MQM and CANADIAN COURT DECISION (Declared Terrorists)

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Citizen
MQM Terrorist N0.1. Baqri v. Canada

http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2001/2001fct1096/2001fct1096.html

Citation: Baqri v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (T.D.), 2001 FCT 1096, (2001), [2002] 2 F.C. 85
Date: October 9, 2001
Docket: IMM-4211-00

IMM-4211-00

2001 FCT 1096

Syed Safdar Ali Baqri (Applicant)

v.

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Respondent)

Indexed as: Baqriv. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (T.D.)

Trial Division, Lutfy A.C.J.--Toronto, May 2; Ottawa, October 9, 2001.

Citizenship and Immigration -- Status in Canada -- Convention Refugees -- Judicial review of CRDD decision applicant excluded from consideration as Convention refugee by Art. 1F(a), stating Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom serious reasons for considering committed crime against humanity -- Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) political party in Pakistan accused of torture, execution of dissident members, opponents -- Applicant elected MQM member of legislative assembly -- Denial of involvement with crimes against humanity not challenged on cross-examination -- CRDD concluded applicant had knowledge of violence committed by MQM while involved in MQM, applicant in leadership position, as such shared common purpose of MQM -- Inferred complicity in crimes against humanity -- Application allowed -- Minister bears onus of proof under Art. 1F(a) -- Use of "committed" implying mental element -- In seeking to show complicity, Minister must show advance knowledge of crimes, shared purpose -- Leadership role may support inference of knowing participation -- CRDD erred in law due to: vagueness of credibility finding; failure to provide clear, unmistakable reasons concerning credibility; omission in stating specific crimes for which applicant found to be complicit; failure to question applicant about those crimes.

This was an application for judicial review of the Convention Refugee Determination Division's (CRDD) decision that the applicant was excluded from consideration as a Convention refugee under United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1F(a) as a result of his involvement with the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) which reportedly illegally detained, tortured and sometimes executed dissident members and political opponents. Article 1F(a) states that the Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a crime against humanity as defined in international instruments. The CRDD referred to the Charter of the International Military Tribunal which defines "crimes against humanity" and deals with the responsibility of "leaders". Article 6 thereof provides that leaders participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan to commit crimes against humanity are responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of such a plan. Between 1990 and 1992 the applicant was an elected MQM member of the legislative assembly in the province of Sindh in Pakistan and was appointed provincial Minister for Industries. In 1992 the MQM was targeted in a joint army and police operation, which resulted in the applicant's resignation and his decision to flee Pakistan. He was convicted in absentia in a high-profile kidnapping case, but an appeal was upheld and he was acquitted. After six years in the United States of America, his claim for asylum was denied. He came to Canada and claimed refugee status. The CRDD stated that the claimant acknowledged that he was aware of the violent acts committed by the MQM but denied that the MQM leadership condoned the violent acts. It found that it was not credible that the claimant would not have knowledge of the atrocities committed by the MQM. Having concluded that the applicant was a leader of the MQM and that his leadership role was linked to the violence attributed to the MQM, the CRDD found that the applicant was complicit in crimes against humanity.

Held, the application should be allowed.

The Minister bears the onus of proof in Article 1F(a) cases. Use of "committed" in Article 1F(a) implies a mental element. Absent a finding that the organization is principally directed to a limited, brutal purpose, the Minister, in seeking to establish complicity, must show that the member had advance knowledge of the crimes in question and shared the organization's purpose in committing them. A leadership position, while not necessarily justifying a conclusion of complicity, may support the inference of a knowing participation in the organization's plan and purpose to commit the international crimes.

The CRDD erred in law in the manner in which it concluded that the application came within the scope of Article 1F(a), both as to the assessment of the applicant's credibility and by not specifying the crimes against humanity concerning which the applicant was found to be complicit.

The negative finding of credibility was not explained in clear and unmistakable terms. The applicant's denial of his involvement in crimes against humanity was not challenged on cross-examination. There was neither a negative finding concerning his evidence nor one explained in clear and unmistakable terms. In these circumstances, the applicant's leadership position in 1992, without further questioning concerning his possible advance knowledge and role in the planning of the atrocities, was not a sufficient basis from which to infer his complicity in crimes against humanity.

The panel's reasons did not disclose the criminal acts for which the applicant is said to be complicit. They spoke in broad general terms of a broad range of violent and criminal acts. The conclusion that the claimant had knowledge of the violence was equally general and not directed to any of the specific allegations referred to in the documentary evidence. This omission was of even greater significance in view of the absence of any cross-examination of the applicant to challenge his denial of involvement.

The CRDD's errors of law concerning the vagueness of the credibility finding, the absence of clear and unmistakable reasons concerning credibility, the omission in stating the specific crimes for which the applicant was found to be complicit and the lack of questioning the claimant concerning those specific crimes required that the finding under Article 1F(a) be set aside.

statutes and regulations judicially

considered
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annex of the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 8 August 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, Art. 6.
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, [1969] Can. T.S. No. 6, Art. 1F(a).
Statut du Tribunal Militaire International, Annexe de l'Accord concernant la poursuite et le chtiment des grands criminels de guerre des Puissances europ-ennes de l'Axe, 8 aot 1945, 82 R.T.N.U. 279, art. 6.
cases judicially considered
applied:
Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 433; (1993), 163 N.R. 197 (C.A.); Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2 F.C. 306; (1992), 89 D.L.R. (4th) 173; 135 N.R. 390 (C.A.); Cardenas v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 74 F.T.R. 214; 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 244 (F.C.T.D.).
referred to:
Hilo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991), 15 Imm. L.R. (2d) 199; 130 N.R. 236 (F.C.A.).

APPLICATION for judicial review of the Convention Refugee Determination Division's decision that the applicant was excluded from consideration as a Convention refugee under United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1F(a) as a result of his leadership role with the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) and the inference of complicity drawn from his admitted knowledge of violent acts committed by MQM members, despite his denial that these were the result of any plan or participation by the party hierarchy. Application allowed.
appearances:
Lorne Waldman for applicant.
I. John Loncar for respondent.
solicitors of record:
Jackman, Waldman & Associates, Toronto, for applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent.

The following are the reasons for order rendered in English by

[1]Lutfy A.C.J.: The Convention Refugee Determination Division found that the applicant, Syed Safdar Ali Baqri, a citizen of Pakistan, was complicit in crimes against humanity as the result of his involvement with the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) and, accordingly, was excluded from consideration as a Convention refugee under Article 1F(a) of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees [July 28, 1951, [1969] Can. T.S. No. 6].

[2]The panel also found that the applicant would face more than a mere possibility of persecution should he return to Pakistan. While its decision does not state so directly, it is reasonable to infer the panel would have determined that the applicant was a Convention refugee if it had not made its exclusion finding.

The historical background of the MQM

[3]The panel noted that Mohajir means "refugee" in Urdu, the national language of Pakistan. The Urdu-speaking Muslims, who migrated from India to Pakistan after partition in 1947, were Moh ajirs. There are over 30 million Mohajirs in Pakistan and they comprise some 50% of the population of Sindh province. The largest urban centre in Sindh is the coastal city of Karachi.

[4]In 1984, the Mohajir Quami Movement was formed under the leadership of Altaf Hussain. Its objectives were to represent the interests of the Mohajirs and to safeguard their rights in opposition to other Sindhi parties. According to the 1993 Amnesty International report, the MQM was the third strongest party in Pakistan. The applicant testified that there were some 35,000 MQM party workers in Karachi in the early 1990's. Amnesty International described the MQM as "a tightly organized party and reportedly has a militant wing that has been held responsible for a n umber of offences".

[5]The MQM was "highly successful", in the panel's words, in the Sindh provincial elections in 1988, 1990 and 1997.

[6]In 1991, dissension set in within the MQM and a splinter group known as the MQM Haqiqi (MQM-H) was created. Sometime thereafter, the original MQM under the leadership of Altaf Hussain changed its name to Muttahidda Quami Movement (Altaf Faction) (MQM(A)).

[7]Amnesty International portrayed the MQM as both a perpetrator and a victim of human rights violations:

The MQM, before and during its tenure as a coalition partner of the government in Sindh, reportedly maintained torture cells in which it illegally detained, tortured and sometimes executed dissident members of the MQM and political opponents. Since June 1992, MQM activists as also friends and family members of MQM members have reportedly been subjected to illegal detention and torture in police and military custody; some of these prisoners have reportedly died as a result of torture and some may deliberately have been killed.

The applicant's background

[8]Syed Safdar Ali Baqri was born in 1964 in Karachi where he resided until he fled Pakistan. In 1982, the applicant joined the All Pakistan Mohajir Student Organization. He was active with this group during his medical studies, participating in MQM political rallies and assisting the party in the 1987 municipal elections. He assumed greater responsibilities for the party in the 1988 provincial and national elections. In June 1990, the applicant completed his post-graduate studies in medicine.

[9]During his medical residency, the applicant worked for the medical aid committee of the MQM in providing medical care to Mohajirs and other ethnic groups. For some four months during the same period, he also worked and resided at the party headquarters in Karachi which was also the residence of Altaf Hussain.

[10]Between October 1990 and July 1992, Dr. Baqri was an elected MQM member of the legislative assembly in Sindh and was appointed provincial Minister for Industries. In 1991, for some two or three weeks, he was appointed head of an MQM zone in Karachi.

[11]In June 1992, the MQM was targeted in a joint army and police operation. This resulted in Dr. Baqri's resignation from the Sindh government and his decision to flee Pa kistan some five months later. In 1994, the applicant was convicted in absentia in the high profile "Major Kaleem" kidnapping case and sentenced to imprisonment for 27 years. He was jointly convicted with Altaf Hussain and some 15 other MQM leaders. In Feb ruary 1998, the Sindh High Court upheld the appeal against these convictions and sentences and acquitted the applicant and his fellow accused.

[12]In late 1992, because the applicant and others in the MQM were being targeted by government authorities, he left Pakistan for the United States of America. His claim for asylum in the U.S. was denied in early 1998. He then came to Canada where he claimed refugee status.

[13]While in the United States, Dr. Baqri was part of a small central organizing committee to strengthen and expand the presence of the MQM in North America. He has continued this political activity while in Canada. He has organized protests in Ottawa and in Toronto against the government in Pakistan. There are some 9,000 MQM supporters in Canada. Funds raised from these persons have been spent solely on organizational activities in Canada.

[14]Since 1992, Dr. Baqri has travelled between North America and the United Kingdom on some five occasions to visit the MQM leader, Altaf Hussain in London. The evidence does not link the applicant's contacts with Mr. Hussain during these visits with any of the violence attributed to the MQM subsequent to 1992. The exchanges between Dr. Baqri and Mr. Hus sain concern the former's role as representative for the party in Canada.

The tribunal decision

[15]In its decision, the panel concluded that the applicant "was aware of the atrocities committed by the MQM Altaf during the years he was pres ent in Pakistan and involved in the MQM". After noting the absence of any reliable evidence to substantiate that the MQM publicly condemned the violence committed by its workers, the panel added that: "It is not credible that, considering his particular po litical profile, [the applicant] was ignorant of the MQM's participation in the committing of atrocities and human rights abuses during his years when he was active in the MQM in Pakistan ." (Emphasis added.) Here, the panel must be referring to atrocities and human rights abuses committed prior to the applicant fleeing Pakistan in 1992.

[16]The panel concluded with the following findings:

The panel finds that the claimant had knowledge of the violence committed by the MQM. The panel finds that he continues to be active in the MQM outside his country, Pakistan. . . . The panel finds that the claimant was in a leadership position and he shared in the common purpose of the MQM. [Emphasis added.]

[17]Earlier in its reasons, the panel reviewed the applicant's knowledge of the commission of violent acts and his leadership role with the MQM. In the words of the panel:

The claimant acknowledges that he was aware of the violent acts committed by the MQM but denies that the MQM leadership condoned the violent acts. He said that the MQM took steps to expel members who engaged in violent acts. However, he did not provide any reliable evidence to substantiate that the MQM was not complicit in the political violence and he did not provide any reliable evidence that the MQM routinely expelled members who committed violent acts. He was only able to name two or three MQM members who were expelled by Altaf Kussein.

The claimant was a Cabinet Member of the Pakistan Sindh Provincial Assembly and he was in a position of power and trust within the MQM leadership. It is not credible that the claimant would not have knowledge of the atrocities committed by the MQM. He said that he attended MQM rallies and strikes and he saw MQM members and workers carry weapons. He denied that he saw weapons used by any workers or members. He acknowledged that business owners would be threatened or beaten if they did not close their premises during strikes and rallies. There is no reliable evidence that the claimant took steps to prevent this violence. There is no evidence that he disassociated himself from the MQM-Altaf.

[18]In my view, it was open to the tribunal to find that Dr. Baqri was and is a leader of the MQM. However, the tribunal's linkage of his leadership role with "the violence", "the violent acts" or "the political violence" attributed to the MQM invites further analysis of the conclusion that he was complicit in crimes against humanity.

Analysis

[19]Article 1F(a) of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees states:

F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; [Emphasis added.]

From among the crimes referred to in Article 1F(a), the panel in this case found the applicant to be complicit in crimes against humanity.

[20] One of the international instruments referred to in Article 1F(a) is the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal [Annex of the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 8 August 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279]. The Military Tribunal was established for "the trial and p unishment of major war criminals." The definition of crimes against humanity as set out in Article 6(c ) of the Charter was referred to by the panel:

Article 6

. . .
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

[21]The panel also noted as relevant the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Charter which dealt with the responsibility of "leaders":

Article 6

. . .

Leaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan. [Emphasis added.]

[22]In Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 433 (C.A.), Justice Linden also considered the role of "leaders", as defined in Article 6, in the context of the Nuremberg t rials (at page 441):

This principle was applied to those in positions of leadership in Nazi Germany during the Nuremberg Trials, as long as they had some knowledge of the crimes being committed by others within the organization. For example, the trial of Erhard Milch, United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vo1. VII, page 27, involved an Inspector-General and a Field-Marshal in the German Air Force who was accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in the form of illegal and appalling experiments carried out on German nationals as well as members of armed forces and civilians from countries at war with Germany. Though convicted of another charge, he was acquitted with respect to the experiments on the basis that, while the illegal experiments had been carried out by people under Milch's command, Milch had not personally participated in or instituted the experiments, nor had he any knowledge that the experiments were being carried out.

[23]It is common ground that the Minister bears the onus of proof in Article 1F(a) cases: Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2 F.C. 306 (C.A.), at page 314.

[24]In Ramirez, Justice MacGuigan stated that the Convention's use of the word "committed" in Article 1F(a) implied a mental element. In his words (at page 317), "no one can `commit' international crimes without personal and knowing participation."

[25]Justice MacGuigan further stated that an associate of the principal offender can be characterized as an accomplice where the evidence establishes (at page 318) "the existence of a shared common purpose and the knowledge that all of the parties in question may have of it."

[26]In Sivakumar, the complicity of a person who can be characterized as "a leader" of the organization guilty of international crimes was considered by Justice Linden in these terms (at pages 440 and 442):

Bearing in mind that each case must be decided on its facts, the closer one is to being a leader rather than an ordinary member, the more likely it is that an inference will be drawn that one knew of the crime and shared the organization's purpose in committing that crime. Thus, remaining in an organization in a leadership position with knowledge that the organization was responsible for crimes against humanity may constitute complicity.

. . .

. . . the closer one is to a position of leadership or command within an organization, the easier it will be to draw an inference of awareness of the crimes and participation in the plan to commit the crimes.

[27]Absent a finding that the organization is principally directed to a limited, brutal purpose, "the Minister seeking to establish complicity must show that the member had knowledge of the crimes in question and shared the organization's purpose in committing them": Cardenas v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 74 F.T.R. 214 (F.C.T.D.), at paragraph 13. In Cardenas (paragraphs 16 and following), Associate Chief Justice Jerome had in mind advance knowledge of the crimes against humanity attributed to the organization. The applicant in Cardenas was described (at paragraph 18) "at most, only very remotely connected to the criminal activities attributed to the dissident faction of his organization."

[28]In summary, complicity requires evidence of a shared common purpose. A leadership position, while not necessarily justifying a conclusion of complicity, may support the inference of a knowing participation in the organization's plan and purpose to commit the international crimes.

[29]With these principles in mind and on the basis of the record in this proceeding, I am satisfied the panel erred in law in the manner in which it concluded that the application came within the scope of Article 1F(a). My reasons are based on two of the applicant's principal arguments.
(i) The panel's assessment of the applicant's credibility

[30]The respondent acknowledges that the panel did not characterize the MQM as an organization "principally directed to a limited, bru tal purpose". Similarly, the respondent recognizes that neither the evidence nor the panel's decision suggests the applicant was personally involved in the commission of the violent acts. The exclusion finding under Article 1F(a) is linked only to the appl icant's leadership role in the MQM and the inference of complicity drawn from his admitted knowledge of violent acts committed by MQM members despite his denial that these were the result of any plan or participation by the party hierarchy.

[31]Concerning the applicant's knowledge of the atrocities, it is useful to repeat the panel's two statements related to its view of the applicant's credibility (supra , paragraph 17): (a) "[t]he claimant acknowledges that he was aware of the violent acts c ommitted by the MQM but denies that the MQM leadership condoned the violent acts"; and (b) "t is not credible that the claimant would not have knowledge of the atrocities committed by the MQM." It is difficult to accept that the second statement represe nts a coherent negative finding of credibility in the light of the applicant's acknowledgment recognized in the first statement. In any event, any such finding has not been explained in "clear and unmistakable terms": Hilo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991), 15 Imm. L.R. (2d) 199 (F.C.A.).

[32]In response to a direct question from his counsel, the applicant stated that he had nothing to do with kidnapping and torture. Here, the testimony was with reference to the kidnapping in the "Major Kaleem" case, supra , paragraph 11, and the army disclosure in June 1992 that it had uncovered 23 torture cells in Karachi. According to the 1993 Amnesty International report, "the MQM reportedly tortured, and sometimes killed MQM dissidents and political opponents; military spokesman said these cells had been found in MQM offices, schools and hospitals."

[33]The applicant was cross-examined by the Minister's repre sentative, the refugee claims officer and the panel members. The cross-examination was twice as long as the examination-in-chief. However, the applicant was never challenged with respect to his denial of any involvement in kidnapping or torture. Not a single question was asked in this regard by any of the four persons who cross-examined the applicant. Their questioning focussed principally on his leadership role with little, if any, probing of his advance knowledge, planning or participation with respect to the crimes against humanity.

[34]The applicant's denial of his involvement in crimes against humanity was not challenged during his testimony. In my view, there is neither a negative finding concerning his evidence nor one explained in clea r and unmistakable terms. In these circumstances, the applicant's leadership position in 1992, without further questioning concerning his possible advance knowledge and role in the planning of the atrocities, was not a sufficient basis from which to infer his complicity in crimes against humanity.
(ii) The panel's failure to specify the crimes against humanity concerning which the applicant was found to be complicit

[35]It was also open to the panel, on the basis of the documentary evidence, to find that MQM members were involved in the commission of violent and criminal acts. Some of these, such as the operation of torture chambers, fall within the definition of crimes against humanity.

[36]The panel also referred to the MQM's reliance "on strong-armed methods and criminal elements to impose its will and collect bhatta (protection money) from businesses across Sindh". These acts, while reprehensible and rep ugnant, do not necessarily constitute crimes against humanity.

[37]In its reasons, the panel also noted, supra, paragraph 17, that the applicant "acknowledged that business owners would be threatened or beaten if they did not close their pre mises during strikes and rallies. There is no reliable evidence that the claimant took steps to prevent this violence." Again, there is no analysis or explanation by the panel from which to understand that these particular violent acts, while criminal, ris e to the level of crimes against humanity.

[38]The reasons do not disclose the criminal acts for which the applicant is said to be complicit. In Cardenas, supra, Associate Chief Justice Jerome stated (at paragraph 22):

. . . the Board has made little effort to link the applicant to specific criminal activities. Rather, it chose to refer only in general terms to shootings and bombings carried out by the military faction. Given the serious consequences to [the refugee claimant] of the application of the exclusion clause, the Board should have endeavoured to carefully detail the criminal acts which it considers the claimant to have "committed".

[39]Similarly, in Sivakumar, supra, Justice Linden underlined the importance of providing findings of fact as to specific crimes against humanity which the refugee claimant is alleged to have committed (at page 449):

Given the seriousness of the possible consequences of the denial of the appellant's claim on the basis of section F(a) of Article 1 of the Convention to the appellant and the relatively low standard of proof required of the Minister, it is crucial that the Refugee Division set out in its reasons those crimes against humanity for which there are serious reasons to consider that a claimant has committed them. In failing to make the required findings of fact, I believe that the Refugee Division can be said to have made an error or law.

