Arguments from particularisation
This is the main form of argument used by early Asharites, and is often used by Mutazilites and later Asharites. It turns on the notion of particularisation (takhsıs), which has its background in a trend distinctly characteristic of classical kalam, stemming from the sense that randomness of any kind, in either quantity or quality, is inconceivable. Every seemingly random fact about the world or things therein thus calls for explanation. Different instances of this type of proof cite different facts. The earliest arguments were relatively simple and departed from the atomist framework of classical kalam, as in the following two arguments advanced by the Asharite theologian al-Baqillanı (d. 1013).
He argues that we observe identical things coming into being at different times. If the occurrence of one thing at a particular moment is due to an intrinsic quality thereof, all similar things should occur at the same time. It thus appears that nothing intrinsic to the thing itself could make it more likely to occur at a particular moment rather than at another moment, or more likely to occur at a given moment than another, similar thing. Therefore, there must be an external voluntary effecter, who causes particular things to occur at particular moments.
Baqillanı further argues that objects in this world have different shapes, since they consist of different arrangements of atoms. Yet it is conceivable for each object to have an arrangement different from the one it actually has:
What is square can be round, and what is round square. What has the shape of one particular animal can have that of another. Each object may lose its shape to take on a different shape. It is inconceivable that what has a certain particular shape will have it by virtue of itself, or because it is possible for it to have it. Otherwise, if [the latter] were the case, [the object] would have to take on every shape that it may possibly take, all at the same time, so that it would acquire all dissimilar shapes simultaneously.(46)
The absurdity of this, Baqillanı continues, proves that the shapes of objects must have been determined by a shaper, possessed of will.
Both arguments are occasionalistic and presuppose classical Asharite atomism and a rejection of natural causality. Things, we are told, do not come into being at particular moments with particular characteristics because of any natural factors, such as intrinsic properties therein or a causal nexus between one moment and another. There is no natural necessity determining the way things actually are. All things, rather, consist of identical atoms and of different accidents present in them, which come in and out of existence at every moment. At each moment, therefore, every atom will have endless possibilities and will hence require an external factor to determine its properties and the accidents to be generated in it. This, it is argued, must be God.
As mentioned, the general particularisation argument can take different types of facts as its point of departure. The foregoing examples focus on the when and how with respect to the generation of things. In later, more sophisticated, arguments advanced by Juwaynı, the same lines of reasoning are applied to the world as a whole, which allows him to transcend the occasionalistic bias of earlier particularisation arguments.
He argues, first, that since the world is generated, it must have come into being at a particular point in time. This implies that a separate particularisation agent must exist to select this particular moment for creating the world out of other possible moments. Such selection can only be made by a voluntary agent. An unchanging, non-voluntary pre-eternal cause will necessitate its effect and will thus produce a pre-eternal world; yet the world, Juwaynı argues, has been shown to be temporally originated.(47) This argument faces the problem that it implies that time existed before creation, a doctrine that was subject to much debate.(48)
Elsewhere, Juwaynı also argues that if we observe the world, we find that it consists of things that have great variety in their attributes, composition and circumstances. None of these, however, is necessary, as the mind can imagine all things being otherwise. It becomes evident, he continues, that since the world is possible, it will require a determinant [muqtadı], which determines it in the way it actually is. What could exist in different possible ways cannot exist randomly (ittifaqan), without a determinant, in one particular way.(49) Again, the determinant has to be a voluntary agent; for a non-voluntary factor will necessitate a uniform, undifferentiated effect, whereas this world consists of highly complex parts, which do not behave in simple, uniform ways.(50) Ghazalı writes with reference to the notion of particularisation: The world came into existence whence it did, having the description with which it came to exist, and in the place in which it came to exist, through will, will being an attribute whose function is to differentiate a thing from its similar.(51)
Such particularisation arguments, which refer to characteristics of the world or things therein differ crucially from arguments from design. The latter focus on aspects of perfection, masterly production, or providence in the world. Particularisation arguments, by contrast, depart from the mere fact that existents in this world, regardless of their perfection, imperfection, goodness or badness, are possible, since they exist in one particular way rather than another, and thus require an external factor to select this possibility over all other possibilities. Such arguments aim only at proving that the world has a voluntary producer, whereas arguments from design seek to prove that the world must have a wise, powerful and good producer.
Finally, Juwaynı goes further to develop a third argument by applying the particularisation principle to the fact that the world exists. In this crucial modification to the particularisation argument, he frees it completely from the constraints of atomist physics. He first demonstrates that the world is temporally originated, then writes:
What is temporally originated is a possible existent (jaiz al-wujud); for it is possible to conceive its existence rather than its nonexistence, and it is possible to conceive its non-existence rather than its existence. Thus, since it is characterised by possible existence rather than possible non-existence, it will require a particularising factor (mukhassis), viz. the Creator, be He exalted.(52)
The argument departs from the fact that the world exists, regardless of what it consists of and the way in which it exists. Since it is equally possible that the world did not exist, the fact that it does exist points to an external factor which effected one of the two possibilities.
