Kargil adventure was four-man show: Lt Gen Shahid Aziz

[Fursan]

Re: Kargil Conflict according to Lt Gen Shahid Aziz

kargil wars defeat reason was only one.lack of faith and lack of iman among senior generals level (and probably some foreign agent generals like musharaf intentionally lost this war too). otherwise Taliban at present have defeated americans in much more difficult situation in Afghanistan than Pakistani army was in kargil.its said by war experts that if Taliban had been fighting in kargil Kashmir had been freed upto sri nagar easily.i agree that india had superior air power but Taliban have no air power and American airpower is much superior to even indian airpower and still America lost in Afghanistan mashalah.

You really have to correct your facts, the comment you made is totally rubbish and against ground reality.

Kargil withdrawal was not related to lack of faith and lack of iman among senior generals level (and probably some foreign agent generals like musharaf intentionally lost this war too).

The fact is that Nawaz Sharif went to US and signed the declaration of withdrawal when he was already told in a briefing that the position of Pak Army and Mujahideen is stronger and Indian Army is in a weaker position as it was unable to capture Kargil peaks even with its air force, two IAF jets were also shot down.

So what the hell are you ranting ??????? You are fooling yourself.

Dont over estimate Taliban that if they had been fighting in kargil, Kashmir had been freed upto sri nagar easily. By making such comment you are creating fantasies. At present, the fact is that the Afghan Taliban have not gained any remarkable success against US occupation. Their resistance is hardly average.

 

[sajoo]

Re: Kargil Conflict according to Lt Gen Shahid Aziz

U.N.Resolution August 13, 1948.

This is the most significant resolution passed by the UN on the state of Jammu & Kashmir. It clearly states that Pakistan was to vacate its troops from the whole of the state. It also mentions, albeit indirectly, that Pakistan had consistently lied on the question of whether or not its troops were involved in the fighting in Jammu & Kashmir. Once the then Pakistani Prime Minister conceded that Pakistani troops wereindeed involved, the UN had no option but to ask for their withdrawal. That the withdrawal never took place, is another story.

---

[SIZE=+1]The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.[/SIZE]
Having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the representatives of India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir; and
Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security are essential to implementation of its endeavors to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation;
Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following proposal:
PART I: CEASE-FIRE ORDER

A. The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High Commands will issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire order to apply to all forces under their control and in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as of the earliest practicable date or dates to be mutually agreed upon within four days after these proposals have been accepted by both Governments.


B.The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistani forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. ( For the purpose of these proposals forces under their control shall be considered to include all forces, organized and unorganized, fighting or participating in hostilities on their respective sides.
C.The Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of India and Pakistan shall promptly confer regarding any necessary local changes in present dispositions which may facilitate the cease-fire.


D. In its discretion and as the Commission may find practicable, the Commission will appoint military observers who, under the authority of the Commission and with the co-operation of both Commands, will supervise the observance of the cease-fire order.
E. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan agree to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations.
PART II: TRUCE AGREEMENT

Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both the Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission.A.
1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.


2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.


3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the commission.
B.
1.When the commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred to in Part II, A, 2, hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.
2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary.


3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within its powers to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human political rights will be granted.
4. Upon signature, the full text of the truce agreement or a communique containing the principles thereof as agreed upon between the two Governments and the Commission, will be made public.
PART III
The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.

---

Source: United Nations[SIZE=+1]Return to Index of Documents[/SIZE]

I've told ya to please stick to one topic at a time. Where does this document say that Pakistan took the matter to UN? On the contrary, the source that you cited also contains a document titled "Text of India's Indian Complaint to the Security Council, 1st January 1948".

Now would you bother to say sorry about the following ungenerous comments?

One thing for sure that one of us is a big immoral, lowdown, scum of a liar.

 

[pacafic.seal]

Re: Kargil Conflict according to Lt Gen Shahid Aziz

A totally false remark

Ayub and associates Incorportaed. 1958 and ending in december 1971.
Zia Trading corporation july 1977 ending augst 1987
Musharraf Brothers limited 1999 ending in an NRO 2008, which brought his brother zardari into his place.