[40]In its reasons, the panel speaks in general terms of a broad range of violent and criminal acts. Its conclusion that the claimant had knowledge of the violence is equally general and not directed to any of the specific allegations referred to in the documentary evidence. This omission is of even greater significance in view of the absence of any cross-examination of the applicant to challenge his denial of involvement.

[41]It is not for this Court to determine the applicant's complicity in the crimes against humanity because of his leadership p osition. However, the panel's errors of law concerning the vagueness of the credibility finding, the absence of clear and unmistakable reasons concerning credibility, the omission in stating the specific crimes for which the applicant was found to be compl icit and the lack of questioning the claimant concerning those specific crimes require that the finding of exclusion under Article 1F(a) be set aside. Accordingly, this matter will be referred to a differently constituted panel for rehearing and redetermination. The parties may suggest a question for certification within seven days of the date of these reasons.
 

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MQM Terrorist No. 2 Jalil v. Canada

http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2006/2006fc246/2006fc246.html

Citation: Jalil v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2006 FC 246, [2006] 4 F.C.R. 471
Date: February 24, 2006
Docket: IMM-735-05


IMM-735-05



2006 FC 246



Iftikhar Shoaq Jalil (Applicant)



v.



The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Respondent)



Indexed as: Jalil v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.)



Federal Court, Mosley J.Ottawa, February 7, 24, 2006.



Citizenship and Immigration Exclusion and Removal Inadmissible Persons Judicial review of immigration officers decision applicant inadmissible to Canada on grounds member of organization (Mohajir Quami Movement -Altaf (MQM-A)) reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts of terrorism pursuant to Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s. 34(1)(f) Applicant, Convention refugee, applying for permanent residence Officer committing reviewable error in finding MQM-A terrorist organization Decision, notes not indicating what term terrorism meant, how applied term Merely listing acts described as terrorist activities Must be evidentiary foundation to support finding organization engaged in acts of terrorism Officers reasons not standing up to somewhat probing scrutiny Application allowed.



Citizenship and Immigration Immigration Practice Judicial review of immigration officers decision applicant inadmissible to Canada on grounds member of organization (Mohajir Quami Movement-Altaf (MQM-A)) reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts of terrorism pursuant to Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s. 34(1)(f) Quality of evidence criticized.



Criminal Justice Terrorism Judicial review of immigration officers decision applicant inadmissible to Canada on grounds member of terrorist organization Immigration officer to have regard to terms terrorist activity , terrorist group under Criminal Code, s. 83.01(1) in addition to Supreme Court of Canadas definition of terrorism in making inadmissibility assessment under Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s. 34(1).



This was an application for judicial review of an immigration officers decision that the applicant was inadmissible to Canada on the grounds that he was a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts of terrorism in accordance with paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The applicant, a Pakistani, came to Canada in 1996 and was granted refugee status. In 1997 the applicant applied for permanent resident status. In his application form, he indicated that he had been a member of the Mohajir Quami Movement - Altaf (MQM-A) from 1985 to 1996. While a member of the MQM-A, the applicant wrote articles on the MQM-As activities, distributed flyers and canvassed door-to-door during elections. In February 1998, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) advised the applicant that he met the eligibility requirements for processing as a Convention refugee and that a decision on his application would be made within 18 months of meeting all statutory requirements for permanent residence. The applicant was interviewed in 2000 by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, which later requested that the applicant be interviewed by an immigration officer to determine if he was inadmissible to Canada under section 34 of the IRPA. In 2004, the applicant obtained leave to bring an application for judicial review, seeking an order of mandamus compelling the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to render a decision regarding his application for permanent residence.



After a first immigration interview, the applicant was informed that his application could possibly be refused for inadmissibility on security grounds. At a second interview, the applicant answered questions regarding his involvement with MQM-A as well as the nature of the organization. Sometime later, the officer provided applicants counsel with the sources of information cited in a document relied on in assessing whether the MQM-A engaged in terrorist activities. Meanwhile, the Federal Court ordered the respondent to make a determination regarding the applicants application for permanent residence within 60 days of the order. The refusal letter essentially stated that the applicants involvement in a terrorist organization made him inadmissible. The issues were whether the officer erred in finding that the MQM-A has engaged in acts of terrorism pursuant to the IRPA, paragraph 34(1)(c) and whether she erred in relying on evidence that is unreliable, not credible and trustworthy.



Held, the application should be allowed.



The officer committed a reviewable error in arriving at the determination that the MQM-A is an organization that has participated in terrorist activities. The Federal Court previously dealt with the issue of terrorist organization and relied on the functional and stipulative definition of the term terrorism provided by the Supreme Court of Canada. The functional approach defines terrorism by reference to specific acts of violence spelled out in the annexed list of treaties to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The stipulative definition of terrorism, refers to Article 2 of the Convention, which defines terrorism. The Federal Court then reviewed the Courts case law and concluded that there must be an evidentiary foundation to support a finding that an organization has engaged in acts of terrorism. With specific reference to MQM-A and in setting aside a finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that it is a terrorist organization under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA, the Federal Court subsequently held that the officer would have to have regard to the definition of terrorism provided by the Supreme Court as well as to the definitions of terrorist activity and terrorist group contained in subsection 83.01(1) of the Criminal Code.



On the standard of review of reasonableness, a determination that the organization to which the applicant belonged engaged or engages in terrorism must be supported by reasons that will withstand a somewhat probing examination. The officers decision and notes did not paint a clear picture of what she understood terrorism to mean, other than listing acts described as terrorist activities, and how that understanding was applied to the organization in question. She should have provided the definition she relied upon and explained how the listed acts met the definition. Her failure to do so meant that her reasons did not stand up to a somewhat probing scrutiny.



In finding MQM-A to be a terrorist organization, the immigration officer relied primarily on two documents: one from the RZTZ/Intelligence Branch of the Canadian Border Services Agency (which includes U.S. Department of Justice, Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism, etc.) and another posted on the South Asia Terrorism Portal web site. The Federal Court recently expressed concern about the quality of the evidence routinely put forward in immigration proceedings. Where decisions are being made as to what the subject did or did not do, preference should be given to direct evidence and less weight to generalized, otherwise unsupported statements, even if from apparently reliable sources. While the standards of accuracy, impartiality and reliability that librarians normally use to assess Internet documents may not be readily achievable, particularly when dealing with the history of events in regions where records are not kept with the rigour of a North American university library, a number of frailties with the sources relied upon by the immigration officer were identified. The integrity of the process of determining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that an individual is a member of an organization that has engaged in terrorist activities deserved greater diligence than was displayed in this instance.



statutes and regulations judicially

considered



Anti-terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41.

Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 83.01(1) terrorist activity (as enacted by S.C. 2001, c. 41, s. 4), terrorist group (as enacted idem).

Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, r. 9.

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 34.

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, GA Res. 54/109, 9 December 1999, Art. 2.



cases judicially considered



considered:



Kanendra v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2005), 47 Imm. L.R. (3d) 265; 2005 FC 923; Fuentes v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 4 F.C. 249; (2003), 231 F.T.R. 172; 28 Imm. L.R. (3d) 172; 2003 FCT 379; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3; (2002), 208 D.L.R. (4th) 1; 37 Admin. L.R. (3d) 152; 90 C.R.R. (2d) 1; 18 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1; 281 N.R. 1; 2002 SCC 1; Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 433; (1993), 163 N.R. 197 (C.A.); Ali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 1 F.C.R. 485; (2004), 42 Imm. L.R. (3d) 237; 2004 FC 1174; Bedoya v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1092.



referred to:



Hussain v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1196; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 867; Poshteh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 3 F.C.R. 487; (2005), 29 Admin. L.R. (4 th) 21; 129 C.R.R. (2d) 18; 46 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1; 331 N.R. 129; 2005 FCA 85; Au v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2001), 202 F.T.R. 57; 2001 FCT 243; Alemu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2004), 257 F.T.R. 52; 38 Imm. L.R. (3d) 250; 2004 FC 997; Kin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 198 F.T.R. 172; 11 Imm. L.R. (3d) 213 (F.C.T.D.); Chiau v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 2 F.C. 297; (2000), 195 D.L.R. (4th) 422; 265 N.R. 121 (C.A.); Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748; (1997), 144 D.L.R. (4th)1; 50 Admin. L.R. (2d) 199; 71 C.P.R. (3d) 417; 209 N.R. 20; Souare v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] F.C.J. No. 71 (T.D.) (QL); Bakir v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2004), 244 F.T.R. 275; 33 Imm. L.R. (3d) 171; 2004 FC 70.



authors cited



Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Immigration Manual: Enforcement (ENF). Chapter ENF 2: Evaluating Inadmissibility, online <http://www.cic.gc. ca/manuals?guides/english/enf/enf02e.pdf>.



APPLICATION for judicial review of an immigration officers decision that the applicant was inadmissible to Canada on the grounds that he was a member of an organization (the Mohajir Quami Movement - Altaf) that there were reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts of terrorism in accordance with paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Application allowed.



appearances:



Silvia Valdman for applicant.



Lynn Marchildon for respondent.



solicitors of record:



Silvia Valdman, Ottawa, for applicant.



Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent.



The following are the reasons for order and order rendered in English by



[1]Mosley J.: This is an application for judicial review of the decision of an immigration officer, dated January 17, 2005, wherein the applicant was found to be inadmissible to Canada pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that the officer erred and the matter must be sent back for reconsideration by a different officer.



[2]The applicant is a 65?year-old citizen of Pakistan who came to Canada in 1996, along with his wife, because of persecution suffered in Pakistan due to his membership in the Mohajir Quami Movement Altaf (MQM?A). The applicant and his wife sought refugee protection and were recognized as Convention refugees by the Immigration and Refugee Board on July 22, 1997.



[3]The applicant stated on his Personal Information Form (PIF) dated October 10, 1996, that he had worked as a freelance journalist and did MQM?A party work from 1987?1996. He further stated in an appendix to his PIF that he joined the MQM?A in 1985 and began looking after publicity matters and writing articles that covered MQM?A meetings and press releases. The applicant also stated on his application for permanent residence that he was a member of the MQM?A from 1985?1996.



[4]In November 1997, the applicant applied to become a permanent resident in Canada together with his wife and three dependent children outside of Canada. On February 2, 1998 the applicant was advised by the Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) office in Vegreville, Alberta that he met the eligibility requirements for processing as a Convention refugee and that a decision would be made within 18 months of meeting all statutory requirements for permanent residence.



[5]The applicant was interviewed by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) at CIC Ottawa in September 2000. The security review section of CIC later requested that the applicant be interviewed by an immigration officer to determine if he was inadmissible to Canada pursuant to section 34 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).



[6]In April 2004, the applicant initiated an application for leave and judicial review, seeking an order of mandamus to compel the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to render a decision with respect to his application for permanent residence. Leave was granted on September 6, 2004.



[7]Immigration officer, Dawn Byrd, held a first interview with the applicant, his counsel, and an Urdu interpreter on November 4, 2004. The immigration officer sent the applicant a letter dated November 10, 2004 stating that the information available suggested that his application for permanent residence may have to be refused given that he appeared to be inadmissible on security grounds.



[8]On December 2, 2004, the applicant and his counsel attended a second interview, convened at the immigration officers request. Before the interview began, the officer advised the applicant that she wanted him to address her concerns regarding his involvement with MQM?A. She also read to the applicant and his counsel the CIC definition of member as set out in Immigration Manual: Enforcement (ENF). Chapter ENF 2: Evaluating Inadmissibility, section 4.5.



[9]At the interview, the applicant explained that the MQM?A faction he associated himself with did not believe in violence and had he known that MQM?A was involved in violence he would never have joined them. The applicant told the officer that his duties while a member of MQM?A were mainly as a freelance writer writing articles on MQM?A activities, in addition to distribution of flyers and canvassing door-to-door during elections.



[10]The applicant told the officer that because of his ill health, since arriving in Canada he had not been involved with MQM?A. The applicant was asked whether he had given money to MQM?A and he told the officer that he had not, given that he was in receipt of a fixed income by way of the Ontario Disability Support Program. The applicant was asked whether MQM?A used terrorist tactics to keep control over Karachi, Pakistan when violence peaked between 1995 and 1998. The applicant explained that while he was in Pakistan none of these things happened. The applicant also stated that if MQM?A was involved in violence he would never have been involved with them as according to his religion and conscience, he could not be party to violence.



[11]On December 3, 2004, the officer provided applicants counsel with the sources of information cited in one of the documents she relied on in assessing whether the MQM?A engaged in terrorist activities. The applicants counsel responded with written submissions in support of the applicants admissibility by way of a letter dated December 6, 2004.



[12]The same day, December 6, 2004, an order was issued by Madam Justice Carolyn Layden?Stevenson ordering the respondent to make a determination as to the application for permanent residence within 60 days of the order.



DECISION



[13]In a January 17, 2005 letter, immigration officer Byrd advised the applicant that he was inadmissible to Canada pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA on the grounds that he was a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts of terrorism. In her letter, the officer stated:



I have come to the conclusion that you are inadmissible to Canada based on your involvement with the Mohajir Quami Movement Altaf (MQM?A) from 1985 until 1996 working as a volunteer distributing pamphlets, attending meetings and writing newspaper articles for MQM?A; MQM?A is a known organization that has participated in terrorist activities. As a result your application for permanent residence has been refused.



[14]No reasons, other than the terse explanation in the letter, were initially provided by the officer. Pursuant to rule 9 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998 [SOR/98-106], the officer provided her notes of the interview of the applicant as reasons, along with two attachments referred to in her written reasons.



ISSUES



[15]The applicant raised the following issues with respect to the officers decision:



1. Did the officer err in finding that MQM?A has engaged in acts of terrorism pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act?



2. Did the officer err by relying on evidence that is unreliable, not credible and not trustworthy?



3. Did the officer breach the duty of fairness by failing to disclose all information relied on in reaching her decision and by misrepresenting the facts to applicants counsel?



[16]As I have found that the officer committed a reviewable error in arriving at the determination that the MQM?A is an organization that has participated in terrorist activities, my decision is based on that conclusion. For the guidance of the next officer to consider the matter, I will provide some comments with respect to the quality of the evidence considered by the officer in arriving at the decision under review.



[17]With respect to the claimed breach of the duty of fairness, I have carefully considered the applicants detailed written submissions and oral argument and am unable to agree that the officer failed in this regard. It appears to me that this claim is based largely on counsels perception that she was in some way misled by the officer or that the officer failed to disclose pertinent information in a timely manner. Neither concern is supported by the record, in my view.



[18]From the record before me, the applicant was provided with a reasonable opportunity to know and to respond to the information which the decision maker proposed to rely upon in making her decision. The applicant was told of the officers concerns prior to the second interview and had an ample opportunity to respond. Further, at the end of the interview, the immigration officer invited the applicants counsel to provide written submissions on the issue of admissibility. The fact that the officer did not respond to every communication from counsel in the manner expected by counsel does not constitute procedural unfairness.



RELEVANT LEGISLATION



34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for



. . .



(c) engaging in terrorism;



(d) being a danger to the security of Canada;



(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada; or



(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).



ARGUMENT & ANALYSIS



Standard of Review



[19]The question of whether an organization is one described in paragraph 34(1)(a), (b) or (c) has been dealt with previously by this Court according to the standard of reasonableness: see Hussain v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1196, at paragraph 12 ff.; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 867, at paragraphs 35?40. In Kanendra v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2005), 47 Imm. L.R. (3d) 265 (F.C.), at paragraphs 10?12, Justice Simon Nol, relying upon a pragmatic and functional analysis conducted by Justice Marshall Rothstein of the Federal Court of Appeal in Poshteh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 3 F.C.R. 487, applied the standard to a finding of membership in an organization described in paragraph 34(1)(f).



[20]I would adopt the reasoning of Justice Rothstein and Justice Nol to the review of the immigration officers conclusion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the MQM?A is an organization that has engaged in terrorism. The question before the immigration officer is one of mixed fact and law; immigration officers have been recognized as having a degree of expertise in determining admissibility on the basis of the criteria set out in section 34 of the IRPA. Finally, the issue of whether MQM?A has engaged in terrorism involves the consideration of discrete indicia rather than a broad?based assessment: Au v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2001), 202 F.T.R. 57 (F.C.T.D.), at paragraphs 38?39.



The Officers Finding that MQM?A has Engaged in Acts of Terrorism



[21]The applicant submits the officer erred in finding that MQM?A qualifies under paragraph 34(1)(f) as an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts of terrorism as contemplated by paragraph 34(1)(c).



[22]The Court has dealt with the issue of terrorist organization in Fuentes v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 4 F.C. 249 (T.D.). Mr. Justice Franois J. Lemieux noted that in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, the Supreme Court of Canada had provided both a functional and a stipulative definition of the term terrorism. The functional approach consisted of defining terrorism by reference to specific acts of violence (e.g. hijacking, hostage?taking and terrorist bombing) spelled out in the annexed list of treaties to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism [GA Res. 54/109, 9 December 1999] (the Convention).



[23]With respect to the stipulative definition of terrorism, Justice Lemieux held that the Supreme Court referred to Article 2 of the Convention which defined terrorism as [a]ny . . . act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.



[24]Mr. Justice Lemieux then reviewed the jurisprudence of this Court and concluded that there must be an evidentiary foundation to support a finding that an organization was engaged in acts of terrorism. He noted that in Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 433 (C.A.) this Court stressed the importance of providing findings of fact as to specific crimes against humanity which the refugee is alleged to have committed: Fuentes, at paragraphs 74, 82.



[25]With specific reference to MQM?A and in setting aside a finding under paragraph 34(1)(f) that there were reasonable grounds to believe that it is a terrorist organization, Madam Justice Anne L. Mactavish in Ali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 1 F.C.R. 485 (F.C.) held that the officer would have to have regard to the definition of terrorism provided in Suresh as well as to the definitions of terrorist activity [as enacted by S.C. 2001, c. 41, s. 4] and terrorist group [as enacted idem] contained in subsection 83.01(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C?46: see also Alemu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2004), 257 F.T.R. 52 (F.C.).



[26]The applicant submits that the officer in this case concluded that MQM?A is a terrorist organization without providing any analysis and reasons for her conclusion as required by Suresh, Fuentes, Ali and Alemu. The officer did not provide any specific findings of fact as to what specific acts of terrorism MQM?A is alleged to have committed in order to justify a finding that it is an organization engaged in terrorist activities.



[27]The respondent submits that the onus was on the applicant to persuade the immigration officer of his admissibility to Canada: Kin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 198 F.T.R. 172 (F.C.T.D.) and that the standard of proof required to establish reasonable grounds is more than a flimsy suspicion, but less than the civil test of balance of probabilities. It is a bona fide belief in a serious possibility based on credible evidence: Chiau v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 2 F.C. 297 (C.A.), at paragraph 60.



[28]The respondent submits that the immigration officers notes to file enumerated the specific acts committed by MQM that led her to conclude that the MQM?A is a terrorist organization as defined by the Supreme Court in Suresh and refined by this Court in Fuentes. Moreover, the officer relied upon the following in arriving at her conclusion:



1. An Amnesty International report stating that the government of Pakistan held the MQM?A responsible for most of the human rights abuses perpetrated in Karachi;



2. In the mid?1990s, the US State Department, Amnesty International and others accused the MQM?A and a rival faction of summary killings, torture and other abuses;



3. Further, MQM?A used killing and other violence to keep shops closed and people off the streets. During strikes, MQM?A activists ransacked business that remained open and attacked motorists and pedestrians who ventured outside.



[29]The respondent submits that the above-cited activities fall within the definition of terrorism set out by the Supreme Court in Suresh, that is [a]ny . . . act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking any active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an organization to do or abstain from doing any act.



[30]On the reasonableness standard of review, a determination that the organization to which the applicant belonged engaged or engages in terrorism must be supported by reasons that will withstand a somewhat probing examination as described by Justice Iacobucci in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, at paragraph 56.



[31]The respondent may well be correct that the acts attributed to the MQM?A fall within the Suresh definition, or of the similar definition added to the Criminal Code by the Anti?terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41, but that is not apparent from a reading of the officers notes or her decision letter. There is no indication as to what she means when she says that MQM?A is an organization that has engaged in terrorism other than through a listing of acts described as terrorist activities. Thus it is impossible to determine how the officer defined terrorism in assessing these acts. She has simply asserted that MQM is a known organization that has participated in terrorist activities without explaining how she understood and applied those terms.



[32]A reader of the officers decision letter and notes does not have a clear picture of what the officer understood terrorism to mean and how that understanding was applied to the organization in question. The officer should have provided the definition she relied upon and explained how the listed acts met the definition. Her failure to do so means that her reasons do not stand up to a somewhat probing scrutiny. Accordingly, the application will be granted and the matter remitted for reconsideration by a different officer.



