Need to revisit Pakistan's Afghan policy

M Ali Khan

Minister (2k+ posts)
VIEW : Need for revisiting Pakistans Afghan policy I Professor Ijaz Khan


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Pakistans reluctance to act decisively against the Taliban and/or other related targets inside Pakistan made Pakistans demands to have a strong say in the Afghan solution not trustworthy

Pakistan tried to bargain a solution for Afghanistan that will ensure an upper hand to groups it shares friendly ties with. Pakistans diplomacy relied on US plans/needs to disengage militarily from Afghanistan. Pakistan also depended on the strength it gained from its location and history of the past two and half decades, which gave Pakistan real influence in Afghan affairs. Pakistan has been using that influence as a bargaining chip. If played appropriately, it could have got Pakistan a much better deal. However, it appears Pakistan has not just failed to gain much, but has lost in terms of domestic security, and is facing a crisis of existential proportions, economic meltdown, and international and regional (almost) isolation with a very negative image. It is getting late but if Pakistan is somehow able to make some quick adjustments in its demands and methods, it can still clinch a favourable deal. At the very least, it can minimise the loss.

When the US announced its surge policy leading to a drawdown, wrongly termed as withdrawal, Pakistans Afghan policy managers initially jumped with excitement and started thinking of a possible return of the pre-2001 Afghanistan, but a little more amenable to its security interest perceptions. However, apparently they soon realised that this may not be the case and we may witness a situation of serious violence in Afghanistan and a real threat to Pakistan itself from religious extremists. Observers of Pakistans Afghan policy started noting a change in voices closer to the establishment. Arguments started emanating from such quarters against the US drawdown termed withdrawal without a final solution. The final solution, it was argued, must be found through a negotiated settlement with the Taliban; the Taliban have differences with al Qaeda; the Taliban have become more mature; anecdotes of some mid-level Taliban commanders talking negatively of al Qaeda emerged 2011 inwards. An increased level of violence in Afghanistan with some spectacular attacks to make global news headlines was also seen. Pakistan started a policy of pressurising the US for finding a solution to Afghanistan suiting its interests. The increased condemnation of drones and closure of NATO supply routes at different times were some tactical moves to establish the need for a deal in Afghanistan and centrality of Pakistan to any such deal. However, such policy added to the suspicion of Pakistan being soft on the Taliban and the US started looking more earnestly to find a solution sans Pakistan, gradually considering Pakistan as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

The US expected the surge would weaken the Taliban to a certain level by December 2014 that could be handled by the Afghans themselves, with international support from outside. Pakistan pursued a policy that told the US this could only happen through Pakistans role. The US tried to push/convince Pakistan to help in achieving such ends. Pakistani demands for doing so, it seems, were considered not worth Pakistans help. Additionally, Pakistans reluctance to act decisively against the Taliban and/or other related targets inside Pakistan made Pakistans demands to have a strong say in the Afghan solution not trustworthy. The increased Talibanisation inside Pakistan, partly a result of the Pakistani policy of not decisively acting against them, strengthened perceptions that Pakistan itself may be overrun by these extremist forces. Such a probability, even if remote, was considered more dreadful due to Pakistan being a nuclear-armed state. This fear resulted in not only mistrust but also in a policy of continued engagement of Pakistan.

With December 2014 approaching, the urge to ensure the survival of the existing constitutional system in Afghanistan to deny it being reverted partly or fully to becoming a safe haven for global terrorists made US diplomacy pursue a policy of engaging all Afghan neighbours. This was in the perspective of all those who shared the threat of terrorism, including China, Russia, and more importantly, especially from Pakistans standpoint, India. Iran, though at loggerheads with the US everywhere else, was also tolerated in Afghanistan, as the US at least shared with Iran the mistrust of the Taliban. While doing that, the US continued to keep Pakistan engaged, urging it to cooperate more with it on the Afghanistan issue. The US also started a policy of reaching out to the Taliban with the expectation of finding a negotiated settlement. Pakistans role became very crucial in such a dialogue.

This led to the establishment of the Taliban office in Doha, Qatar. The Doha office was opened to provide a neutral place for negotiations between the Taliban and the US. Pakistan played an important role in this entire process. However, despite initial fanfare and hyped up expectations, it has become a non-starter for a variety of reasons, the most important being the almost complete absence of the most important player from this process, i.e. the government of Afghanistan. Some ceremonial controversies apart, like the hoisting of the Talibans Afghanistan flag on the Doha office, the Afghan government considered the entire process as Pakistan-centred and undermined it.

The chances of its revival and becoming a vehicle of any meaningful progress are decreasing with each passing day. Those interested in finding peace, or at a minimum, starting a process of peace in Afghanistan must make a fresh start. That initiative must begin with looking at what has been missing in the different attempts so far. While all parties need to revisit their existing policies, this essay will limit itself to some pointers for Pakistan, if for no other reason than for the constraints and limits of space, and audience.

(To be continued)

The writer is a professor of International Relations at the University of Peshawar and can be reached at Ijazk.blogspot.com


http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013/08/19/story_19-8-2013_pg3_4
 

M Ali Khan

Minister (2k+ posts)
VIEW : Need for re visiting Pakistan’s Afghan Policy — II — Professor Ijaz Khan


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Pakistan faces a real existential challenge in the expected increased violence in the post-December 2014 Afghanistan, which will not remain limited to north of the Durand Line

Pakistan has a new government in place. The party that leads it, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), a centre-right party, despite accusations of having links with extremists and being soft on them, promises in its manifesto there will be civilian control of intelligence agencies and considers trade and interaction to be a better security policy than purely military means. It also promises to improve relations with India. The new prime minister Mian Nawaz Sharif has, on more than one occasion, declared his government’s determination not to permit the use of Pakistan’s territory against anyone. This means he intends to bring some changes and not just tactical adjustments to Pakistan’s security/foreign policy including Pakistan’s Afghan policy. If he really means it and has the capability to do so, the results should be evident very soon. Change is not visible yet.