In this argument, Juwaynı marries the argument from creation ex nihilo to the particularisation argument, which allows him, as an Asharite, to argue that the world requires an originator because it is temporally originated, without resorting to the Mutazilite analogy from human action. More crucially, Juwaynıs modified argument brings the particularisation argument close to Avicennas argument from contingency, paving the way for a synthesis of the two arguments in later kalam. (Winter, Tim, ed. The Cambridge companion to classical Islamic theology. Cambridge University Press, 2008.)
46. Muhammad al-Baqillanı, Tamhıd al-awail wa-talkhıs_al-dalail, ed. I. Haydar (Beirut, 1987), pp. 434.
47. Juwaynı, Shamil, pp.263ff., and Guide, p.17; Juwaynı al-Aqıda al-Nizamiyya, ed. M. al-Kawtharı (Cairo, 1948), p. 20.
48. Cf. al-Ghazalı, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, tr. Michael E. Marmura (Provo, UT, 1997), p. 31.
49. Juwaynı, Nizamiyya, p. 16.
50. Ibid., p. 17.
51. Ghazalı, Incoherence, p.22.
52. Juwaynı, Luma al-adilla, ed. Fawqıya Husayn, Mahmud (Cairo, 1965), pp. 801.
Common Teleological Arguments (From the Same Book)
An argument from design, or a so-called teleological argument, is one which argues from manifestations of order or providence in the world to a God who produced them. (16) The Quran constantly invites to this type of reasoning; for instance 2:164:
In the creation of the heavens and earth; in the alternation of night and day; in the ships that sail the seas with goods for people; in the water which God sends down from the sky to give life to the earth when it has been barren, scattering all kinds of creatures over it; in the changing of the winds and clouds that run their appointed courses between the sky and earth: there are signs in all these for those who use their minds. (17)
With a primarily quranic inspiration and endorsement, arguments from design have become extremely popular in general religious literature and among lay believers. They serve, not only as proofs for the existence of God as such, but often primarily as pointers to evidence for various attributes of the creator, to be contemplated pietistically by believers. The quran here merely provides the theologian with guidance on what kind of evidence and arguments to employ; hence such quranically inspired arguments are not premised on the revealed nature of the text, which otherwise would entail circularity. (18)
Numerous works have been dedicated to the argument from design; yet we still have a very sketchy understanding of its history in Islam. One early book plausibly attributed to al-Jahiz (d. 869), the Mutazilite theologian and litterateur, draws on pre-Islamic Greek sources, (19) whereas another by his contemporary al-Qasim ibn Ibrahım (d. 860) has a primarily quranic inspiration. (20) The list of exponents of the argument from design later comes to include some of the foremost philosophers and theologians in medieval Islam, including Abu Bakr al-Razı (d. 925), Ibn Hazm (d. 1064), al-Ghazalı, Averroes, and Fakhr al-Dın al-Razı. In what follows, we will focus on discussions of this argument by Fakhr al-Dın al-Razı. On this he writes:
Whoever contemplates the various parts of the higher and lower worlds will find that this world is constructed in the most advantageous and best manner, and the most superlative and perfect order (tartıb). The mind unambiguously testifies that this state of affairs cannot be except by the governance (tadbır) of a wise and knowledgeable [being]. (21)
Here and in other places, Razı distinguishes between two types of evidence of design. First, he refers to signs of providence, that is, advantages (manafi) provided to conscious beings, which indicate the existence of a God attributed with beneficence (ihsan), who is responsible for them. Second, he refers to signs of order, or masterly production (ihkam, itqan), in the world, which point to a God possessed of wisdom (hikma) and power. When explicated in detail, the latter signs of order or beauty observable to us in the created world are often referred to as marvels (ajaib), or wonders (badai). (22)
These signs may be gleaned, according to Razı, by directing attention to different loci of discernment (sing. mahall al-itibar) in the cosmos. In the lower world, these are: (a) the human body, (b) the human psyche, (c) animals, (d) plants, (e) minerals, (f) meteorological phenomena, (g) the elements, and (h) marvels that occur because of the discernable expediencies among these things, and the manner in which each assists in preserving the species of the other. (23) In the higher world, they are: (i) the natures of the celestial spheres and the planets, (j) the magnitudes of each, (k) their complex motions and the way in which these motions influence the lower world in a manner advantageous to creatures, (l) the way in which daily, monthly and annual cycles are dependent on the motions of celestial bodies, (m) the manner in which things in this world depend on the suns motion, and (n) marvels that can be observed in both fixed and moving stars.