The Quality of the Evidence Relied Upon by the Officer



[33]In finding MQM?A to be a terrorist organization, the immigration officer relied primarily upon two documents which were attached to her notes to file: Attachment A, a November 10, 2004 memo on the MQM from the RZTZ/Intelligence Branch of the Canadian Border Services Agency [CBSA] and Attachment B entitled Muttahida Quomi Mahx, Terrorist Group of Pakistan a document posted on the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), a Web site which states it provides comprehensive, searchable and continuously updated information relating to terrorism, low intensity warfare and ethnic/communal/sectarian strife in South Asia.



[34]In a thoroughly researched and reasoned argument, applicants counsel submits that both documents contain information from unreliable sources found on the Internet, many of which are not identified with any specificity. Beside providing no critical analysis of the sources, the documentary evidence relied on by the officer is questionable in terms of accuracy, credibility and trustworthiness.



[35]Applicants counsel cites a variety of problems with the footnotes in the CBSA memo including incompleteness and obscurity. The footnotes in the memo refer to five sources: a book on Pakistan, an Amnesty International report on Pakistan, and three Web sites, one based in India, the other two in the U.S. and the U.K. Counsel takes issue with each of these sources and points to what she considers to be flaws in their reliability.



[36]In support of this argument, counsel has submitted an affidavit from Dr. Lisa Given, an Associate Professor in the School of Library and Information Studies, Faculty of Education at the University of Alberta. In reviewing the documents, Dr. Given considered the criteria that librarians use to assess Internet documents and her own criteria for assessing quality university?level papers.



[37]Dr. Given finds several difficulties with the documents including a lack of defined terms, inconsistency in the acronyms for MQM, Internet sources cited which are no longer available or are cited incorrectly. Dr. Given also reviewed the documents in terms of the quality of the resources used and raised a number of questions including possible source bias, currency and general reliability of Internet sources.



[38]The respondent emphasizes that the sources for the RZTZ information include the U.S. Department of Justice, Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism, and Amnesty International. U.S. Department of State reports are routinely submitted by the parties and relied upon by immigration decision makers as a source of country condition and human rights information. This Court has also described Amnesty International as credible and a reliable and independent source: Souare v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] F.C.J. No. 71 (T.D.) (QL), at paragraph 9, Bakir v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2004), 244 F.T.R. 275, at paragraphs 33, 35. Janes publications are widely regarded as authoritative sources, the respondent submits.



[39]My colleague, Justice Roger Hughes, has recently expressed concern about the quality of the evidence routinely put forward in immigration proceedings, from sources such as the U.S. State Department reports. In Bedoya v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1092, Justice Hughes noted that it was not the best evidence. Where decisions are being made as to what the subject did or did not do, preference should be given to direct evidence and less weight to generalized, otherwise unsupported statements, even if from apparently reliable sources.



[40]I suspect that the standards of accuracy, impartiality and reliability described by Dr. Given and for which applicants counsel argues, may not be readily achievable in the world in which these decisions are made, particularly when dealing with the history of events in regions where records are not kept with the rigour of a North American university library. Nevertheless, the applicant has identified a number of frailties with the sources relied upon by the immigration officer which one would not expect to find if due care and attention had been paid to the material. The integrity of the process of determining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that an individual is a member of an organization that has engaged in terrorist activities deserves greater diligence than was displayed in this instance.



[41]The applicant has requested that I certify two questions as matters of general importance. The first asks what are the standards that an immigration officer should apply to information obtained from the Internet, including from well?known sources of information on human rights conditions existing in countries such as those from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the U.S. Department of State. The second asks if the failure to observe these standards constitutes an error of fact, of law, of mixed fact and law or a breach of natural justice.



[42]The respondent is opposed to these questions being certified as they would not be dispositive of an appeal in this matter. As I have decided this application on another ground, I agree with the respondent and decline to certify them.



ORDER



THIS COURT ORDERS that the application is granted and the matter remitted for reconsideration by another officer. No questions of general importance are certified.
 

Arrow

Citizen
MQM Terrorist No. 3 Ali v. Canada

Citation: Ali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2004 FC 1174, (2004), [2005] 1 F.C.R. 485
Date: August 26, 2004
Docket: IMM-5086-03

IMM-5086-03

2004 FC 1174

Syed Zahid Ali (Applicant)

v.

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Respondent)

Indexed as: Ali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.)

Federal Court, Mactavish J.--Toronto, July 15; Ottawa, August 26, 2004.

Citizenship and Immigration -- Exclusion and Removal -- Inadmissible Persons -- Applicant Convention refugee, citizen of Pakistan, MQM Altaf faction member -- Denies faction terrorist -- Application for judicial review of immigration officer's IRPA, s. 34(1) decision no further consideration of landing application because applicant member of organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages in terrorism -- S. 34(2) request for ministerial relief outstanding -- Preliminary objection by MCI: currently no "decision" capable of review -- Upon consideration of statutory scheme, preliminary objection denied -- Roles of officer, Minister different -- Applicant prejudiced if must await Minister's decision -- Whether officer's decision final or interlocutory -- Favourable decision by MCI not rendering instant application moot -- Ministerial relief process not adequate alternate remedy -- Standard required for s. 34(1) inadmissibility finding -- Case law, statutory definitions of "terrorism" -- Shortcomings of officer's reasons -- Duty of fairness breached by failure to observe request to know documentation relied on by officer.

This was an application for judicial review of an immigration officer's decision that a landing application would not be considered in that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe applicant was a member of the terrorist organization Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM). While applicant admitted to membership in MQM's Altaf faction, he denied that this faction is involved in terrorism and said that the officer failed to identify any particular terrorist acts committed by MQM-A. His argument was that the duty of fairness was breached by non-disclosure of the evidence relied upon by the officer. Applicant has also sought ministerial relief under IRPA, subsection 34(2), asserting that his presence here would not be contrary to the national interest. A preliminary objection was advanced for the Minister: since applicant's ministerial relief application is still pending, there has not been a final admissibility determination and accordingly no "decision" open to judicial review.

The applicant is a citizen of Pakistan who was found to be a Convention refugee in 1999. But after he applied for permanent resident status, CSIS indicated its desire to interview him prior to a decision being made on the landing application. The matter of concern was his association with MQM in Pakistan. Later, the immigration officer wrote to applicant, advising that the "CIC possesses information indicating that you are inadmissible to Canada pursuant to sub-paragraph 34(1) of the Act".

The issues were: (1) whether the determination of an immigration officer under subsection 34(1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an applicant is a member of a terrorist organization is a judicially reviewable decision when an application for ministerial relief is outstanding; (2) whether the officer provided proper reasons for concluding that MQM-A is a terrorist organization; (3) whether there was a breach of the duty of fairness.

To deal with the preliminary objection, it was necessary to consider the statutory scheme, in particular sections 33 and 34. Reference had also to be made to subsection 6(3), which makes it clear that the Minister possesses a discretion, which may not be delegated, to grant an exemption based on national interest. The Minister submitted that it was open to applicant to argue that the MQM-A is not a terrorist organization and that the officer's conclusions on that could be revisited by the Minister. And if an applicant should be dissatisfied with the Minister's subsection 34(2) decision, judicial review could then be sought. Applicant's position was that he would suffer prejudice if required to await the ministerial relief decision because he cannot bring his wife to Canada as long as his own immigration status remains in question. His relief application has been oustanding for more than a year. He would be further prejudiced in being unable to challenge the officer's underlying findings. Applicant suggested that the officer's determination, that he belonged to a terrorist organization, is final and not interlocutory. Applicant pointed to the section 44 "Report on Inadmissiblity", prepared by the officer on the very day of their interview, as evidence that a final determination has been made on a substantive issue. While the Court will not normally judicially review interlocutory administrative decisions, it will, in "special circumstances" exercise its jurisdiction.

Held, the application should be granted and the matter remitted for redetermination by a different immigration officer.

(1) It was appropriate for the Federal Court to entertain an application for judicial review of an officer's decision nowithstanding that an application for ministerial relief under subsection 34(2) was pending. Although a final admissibility determination will not be made until the ministerial relief application is disposed of, it did not necessarily follow that the officer's subsection 34(1) determination was interlocutory in nature. The Minister's role under subsection 34(2) is not to revisit the officer's subsection 34(1) determination of terrorist organization membership but rather to consider whether--given such membership--it would be detrimental to the national interest for that person to remain here. So the officer's decision did dispose of a substantive issue. It was a finding of inadmissibility, subject to a grant of exceptional relief by the Minister. This conclusion found support in the fact that the officer considered it appropriate to prepare a section 44 report confirming her opinion that the applicant was inadmissible. The Court was not persuaded that a grant of ministerial relief would render this application moot. Even though it would permit applicant to remain, it would still leave the finding of terrorist organization membership which might have serious ramifications for applicant's future.

The ministerial relief process does not constitute an adequate alternate remedy since it does not involve an examination of the original decision's soundness and it was for this reason that this Court's decision--affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal--in Fast v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), could be distinguished. There was yet another problem. Should applicant seek judicial review of the decisions of both the officer and the Minister, he might be faced with rule 302 and an argument that he was attempting to review two different decisions upon a single application for judicial review. This application should, therefore, be entertained.

(2) An inadmissibility finding under subsection 34(1) has to be based on something more than a flimsy suspicion, though it need not meet the civil standard of a balance of probabilities. Also, the officer must follow the definition of "terrorism" adopted in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the Anti-terrorism Act and the Criminal Code, subsection 83.01 definitions of "terrorist activity" and "terrorist group". The officer concluded that applicant belonged to a terrorist organization but it was impossible to discern how she defined "terrorism". It has been held that any departure from the Suresh definition constitutes reviewable error. The impugned reasons were insufficient to allow the Court to determine whether the term had been correctly defined. Again, the officer failed to identify any specific act carried out by MQM-A that would meet the definition of "terrorism" in Suresh. In providing no explanation for the finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the MQM-A is a terrorist organization, she fell into reviewable error.

(3) The Court found as a fact that a specific request had been made at the interview for a copy of the documentary evidence relied upon by the officer as to MQM activities but that request was not complied with. The question was whether, in the circumstances, fairness required that applicant be fully apprised of the case he had to meet. This was not a case involving generic, publicly available information on country conditions but rather specific information relied upon in arriving at an exclusion finding. IRPA, section 34 proceedings should not be reduced to a guessing game in which an applicant has to figure out on his own what information is being used against him. The officer's failure to identify the I.R.B. report relied upon amounted to reviewable error.

The matter should be remitted for redetermination and the following question certified as one of general importance: "Is a determination under subsection 34(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, a judicially reviewable decision if an application for Ministerial relief under subsection 34(2) is outstanding and no decision has been made on the application for landing?"

statutes and regulations judicially

considered

Anti-terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41.
Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 83.01(1) "terrorist activity" (as enacted by S.C. 2001, c. 41, s. 4), "terrorist group" (as enacted idem).
Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, r. 302.
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 6(3), 33, 34, 44(1).

cases judicially considered

applied:

Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3; (1995), 122 D.L.R. (4th) 129; 26 Admin. L.R. (2d) 1; [1995] 2 C.N.L.R. 92; 177 N.R. 325; Alemu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 997; [2004] F.C.J. No. 1210 (F.C.) (QL); Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3; (2002), 208 D.L.R. (4th) 1; 37 Admin. L.R. (3d) 152; 90 C.R.R. (2d) 1; 18 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1; 281 N.R. 1; Fuentes v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 4 F.C. 249; (2003), 231 F.T.R. 172; 28 Imm. L.R. (3d) 172 (T.D.).

distinguished:

Fast v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 1 F.C. 257; (2000), 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 74; 186 F.T.R. 16; 7 Imm. L.R. (3d) 40 (T.D.); affd (2001), 41 Admin. L.R. (3d) 200; 288 N.R. 8 (F.C.A.); Mancia v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 3 F.C. 461; (1998), 161 D.L.R. (4th) 488; 45 Imm. L.R. (2d) 131; 226 N.R. 134 (C.A.).

considered:

Zndel v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 4 F.C. 255; (2000), 25 Admin. L.R. (3d) 135; 256 N.R. 125 (C.A.).

referred to:

Szczecka v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 116 D.L.R. (4th) 333; 25 Imm. L.R. (2d) 70; 170 N.R. 58 (F.C.A.); Pfeiffer v. Canada (Superintendent of Bankruptcy), [1996] 3 F.C. 584; 116 F.T.R. 173 (T.D.); Froom v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2004] 2 F.C.R. 154; (2003), 8 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1; 242 F.T.R. 1 (F.C.).

authors cited

D. J. M. Brown and J. M. Evans. Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada, looseleaf. Toronto: Canvasback Publishing, 1998.

APPLICATION for judicial review of immigration officer's decision she had reasonable grounds to believe a permanent residence applicant belonged to a terrorist organization and accordingly his application could not go forward. Application allowed, matter remitted for redetermination and question certified.

appearances:

Krassina Kostadinov for applicant.

Mary Matthews for respondent.

solicitors of record:

Waldman & Associates, Toronto, for applicant.

Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent.

The following are the reasons for order and order rendered in English by

[1]Mactavish J.: Syed Zahid Ali is a Convention refugee from Pakistan, who is trying to obtain permanent resident status in Canada. An immigration officer determined that she had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Ali is a member of a terrorist organization, that is, the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM). In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act [S.C. 2001, c. 27] (IRPA), the officer then notified Mr. Ali that his application for landing would not be considered further. Mr. Ali was also advised that he had the option of seeking ministerial relief in order to allow his application to continue to be processed.

[2]Mr. Ali admits that he is a member of the Altaf faction of the MQM. He does not, however, agree that the Altaf faction (also known as the MQM-A), is engaged in terrorism. Accordingly, he seeks to judicially review the finding of the immigration officer in this regard, contending that the officer erred in failing to properly identify any specific acts of terrorism that the MQM-A is alleged to have committed. Mr. Ali also argues that the officer breached the duty of fairness owed to him by failing to disclose the evidence that she relied upon to support her finding that the MQM-A is a terrorist organization.

[3]Mr. Ali has also applied for ministerial relief, in accordance with subsection 34(2) of IRPA, asserting that his presence in Canada would not be contrary to the national interest.

[4]The respondent contends that the documentary evidence before the immigration officer clearly shows that the MQM-A is a terrorist organization. Mr. Ali was made aware of the concerns regarding his application for permanent residence, and was afforded ample opportunity to address these concerns. As a result there has been no denial of natural justice.

[5]As a preliminary matter, the respondent submits that as long as the request for ministerial relief is pending, no final determination has been made with respect to Mr. Ali's admissibility. As a consequence, there is currently no "decision" that may properly be subject to an application for judicial review.

Background

[6]Mr. Ali is a citizen of Pakistan. In 1999, he was found to be a Convention refugee, and in April 2000, he applied for permanent resident status. Six months later, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service informed Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) that it wished to interview Mr. Ali prior to a decision being rendered in connection with his application for landing. This interview took place in early 2001.

[7]Mr. Ali was then asked by CIC to provide additional proof of his identity, which he did. After receiving this information, CIC scheduled an interview with Mr. Ali in order to discuss his association with the MQM. He was advised that his application for landing may be refused, as it appeared that he might be inadmissible on security grounds because of his association with the MQM in Pakistan.

[8]Mr. Ali was interviewed on May 28, 2003, in the presence of his counsel. That same day, the immigration officer prepared a report under subsection 44(1) of IRPA, indicating that she had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Ali was inadmissible on security grounds. It does not appear, however, that this report was ever transmitted to the Minister.

[9]On June 19, 2003, the officer sent Mr. Ali a letter advising him that: "CIC possesses information indicating that you are inadmissible to Canada pursuant to sub-paragraph 34(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of Canada." After referring to the text of paragraph 34(1)(f), which refers to organizations which are engaged or will engage in acts of terrorism, the letter goes on to say: "There are reasonable grounds to believe that you are a member of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM)."

[10]As a result of this finding, the immigration officer advised Mr. Ali that "[T]here will be no further consideration of your application for permanent residence in Canada. However, it was understood . . . that you would like to request ministerial `relief' which, if granted would allow your case to continue to be processed for permanent residence." Mr. Ali was asked to confirm this understanding by signing and returning a "Request to seek the Opinion of the Minister".

[11]The June 19, 2003 letter advises Mr. Ali that, in considering his request for relief, the Minister would consider:

. . . whether granting you permanent residence to Canada would be contrary to the national interest to Canada. This will require an assessment of the detriment that you pose to the national interest of Canada as well as any humanitarian and compassionate circumstances pertinent to your situation (sic throughout).

[12]Mr. Ali filed his application for ministerial relief on July 17, 2003. This request is still outstanding. He also filed an application for leave and for judicial review, challenging the officer's finding under paragraph 34(1)(f) of IRPA. The respondent initially defended the application on the basis that the immigration officer's June 19 letter constituted a "decision". This position changed, however, shortly before the hearing, when counsel became aware that an application for ministerial relief was pending.

[13]The respondent now argues that no final decision has been made with respect to Mr. Ali's application for permanent residence, and that, as a result, there is currently no "decision" that may properly be subject to judicial review.

Issues

[14]There are three issues before the Court. The first is the preliminary question of whether the determination of an immigration officer under subsection 34(1) of IRPA that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an applicant is a member of a terrorist organization is a judicially reviewable decision when an application for ministerial relief is outstanding.

[15]In the event that I find that the officer's decision is properly reviewable, the issue then arises as to whether the officer provided proper reasons for her conclusion that the MQM-A is a terrorist organization. I must also decide whether the officer breached the duty of fairness owed by her to Mr. Ali by failing to identify the evidence that she was intending to rely upon in arriving at her conclusion that the MQM-A is a terrorist organization. I will deal with each of these issues in turn, beginning with the preliminary question of whether the officer's decision is properly reviewable.

The Statutory Scheme

[16]In order to determine whether a reviewable decision has been made with respect to Mr. Ali's application for permanent residence, it is necessary to have regard to the statutory scheme in issue. The relevant sections of IRPA are sections 33 and 34, which provide:

33. The facts that constitute inadmissibility under sections 34 to 37 include facts arising from omissions and, unless otherwise provided, include facts for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have occurred, are occurring or may occur.

34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for

(a) engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada;

(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government;

(c) engaging in terrorism;

(d) being a danger to the security of Canada;

(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada; or

(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).

(2) The matters referred to in subsection (1) do not constitute inadmissibility in respect of a permanent resident or a foreign national who satisfies the Minister that their presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest.

[17]Regard must also be had to subsection 6(3) of IRPA, which makes it clear that the discretion to grant an exemption based on national interest under subsection 34(2) is one that vests exclusively in the Minister, and may not be delegated.

Is the Immigration Officer's Finding Under Subsection 34(1) a Reviewable Decision?

The Respondent's Position

[18]The respondent acknowledges that a determination by an immigration officer that an individual is a member of a terrorist organization can properly be the subject of an application for judicial review, where the applicant chooses not to avail him or herself of the option of seeking ministerial relief pursuant to subsection 34(2). Indeed, I am advised by counsel for the respondent that where an applicant is dissatisfied with the findings of an immigration officer under subsection 34(1), the normal course is to immediately seek judicial review of those findings. The respondent does not suggest that there is anything wrong with this practice, and I am advised that applications to review findings made under subsection 34(1) of IRPA are regularly dealt with by this Court.

[19]This case is unusual, counsel says, as Mr. Ali has elected to seek ministerial relief, while, at the same time seeking to judicially review the immigration officer's findings under subsection 34(1). According to the respondent, as long as the request for ministerial relief is outstanding, the issue of whether or not Mr. Ali is admissible has not been finally determined, and the application for judicial review is premature.

[20]Although the focus of an application for ministerial relief under subsection 34(2) is usually on the role of the applicant within the organization in question, the respondent submits that it is nonetheless open to Mr. Ali to continue to argue before the Minister that the MQM-A is not a terrorist organization. It is further open to the Minister to revisit the conclusions of the immigration officer in this regard.

[21]In support of this argument, counsel points to a document which is allegedly provided to individuals who have been found inadmissible under subsection 34(1), and who may be interested in seeking ministerial relief. This document advises that applicants' submissions should focus on a number of issues, including the purpose of the organization, the individual's role within the organization, the nature and extent of the individual's activities within the organization, and whether these activities involved violence. Information is also requested regarding the timing of the individual's membership in the organization in question, and the individual's current attitude regarding the organization. Applicants are advised that the Minister will also consider the reason why the individual is immigrating to Canada, and any "special circumstances" surrounding the application. Applicants are also asked to describe any current activities that they are involved in such as employment, education and involvement in the community, and to provide information regarding their family situation, as well as any other information the applicant considers relevant. It should be noted that Mr. Ali denies ever receiving this document, although it is referred to in the June 19, 2003 letter.