Pakistan, to be able to make the best of its location and significance to Afghanistan, must start playing a role that really contributes to peace and is very visible. The first step is the conceptual framework, i.e. how you view terrorism and religious extremism, where you place it in your foreign policy/security policy. The Pakistani state has viewed religious extremism as a good tool, as a useful policy regarding India and Afghanistan, as well as internally in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and also Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The change must start there; perceptions that jihadis/religious extremists/extremism can serve any foreign or domestic policy goal has to be abandoned. Thus an active policy of dismantling of the jihadi complex has to commence. There must be a clean break from such mindset/actions/policy, without any exception. In Afghanistan the policy of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban must go, as starters. It should be followed up with a more proactive policy.

Pakistan must start with proactive pursuance of a policy of resolving its disputes with the government of Afghanistan. The first step should be a simple change: from asking for a friendly government in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s policy should be the desire of friendship with the state of Afghanistan. It must clearly refrain from supporting or opposing any Afghan party or ethnicity. This can start by changing this part of policy statements on various occasions. Pakistan must initiate action against terrorists, foreign or local, whether targeting Pakistan or others, especially Afghanistan. Therefore the policy of differentiating between the good and bad Taliban must go and be seen as gone. A very significant trust building measure can be the initiative of handing over the Afghan Taliban the Pakistan government keeps in its custody. If Pakistan wants to improve relations with India, it should have not created any problem in Indo-Afghan relations. Pakistan can permit the use of its territory for trade and other communication between its two neighbours. This step will be the on-ground implementation of the PML-N manifesto’s definition of security in trade and interaction.

Such preliminary proactive actions will place Pakistan in a very strong position in the emerging regional peace centred on peace in Afghanistan. It must be remembered that time is not in favour of Pakistan. Changing track after December 2014 may be too late. US interests are very limited compared to those of Pakistan. The US is looking for a peaceful and respectable way out, which it will get with or without Pakistan. But the continuation of violence in Afghanistan will only escalate after the US drawdown; as for Pakistan, continued religious terrorism is an existential issue, threatening its security.

The Pakistani state is giving mixed signals. These mixed signals are more a result of confusion and the lack of a clear policy than some conscious policy decision, good or bad. Calling it Pakistan’s double game is giving the policy confusion and indecisiveness a great deal of underserved respectability. It appears that the realisation of the need to change is there; however, the existence of required understanding and political will to go about it is lacking. The first step in correcting that would be changing the sources of input in decision making, both political and intellectual. Bureaucracies — uniformed or otherwise — have a tendency and expertise to present facts and available policy alternatives in such a manner that even the most intelligent and independent political bosses select the alternative that the bureaucrats intended to be selected. Then in Pakistan exist a large number of so-called independent security/foreign policy experts, mostly former diplomats, generals and journalists as well as some from academia, who actually promote deep state views, with minor variations. Whether they may genuinely think that due to their training and lifelong association or at times may be encouraged to do so is irrelevant. The political leadership, if interested in controlling and making its own decisions to take policy initiatives, need not know all policy details, need not be experts, and they are not so even in the most developed states. However, they must have the ability to identify independent minds and opinion, which is the real quality of a democratic leader.

Time is moving. It has to be realised that agreement or not, December 2014 will arrive. The implications of that should not be lost on anyone. Pakistan faces a real existential challenge in the expected increased violence in the post-December 2014 Afghanistan, which will not remain limited to north of the Durand Line.

(Concluded)

The writer is a professor of International Relations at the University of Peshawar and can be reached at Ijazk.blogspot.com


http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013/08/20/story_20-8-2013_pg3_4
 

hans

Banned
Afgan hate Pakistani....
They love India.

Every one knows .... we export Taliban idiology. We provide them home and resting grounds. We feed them and arm them.

You agree or not.. but the truth is on the wall. Ask any Afgani National.
 

Shahbaz Baig

MPA (400+ posts)
all rubbish... why cant be controlled over the Durand Line.....:angry_smile: All the Members including politician and journalist are too much stupid...

the only Solution of all this kind of article and pak-afghan problems is

once you will Wall the Durand Line with Mine then all things will be normal in few months.....:angry_smile:

i am just saying wall the durand line and mine the hotspots where militants are known to cross over Pak-Afghan border from outside or inside, guard it with troops also but not in disputed areas.. pakistan dont need any disputed areas except Hindo Kash area...

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1. it is Possible to Block The Durand Line with Mine and military in Pakistan areas not disputed areas in order to stop all the outside inside terrorist activities across pak-afghan border. In this matter Pakistan don't need to take the American or Afghan Instruction... because Pakistan have right to block the Durand Line in his Areas not disputed Areas... i am just saying wall the Durand line and mine the hotspots where militants are known to cross over Pak-Afghan border from outside or inside, guard it with troops also but not in disputed areas.. Pakistan don't need any disputed areas except Hindo Kash area...

2. when NATO Leave in 2014. then it is more difficult to wall the Durand line and mine the hotspots where Indian or Taliban militants are crossing border.. first Pakistan have to control the Durand line then it will be easy to handle the terrorist living inside Pakistan.. because when you cut off the chain,supply and movement of terrorist wings across the border then you will be able to handle the inside terrorist otherwise they will keep on moving from one side to another.... few years ago UN announced that there will be negotiation about Durand line between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the end of 2013.. i wish this negotiation would happen soon... Pakistan have to control the Durand line before American withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014...
 
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