Note: my earlier remark is intended for these three periods of our history.

 

[Fursan]

Re: Kargil Conflict according to Lt Gen Shahid Aziz

Ayub and associates Incorportaed. 1958 and ending in december 1971.
Zia Trading corporation july 1977 ending augst 1987
Musharraf Brothers limited 1999 ending in an NRO 2008, which brought his brother zardari into his place.



Note: my earlier remark is intended for these three periods of our history.

Your comment is again not showing the reality.

 

[pacafic.seal]

Re: Kargil Conflict according to Lt Gen Shahid Aziz

Your comment is again not showing the reality.

Reality check, by supreme court of pakistan,

-Constitutional petitions terming martial laws/LFO's as illegal, constitutional pet.number 21 of 2007,
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/page.asp?id=103

-Asghar khan case, http://dawn.com/2012/11/08/sc-issues-detailed-verdict-of-asghar-khan-case/

 

[deltaforce]

Re: Kargil Conflict according to Lt Gen Shahid Aziz

who started taking over of kashmir by sending armed men of army in the garb of tribals ? why ? was not there a committee of english experts who were doing it through negotiations ?

the same thing was done in kargil by idiot musharraf by sending poorly equipped( tribals out fitted ) army jawans then abandoned there to die , simply a fool generals more foolish plan to capture kashmir .

 

[Fursan]

Kargil adventure was four-man show: general



ISLAMABAD: The men who witnessed the Kargil fiasco continue to spill the beans. Lt Gen (retd) Shahid Aziz, a former chief of general staff of Pakistan Army who has till now kept his peace about what he witnessed in the summer of 99, says the misadventure was a four-man show the details of which were hidden from the rest of the military commanders initially.

This is the first time someone this senior in the military hierarchy of the time has spoken in such detail and with such frankness about the fiasco that was Kargil.

According to him, initially the Kargil operation was known only to Gen Pervez Musharraf, chief of general staff Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz, FCNA (Force Command Northern Areas) commander Lt Gen Javed Hassan and 10-Corps commander Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmad.

The majority of corps commanders and principal staff officers were kept in the dark, says Gen Aziz. Even the-then director general military operations (DGMO) Lt Gen Tauqir Zia came to know about it later, says Gen Aziz who at the time was serving as director general of the analysis wing of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

He said that Gen Musharraf worked on a policy of need to know throughout his tenure as COAS and later president in other words, Musharraf would issue orders to only those who were required to implement orders instead of first consulting corps commanders and other military officers.

The Kargil operation began in the summer of 1999 when Pakistani soldiers infiltrated into positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control.

The infiltration, which managed to cut off Indian supply lines, took New Delhi by surprise.

Initially, Islamabad claimed that the infiltrators were mujahideen but it could not maintain this faade for long. The Indian response coupled with international pressure forced the Pakistan military to withdraw.

However, the aftermath of the operation served to heighten tensions between Gen Musharraf and then prime minister Nawaz Sharif which culminated in the October coup when the military removed the elected government and took over.

Operation was never planned

The Pakistan Army did not plan the operation because Gen Musharraf never saw Kargil as a major operation. Only the FCNA was involved in it and perhaps a section of 10-Corps, says Aziz, adding that it was a major intelligence failure for India. More details of the operation are expected in Gen Azizs book which is hitting the bookshelves next week.
It was a miscalculated move, he says when asked about the operation, adding that its objectives were not clear and its ramifications were not properly evaluated.

At his picturesque farmhouse in Pind Begwal in the foothills of Murree, about 30km from the capital, Gen Aziz was not averse to speaking frankly about the operation.

It was a failure because we had to hide its objectives and results from our own people and the nation. It had no purpose, no planning and nobody knows even today how many soldiers lost their lives.

He said he was personally not aware of what information had been shared with then prime minister Nawaz Sharif, but he felt that Mr Sharif was not fully in the picture.