[22]If an applicant is dissatisfied with the decision of the Minister under subsection 34(2), the respondent says that it is always open to the applicant to seek judicial review at that point in the proceedings. An application for judicial review initiated after the issue of admissibility has been finally determined can challenge the findings of the Minister under subsection 34(2) and, as well, can challenge the earlier findings of the immigration officer under subsection 34(1).

[23]Finally, the respondent argues that there is no prejudice to Mr. Ali in making him wait until the issue of his admissibility has been finally determined.

Mr. Ali's Position

[24]Mr. Ali submits that he will indeed be prejudiced if he is required to wait until the Minister deals with his request for ministerial relief, pointing out that he wants to bring his wife to Canada, and that as long as his immigration status is in question, he is precluded from doing so. His application for ministerial relief has been outstanding for over a year, Mr. Ali says, and there is no indication when a decision from the Minister might be forthcoming. The fact that he continues to be separated from a loved one amounts to very real prejudice.

[25]Mr. Ali asserts that he will be further prejudiced if he is required to wait until the Minister deals with his request for relief under subsection 34(2), as he says that he would then be unable to challenge the underlying findings of the immigration officer made under subsection 34(1) of IRPA.

[26]Mr. Ali also disputes that the decision of the immigration officer is interlocutory in nature. What he seeks to challenge is the final decision of the immigration officer determining that he is a member of a terrorist organization.

[27]According to Mr. Ali, in deciding whether to exercise the discretion conferred by subsection 34(2), the Minister will not revisit the finding that he is a member of a terrorist organization. Rather, the Minister will consider whether or not Mr. Ali's continued presence in Canada would be detrimental to the national interest.

[28]Finally, although the immigration officer's affidavit indicates that she would only prepare a section 44 "Report on Inadmissibility" once a determination has been made with respect to Mr. Ali's request for ministerial relief, Mr. Ali points out that the officer prepared just such a report the same day that she interviewed him. This is evidence, Mr. Ali says, that a final determination has been made on a substantive issue.

The Applicable Legal Principles

[29]In order to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings, and to ensure that administrative proceedings are not derailed by applications to judicially review preliminary or interlocutory decisions, the Court will ordinarily decline to exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a decision that does not finally determine the substantive rights of the individual in question, where an adequate alternate remedy is available later: D. J. M. Brown and J. M. Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada, looseleaf (Toronto: Canvasback Publishing, 1998), at paragraph 2-69.

[30]As the Court of Appeal pointed out in Zndel v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 4 F.C. 255, the rationale for this rule is that a complaining party may be successful in the end result, rendering the application for judicial review of an interlocutory decision totally unnecessary. Further, the delays and expenses associated with such applications can bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

[31]This principle is not absolute, however, and judicial review of an interlocutory decision may proceed where "special circumstances" exist: Szczecka v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 116 D.L.R. (4th) 333 (F.C.A.).

[32]"Special circumstances" have been found to exist where, for example, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is in issue: Pfeiffer v. Canada (Superintendent of Bankruptcy), [1996] 3 F.C. 584 (T.D.).

[33]A determination of the availability of an adequate alternate remedy "engages issues of both statutory interpretation and a consideration of the appropriate circumstances under which the Court should decline to exercise its discretion to entertain an application for judicial review because of the existence of an adequate alternate remedy": Froom v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2004] 2 F.C.R. 154 (F.C.), at paragraph 52.

[34]As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3, a variety of factors should be considered in determining whether it is appropriate to engage in judicial review, or whether an applicant should be compelled to avail him or herself of the alternate available remedy. These factors include the convenience of the alternative remedy, the nature of the error, and the nature of the appellate body. The list is not an exhaustive one, and it is for the courts to identify and balance the relevant factors in specific situations.

[35]An adequate alternate remedy was found to exist where the review process allowed the initial decision to be examined as to its soundness: Fast v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 1 F.C. 257 (T.D.), affd (2001), 41 Admin. L.R. (3d) 200 (F.C.A.).

[36]With this understanding of the applicable legal principles, I turn now to the application of these principles to the facts of this case.

Analysis

[37]Having carefully considered the positions advanced by each of the parties, I have concluded that judicial review should lie from the decision of an immigration officer made pursuant to subsection 34(1) of IRPA. In my view, it is appropriate for the Federal Court to entertain an application for judicial review of an officer's decision, notwithstanding that an application for ministerial relief under subsection 34(2) is pending.

[38]In coming to this conclusion, I have considered whether the immigration officer's determination is interlocutory in nature, and, as well, whether the avenue of ministerial relief constitutes an adequate alternate remedy. Each of these issues will be addressed in turn.

Is the Finding of the Immigration Officer under Subsection 34(1) an Interlocutory One?

[39]It is true that section 34 deals with the overall question of admissibility to Canada, and that no final determination with respect to Mr. Ali's admissibility will have been made until such time as his application for ministerial relief is finally disposed of. That said, it does not necessarily follow that the determination by the immigration officer pursuant to subsection 34(1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Ali is a member of a terrorist organization is interlocutory in nature.

[40]There are two components to section 34 of IRPA. When read in conjunction with section 33, subsection 34(1) contemplates a determination being made by an immigration officer as to whether, amongst other things, there are reasonable grounds for believing that an applicant is a member of a terrorist organization.

[41]Subsection 34(2) contemplates that a different decision maker--that is the Minister herself--consider whether the continued presence in Canada of a foreign national such as Mr. Ali would be detrimental to the national interest.

[42]A subsection 34(2) inquiry is directed at a different issue to that contemplated by subsection 34(1). The issue for the Minister under subsection 34(2) is not the soundness of the officer's determination that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an applicant is a member of a terrorist organization--that determination will have already been made. Rather, the Minister is mandated to consider whether, notwithstanding the applicant's membership in a terrorist organization, it would be detrimental to the national interest to allow the applicant to stay in Canada.

[43]In other words, subsection 34(2) empowers the Minister to grant exceptional relief, in the face of a finding that has already been made by the immigration officer.

[44]As a result, I am satisfied that the decision of the immigration officer in issue here did dispose of a substantive issue raised on Mr. Ali's application for permanent residence--that is, whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is a member of a terrorist organization. This is not a preliminary or interlocutory step in the process. It is a finding of inadmissibility, subject to the grant of exceptional relief based upon a consideration of the national interest.

[45]This view is supported by the fact that once the May 28, 2003 interview with Mr. Ali was completed, the immigration officer felt it appropriate to prepare a section 44 report confirming her opinion that Mr. Ali was inadmissible.

[46]I am also not persuaded that a positive finding by the Minister in relation to Mr. Ali's request for ministerial relief would have the effect of rendering this application unnecessary or moot. A finding by the Minister under subsection 34(2) that Mr. Ali's continued presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest would allow Mr. Ali to be granted permanent residence, which is, after all, what he is seeking. However, Mr. Ali would still be left with the finding that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is a member of a terrorist organization. This is a very serious finding, and one which may well have ramifications for Mr. Ali in the future.

Can an Application for ministerial Relief Provide an Adequate Alternate Remedy?

[47]The respondent submits that while a decision made by an immigration officer under subsection 34(1) is properly the subject of an application for judicial review where the applicant elects not to seek ministerial relief under subsection 34(2), it is not judicially reviewable when such an application is outstanding, because the ministerial relief process provides the applicant with an adequate alternate remedy.

[48]I confess to being troubled by this argument. It seems to me that the avenue of ministerial relief either provides an applicant with an adequate alternate remedy or it does not. If it does, then applicants should be compelled to seek such relief prior to coming to the Federal Court on judicial review. If, on the other hand, it does not provide applicants with an adequate alternate remedy, then the fact that an application for relief under subsection 34(2) is outstanding should not operate to preclude judicial review of the findings under subsection 34(1).

[49]In other words, the choice made by an applicant as to whether or not to avail himself of the procedure under subsection 34(2) should not affect the characterization of an application for ministerial relief as an adequate alternate remedy or not.

[50]The ministerial relief process does not, in my view, constitute an adequate alternate remedy for Mr. Ali. As noted above, in exercising the jurisdiction conferred on her by subsection 34(2), the Minister is not reviewing the soundness of the decision of the immigration officer under subsection 34(1). Instead, the Minister exercises a separate and distinct statutory function, considering the impact that the continued presence of an applicant in Canada would have for the national interest. In this regard, the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Fast.

[51]There is a further difficulty that I see with the respondent's position. The respondent says that if Mr. Ali is dissatisfied with the decision of the Minister under subsection 34(2) of IRPA, it would be open to him to seek judicial review at that point in the proceedings, with respect to both the decision of the Minister, and the decision of the immigration officer. However, if Mr. Ali were to attempt to review the findings of the immigration officer at the same time that he sought judicial review of the decision of the Minister not to grant relief pursuant to subsection 34(2), he would potentially run afoul of rule 302 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998 [SOR/98-106]. That is, it could be argued that Mr. Ali was seeking to review two decisions, made by two different individuals, in a single application for judicial review.

[52]As a result, I am not persuaded that the ministerial relief route provides an adequate alternate forum in which Mr. Ali can challenge the finding of the immigration officer that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is a member of a terrorist organization. It is therefore appropriate to entertain Mr. Ali's application for judicial review.

Failure to Link the MQM-A to Acts of Terrorism

[53]The officer's reasons consist of her notes of her interview with Mr. Ali. In the interview, Mr. Ali admitted membership in the MQM-A, but asserted that, unlike the MQM-H, the MQM-A was a peaceful political party, one which focussed on the needs of the poor in Pakistan. Mr. Ali claimed that the organization did not believe in violence, and that he had never heard any discussions of violent activities within the group. Had he been aware that the MQM-A was engaging in violent activities, Mr. Ali says, he never would have become involved in the organization, as he is a peaceful person.

[54]Mr. Ali asserts that the immigration officer erred in finding that the MQM-A is an organization which there are reasonable grounds to believe has engaged, is engaging or will engage in acts of terrorism, by failing to provide proper reasons for her conclusion. The officer failed to provide any analysis to support her conclusion that the MQM-A is a terrorist organization. In particular, she failed to identify any specific acts that the MQM-A is alleged to have committed in order to justify her finding that it is a terrorist organization.

[55]The respondent submits that it cannot be logically argued that Mr. Ali was not aware of the violent activities of the MQM-A, as he admits to being a member, and was attending and organizing meetings of the organization. Further, Mr. Ali was confronted with information during the interview that suggests that the MQM is a violent organization. Mr. Ali did not deny that these events occurred, saying simply that he was not aware of them. According to the respondent, Mr. Ali's professed belief that the MQM-A is a peaceful organization is simply not consistent with the documentary evidence.

[56]Further, the respondent says, the suggestion that the immigration officer failed to provide adequate reasons is unfounded. According to the respondent, the decision of the immigration officer clearly discloses that Mr. Ali was found to be a member of an organization for which there are reasonable grounds to believe is or was engaged in terrorism.

[57]In order to make a finding of inadmissibility under subsection 34(1) of IRPA, an immigration officer must have "reasonable grounds to believe" that an applicant is, amongst other possibilities, a member of an organization that is engaged in terrorism. The standard of proof required to establish "reasonable grounds" is: "more than a flimsy suspicion, but less than the civil balance of probabilities": Alemu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 997; [2004] F.C.J. No. 1210 (F.C.) (QL), at paragraph 26.

[58]Further, in order to arrive at a finding under paragraph 34(1)(f), the immigration officer would have to have regard to the definition of "terrorism" provided in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, at paragraph 98, where the Court stated that:

. . . "terrorism" . . . includes any "act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act".

Reference may also be had to the Anti-terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41, and the definitions of "terrorist activity" and "terrorist group" contained in subsection 83.01(1) [as enacted by S.C. 2001, c. 41, s. 4] of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46.

[59]In this case, a review of the immigration officer's notes discloses that Mr. Ali admitted his ongoing involvement with the MQM-A. However, he maintained throughout the interview that to the best of his knowledge the MQM-A was a peaceful political party engaged in good works for the benefit of the poor in Pakistan.

[60]Midway through the interview, the officer's notes record that she "Read excerpt from Int'l Human Rights re violence by MQM(A)", following which the officer asked Mr. Ali for his comments. It is not clear from the notes what document the officer was referring to. However, the officer's affidavit identifies the document as a paper prepared by the Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board relating to the activities of the MQM in Pakistan between January 1995 and April 1996. There is no indication in either the officer's notes, or in her affidavit as to which extracts from the paper were read to Mr. Ali. According to the officer's notes, Mr. Ali responded by asserting that the MQM never believed in violence.

[61]The officer later stated that "It's stated MQM involved in violence & used terrorist tactics to keep control over Karachi--violence peaked 95/98 your thoughts on that", to which Mr. Ali reportedly responded "As long as I was in Pakis[tan], none of these things happened, we were the victims."

[62]Although there is no analysis or finding contained in the officer's notes, her June 19, 2003 letter reflects a finding that she had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Ali was a member of a terrorist organization. In my view, this conclusion cannot stand.

[63]First, there is no indication in either the officer's notes, or in her letter, as to what she means when she says that Mr. Ali is a member of an organization that is engaged in "terrorism", as it is impossible to discern how the officer defines the term. It is clear that a departure from the Suresh definition of terrorism by a decision maker constitutes a reviewable error: Fuentes v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 4 F.C. 249 (T.D.). The reasons of the officer in this case are simply insufficient to allow the Court to determine whether the term has been properly defined in this case.

[64]There are additional problems with the officer's decision. The immigration officer's reasons make specific reference to Mr. Ali's admission that he was, and still is, a member of the MQM-A. As such, there is a clearly articulated explanation for the officer's finding of membership in the organization. However, I am concerned about the failure of the officer to identify any specific acts carried out by the MQM-A that would meet the Suresh definition of "terrorism", or to provide any analysis of that evidence. There is also a question as to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the officer's conclusion.

[65]In argument, counsel for the respondent pointed to various extracts from the Immigration and Refugee Board document as support for the proposition that the MQM-A is a terrorist organization. There was indeed evidence before the officer that would support the conclusion that the MQM generally, and the MQM-H in particular, were engaged in acts of terrorism. However, in the case of the MQM-A, the evidence is much more limited, and is largely confined to violent acts carried out by MQM-A members against members of the rival MQM-H organization.

[66]The IRB report clearly recognizes that the MQM is comprised of two factions: the MQM-A and the MQM-H. While certain acts of terrorism are clearly attributed to the MQM-H, most of the report does not distinguish between the two groups, referring only to actions carried out by "MQM activists", "MQM workers", or "MQM militants".

[67]As Justice Layden-Stevenson observed in Alemu, at paragraph 41:

An exclusion finding is extremely significant to an applicant. Caution must be exercised to ensure such findings are properly made. The court will not substitute its opinion for that of the decision-maker when the analysis and basis for the decision are reasonable. That is not the situation here. A finding of exclusion must provide some basis for the determination regarding the nature of the group. . . . Failure [to do so] . . . yields a result that falls [far] short of being reasonable.

[68]In this case, the officer's reasons do not provide an adequate basis for her finding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the MQM-A is a group engaged in terrorist activities. In particular, there is no analysis of the IRB report, and no identification of which activities on the part of the MQM-A the officer considers to be terrorist in nature. In my view, in light of the seriousness of the finding in issue and its consequences for Mr. Ali, it was incumbent on the officer to provide some explanation for her finding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the MQM-A is a terrorist organization. Her failure to do so constitutes a reviewable error.

Failure to Disclose the Evidence Relied upon by the Immigration Officer

[69]Although it appears from the record that there may have been other documents before the officer that have not been disclosed, both parties focussed their attention exclusively on the question of whether there was any obligation on the part of the respondent to disclose the Immigration and Refugee Board report. As a result, I shall confine my analysis to this issue.

[70]Mr. Ali asserts that the immigration officer breached the duty of fairness by failing to provide him with a copy of the IRB report relied upon by the officer with respect to the activities of the MQM-A. According to Mr. Ali's affidavit, at the conclusion of the May 28, 2003 interview, his counsel asked the immigration officer what information she was relying on with respect to the allegation that the MQM was engaged in terrorism. The officer reportedly responded that she was relying on information that she had obtained over the Internet.

[71]Mr. Ali deposes that his counsel then asked for a copy of this material. Counsel also asked for the opportunity to present submissions in response with respect to the MQM organization. However, Mr. Ali's counsel was never provided with the requested information, nor was she provided with an opportunity to make submissions with respect to the nature of the MQM organization.

[72]Although there is no reference to this discussion in the immigration officer's notes, the officer does not dispute that a discussion took place at the interview with respect to the document in question. The officer has submitted an affidavit, sworn some six months after the interview, in which she deposes that "At the end of the interview Ms. Kostadinov asked me what evidence I would be relying on to make my decision. I indicated that I had accessed information from the Internet." The officer goes on to state "I had reviewed information from the Research Directorate, Documentation and Research Branch, IRB Ottawa." She then identifies the IRB paper, which is attached as an exhibit to her affidavit.

[73]According to the immigration officer "If the Applicant or his Counsel had requested a copy of the documents I relied upon regarding the MQM, I would have provided them with a copy or a list of the documents and where they could find them." Thus, although the immigration officer does not expressly say so, it is implicit in her affidavit that no such request was forthcoming from counsel for Mr. Ali.

[74]With respect, this does not make sense. Both sides agree that Mr. Ali's counsel asked about the documentation that was being considered, and that the immigration officer advised that she was relying on information obtained over the Internet. Neither side suggests that the paper was ever identified by name, or that the information was specifically identified as emanating from the Immigration and Refugee Board. Even though the information in question is readily accessible through the Board's Web site, without knowing what she was looking for, counsel for Mr. Ali would have had no way of locating it.

[75]Common sense dictates that, at the very least, counsel for Mr. Ali would have asked for the name and source of the document in issue, so that she could obtain a copy. Otherwise, there would simply have been no point to her having asked about the document in the first place. As a result, I prefer the affidavit of Mr. Ali to that of the immigration officer and find that a specific request was made at the interview for a copy of the documentary evidence relied upon by the immigration officer with respect to the activities of the MQM.

[76]As a general rule, there is no duty on the respondent to disclose publicly available information with respect to conditions in other countries: Mancia v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 3 F.C. 461 (C.A.). Counsel for Mr. Ali submits that nevertheless, in cases such as this, where the effect of the finding of inadmissibility is to brand Mr. Ali as a member of a terrorist organization and thus to deny him permanent residence, fairness requires that he be fully apprised of the case that he has to meet.

[77]I think that a distinction can arguably be drawn between the situation contemplated in Mancia, where the Court of Appeal was concerned with generic information regarding country conditions in the context of what was then known as a Post-determination Refugee Claimants in Canada Class decision (PDRCCC), and the situation here, where the officer was relying on specific information in order to reach an exclusion finding. However, I do not need to decide whether there is a general duty on the part of an immigration officer to disclose publicly available documentary information in the context of a subsection 34(1) proceeding, as I am satisfied that in this case, there was a specific request from counsel for Mr. Ali for information regarding the documentation being considered, and that no such information was provided prior to a decision being made by the immigration officer.

[78]Proceedings under section 34 of IRPA can have serious consequences for applicants and should not be reduced to a guessing game, where the applicant has to try to figure out on their own what information is being used against them.

[79]The failure of the immigration officer to identify the Immigration and Refugee Board report for Mr. Ali, in response to an express request from his counsel for such information, amounts to a reviewable error, and constitutes a further basis for setting aside the officer's decision.

Conclusion

[80]For the foregoing reasons, this application is allowed. The decision of the immigration officer is set aside, and the matter is remitted to a different immigration officer for redetermination.

Certification

[81]The respondent proposes the following question for certification:

Is a determination under subsection 34(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act a judicially reviewable decision if an application for ministerial relief under subsection 34(2) is outstanding and no decision has been made on the application for landing?

[82]In my view, this is a serious question of general importance--one which transcends the interests of the parties in this case. As a result, I am prepared to certify the question.

ORDER

THIS COURT ORDERS that:

1. This application is allowed. The decision of the immigration officer is set aside, and the matter is remitted to a different immigration officer for redetermination.

2. The following question is certified:

Is a determination under subsection 34(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act a judicially reviewable decision if an application for ministerial relief under subsection 34(2) is outstanding and no decision has been made on the application for landing?
 

