behavior.



7. In May, a US woman diplomat was caught arranging a quiet [read 'secret'] meeting between a low-level Indian diplomat and several senior Pakistani government officials. An address in Islamabad 152 Margalla Road was identified as a venue where the secret meeting took place. The American diplomat in question knew there was no chance the Indian would get to meet the Pakistanis in normal circumstances. Nor was it possible to do this during a high visibility event. After the incident, Pakistan Foreign Office issued a terse statement warning all government officials to refrain from such direct contact with foreign diplomats in unofficial settings without prior intimation to their departments.



8. Pakistani suspicions about American foul play inside Pakistan are not new. On July 12, 2008 in a secret meeting in Rawalpindi between military and intelligence officials from the two countries these concerns were openly aired. The Americans accused ISI of maintain contacts with the Afghan Taliban. The Pakistani answer was that normal low-level contacts are maintained with all parties in the area. NATO and the Kabul regime were doing the same thing in Afghanistan. In return, the Pakistanis laid out evidence, including photographs, showing known terrorists meeting Indian and pro-US Kabul regime officials. Was the United States supporting these anti-Pakistan activities is the question that was posed to the US military and CIA.



9. Further back into history, in 1978 the ISI broke a spy ring made up of Pakistani technicians working for the nascent Pakistani nuclear program who were recruited by CIA. Pakistan chose not to raise the issue publicly but did so privately at the highest level in Washington.



Now there are reports that the Zardari-Gilani government is consulting Pakistan's Naval headquarters on a proposal to construct a US navy base on the coast of Balochistan. When things have reached this level of American meddling in Pakistan, Blackwater seems like a small issue. Some Pakistani analysts are of the view that elements within the Pakistani security establishment need to be very careful about where they intend to draw the red line for CIA operations in and around Pakistan.
 

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