The marvels in each of these fields are explicated in their respective disciplines; for example, those of the human body in anatomy, and those of plants in botany. Razıs Great Commentary on the Quran also abounds with such discussions. He furthermore dedicates his little known work Secrets of Revelation (Asrar al-tanzıl) to proofs for the existence of God from features in the observable world, including proofs from design and proofs from particularisation. Being quranically inspired, this book provides a different set of categories of loci for evidence: (a) the heavens, (b) the sun and the moon, (c) the stars, (d) man, (e) animals (the book is incomplete and ends here), (f) plants, (g) meteorological phenomena, (h) seas, and (i) mountains. (24)
Let us consider the following representative example. (25) Although the human body is tremendously complex, Razı reasons, it is generated from simple sperm. Let us first assume that the body emerges from sperm purely by virtue of its natural properties, as naturalists (tabıiyyun) claim. Now either sperm is homogeneous (according to Aristotelian biology), or it consists of components drawn from, and corresponding in their natures to, the various different organs of the human body (the so-called pansomatic view dominant among earlier physicians). However, if sperm is homogeneous, it should produce an equally simple effect, namely a homogenous spherical object. Naturalists, however, maintain that sperm is inhomogeneous and that each of its components, purely by virtue of its latent natural disposition, produces a specific organ in the human body. Razı replies that, by the same foregoing analysis, each component would produce a simple effect in which case a conglomerate of homogenous spherical objects would result and that nothing among these components would determine the correct relative position of each organ in the body, guaranteeing, for instance, that the heart does not appear in the brains position and vice versa. Therefore, sperm cannot develop into a fully fledged human body simply by the impulse of its natural properties. This development will require the agency of a wise (hakım) creator who is able to produce objects with such complex and perfect features. As nature, Razı contends, lacks the wisdom to produce such sophisticated effects, the physicalist atheism of the naturalists will appear irrational.
He then quotes the philosopher-physician Abu Bakr al-Razı on the reasoning that underlies arguments from design. If one considers the design of a jug, he opines, which serves the function of containing water and pouring it controllably, one will have certainty that it did not acquire its composition by virtue of a nature that lacks consciousness and perception; rather, one will ascribe this jug to a knowledgeable and powerful agent who knew that benefit is achievable only when the jug has this particular composition. Abu Bakr al-Razı then explicates the signs of divine power and wisdom discernible in the human body, before concluding: These marvels and wonders in this bodys composition cannot be produced except by a powerful and wise [God], who created this composition with His power and fashioned it in a masterly manner with His wisdom. (26)
In many arguments from design, it is difficult to separate evidence of providence from evidence of order. Since some theologians conceived man as the centre and telos of the universe, they tended to interpret the cosmic order in terms of provisions to man. Yet Fakhr al-Dın al-Razı provides a different rationale behind the combination of these two trends in quranic arguments from design: he has the reader in mind. Most evidences (dalail) provided in the Quran, he writes,
are in one respect evidences, and in another respect blessings [niam]. Such subtle evidences are more efficacious in the heart, and more effective in the soul; for qua evidences they provide knowledge, whereas qua blessings they lead to surrender to the Benefactor, thankfulness to Him and submission to His majestys might. (27)
The combination of these two respects provides a cognitive recognition of Gods existence and attributes, especially knowledge, power and unity, as well as soteriological advantages to man an analysis that accords perfectly with Razıs notion that the method [tarıqa] of the Quran is to combine demonstrative and rhetorical modes of discourse for maximal efficacy in humans. (28) Arguments from design, moreover, draw much strength from being cumulative (mutaadida) and from involving faculties of sense and imagination alongside reason. (29) For these reasons, Razı contends in his later works that arguments from design are superior to all other arguments for the existence of God, namely the classical arguments of kalam and philosophy (below), which are subtle and address reason alone. (30) By this, he explains the fact that although arguments from design are easy to devise and often lack formal rigour, they are normally the most powerful and widespread.
16. I here apply the conventional Kantian classification of arguments for the existence of God into teleological arguments, cosmological arguments and ontological arguments (cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 61819). The last two types are defined below.
17. The Quran, tr. Muhammad Abdel Haleem (Oxford, 2004).
18. Cf. Juwaynı, Shamil, pp. 277, 287.
19. Cf. Herbert Davidson, Proofs for Eternity: Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (New York and Oxford, 1987), pp. 219ff.
20. English translations of both texts are available (see Further reading).
21. Razı, Matalib, i, p.233.
22. See also Averroes, Faith and Reason: Averroes Exposition of Religious Arguments [Al-Kashf an manahij al-adilla fı aqaid al-milla], tr.I. Najjar (Oxford, 2001), p. 33, who distinguishes between the argument from design (ikhtira) and the argument from providence (inaya).
23. Razı, Matalib, i, p.234.
24. Razı, Asrar al-tanzıl wa-anwar al-tawıl, ed. M. Muhammad et al. (Baghdad, 1985), p. 151.
25. Razı, Matalib, i, pp. 21824.
26. Ibid., i, pp. 2245. On Abu Bakr al-Razıs notion of God, see Michael E. Marmura, The Islamic philosophers conception of Islam, in R. Hovannisian (ed.), Islams Understanding of Itself (Malibu, 1981), pp. 87102.
27. Razı, Asrar, p.151; cf. Matalib, i, p. 216.
28. On this notion, see Shihadeh, Teleological Ethics, pp. 142ff.
29. Razı (Matalib, i, p.239) also recognises the importance of cumulating arguments more generally for the existence of God. Even if each separately does not provide certainty, their cumulative force may achieve this. For a recent defence of such a strategy, see Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford, 1991), pp. 1315.
30. Razı, Matalib, i, pp. 216, 236.