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Citizen
MQM Terrorist N0.4 Jilani v. Canada

http://recueil.cmf.gc.ca/eng/2007/2007fc1354/2007fc1354.html

Citation: Jilani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1354, (2007), [2008] 2 F.C.R. D-6
Date: December 21, 2007
Docket: IMM-711-07

SEE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT Printer-Friendly Page PDF

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION



Status in Canada

Persons in Need of Protection

Judicial review of negative pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA)Applicant, Pakistani, active member of MQM-A political movementPRRA officer finding applicant having internal flight alternative (IFA) in city of Karachi, where applicant livedAlthough past persecution occurred in Karachi, evidence clearly establishing MQM-A having strongholds within several districts in Karachi in which its members live, work safelyConcept of IFA not requiring safe haven to be in another city or province of state of origin as long as area offering refuge from persecution experienced in home districtOfficers conclusion state protection available reasonableAs integrated into political life of country, MQM-A having some influence over security forcesApplicant not showing more than mere possibility of risk in PakistanApplication dismissed.
 

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Citizen
MQM Terrorist N0.5 Naeem v. Canada

http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2007/2007fc123/2007fc123.html

Citizenship and Immigration Exclusion and Removal Inadmissible Persons Judicial review of decisions refusing permanent residence application on basis applicant inadmissible as result of membership in terrorist organization, and of decision refusing ministerial relief Inadmissibility decisions unreasonable as officer not indicating how definition of terrorism understood, applied, details of so-called terrorist acts Ministerial relief decision patently unreasonable as not addressing national interest considerations set out in ministerial guidelines Applications allowed.



Citizenship and Immigration Immigration Practice Motion for order declaring redacted portions of tribunal record not required to be disclosed for reasons of national security Parliament presumed or implicitly intended Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s. 87 (application for non-disclosure) to apply to all applications for judicial review, including inland determinations of inadmissibility Procedure set out in s. 87 followed Disclosure would be injurious to national security.



Administrative Law Judicial Review Justiciability Immigration officer concluding applicant inadmissible to Canada under Immigration and Refugee Protection Act as result of membership in terrorist organization That decision not interlocutory in nature Fact decision held in abeyance pending outcome of ministerial relief application not detracting from its justiciability.



These were applications for judicial review heard together challenging three decisions. In the first decision, the applicants application for permanent residence was refused by an officer who concluded, in a memorandum, that the applicant was inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act as a result of his membership in a terrorist organization. This decision was held in abeyance pending the outcome of the applicants application for ministerial relief, pursuant to subsection 34(2) of the Act, which was ultimately refused. The third decision consisted of a second document prepared by the officer refusing the applicants application for permanent residence.



As a preliminary matter, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration argued that the first decision was not justiciable because it was a preliminary assessment and not the final decision on the issue of inadmissibility. He also brought a motion for an order declaring that he was not required to disclose the redacted portions of the certified tribunal record for reasons of national security.



Held, the applications should be allowed.



Disclosure of the redacted information would be injurious to national security. Apparently Parliament overlooked the situation of inland determinations of inadmissibility when considering the types of applications for judicial review listed in subsection 87(1), which permits an application to a judge for non-disclosure of information. Parliament no doubt presumed or intended section 87 to apply to all applications for judicial review under the Act where the decision maker considered information which, if released, would be injurious to national security or to the safety of persons. The Ministers motion was therefore dealt with by following the procedure set out in subsection 87(2) of the Act.



The first decision was justiciable. It was not interlocutory in nature (the wording of the memorandum was consistent with a final decision on admissibility) and the availability of ministerial relief did not provide an adequate alternate remedy. The instructions to officers contained in chapter IP 10 of the Immigration Manual: Inland Processing (IP) are also consistent with the conclusion that the first decision was justiciable. These instructions favor the view that the final position on inadmissibility be put before the Minister before he is asked to exercise his discretion with respect to ministerial relief. Finally, the fact that a decision is held in abeyance does not detract from the justiciability of an officers decision that, but for the exceptional exercise of ministerial discretion, the applicant is inadmissible.



The officers decision with respect to inadmissibility was unreasonable. Her reasons did not indicate how she understood and applied the definition of terrorism, nor did they set out the details and circumstances of the acts characterized to be terrorist acts and explain why these were in fact terrorist acts.



The Ministers decision, which was to be taken to be the President of the Canada Border Services Agencys memorandum recommending that ministerial relief not be granted, was also patently unreasonable. The memorandum failed to address a number of national interest considerations set out in section 13.7 of the applicable ministerial guidelines (found in Chapter ENF 2 of the Immigration Manual: Enforcement (ENF)), such as whether the applicants entry into Canada will be offensive to the Canadian public, whether all ties with the organization have been completely severed, and whether the person has adopted the democratic values of Canadian society. Also missing was consideration of the concept of national interest and a thorough assessment and balancing of all factors relating to the entry into Canada of the person in accordance with the explanation of national interest, which is set out in section 13.6 of the guidelines.



statutes and regulations judicially

considered



Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-5, s. 38.01 (as enacted by S.C. 2001, c. 41, s. 43).

Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22 (as am. by SOR/2005-339, s. 1), rr. 4(1) (as am. by SOR/2005-339, s. 3), 22 (as am. by SOR/2002-232, s. 11).

Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, rr. 1 (as am. by SOR/2004-283, s. 2), 4, 317 (as am. by SOR/2002-417, s. 19), 318.

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 11, 34, 44(1), 78, 84(2), 86(1), 87, 112, 115.



cases judicially considered



applied:

Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 4 F.C.R. 300; (2006), 57 Imm. L.R. (3d) 105; 2006 FC 1310; Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 3 F.C.R. 142; (2005), 251 D.L.R. (4th) 13; 45 Imm. L.R. (3d) 163; 330 N.R. 73; 2005 FCA 54; Ali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 1 F.C.R. 485; (2004), 42 Imm. L.R. (3d) 237; 2004 FC 1174; Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1412; Poshteh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 3 F.C.R. 511; (2005), 252 D.L.R. (4th) 335; 332 N.R. 374; 2005 FCA 121; Kanendra v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2005), 47 Imm. L.R. (3d) 265; 2005 FC 923; Jalil v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2006] 4 F.C.R. 471; (2006), 52 Imm. L.R. (3d) 256; 2006 FC 246; Miller v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2007] 3 F.C.R. 438; 2006 FC 912.

considered:

Hassanzadeh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 4 F.C.R. 430; (2005), 276 F.T.R. 117; 47 Imm. L.R. (3d) 251; 2005 FC 902; C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539; (2003), 226 D.L.R. (4th) 193; 50 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1; 304 N.R. 76; 173 O.A.C. 38; 2003 SCC 29; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3; (2002), 208 D.L.R. (4th) 1; 37 Admin. L.R. (3d) 152; 90 C.R.R. (2d) 1; 18 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1; 281 N.R. 1; 2002 SCC 1; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; (1999), 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193; 14 Admin. L.R. (3d) 173; 1 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1; 243 N.R. 22.

authors cited

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Enforcement Manuel (ENF). Chapter ENF 2: Evaluating Inadmissibility, online: http://www.cic.gc. ca/ english/resources/manuals/enf/enf02.e.pdf

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Inland Processing Manual (IP). Chapter IP 10: Refusal of National Security Cases/Processing of National Interest Requests. Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration, online: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/ manuals/ip/ip10e.pdf

APPLICATIONS for judicial review of decisions refusing the applicant permanent residence because of his inadmissibility resulting from his membership in a terrorist organization, and of a decision wherein the applicant was refused ministerial relief. Applications allowed.

appearances:

Lorne Waldman for applicant.

Robert Bafaro and Amy Lambiris for respondents.

solicitors of record:

Waldman & Associates, Toronto, for applicant.



Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondents.



The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by



Dawson J.:



INTRODUCTION



[1]These three applications for judicial review were heard together pursuant to the consent of the parties and an order of the Court. In them, Mr. Naeem challenges what he characterizes to be the following decisions:



IMM?5395?05 (first application): the March 7, 2005 decision of an officer wherein she refused the application for permanent residence of the Applicant and concluded that the Applicant was inadmissible pursuant to section 34(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Act).



IMM?2728?06 (second application): the March 14, 2006 decision of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (Minister) wherein the Minister refused the Applicants request for Ministerial relief pursuant to s. 34(2) of the Act.



IMM?2727?06 (third application): the May 10, 2006 decision of an officer based upon a memorandum dated May 8, 2006 wherein the officer refused the Applicants application for permanent residence in Canada.



[2]These reasons deal with all three applications and a copy shall be placed on each file. After receiving submissions from the parties with respect to the certification of any question, separate orders shall issue with respect to each application.



BACKGROUND FACTS



[3]Mr. Naeem is a citizen of Pakistan who came to Canada in 1999 and made a refugee claim based upon his membership and activities in the Mohajir Quami Movement (Altaf faction) (MQM?A) and its student wing, the All Pakistan Mohajir Student Organization (APMSO). He was found to be a Convention refugee in February of 2001. Immediately thereafter he applied for permanent residence in Canada.



[4]In February of 2005, Mr. Naeem was interviewed by the officer for the purpose of determining whether he was inadmissible to Canada under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act as a result of his membership in the MQM?A. Section 34 of the Act provides as follows:



34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for

(a) engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada;



(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government;



(c) engaging in terrorism;



(d) being a danger to the security of Canada;



(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada; or



(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).



(2) The matters referred to in subsection (1) do not constitute inadmissibility in respect of a permanent resident or a foreign national who satisfies the Minister that their presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest. [Underlining added.]



[5]It appears that on or about the same date Mr. Naeem requested ministerial relief pursuant to subsection 34(2) of the Act.



[6]On March 7, 2005, the officer prepared a memorandum in which, among other things, she set forth Mr. Naeems immigration history, described her interview with Mr. Naeem and set out his personal circumstances. The officer also stated:



After taking into account all of the information at my disposal I am satisfied that the applicant is inadmissible to Canada on grounds of national security. The applicant has requested Ministerial relief pursuant to subparagraph 34(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.



In keeping with the new guidelines in IP 10 Processing of National Interest Requests this report is being referred for consideration. [Emphasis deleted.]



[7]Specifically, the officer concluded that Mr. Naeem was a self?admitted member of the APMSO and the MQM?A and that there was sufficient reliable information on which to conclude that the APMSO and MQM?A were involved in acts of terrorism during the period from 1988 to 1999 when he was a member.



[8]Upon being notified of this decision Mr. Naeem commenced the first application. He also made extensive submissions in respect of his application for ministerial relief.

[9]Mr. Naeem was given the opportunity to respond to the officers memorandum which was prepared in accordance with Chapter IP 10 of the Inland Processing Manual (IP) manual dealing with Refusal of National Security Cases/Processing of National Interest Requests (IP 10). The officers memorandum and Mr. Naeems submissions were then sent to the Intelligence Branch of Security Review in Ottawa. After review, the President of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) made a negative recommendation to the Minister on the issue of ministerial relief. Mr. Naeem was provided with the recommendation and given an opportunity to respond before the material was submitted to the Minister.



[10]On March 14, 2006, the Minister indicated his concurrence with the negative recommendation. After being notified of this, Mr. Naeem commenced the second application.



[11]After the Minister rejected the application for relief, the officer prepared, on May 8, 2006, a second document entitled Decision and Rationale Application for Permanent Residence in Canada as a person deemed to be a Convention Refugee. In it, the officer noted that the application for permanent residence is refused as the applicant is inadmissible to Canada for Security reasons pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act. She wrote [t]his decision has been held in abeyance pending the applicants request for Ministerial relief pursuant to subsection 34(2) of the Act. The decision was communicated to Mr. Naeem in a letter dated May 10, 2006. The third application was filed in respect of this decision.



PROCEDURAL HISTORY



[12]The oral hearing in respect of the first application was heard on July 25, 2006. At that time it was the position of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration that the decision of March 7, 2005 was not justiciable because it was a preliminary assessment and not the final decision on the issue of inadmissibility. As of July 25, 2006, the second and third applications had been filed, but not perfected. After discussion between the Court and counsel, instructions were received whereby the parties agreed that the hearing of the first application would be adjourned, the responsible Minister would consent to the granting of leave in the second and third applications and the three applications would be heard together. In my view, this avoided potentially inconsistent results and brought the matters on for hearing on a timely and organized basis.



PROCEDURAL MATTER



[13]Prior to the first hearing in the first application, the Minister brought a motion for an order declaring that he was not required to disclose the redacted portions of the certified tribunal record for reasons of national security. The parties agreed that section 87 of the Act, which permits an application to a judge for the non?disclosure of information, was not applicable because the information at issue was neither protected under subsection 86(1) of the Act, nor considered under section 11, 112 or 115 of the Act. These are the circumstances where section 87 of the Act is expressed to have application. Section 87 is contained in Schedule A to these reasons.



[14]The Minister argued that there exists a gap in the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 [r. 1 (as am. by SOR/2004-283, s. 2)] and the Federal Courts Immigra-tion and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93?22 [as am. by SOR/2005-339, s. 1] for dealing with information which a tribunal does not disclose, on grounds of national security, in the record it files with the Court. Accordingly, he relies upon the Federal Courts gap rule, rule 4, to argue that the Court could use the procedure found in rules 317 [as am. by SOR/2002-417, s. 19] and 318. Those three rules are set out in Schedule B to these reasons.



[15]In response, Mr. Naeem argued that:



(i) Rules 317 and 318 of the Federal Courts Rules have no application because they are expressly excluded from application in immigration matters by subsection 4(1) [as am. by SOR/2005-339, s. 3] of the Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, and because rules 317 and 318 are not intended to apply where the objection to disclosure is based upon national security concerns.



(ii) Disclosure could be governed by section 38.01 [as enacted by S.C. 2001, c. 41, s. 43] of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C?5.



(iii) A fundamental principle of the administration of justice is the open court system.



(iv) There must be clear, established legislative authority and clear criteria to set out the basis upon which the Court will determine whether or not information can be withheld.



(v) Rule 318 provides no such criteria.



[16]For reasons to be delivered with the reasons disposing of the first application on its merits, I followed the procedure prescribed by subsection 87(2) of the Act in order to deal with the Ministers motion. As a result, some further disclosure of information was made and an order issued approving the redactions from the tribunal record that remained after the further disclosure. I was satisfied that disclosure of the redacted information would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person. What follows are the reasons for that decision.



[17]Subsequent to my order with respect to the motion for non?disclosure, the same issue was raised before my colleague Mr. Justice von Finckenstein. He too applied the procedure dictated by subsection 87(2) of the Act for reasons reported as Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 4 F.C.R. 300 (F.C.). I agree with and adopt those reasons as my own.



[18]I add one further reason. As the Federal Court of Appeal noted in Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 3 F.C.R. 142, at paragraph 71, there are such things in the field of legislative drafting as oversights. At paragraphs 59 to 77, the Court considered the failure of Parliament to specify that section 78 of the Act applies to an application for judicial release made under subsection 84(2) of the Act. The Court concluded that Parliament [at paragraph 72] presumed or implicitly intended that the section 78 procedure would apply to application for release.



[19]Similarly, in my view, Parliament overlooked the situation of inland determinations of inadmissibility when considering the types of applications for judicial review listed in subsection 87(1) of the Act. I have no doubt that Parliament presumed or intended section 87 to apply to all applications for judicial review under the Act where the decision maker considered information which, if released, would be injurious to national security or to the safety of persons.



[20]I now turn to the substantive issues raised in these applications.



THE ISSUES TO BE DECIDED



[21]I frame the issues to be decided on these applications as follows:



1. Which admissibility decision ought to be reviewed by the Court, the one made on March 7, 2005 (first decision) or the one made on May 8, 2006 (second decision)?



2. What is the standard of review to be applied to the officers decision with respect to Mr. Naeems inadmissibility?



3. If the second decision is the one that is properly subject to judicial review, was Mr. Naeem denied fairness because he was not provided notice, or given any opportunity to respond to what is said to be new evidence, or to make submissions on admissibility?



4. Was the decision with respect to inadmissibility otherwise tainted by any reviewable error?



5. What is the standard of review to be applied to the Ministers decision on the application for ministerial relief?



6. What constitutes the reasons of the Minister for his negative decision?



7. Did the Minister err in law by failing to consider the national interest, or by relying on patently unreasonable findings of fact, or by ignoring evidence, or by making unreasonable inferences?



8. Is this an appropriate case for an award of costs?



[22]I now consider each issue.



1. Which admissibility decision is the one that ought to be reviewed by the Court, the one made on March 7, 2005 (first decision) or the one made on May 8, 2006 (second decision)?





[25]Returning to the prior jurisprudence of the Court, in Ali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 1 F.C.R. 485 (F.C.), my colleague Madam Justice Mactavish rejected the Ministers argument that the decision of an immigration officer with respect to admissibility under subsection 34(1) of the Act, made prior to a decision with respect to ministerial relief, was not justiciable. She found that such a decision was not interlocutory in nature and that the availability of ministerial relief did not provide an adequate alternate remedy. Ali was recently followed on this point by my colleague Mr. Justice von Finckenstein in Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1412.



[26]Before me in oral argument, the Minister did not pursue the argument that Ali and Mohammed were distinguishable. Rather, he argued that they were wrongly decided.



[27]I disagree. For reasons of comity, and because I believe they were decided correctly, I adopt the reasons of my colleagues on this issue and find the first decision is justiciable. However, before leaving this issue, I make the following additional comments.



[28]First, I initially had concern whether the present case was distinguishable from Ali and Mohammed on the ground that in this case, after the first decision, no report was issued under subsection 44(1) of the Act.



[29]Subsection 44(1) provides:

44. (1) An officer who is of the opinion that a permanent resident or a foreign national who is in Canada is inadmissible may prepare a report setting out the relevant facts, which report shall be transmitted to the Minister.



[30]Such a report may lead to the making of a removal order.



[31]However, having considered the guidance provided to officers in IP 10 with respect to enforcement actions, as described below, I am satisfied that the absence of a subsection 44(1) report is not significant.



[32]Section 10 of IP 10 instructs officers that after the initial determination with respect to inadmissibility is made, and pending the decision on ministerial relief, an officer has discretion whether to issue a subsection 44(1) report. Thus, the issuance or non?issuance of a report does not alter or impact upon the effect of the decision with respect to inadmissibility.



[33]It follows that I am satisfied that counsel properly declined to attempt to distinguish this case from Ali or Mohammed.



[34]Second, I find the following matters support the conclusion that the first decision is justiciable.



(1) Section 34 of the Act is set out at paragraph 4, above. Reading subsections 34(1) and 34(2) together, it makes little sense to me that a request for ministerial relief from a finding of inadmissibility would be considered before a finding of inadmissibility is made. This is consistent with the conclusion of my colleague Mr. Justice Mosley in Hassanzadeh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 4 F.C.R. 430 (F.C.). There, he accepted the finding of Justice Mactavish in Ali that a subsection 34(1) finding is a separate and discrete determination of inadmissibility that is not tied to the exercise of ministerial discretion under subsection 34(2). He went on to note that, but for an exceptional circumstance, it is preferable for the evidence to be presented and fact finding to be conducted with respect to inadmissibility before the Minister considers an application for discretionary relief.



(2) The wording of the officers March 7, 2005 memorandum is consistent with a final decision on admissibility. She wrote, I am satisfied that the applicant is inadmissible to Canada on grounds of national security.



(3) The following instructions to officers contained in IP 10 are also consistent with the conclusion that the March 7, 2005 memorandum embodies a justiciable decision that Mr. Naeem is inadmissible, subject to ministerial relief being granted.



(a) Section 6 of IP 10 defines the term Ministerial relief as follows:



There are exceptional situations where individuals may fall within the above grounds of inadmissibility but it would not be contrary to the program objectives mentioned in section 2 above to grant their admission to Canada. In such instances, the Minister can grant relief where the Minister is of the opinion that the persons presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest. Once the Minister has made this determination, the person is no longer inadmissible on that ground.



Relief provisions are found in A34(2) (security), A35(2) (designated regimes or persons whose entry is restricted pursuant to international sanctions), and A37(2) (organized crime). The relief provisions do not apply to persons who have committed or have been complicit in human rights violations as described in A35(1)(a). [Underlining added.]



(b) When instructing officers with respect to rendering a decision, section 8.8 of IP 10 advises:



Procedural fairness requires that the officer must render a decision in a timely manner. Where the officer determines that the person is not inadmissible on grounds of national security, the person should be advised accordingly and informed that the processing of the application will continue. Subject to section 9 below (Requests for relief), where the officer determines that the person is inadmissible, a letter refusing the application for permanent residence should be sent to the applicant. While it is not necessary to provide detailed reasons to the client, the officer must record the reasons for their decision in notes on the file. The content of the letter may be discussed with the CBSA NHQ analyst. See Appendix F for a sample refusal letter. [Underlining added.]



(c) When an applicant for permanent residence applies for ministerial relief, section 9 of IP 10 states [t]he officer should be guided by the following principles and guidelines. Under the subheading Processing the request officers are instructed in section 9.2:



The request for relief must be processed only if the officer is satisfied that the applicant is inadmissible on grounds of national security.



After having reviewed all the information, if the officer determines that the person is not inadmissible on grounds of national security, processing of the application for permanent residence will continue. [Underlining added.]



(d) Under the subheading After issuance of Ministers decision officers are instructed in section 9.5:



A faxed copy of the Ministers decision will be forwarded to the CIC. Where the decision is positive, the client should be informed that they are not inadmissible on grounds of national security and processing of the application for permanent residence should continue.



Where the decision is negative, the client should be issued a refusal letter and action taken pursuant to section 8.8 above. The refusal letter (see Appendix F) should indicate that the application for permanent residence is refused as the applicant was determined to be inadmissible and the Minister did not grant relief. [Underlining added.]



(e) Returning to section 9 of IP 10, one of the principles set out to guide officers is found in section 9.1:

The national interest provisions are intended to be exceptional. A6(3) precludes any delegation from the Minister. The following principles apply:



The decision to grant relief is entirely within the discretion of the Minister. The role of the officer is primarily to ensure that accurate and complete information is placed before the Minister so that the Minister can make an informed decision. [Underlining added.]



Section 9.2 and Appendix D thereto instruct that preparing the request for relief report and the request to the Minister should consist of three parts:



1. The clients submission and all supporting documentation;



2. A report prepared by the officer addressing the applicants current situation with respect to the ground of inadmissibility and any exceptional circumstances to be taken into account. This includes:



details of the immigration application;



basis for refugee protection, if applicable;



other grounds of inadmissibility, if applicable;



activities while in Canada;



details of family in Canada or abroad;



any Canadian interest;



any personal or exceptional circumstances to be considered.



3. A recommendation to the Minister prepared by the CBSA, NHQ. In order to assess the current situation regarding the ground of inadmissibility, evidence must be produced to address the questions stated in the following table:



[35]It is contrary to logic and to these instructions that a less than complete or final report with respect to an applicants ground of inadmissibility would be provided to the Minister. Logic, and these instructions, favor the view that the final position on inadmissibility be put before the Minister before he is asked to exercise his discretion with respect to ministerial relief.

[36]I do note that in the present case, the second decision of May 8, 2006 was materially expanded upon, as discussed above. This seems to be contrary to the instructions found in IP 10. Further, Mr. Naeem was not invited to provide further submissions to the officer before the May 8, 2006 memorandum was prepared. If this was a new final decision, based upon additional considerations, fairness would have required that Mr. Naeem be given an opportunity to make further submissions, particularly in view of the officers apparently changed view of Mr. Naeems credibility (or at the least, the altered expression of her opinion as to his credibility).




Having interviewed Mr. Naeem and reviewing the information on file it is clear that he was a self[?]admitted member of APMSO and MQM.



He has admitted that there was violence and in fighting MQM?A against MQM?H and the rangers on the Karachi campuses and elsewhere. He feels MQM was not a terrorist organization and was labelled so by the Government. This was in his opinion influenced by the propaganda in the media and press.



There is sufficient reliable information which I shared with the applicant to conclude the APMSO and MQM?A [were] involved in acts of terrorism during the time frame 1988?1999. We discussed information outlined in: Amnesty InternationalLibrary?Pakistan. [Footnote omitted.]



AI concluded on page 23 In Karachi, the two factions of the MQM, the factions of the Jeay Sindh and different religious groupings are pitted against each other and several of them oppose the Government. These confused lines of conflict have enabled each group as also the Government to hold others responsible for abuses. However, AI believes that the available evidence strongly suggests that [all] the armed opposition groups operating in Karachi are responsible for torture, abductions and killings. [Footnotes omitted.]



These materials are all available to the public and [are] not classified.



These reports are from a reliable unbiased source. I have confidence in the validity of the source and have concluded the MQM?A has indeed been involved in acts of terrorism, such as assault, kidnapping and revenge killings during the time frame 1988 until 1999 when Mr. Naeem was a member of both the student wing APMSO and MQM?A.



[43]Mr. Naeem asserts that the officer erred in finding that the APMSO and the MQM?A qualified, under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act, as organizations that engage, have engaged or will engage in terrorism as contemplated by paragraph 34(1)(c) of the Act.



[44]The jurisprudence of this Court with respect to the determination of whether an entity is a terrorist organization was summarized succinctly by my colleague Mr. Justice Mosley in Jalil, cited above. There, he wrote at paragraphs 22 through 25:



The Court has dealt with the issue of terrorist organization in Fuentes v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] 4 F.C. 249 (T.D.). Mr. Justice Franois J. Lemieux noted that in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, the Supreme Court of Canada had provided both a functional and a stipulative definition of the term terrorism. The functional approach consisted of defining terrorism by reference to specific acts of violence (e.g. hijacking, hostage?taking and terrorist bombing) spelled out in the annexed list of treaties to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism [GA Res. 54/109, 9 December 1999] (the Convention).



[45]Justice Mosley went on to conclude that in the case before him, the officer had erred in the following respects [at paragraphs 30-32]:



On the reasonableness standard of review, a determination that the organization to which the applicant belonged engaged or engages in terrorism must be supported by reasons that will withstand a somewhat probing examination as described by Justice Iacobucci in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, at paragraph 56.



The respondent may well be correct that the acts attributed to the MQM?A fall within the Suresh definition, or of the similar definition added to the Criminal Code by the Anti?terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41, but that is not apparent from a reading of the officers notes or her decision letter. There is no indication as to what she means when she says that MQM?A is an organization that has engaged in terrorism other than through a listing of acts described as terrorist activities. Thus it is impossible to determine how the officer defined terrorism in assessing these acts. She has simply asserted that MQM is a known organization that has participated in terrorist activities without explaining how she understood and applied those terms.



A reader of the officers decision letter and notes does not have a clear picture of what the officer understood terrorism to mean and how that understanding was applied to the organization in question. The officer should have provided the definition she relied upon and explained how the listed acts met the definition. Her failure to do so means that her reasons do not stand up to a somewhat probing scrutiny. Accordingly, the application will be granted and the matter remitted for reconsideration by a different officer.



[46]In my view, the officers decision in the present case suffers from the same inadequacy. There is no indication as to how the officer understood and applied the definition of terrorism. The reasons do not set out the details and circumstances of the acts characterized to be terrorist acts. Acts such as kidnapping, assault and murder are undoubtedly criminal, but are not necessarily acts of terrorism. It was incumbent on the officer to explain why she viewed them to be terrorist acts. Her failure to do so leads to the conclusion that her reasons do not withstand somewhat probing scrutiny.



[47]For these reasons, the first decision was made in error and should be set aside.



5. What is the standard of review to be applied to the Ministers decision on the application for ministerial relief?



[48]The parties agree that the Court must grant deference to the Ministers exercise of discretion on questions of national interest. Therefore, the applicable standard of review to be applied to the Ministers decision is patent unreasonableness. I adopt the pragmatic and functional analysis conducted by Chief Justice Lutfy in Miller v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2007] 3 F.C.R. 438 (F.C.) and agree that the standard of review is patent unreasonableness.



[49]In C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, at paragraphs 164 and 165 Mr. Justice Binnie, for the majority of the Court, explained review on the standard of patent unreasonableness in the following terms:



However, applying the more deferential patent unreasonableness standard, a judge should intervene if persuaded that there is no room for reasonable disagreement as to the decision makers failure to comply with the legislative intent. In a sense, like the correctness standard, the patently unreasonable standard admits only one answer. A correctness approach means that there is only one proper answer. A patently unreasonable one means that there could have been many appropriate answers, but not the one reached by the decision maker.



A patently unreasonable appointment, then, is one whose defect is immedia[te] or obviou (Southam, supra, at para. 57), and so flawed in terms of implementing the legislative intent that no amount of curial deference can properly justify letting it stand (Ryan, supra, at para. 52).



6. What are the reasons of the Minister for his negative decision?



[50]The parties also agree that the Ministers reasons should be taken to be the memorandum of the President of the CBSA that recommended that ministerial relief not be granted to Mr. Naeem. I agree that, because the Minister adopted the negative recommendation, the memorandum should serve as his reasons. See also: Miller, cited above, at paragraphs 55 through 63.



[51]In oral argument counsel for the Minister agreed that the rationale for the Ministers decision is contained in that portion of the memorandum found under the heading Recommendation. In full, that portion of the memorandum is as follows:

We do not recommend that Ministerial relief be granted to Mr. Naeem as per section 34(2) of IRPA to overcome his inadmissibility pursuant to section 34(1)(f) of IRPA. Section 34(2) states: The matters referred to in subsection (1) do not constitute inadmissibility in respect of a permanent resident or a foreign national who satisfies the Minister that their presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest.



Mr. Naeem was a member of the MQM for eleven years. He was nominated to a leadership level in the student wing of the MQM while attending National College. He met a number of times each year with other executive leaders to plan actions that would further the cause of the Mohajir students.



It was under his leadership that a group of students clashed with police and he was arrested and beaten. He was warned to desist from further activities with the MQM. He disregarded the warning and was arrested a few months later at a MQM office. He was detained for one week and released. One month later, a more serious altercation with the police took place while travelling with party members to Hyderabad. Police opened fire and a number of party members were killed.



Mr. Naeem described himself as a prominent member of the MQM and, as such, a target for police arrest. This forced him to go into hiding for a few years. Despite the threat of arrest, Mr. Naeem remained a loyal party member and continued to attend secret meetings. This led to another arrest and a week of detention during which time he was again beaten. He moved to another city but continued to remain active in the MQM and narrowly escaped an additional arrest by police. In his submissions, Mr. Naeem claimed that he was not very actively involved in the party after 1993; however, he was active enough in 1998 to attend to [sic] secret party meetings in Lahore (Appendix 3).



His prominence as a party member led to a final attack on him by members of a rival faction of the MQM, as well as threats to his family. His parents persuaded him that it would be best for everyone if he left the country.



The numerous altercations with the authorities suggest that Mr. Naeem was more than just a minor member of the MQM. He was obliged to go underground for several years and to move to another city to escape being targeted by police. During the eleven years of his membership, the MQM perpetrated numerous acts of violence and human rights abuse (Appendix 2). Despite living with the continual threat of imprisonment and beatings, Mr. Naeem remained loyal to the party. As a prominent member he would have had considerable knowledge of the violence. Despite his denial that he didnt support the use of violence, his continued membership within the party strongly suggests that he did condone it.



In his descriptions of the violence that was directed towards him by police authorities, as well as a rival MQM faction, Mr. Naeem illustrated his continued dedication to the group and his strong belief in party policies and activities. In spite of the continual threat of arrest or physical harm he remained loyal to the MQM. Violent acts were committed between rival MQM factions, against government authorities as well as the general public. His longevity within the party ranks denotes his acceptance of violent acts to attain political goals. No mention was made by Mr. Naeem of any acts of violence perpetrated by the MQM.



The rationale for our recommendation is detailed in the considerations above.

If you agree with our recommendation, Mr. Naeems application for permanent residence will be refused. He cannot be removed from Canada at this time pursuant to section 115 of IRPA, as he has been recognized as a Convention refugee and as he does not present a threat to the security of Canada.



If you do not agree and the reasons for your decision are not included in the text above, please provide the rationale for your decision.



[52]I now turn to review the Ministers decision on the standard of patent unreasonableness.



7. Did the Minister err in law by failing to consider the national interest, or by relying on patently unreasonable findings of fact, or by ignoring evidence, or by making unreasonable inferences?



[53]I begin consideration of this issue by setting out three applicable principles of law.



[54]First, the burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that his admission to Canada will not be detrimental to the national interest. See: Miller, at paragraph 64.



[55]Second, I accept the submission of counsel for the Minister that when the Minister considers whether to grant relief, the Minister is to consider, notwithstanding the applicants admissibility under subsection 34(1) of the Act, the impact the continued presence of the applicant in Canada would have upon the national interest. The Minister is not to review the soundness of the determination of inadmissibility.



[56]Third, the Ministers guidelines are intended to be instructive to the official responsible for preparing the memorandum and recommendation to the Minister. As the Supreme Court explained in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, at paragraph 36, its review of the Ministers discretion in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 was based upon the failure of the Ministers officials to comply with ministerial guidelines. In Baker, at paragraph 72, the Court described the ministerial guidelines as a useful indicator of what constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the power conferred by the applicable section of the Act. The fact that this decision was contrary to their directives is of great help in assessing whether the decision was an unreasonable exercise of the discretion conferred by the Act.



[57]The guidelines applicable to this exercise of discretion are found in the Enforcement Manual (ENF) entitled Evaluating Inadmissi-bility (Chapter ENF 2). Section 13 of ENF 2 deals with ministerial relief. In section 13.6 the concept of national interest is explained as follows:



Persons who have engaged in acts involving espionage, terrorism, human rights violations and subversion, and members of organizations engaged in such activities including organized crime, are inadmissible to Canada. The ground of inadmissibility may be overcome if the Minister of PSEP [Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness] is satisfied that their entry into Canada is not contrary to the national interest.



Whereas criminal rehabilitation is specific and results in a decision that the person is not likely to re?offend, the concept of national interest is much broader. The consideration of national interest involves the assessment and balancing of all factors pertaining to the applicants entry into Canada against the stated objectives of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act as well as Canadas domestic and international interests and obligations.



[58]Section 13.7 provides guidance with respect to the preparation of a submission to the Minister in connection with a request for relief. Section 13.7 reads:



National interest considerations



A submission to the Minister of PSEP should consist of three parts:



1. The first part must address the applicants current situation with respect to the ground of inadmissibility;



2. The second part of the submission must deal with the immigration application and humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) considerations;



3. The third part provides the recommendation.



In order to assess the current situation regarding the ground of inadmissibility, evidence must be produced to address the questions stated in the following table:



Question

Will the applicants entry into

Canada be offensive to the Canadian public?



Details



Is there satisfactory evidence that the person does not represent a danger to the public?



Was the activity an isolated event? If not, over what period of time did it occur?



When did the activities occur?



Was violence involved?



Was the person personally invol-ved or complicit in the activities of the regime/ organization?

Is the regime/ organization intern-ationally recognized as one that uses violence to achieve its goals? If so, what is the degree of violence shown by the organization?



What was the length of time that the applicant was a member of the regime/organization?



Is the organization still involved in criminal or violent activities?



What was the role or position of the person within the regime/ organization?



Did the person benefit from their membership or from the activities of the organization?



Is there evidence to indicate that the person was not aware of the atrocities/criminal/terrorist activities committed by the regime/ organization?



Question

Have all ties with the regime/organization been completely severed?



Details



Has the applicant been credible, forthright, and candid concerning the activities/membership that have barred entry into Canada or has the applicant tried to minimize his role?



What evidence exists to demonstrate that ties have been severed?



What are the details concerning disassociation from the regime/ organization? Did the applicant disassociate from the regime/ organization at the first opportunity? Why?



Is the applicant currently associated with any individuals still involved in the regime/ organization?



Does the applicants lifestyle demonstrate stability or a pattern of activity likely associated with a criminal lifestyle?



Question

Is there any indication that the applicant might be benefiting from assets obtained while a member of the organization?



Details



Is the applicants lifestyle consistent with Personal Net Worth (PNW) and current employment?



If not, provide evidence to establish that the applicants PNW did not come from criminal activities.



Question

Is there any indication that the applicant may be benefiting from previous membership in the regime/ organiza-tion?



Details



Does the applicants lifestyle demonstrate any possible benefits from former membership in the regime/organization?



Does the applicants status in the community demonstrate any special treatment due to former membership in the regime/organization?



Question

Has the person adopted the democratic values of Canadian society?



Details

What is the applicants current attitude towards the regime/ organization, his membership, and his activities on behalf of the regime/organization?



Does the applicant still share the values and lifestyle known to be associated with the organization?



Does the applicant show any remorse for their membership or activities?



What is the applicants current attitude towards violence to achieve political change?



What is the applicants attitude towards the rule of law and democratic institutions, as they are understood in Canada?



Question

The second part of the submission should deal with the immigration application and any humanitarian and compassionate considerations. This includes:



Details

details of immigration application/status;



Canadian interest including family in Canada and abroad;



is the applicant a Convention refugee;

does the applicant meet all other statutory requirements.



The recommendation should include a supporting rationale.



The rationale should demonstrate a thorough assessment and balancing of all factors relating to the entry into Canada of the person in accordance with the explanation of national interest as noted in Section 13.6 of this chapter. [Underlining added.]



[59]In the present case, the submission to the Minister consisted of a four?page memorandum prepared by the President of the CBSA and 109 attached pages, comprised of:



(i) paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act;



(ii) a backgrounder on the MQM;



(iii) Mr. Naeems personal information form;



(iv) the officers memorandum of March 7, 2005; and



(v) Mr. Naeems submissions, including those of his counsel.



[60]The submissions on Mr. Naeems behalf dealt with, among other things, the present status of the MQM Party (a recognized political party that as a result of the most recent election forms part of the government of Pakistan. A list was attached showing the members of the national and provincial assemblies, the senators and the national and provincial ministers who are members of the MQM). Additionally, photographs were enclosed of members of the MQM meeting with Canadian members of Parliament, including Prime Minister Harper, then leader of the opposition); Mr. Naeems significant financial success as a real estate agent in Canada; Mr. Naeems current lack of affiliation with the MQM and, historically, his personal lack of involvement in violence; Mr. Naeems lack of knowledge of the commission of any terrorist acts; the officers conclusion that Mr. Naeem posed no threat to Canada; the officers finding that Mr. Naeem was cooperative, credible and sincere; and a discussion of the factors relevant to consideration of the national interest.



[61]With this background, I turn to consider the memorandum prepared and placed before the Minister.



[62] It is apparent from the face of the memorandum that it fails to address a number of questions that section 13.7 of ENF 2 instructs should be addressed. Most significantly, it fails to address the questions:



? Will the applicants entry into Canada be offensive to the Canadian public?

? Have all ties with the organization been completely severed?



? Has the person adopted the democratic values of Canadian society?







[63]Also missing was consideration of the concept of national interest and the thorough assessment and balancing of all factors relating to the entry into Canada of the person in accordance with the explanation of national interest as required by section 13.7 of ENF 2.



[64]Instead, notwithstanding the officers conclusions as to credibility, sincerity and the lack of threat posed by Mr. Naeem, the full extent of the discussion of factors favoring Mr. Naeems admission is found in the following paragraph, which was contained in the portion of the Presidents memorandum providing the context of the application:



Mr. Naeem claims to have broken off any ties with the MQM since his arrival in Canada. He does acknowledge the existence of offices in Canada. He has successfully completed the Toronto Real Estate Board examinations and currently works as a real estate agent. He appears to be well established in his career. He lives alone and has no other family members in Canada.



[65]Given the presence in this case of a number of relevant factors that were favourable to Mr. Naeem I find that the failure of the memorandum (and consequently the resulting reasons) to assess and balance all of the relevant factors pertaining to the national interest as described in that portion of ENF 2, set out above, to be a reviewable error. The decision in that regard is patently unreasonable and should be set aside.



8. Is this an appropriate case for an award of costs?



[66]Mr. Naeem seeks costs on two grounds. First, he notes that the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration did not oppose the granting of leave in the first application, but then took the position when filing his further memorandum of argument that the decision was not reviewable. Second, Mr. Naeem says that the conduct of the officer in attempting to correct the deficiencies in the first decision by making further observations in the second decision, without providing him an opportunity to respond, breaches the principles of fairness.



[67]Rule 22 [as am. by SOR/2002-232, s. 11] of the Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules stipulates that no costs are payable unless the Court, for special reasons, so orders.



[68]I am not prepared to infer on the record before me bad faith or highhandedness on the part of either responsible Minister. As the officer noted in her March 7, 2005 memorandum, the guidelines in IP 10 were, at the time, new. Therefore, no costs are ordered.

9. Conclusion and certification



[69]For the above reasons, the applications for judicial review in the first and second applications are allowed and the decisions shall be set aside.



[70]In view of my conclusion that the first decision was justiciable, some question may arise as to whether or not the second decision was in fact a decision. I do not believe it is necessary for me to decide the point because I am satisfied that any such decision cannot stand in view of its interrelationship with the two decisions that have been set aside. To the extent new matters were added by the officer, it would not be appropriate to sustain the decision on that basis when the new matters were added after Mr. Naeem had filed his submissions as to why the initial decision was inadequate and he was given no chance to respond. For clarity, an order will issue allowing the application for judicial review in the third application. Parenthetically, I note that it was at least implicit in the submissions of counsel that this would be the result if the decisions at issue in the first and second applications were set aside.



[71]Counsel for each Minister shall have seven days to serve and file submissions with respect to certification of any question. Thereafter, counsel for Mr. Naeem will have seven days to file and serve responding submissions. Any reply to those submissions shall be served and filed within three days of receipt of Mr. Naeems submissions.



Schedule A



Section 87 of the Act [Immigration and Refugee Protection Act]:



87. (1) The Minister may, in the course of a judicial review, make an application to the judge for the non?disclosure of any information with respect to information protected under subsection 86(1) or information considered under section 11, 112 or 115.



(2) Section 78, except for the provisions relating to the obligation to provide a summary and the time limit referred to in paragraph 78(d), applies to the determination of the application, with any modifications that the circumstances require.



Schedule B



Rule 4 [Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules]:



4. (1) Subject to subrule (2), except to the extent that they are inconsistent with the Act or these Rules, Parts 1 to 3, 6, 7, 10 and 11 and rules 383 to 385 of the Federal Courts Rules apply to applications for leave, applications for judicial review and appeals.



(2) Rule 133 of the Federal Courts Rules does not apply to the service of an application for leave or an application for judicial review.



[. . .]



Rules 317 and 318 [Federal Courts Rules]:



317. (1) A party may request material relevant to an application that is in the possession of a tribunal whose order is the subject of the application and not in the possession of the party by serving on the tribunal and filing a written request, identifying the material requested.



(2) An applicant may include a request under subsection (1) in its notice of application.



(3) If an applicant does not include a request under subsection (1) in its notice of application, the applicant shall serve the request on the other parties.



318. (1) Within 20 days after service of a request under rule 317, the tribunal shall transmit



(a) a certified copy of the requested material to the Registry and to the party making the request; or



(b) where the material cannot be reproduced, the original material to the Registry.



(2) Where a tribunal or party objects to a request under rule 317, the tribunal or the party shall inform all parties and the Administrator, in writing, of the reasons for the objection.



(3) The Court may give directions to the parties and to a tribunal as to the procedure for making submissions with respect to an objection under subsection (2).



(4) The Court may, after hearing submissions with respect to an objection under subsection (2), order that a certified copy, or the original, of all or part of the material requested be forwarded to the Registry.
 

Arrow

Citizen
MQM Terrorist N0.6 Mohammed v. Canada

http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2006/2006fc1310/2006fc1310.html

Citation: Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2006 FC 1310, (2006), [2007] 4 F.C.R. 300
Date: October 30, 2006
Docket: IMM-7498-05

IMM?7498?05



2006 FC 1310



Zaheer Mohiuddin Mohammed (Applicant)



v.



The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Respondent)



Indexed as: Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.)



Federal Court, von Finckenstein J.Ottawa, October 30, 2006.



Citizenship and Immigration Immigration Practice Motion for non?disclosure of tribunal record for reasons of national security, public safety in context of judicial review of immigration officers denial of permanent resident status Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), ss. 86, 87 dealing with non?disclosure of materials in immigration matters Although IRPA, s. 87 applying to judicial review proceedings, limited to information under ss. 11, 86(1), 112, 115 Such information not including circumstances of applicants case Federal Courts Rules (FCR), rr. 317, 318 procedure for tribunal to object to disclosure of certain materials not incorporated by reference into Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules Application of FCR, r. 4 (gap rule) R. 318(3) invoked Procedure set out in IRPA, s. 87 followed Withheld information would be injurious to national security, safety of persons Motion granted.



Practice Gap Rule Motion for non?disclosure of tribunal record for reasons of national security, public safety brought in context of judicial review of immigration officers denial of permanent resident status Federal Court Rules (FCR), r. 4 containing gap rule to deal with lacuna in rules regarding sensitive information tribunal not wanting to disclose in judicial review of immigration decision R. 4 invoked to apply FCR, r. 318(3), follow procedure set out in Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s. 87 Motion granted.



This was a motion by the respondent for non?disclosure of the tribunal record for reasons of national security and public safety and for a declaration that the tribunal be allowed to object to disclosure by serving a written objection. It was brought in the context of an application for judicial review of the denial by an immigration officer (tribunal) of permanent resident status after the applicant was granted Convention refugee status. The denial was based on the applicants membership in the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM), an organization found to have engaged in acts of terrorism, and the applicant was considered inadmissible under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). After leave to seek judicial review was granted, the certified tribunal record was served on the parties. But the Tribunal withheld several pages of documents in its possession on the basis that disclosure of the documents would be injurious to national security or the safety of any person. The applicant then filed a motion to determine whether it was open to the respondent to provide an incomplete disclosure of the tribunal record without first seeking the Courts directions on the matter contrary to rules 317 and 318 of the Federal Courts Rules (FCR). The respondent was ordered to forward the withheld portions to the Court under seal and to bring the present motion for non?disclosure of the portions of the tribunal record it sought to withhold from the applicant. Hearing dates on the motion were subsequently scheduled.



The issue was what is the appropriate procedure to follow to determine whether part of the tribunal record should not be disclosed for national security reasons.



Held, the motion should be granted.



Rules 15, 16 and 17 of the Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules govern applications for leave to commence judicial review proceedings. They make no reference to withholding portions of the record for any reason including reasons of national security. Sections 86 and 87 of the IRPA deal with non?disclosure of materials in immigration matters. Although section 87 would normally apply to an application for judicial review, it is limited to information protected under subsection 86(1) or information arising under section 11, 112 or 115 of the IRPA. The applicants application does not involve those sections since he made an inland application for permanent residence and was considered inadmissible. Rule 4 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules (Rules) incorporates by reference parts of the FCR, but not Part 5 wherein rules 317 and 318, which provide for a procedure allowing a tribunal to object to the disclosure of certain materials are found. Thus there is a lacuna in the Rules regarding sensitive information that a tribunal does not want to disclose in cases concerning judicial reviews of immigration decisions. Rule 4 of the FCR contains a gap rule to deal with such lacuna. Because the issue here was not covered either in the Rules or in the FCR, rule 4 was applicable and was invoked to allow the Court to use FCR, rules 317 and 318. Relying on subsection 318(3) of the FCR, the procedure set out in section 87 of the IRPA was followed since it specifically refers to judicial review proceedings and the Court must stay as close as possible to the original legislative intent when filling lacuna. Parliament evidently had IRPA, section 87 in mind when considering non?disclosure in the context of judicial reviews. Moreover, although the applicant would be entitled to a summary of the suppressed information if the procedure under IRPA, section 86 were followed, the information sought to be withheld in this case would be very difficult to summarize and would be of no help to the applicant while imposing a considerable burden on the respondent.



Finally, the release of the information sought to be withheld would be injurious to national security or to the safety of persons. Therefore, the information was authorized to be released subject to the redactions indicated thereon.



statutes and regulations judicially

considered



Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C?5, s. 38 (as am. by S.C. 2001, c. 41, ss. 43, 141).

Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93?22 (as am. by SOR/2005?339, s. 1), rr. 4 (as am. idem, s. 3), 15 (as am. by SOR/2002?232, s. 8), 16, 17 (as am. idem, s. 14).

Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98?106, rr. 1 (as am. by SOR/2004?283, s. 2), 4, 317 (as am. by SOR/2002?417, s. 19), 318.

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 11, 34(1), 78 (as am by S.C. 2005, c. 10, s. 34(E)), 86, 87, 112, 115.



cases judicially considered



referred to:



Naeem v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Lemieux J., IMM?5395?05, 29/5/06 (F.C.).



MOTION for non?disclosure of part of the Tribunal record for reasons of national security and public safety brought in the context of judicial review of an immigration officers denial of permanent resident status. Motion granted.



appearances:

Lorne Waldman for applicant.



Lorne McClenaghan and Marcel R. Larouche for respondent.



solicitors of record:



Waldman & Associates, Toronto, for applicant.



Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent.



The following are the reasons for order and order rendered in English by



von Finckenstein J.:



Background



[1]Zaheer Mohiuddin Mohammed (the applicant) applied for permanent residence in Canada after being granted Convention refugee status. The application was denied on November 4, 2005, pursuant to subsection 34(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA) based on his membership in the Mohajir Quami Movement (the MQM), an organization that was found to have engaged in acts of terrorism. The applicant does not dispute that he was and is a member of the MQM, but disputes that he or the MQM engaged in acts of terrorism.



[2]The applicant was granted leave to seek judicial review in an order dated July 27, 2006, by Justice Barnes. The July 27 order directed the tribunal to send copies of its record to the parties and to the Registry of the Court by August 17, 2006.



[3]The tribunal, an immigration officer employed by Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC], prepared and certified the tribunal record and served the certified tribunal record on the Court and the parties. The certified tribunal record was accompanied by a cover letter under the signature of June Levato (Levato letter). The Levato letter disclosed that the tribunal was withholding several pages of documents in its possession on the basis that disclosure of the documents would be injurious to national security or the safety of any person.



[4]The applicant then made a motion dated September 6, 2006, to determine whether it was open to the respondent to provide an incomplete disclosure of the tribunal record without first seeking the Courts directions on the matter contrary to rules 317 [as am. by SOR/2002-417, s. 19] and 318 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98?106 [r. 1 (as am. SOR/2004-283, s. 2)] (FCR) or section 38 [as am. by S.C. 2001, c. 41, ss. 43, 141] of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C?5 (CEA).



[5]Prothonotary Lafrenire ordered the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the respondent) to forward the withheld portions to the Court under seal. He also ordered the respondent to bring a motion for non?disclosure of the portions of the tribunal record it seeks to withhold from the applicant.



[6]Consequently, the respondent has brought this motion for non?disclosure requesting:



1. A declaration that the respondent is not required to disclose the redacted portions of the certified tribunal record for reasons of national security and public safety; and



2. A declaration that the tribunal was permitted to object to disclosure by serving a written objection.

[7]On October 11, 2006, Chief Justice Lutfy ordered:



(a) an ex?parte in camera hearing to be heard the morning of October 25, 2006, in the absence of counsel for the applicant; and



(b) a public hearing of the motion of the respondent in the afternoon of October 25, 2006, with counsel for both sides being present.



Issue



[8]At the public hearing both sides agreed that there is only one issue to be decided, namely:



a. What is the appropriate procedure to be followed to determine whether part of the tribunal record may not be disclosed by reasons of national security?



Analysis



[9]Applications for leave to commence judicial review proceedings in immigration matters are governed by Rules 15 [as am. by SOR/2002-232, s. 8], 16 and 17 [as am. idem, s. 14] of the Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules [SOR/93-22 (as am. by SOR/2005-339, s. 1)] (Immigration Rules) which provide as follows:



15. (1) An order granting an application for leave



(a) shall specify the language and the date and place fixed under paragraphs 74(a) and (b) of the Act for the hearing of the application for judicial review;



(b) shall specify the time limit within which the tribunal is to send copies of its record required under Rule 17;



(c) shall specify the time limits within which further materials, if any, including affidavits, transcripts of cross?examinations, and memoranda of argument are to be served and filed;



(d) shall specify the time limits within which cross?examinations, if any, on affidavits are to be completed; and



(e) may specify any other matter that the judge considers necessary or expedient for the hearing of the application for judicial review.



(2) The Registry shall send to the tribunal a copy of an order granting leave forthwith after it is made.



(3) The tribunal shall be deemed to have received a copy of the order on the tenth day after it was sent by mail by the Registry.



16. Where leave is granted, all documents filed in connection with the application for leave shall be retained by the Registry for consideration by the judge hearing the application for judicial review.



17. Upon receipt of an order under Rule 15, a tribunal shall, without delay, prepare a record containing the following, on consecutively numbered pages and in the following order:



(a) the decision or order in respect of which the application for judicial review is made and the written reasons given therefore,



(b) all papers relevant to the matter that are in the possession or control of the tribunal,



(c) any affidavits, or other documents filed during any such hearing, and



(d) a transcript, if any, of any oral testimony given during the hearing, giving rise to the decision or order or other matter that is the subject of the application for judicial review,



and shall send a copy, duly certified by an appropriate officer to be correct, to each of the parties and two copies to the Registry.



[10]It should be noted that there is no reference to withholding portions of the record for any reason including reasons of national security as argued in this case.



[11]Sections 86 and 87 of the IRPA deal with non?disclosure of materials in immigration matters.



86. (1) The Minister may, during an admissibility hearing, a detention review or an appeal before the Immigration Appeal Division, make an application for non?disclosure of information.



(2) Section 78 applies to the determination of the application, with any modifications that the circumstances require, including that a reference to judge be read as a reference to the applicable Division of the Board.



87. (1) The Minister may, in the course of a judicial review, make an application to the judge for the non?disclosure of any information with respect to information protected under subsection 86(1) or information considered under section 11, 112 or 115.



(2) Section 78, except for the provisions relating to the obligation to provide a summary and the time limit referred to in paragraph 78(d), applies to the determination of the application, with any modifications that the circumstances require.



[12]As this case concerns an application for judicial review, section 87 ordinarily would be the applicable section. However, section 87 is limited to information protected under subsection 86(1) or information arising under section 11, 112 or 115. In this instance the applicant was accepted as a Convention refugee and made an inland application for permanent residence. His application in no way involves subsection 86(1), section 11, 112 or 115 of the IRPA. Instead, he was considered inadmissible under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA.



[13]The Immigration Rules incorporate, by reference, parts of the FCR. Rule 4 [as am. by SOR/2005-339, s. 3] of the Immigration Rules provide:



4. (1) Subject to subrule (2), except to the extent that they are inconsistent with the Act or these Rules, Parts 1 to 3, 6, 7, 10 and 11 and rules 383 to 385 of the Federal Courts Rules apply to applications for leave, applications for judicial review and appeals.



(2) Rule 133 of the Federal Courts Rules does not apply to the service of an application for leave or an application for judicial review.



[14]Rules 317 and 318 of the FCR provide for a procedure allowing a tribunal to object to the disclosure of certain materials. They provide as follows:



317. (1) A party may request material relevant to an application that is in the possession of a tribunal whose order is the subject of the application and not in the possession of the party by serving on the tribunal and filing a written request, identifying the material requested.



(2) An applicant may include a request under subsection (1) in its notice of application.



(3) If an applicant does not include a request under subsection (1) in its notice of application, the applicant shall serve the request on the other parties.



318. (1) Within 20 days after service of a request under rule 317, the tribunal shall transmit



(a) a certified copy of the requested material to the Registry and to the party making the request; or



(b) where the material cannot be reproduced, the original material to the Registry.



(2) Where a tribunal or party objects to a request under rule 317, the tribunal or the party shall inform all parties and the Administrator, in writing, of the reasons for the objection.



(3) The Court may give directions to the parties and to a tribunal as to the procedure for making submissions with respect to an objection under subsection (2).



(4) The Court may, after hearing submissions with respect to an objection under subsection (2), order that a certified copy, or the original, of all or part of the material requested be forwarded to the Registry.



[15]Unfortunately, rules 317 and 318 are found in Part 5 of the FCR. Rule 4 of the Immigration Rules does not incorporate Part 5 into said Rules.



[16]Thus, there seems to be a lacuna in the Rules for dealing with sensitive information that a tribunal does not want to disclose in cases concerning judicial review of immigration decisions.



[17]To deal with such a lacuna, the FCR contain a so-called gap rule within rule 4, which provides:



4. On motion, the Court may provide for any procedural matter not provided for in these Rules or in an Act of Parliament by analogy to these Rules or by reference to the practice of the superior court of the province to which the subject?matter of the proceeding most closely relates.



[18]It strikes me that rule 4 is directly applicable to the situation at hand. Here we are dealing with a situation where the parties have brought a motion asking me to deal with an issue not covered either in the Immigration Rules or the FCR.



[19]Parenthetically, I would like to note that no one appearing before me on this motion advanced the proposition that material injurious to national security or the safety of persons must be disclosed by reason of the lack of procedure for non?disclosure. Both parties before me only stressed that the decision as to whether something can be withheld or not should be made by the court and not by the respondent alone. I certainly agree with that proposition.



[20]The closest analogy can be found in rules 317 and 318 of the FCR. I shall therefore deal with the subject-matter of this motion by invoking rule 4 so as to allow me to use rules 317 and 318.



[21]Subsection 318(3) of the FCR allows for directions as to the procedure to be followed. The question therefore arises as to what type of procedure should be invoked.



[22]The parties are unanimous that three types of analogous procedures exist that could be invoked:



(a) section 38 of the CEA; or



(b) the procedure set out in section 86 of the IRPA; or



(c) the procedure set out in section 87 of the IRPA.



[23]The parties also agree that the procedure in section 38 of the CEA is unduly complicated, would require a separate application and would involve another party, the Attorney General of Canada. I agree and, in the spirit of dealing with applications for judicial review expeditiously, I discard the CEA option.



[24]As between sections 86 and 87, the difference lies in the applicants entitlement to a summary under section 86 as to the suppressed information, while the same is not available under section 87.



[25]The respondent advocates following the procedure set out in section 87, while the applicant submits that section 86 is more appropriate. The applicants rationale being that while the applicant should not know the material that falls under the national security umbrella, he is entitled to a summary so that he knows at least the ambit of the information that works against him.



[26]In this case the applicant has been advised that he is not being granted permanent residency, as he is considered to be inadmissible by virtue of paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA, i.e. being a member of an organization in which there are reasonable grounds to believe engages or has engaged or will engage in acts of terrorism. The decision of the CIC officer T. Argyrides, dated November 4, 2005, in the underlying application for judicial review states:



I have considered the documentary evidence presented by counsel on record on behalf of Mr. Mohammad (sic), his admission of his membership with the MQM (Altaf faction) and his support of the parties ideology and principals. It is this officers opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Mohammad (sic) is a member of the MQM Altaf group, an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe is or was engaged in terrorist activity. [Application record, at p. 9.]



[27]The applicant is thus aware that it is his membership in the MQM that caused the immigration officer to consider him inadmissible.



[28]Section 87 refers specifically to judicial review proceedings, while section 86 is more geared to non? admissibility hearings based on ministerial certificates. It behooves the Court when filling lacuna to stay as close as possible to the original legislative intent. In this case, Parliament evidently had section 87 in mind when considering non?disclosure in the context of judicial reviews. Accordingly, it seems to me that section 87 is the more appropriate procedure to be used under these circumstances.



[29]In addition, I would note that a summarizing some of the information normally sought to be withheld (i.e. relating to CSIS [Canadian Security Intelligence Service] procedures, file numbers, contacts, working relationships and names of CSIS personnel) is extremely difficult, would be of no help to the applicant yet imposes a considerable burden on the respondent. Finally, I see that my colleague, Lemieux J., equally ordered a motion under section 87 in the similar case of Naeem v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), file number IMM 5395?05 on May 29, 2006.



[30]This morning I reviewed in camera in the absence of applicants counsel, the materials the respondent wishes to withhold. I am satisfied that the release of the information sought to be withheld would be injurious to national security or to the safety of persons. I, therefore, have authorized the release of the information subject to the redactions indicated thereon.



[31]This application for judicial review shall now proceed on the basis of the tribunal record made of:



(a) the portion already furnished to the applicant; and



(b) the remainder redacted as per my order of October 27, 2006.



[32]Adapting section 78 [as am. by S.C. 2005, c. 10, s. 34(E)] to the circumstances of an application for judicial review (as mandated by subsection 87(2)), I am of the view that:



1. The hearing on the merits should be conducted in two parts:



a public hearing the morning of November 20, 2006, with counsel for both sides being present; and



an ex?parte in camera hearing to be heard in the afternoon of November 20, 2006, in the absence of counsel for the Applicant.



2. When making its decision on the merits in the judicial review application the Court will consider both:



the publicly available Tribunal record; and



the information in the redacted portions of the Tribunal record, available at the in camera hearing, to the extent, if any, that pertains to the applicant.



[33]Finally this matter should have come before the Court by way of motion of the respondent urging the Court to adopt the procedure spelled out above. It is hoped that this will happen in future cases. Given that the applicant had to bring this matter to the attention of this Court, an order for costs of this motion in favour of the applicant will issue.



ORDER



THIS COURT ORDERS that:



1. The motion for non?disclosure of part of the Tribunal record is granted. The respondent shall file with the Court and serve the applicant with the redacted version of the Tribunal record as attached to my order of October 27, 2006.



2. The hearing of the application on the merits of this case on November 20, 2006, will take place in two parts:



a public hearing the morning of November 20, 2006, with counsel for both sides being present; and



an ex?parte in camera hearing to be heard in the afternoon of November 20, 2006, in the absence of counsel for the applicant.



3. The applicant shall have his costs in this motion.
 

Arrow

Citizen
MQM Terrorist N0.7 Samimifar v. Canada

Citation: Samimifar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2006 FC 1301, (2006), [2007] 3 F.C.R. 663
Date: October 30, 2006
Docket: IMM-6468-03

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IMM-6468-03



2006 FC 1301



Hassan Samimifar (Plaintiff)



v.



The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Her Majesty the Queen (Defendants)



Indexed as: Samimifar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.)



Federal Court, Snider J.Toronto, September 26; Ottawa, October 30, 2006.



Citizenship and Immigration Immigration Practice Motion for summary judgment under Federal Courts Rules, rr. 213 to 219 dismissing action for damages caused by negligence, unreasonable delay on ground no issue for trial Plaintiff seeking permanent resident status in 1985 Granted approval-in-principle in 1994 to accept, process application for permanent residence (PR application) from within Canada but PR application refused in 2003 because plaintiff found inadmissible under Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), s. 34(1)(f) That decision quashed on judicial review, redetermination ordered Plaintiff bringing action in negligence, for violation of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7, 24(1) because of unreasonable delay, abuse of process Because plaintiff attacking delay, not denial of PR application, not precluded from bringing action because not first seeking relief under Federal Courts Act, s. 18.1 However, claims for damages based on lack of permanent resident status struck since admissibility, PR application not yet determined; such damages could not be linked to alleged delay in processing Right to bring application for mandamus during period of delay not barring action for damages Such right exhausted when PR application refused in 2003 Motion dismissed.



Practice Summary Judgment Motion for summary judgment under Federal Courts Rules, rr. 213 to 219 dismissing action alleging negligence, breach of Canadian Charter of Rights and Fredoms based on undue delays in processing permanent residence application Summary judgment granted only when no genuine issue for trial Relevant principles, test in determining whether summary judgment should be granted in present motion examined, applied.



Crown Torts Motion for summary judgment under Federal Courts Rules, rr. 213 to 219 dismissing action alleging negligence, breach of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Two-part test set out in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council applied Reliance, proximity between plaintiff, specific immigration officer allegedly responsible for processing application and with whom plaintiff had regular contact during period of delay giving rise to duty of care Although compelling policy considerations justifying dismissal of action, not precluding imposition of duty of care where, as here, immigration officer completely ignoring file Negligence allegation could not be dealt with on motion for summary judgment.



Constitutional Law Charter of Rights Life, Liberty and Security Motion for summary judgment under Federal Courts Rules, rr. 213 to 219 dismissing action for damages alleging negligence, breach of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , ss. 7, 24(1) Whether Charter, s. 7 engaged, whether deprivation contrary to principles of fundamental justice Evidence plaintiff suffering severe psychological harm extending beyond mere grief, sorrow emotional distress caused by unreasonable delay in processing permanent residence application Behaviour of officials responsible for plaintiffs file requiring extensive review Genuine issue to be tried with respect to Charter damages.



This was a motion for summary judgment pursuant to rules 213 to 219 of the Federal Courts Rules (Rules) dismissing all or part of the plaintiffs claim set out in the further amended statement of claim on the grounds that there was no issue for trial. In particular, it was alleged that the plaintiff failed to pursue his available judicial review remedies and that there is no private law duty of care owed by immigration officials to the plaintiff that would give rise to potential liability in negligence or that would allow recovery of damages pursuant to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter). The plaintiff, an Iranian, came to Canada in 1985 and has since been seeking permanent resident status. On November 14, 1994, he was granted approval-in-principle to accept and process his application for permanent residence (PR application) from within Canada. From the time he submitted his application to January 2003, when he was informed that his PR application was refused because he was inadmissible to Canada under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) (reasonable grounds to believe that he was a member of a terrorist organization), his PR application does not seem to have been processed. In May 2003, on judicial review, that decision was quashed and a redetermination was ordered and is still pending. The plaintiff also brought an action against the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on August 20, 2003 and later added Her Majesty the Queen as a defendant, claiming negligence and violation of his rights under section 7 and subsection 24(1) of the Charter. Essentially, the plaintiff claims that the unreasonable delay and abuse of process have resulted in a loss of business, employment and education opportunities, out-of-pocket expenses for him, his common-law wife and children and emotional distress and suffering. He also seeks declaratory relief under section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 but conceded that this declaration cannot normally be combined with a claim under the Charter. The period of alleged delay that gave rise to the plaintiffs claims in damages began in 1994, when he was approved in principle for PR status and ended either in 2001, when his file started to be processed, or in 2003 when he was refused admissibility to Canada.



The main issue was whether there was a genuine issue for trial. The sub-issues were: (1) what is the test for summary judgment; (2) whether the plaintiff is precluded from bringing the action because he did not first seek relief by way of extraordinary remedy under section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act (FCA); (3) whether the defendant owes the plaintiff an actionable private duty of care that would give rise to potential liability in negligence; and (4) whether the plaintiff can seek damages for breach of his Charter rights.



Held, the motion should be dismissed.



(1) Summary judgment should be granted where there is no genuine issue for trial. In determining whether summary judgment should be granted in the present motion, the following relevant principles were applied: the general test is whether the case is so doubtful and clearly without foundation that it deserves no further consideration; each case should be interpreted within its own factual context; a question of fact and law may be determined on the motion if it can be done on the material before the Court; summary judgment should not be granted if the necessary facts cannot be found or doing so would be unjust; and the matter should proceed to trial where the outcome depends on serious issues of credibility or where the material facts are in dispute.



(2) The plaintiff could not be precluded from bringing this action because he did not first seek relief by way of extraordinary remedy under section 18.1 of the FCA. The plaintiff is attacking the delay and seeking damages for the consequences flowing therefrom. Such delay was not a decision and was no longer affecting the plaintiff since a final decision in his case had already been made. Therefore, it was open to him to bring an action claiming damages. Also, the plaintiffs action was not a collateral attack on the January 2003 decision denying admissibility that could have been pursued by way of judicial review. His statement of claim demonstrated that the alleged damages arose purely from the delay, not the effect of the negative PR administrative decision. However, because the plaintiffs PR application has not been determined and it is not yet known whether the applicant is admissible, no damages based on a lack of status as a permanent resident can be linked to the alleged delay and therefore those claims had to be struck. Finally, the plaintiff could not be barred from bringing the action for damages because he had the right to bring an application for mandamus during the period of delay. The 2003 PR application refusal exhausted those rights and therefore an application for mandamus could not be brought since it would have no practical possibility and would not address the delay from 1994 to 2003.



(3) In determining whether there was potential liability in negligence, the two-part test set out in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council was applied. In the first part of the testwhether the circumstances disclosed reasonably foreseeable harm and proximity sufficient to establish a prima facie duty of carealthough the relationship between the government and the governed regarding policy matters is not one of individual proximity, there are situations where the Crown is liable as a person and a duty of care exists. In this case, because there was a specific officer who was allegedly responsible for processing the plaintiffs application and with whom he was in regular contact during much of the period of delay, there was more than mere delay: there was reliance and proximity between the plaintiff and the immigration officer to process his application in a timely fashion and this gave rise to a duty of care. Despite the fact that the Minister has no statutory duty to render a decision in a specific amount of time and delays in the processing of immigration applications are inherent to the system, a common-law duty of care may arise if the facts are sufficient to support the action.



The second part of the testwhether residual policy considerations exist which justify dismissing the action in liability summarilywas answered in the negative. While some policy considerations (e.g. where the imposition of a duty of care would hamper the effective performance of the system of immigration control and the spectre of indeterminate liability would loom large if a common-law duty of care was recognized between the Crown and an immigration applicant) are very compelling, they do not preclude imposition of a duty of care where an immigration officer completely ignores a file, which apparently happened herein. Consequently, the negligence allegation was not an issue that could be dealt with on a motion for summary judgment.



(4) In order to determine whether the plaintiff could claim damages for breach of section 7 Charter rights, it had to be determined whether section 7 was engaged and whether the deprivation was contrary to the principles of fundamental justice. Because there was evidence that the plaintiff had suffered severe psychological harm, which extended beyond mere grief, sorrow or emotional distress as a result of the processing delays, there was an issue for trial. In some cases, delay by state officials can result in a determination that the conduct was not consistent with the principles of natural justice and therefore constituted a breach of the section 7 requirement for fundamental justice. In the present case, the behaviour of the officials who were responsible for the plaintiffs file during the period between 1994 and 2003 will have to be extensively reviewed and was better left for trial. As for damages, if the allegations in the pleadings are proven at trial, they would be considered a gross departure from the behaviour expected from public servants and could give rise to a claim for Charter damages. Therefore, there was a genuine issue to be tried with respect to Charter damages based on the plaintiffs psychological harm caused by negligence or unreasonable delay.



statutes and regulations judicially

considered



Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44], ss. 7, 24(1).

Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6.

Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44], s. 52.

Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C?50, ss. 1 (as am. by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 21), 3 (as am. by S.C. 2001, c. 4, s. 36), 10 (as am. idem, s. 40).

Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, ss. 1 (as am. by S.C. 2000, c. 8, s. 14), 18.1 (as enacted by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 5; 2002, c. 8, s. 27).

Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, rr. 1 (as am. by SOR/2004-283, s. 2), 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219.

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 3(1)(f), 34(1)(f), 72(1) (as am. by S.C. 2002, c. 8, s. 194).



cases judicially considered





ORDER



THIS COURT ORDERS that:



1. The motion is dismissed with costs to the plaintiff, in any event of the cause.



2. The plaintiff will have 30 days from the date of this order to serve and file a further further amended statement of claim;



3. The defendant will have 30 days from the date of service of the further further amended statement of claim to file a further further statement of defence; and



4. The filing dates provided in this order may be amended upon consent of both parties and written notice to the Court.



Federal Courts Rules



213. (1) A plaintiff may, after the defendant has filed a defence, or earlier with leave of the Court, and at any time before the time and place for trial are fixed, bring a motion for summary judgment on all or part of the claim set out in the statement of claim.



(2) A defendant may, after serving and filing a defence and at any time before the time and place for trial are fixed, bring a motion for summary judgment dismissing all or part of the claim set out in the statement of claim.



214. (1) A party may bring a motion for summary judgment in an action by serving and filing a notice of motion and motion record at least 20 days before the day set out in the notice for the hearing of the motion.



(2) A party served with a motion for summary judgment shall serve and file a respondent's motion record not later than 10 days before the day set out in the notice of motion for the hearing of the motion.



215. A response to a motion for summary judgment shall not rest merely on allegations or denials of the pleadings of the moving party, but must set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.



216. (1) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial with respect to a claim or defence, the Court shall grant summary judgment accordingly.



(2) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court is satisfied that the only genuine issue is



(a) the amount to which the moving party is entitled, the Court may order a trial of that issue or grant summary judgment with a reference under rule 153 to determine the amount; or



(b) a question of law, the Court may determine the question and grant summary judgment accordingly.



(3) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court decides that there is a genuine issue with respect to a claim or defence, the Court may nevertheless grant summary judgment in favour of any party, either on an issue or generally, if the Court is able on the whole of the evidence to find the facts necessary to decide the questions of fact and law.



(4) Where a motion for summary judgment is dismissed in whole or in part, the Court may order the action, or the issues in the action not disposed of by summary judgment, to proceed to trial in the usual way or order that the action be conducted as a specially managed proceeding.



217. A plaintiff who obtains summary judgment under these Rules may proceed against the same defendant for any other relief and against any other defendant for the same or any other relief.



218. Where summary judgment is refused or is granted only in part, the Court may make an order specifying which material facts are not in dispute and defining the issues to be tried, including an order



(a) for payment into court of all or part of the claim;



(b) for security for costs; or



(c) limiting the nature and scope of the examination for discovery to matters not covered by the affidavits filed on the motion for summary judgment or by any cross-examination on them and providing for their use at trial in the same manner as an examination for discovery.



219. In making an order for summary judgment, the Court may order that enforcement of the summary judgment be stayed pending the determination of any other issue in the action or in a counterclaim or third party claim.
 

GeoG

Chief Minister (5k+ posts)
such said:
GeoG said:
sobia403 said:
such said:
i asked u to post the actual web address of this news paper with date news and date of that news .............if exists

When you want something from somebody you say I request and then also say please.This is common courtesey.

Their Common Courtsey is Bori Band Lash,
But Time has come to put the culprits in Coffins
.


JAB TUM SAY BAAT KI JAYE TOU BOLA KERO ADAT SAY MAJBOOR HO KER BHONKNA NA SHURU HO JAYA KERO.... baat ya sawal kisi or say kero tou tum q dum hilatay hoye aajatay ho. either u r looser who always runs after females, waisay keep it up soon u ll get it wat u r running for , "kia khoob jamaygi jab mil baithain gay ****** 2" coz u can't stand normal human beings or tum hi dono id's use kertay ho, or kitny id's hai tumharay pass........sick n filthy mind a

Zara Sab Ka Jawab Parho, Kis Nay Kis Ko Jawab Diya, Aur Sharam Say Doob ... [funnny] [funnny]
 

GeoG

Chief Minister (5k+ posts)
Re: MQM Terrorist N0.1. Baqri v. Canada

Jury, Do you get paid for reading as well.
Good Luck, If you do
Have Fun, If you don't
 

Jury

Chief Minister (5k+ posts)
PakPatriot1 said:
@Khalid:
You are exposed by yourself now. Do you know this man on the picture Mr.safdar Baqri is standing with whom?
That is Mr. Stephen Harper, the prime minister of Canada.
So you are telling that Mr. Harper-the PM of Canada has close ties with terrorist. :?

Masha Allah on your wisdom. Keep it bro, you are a gem. Because of you many filths are being exposed by themselves.
 

Jury

Chief Minister (5k+ posts)
Cupertino said:
I would like to request you that please provide the actual web address of the this news paper with a link to the article. Very much obliged.

In fact, I remember seeing one talk show where as usual IK bringing up this matter and Haider Abbass Rizvi challenged him to produce the court decision and he backed out as usual (like AH in handcuffs by end of 2007 promise). I never heard him bring up this issue again. Therefore, I am curious about the authenticity of this report.
Haider Abbas Rizvi challenge to Imran Khan
On Canadian Court Ruling.

 

dukelondon

Senator (1k+ posts)
Re: MQM Terrorist N0.1. Baqri v. Canada

What the hell is this man?? Summarize please. What are you trying to say??? Can you state briefly?? No one has the time to read all of this.
 

Arrow

Citizen
Re: MQM Terrorist N0.1. Baqri v. Canada

dukelondon said:
What the hell is this man?? Summarize please. What are you trying to say??? Can you state briefly?? No one has the time to read all of this.
This is list of MQM Terrorists cases in Canadian courts

[hilar] [hilar] [hilar]

1 Baqri v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (T.D.), 2001 FCT 1096, [2002] 2 F.C. 85 Date: October 9, 2001
http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2001/2001f ... t1096.html

Image
More info. on this terrorist can be found here:
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story. ... dc304164e1


2 Jalil v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2006 FC 246, [2006] 4 F.C.R. 471 Date: February 24, 2006
http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2006/2006f ... fc246.html


3 Ali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2004 FC 1174, [2005] 1 F.C.R. 485 Date: August 26, 2004
http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2004/2004f ... c1174.html


4 Jilani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1354, [2008] 2 F.C.R. D-6 Date: December 21, 2007
http://recueil.cmf.gc.ca/eng/2007/2007f ... c1354.html


5 Naeem v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2007 FC 123, [2007] 4 F.C.R. 658 Date: February 7, 2007
http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2007/2007fc123/2007fc123.html[url]


6 Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2006 FC 1310, [2007] 4 F.C.R. 300 Date: October 30, 2006
http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2006/2006f ... c1310.html


7 Samimifar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2006 FC 1301, [2007] 3 F.C.R. 663 Date: October 30, 2006
http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2006/2006f ... c1301.html
 

Arrow

Citizen
Jury said:
PakPatriot1 said:
@Khalid:
You are exposed by yourself now. Do you know this man on the picture Mr.safdar Baqri is standing with whom?
That is Mr. Stephen Harper, the prime minister of Canada.
So you are telling that Mr. Harper-the PM of Canada has close ties with terrorist. :?

Masha Allah on your wisdom. Keep it bro, you are a gem. Because of you many filths are being exposed by themselves.

Shukria Skhukria, Thanks for admitting yourself being a FILTH.
[hilar] [hilar] [hilar]
Not a news anyway, otherwise the world knows it already.
And people like yourself logging in with multiple identities think the same about others.
 

such

Voter (50+ posts)
GeoG said:
such said:
GeoG said:
sobia403 said:
such said:
i asked u to post the actual web address of this news paper with date news and date of that news .............if exists

When you want something from somebody you say I request and then also say please.This is common courtesey.

Their Common Courtsey is Bori Band Lash,
But Time has come to put the culprits in Coffins
.


JAB TUM SAY BAAT KI JAYE TOU BOLA KERO ADAT SAY MAJBOOR HO KER BHONKNA NA SHURU HO JAYA KERO.... baat ya sawal kisi or say kero tou tum q dum hilatay hoye aajatay ho. either u r looser who always runs after females, waisay keep it up soon u ll get it wat u r running for , "kia khoob jamaygi jab mil baithain gay ****** 2" coz u can't stand normal human beings or tum hi dono id's use kertay ho, or kitny id's hai tumharay pass........sick n filthy mind a

Zara Sab Ka Jawab Parho, Kis Nay Kis Ko Jawab Diya, Aur Sharam Say Doob ... [funnny] [funnny]
first look wat i have posted then reply, i wrote in yr reply..... issi leye tou kehta hon k hamesha ki tarha dum hilatay hoye or zaban latkatay hoye matt chala aya ker
 

gazoomartian

Prime Minister (20k+ posts)
Re: MQM Terrorist N0.1. Baqri v. Canada

moderators. Could you please read and sumemrize them for us?? :)

Arrow: you have done good research but I would have posted few and links instead of posting the whole book [hilar]
 

Jury

Chief Minister (5k+ posts)
Re: MQM Terrorist N0.1. Baqri v. Canada

MQM Haider Abbas Rizvi Challenge To Imran Khan
 

sagaciouscorpion

MPA (400+ posts)
Re: MQM Terrorist N0.1. Baqri v. Canada

I dont have the time to read this long story...

But is Haider Abbas Rizwi resigning or IK leaving the politics???
 

Jury

Chief Minister (5k+ posts)
Re: MQM Terrorist N0.1. Baqri v. Canada

sagaciouscorpion said:
I dont have the time to read this long story...

But is Haider Abbas Rizwi resigning or IK leaving the politics???
Dr Farooq Sattar
Was Presented Shields By Canadian Assembly in October, 2009.

http://express.com.pk/images/NP_KHI/20090403/Sub_Images/1100594460-1.gif
1100594460-1.gif


02 Apr 2009:
Karachi Apr 02: Canada Pakistan Friendship Association has given best mayor award to City Nazim Syed Mustafa Kamal at the Pakistan Day annual dinner in Mississauga. EDO Municipal Services CDGK, Masood Alam on behalf of Nazim Karachi Syed Mustafa Kamal received the award which also included a recognition certificate and pin from the province of Ontario.

The award committee of CPFA had chosen two outstanding mayors from Canada and Pakistan. The other recipient of the best mayor award was Hazel McCallion- the mayor of Canadian City Mississauga.

On this occasion the CPFA also awarded outstanding Community Leaders in harmonizing communities and providing community services.

Large number of Pakistanis and Canadian government officials were present on this occasion.


In a letter to City Nazim Syed Mustafa Kamal, the Secretary of Canada Pakistan Friendship Association Mohammad Sultan Qureshi has said that the best mayor award is the recognition of your outstanding work to bring Karachi upto World Class City.
 

Star Gazer

Chief Minister (5k+ posts)
Re: MQM Terrorist N0.1. Baqri v. Canada

Jury said:
sagaciouscorpion said:
I dont have the time to read this long story...

But is Haider Abbas Rizwi resigning or IK leaving the politics???
Dr Farooq Sattar
Was Presented Shields By Canadian Assembly in October, 2009.

[video]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Wa-8pwmhGA[/video]
http://express.com.pk/images/NP_KHI/20090403/Sub_Images/1100594460-1.gif
1100594460-1.gif


02 Apr 2009:
Karachi Apr 02: Canada Pakistan Friendship Association has given best mayor award to City Nazim Syed Mustafa Kamal at the Pakistan Day annual dinner in Mississauga. EDO Municipal Services CDGK, Masood Alam on behalf of Nazim Karachi Syed Mustafa Kamal received the award which also included a recognition certificate and pin from the province of Ontario.

The award committee of CPFA had chosen two outstanding mayors from Canada and Pakistan. The other recipient of the best mayor award was Hazel McCallion- the mayor of Canadian City Mississauga.

On this occasion the CPFA also awarded outstanding Community Leaders in harmonizing communities and providing community services.

Large number of Pakistanis and Canadian government officials were present on this occasion.


In a letter to City Nazim Syed Mustafa Kamal, the Secretary of Canada Pakistan Friendship Association Mohammad Sultan Qureshi has said that the best mayor award is the recognition of your outstanding work to bring Karachi upto World Class City.


CPFA who are the members? let me guess from MQM! And why did not the Mayor go to Canada to recieve the prestigious award?