He, however, recalls a general telling him that Nawaz Sharif asked when are you giving us Kashmir? during an informal discussion. This suggests, says Gen Aziz, that Mr Sharif was not completely in the dark.
Gen Aziz himself first discovered that something was up when he came across wireless communication intercepts from which he could tell that something was making the Indian forces panic.

The intercepts worried me as I thought we were not aware of whatever was unsettling the Indians. I deputed two officers to figure out what was happening. The next days wireless intercepts were clear enough for Gen Aziz to realise that the Indians anxiety stemmed from the fact that someone from Pakistan had captured some areas in Kargil-Drass sector but it was not clear if they were mujahideen or regular troops. I took these intercepts to then ISI director general Lt Gen Ziauddin Butt and asked what was happening.

It was then that Gen Aziz was finally told by Gen Butt that the army had captured some area in Kargil.
This, says Gen Aziz, was not right. In his opinion, he should have been told about the proposed operation in advance so that he could have provided his analysis in advance.

A day after this conversation between Aziz and Butt, the latter called Gen Aziz and told him that he had been invited to the General Headquarters for a briefing on Kargil.

The briefing
During the briefing, which was also attended by all the principal staff officers, Director General Military Operations Lt Gen Tauqir Zia explained that units of NLI (Northern Light Infantry) and regular troops had captured areas in the Drass-Kargil sector.

Aziz feels that even though the briefing was conducted by DGMO Tauqir Zia, it was clear that he had not been aware of the operation from the beginning.

The day after the DGMO briefing, the friction at Kargil operation was reported in the Pakistani media; interestingly, the Indian media had carried stories a day earlier.

This shows that the military leadership was informed about such a critical operation only after it began and by that time information was trickling down to the media.

At the briefing, Gen Zia did explain the objectives of the operation it had cut off Indias supply lines to Siachen because of the closure of Zojila Pass on Srinagar-Drass-Kargil-Leh road.

This, said Gen Zia, would block India from supplying its troops in Siachen and subsequently, India would evacuate Siachen. That this did not happen is now history.

Gen Aziz says this was because the planners miscalculated the Indian response and overall repercussions.
At the briefing, Gen Tauqir Zia talked about airing pre-recorded Pashto messages that he hoped would be intercepted by the Indian forces.

His objective was that these intercepts would fool India into thinking that the Afghan mujahideen had occupied areas in Kargil.

Gen Aziz says he objected to this plan as these would get exposed very shortly. He adds that this led to lengthy discussions and finally Tauqir Zia conceded that the truth could not be hidden for long.

In retrospect, Gen Aziz feels that even if only NLI men were up there, it would be wrong to suggest that the operation was carried out by paramilitary forces because NLI falls under the military chain of command unlike the Rangers that are headed by a military officer but technically they fall under the control of the ministry of interior.

The study that never was

But for Gen Aziz the end of the operation did not mean the end of the matter.

After he was promoted as chief of general staff, he says that in 2004 he ordered a small study to inquire into what miscalculations had led to

such a huge loss of men and money. He also asked each battalion concerned for details.
But the reaction was swift.

An angry Gen Musharraf called him and asked what the objectives of the study were. I told him it would provide a professional understanding of our mistakes and losses but Gen Musharraf insisted that this was not the time for such a study and ordered that it be stopped.

http://dawn.com/2013/01/29/kargil-adventure-was-four-man-show-general/

 

[Muawiyah]

Re: Kargil adventure was four-man show: general

a good analysis

 

[Muawiyah]

Re: Kargil adventure was four-man show: general

nations should always learn from there mistake

 

[Bangash]

Re: Kargil adventure was four-man show: general

An angry Gen Musharraf called him and asked what the objectives of the study were. “[HI]I told him it would provide a professional understanding of our mistakes and losses but Gen Musharraf insisted that [/HI]this was not the time for such a study and ordered that it be stopped.

اپ نے خود ہی یہ سب کچھ لکھا ہے لیکن اس کے باوجود بھی جرنل مشرف کی غلطیوں کو نہیں مانتے عجیب سی بات ہے:lol:​

 

[aneeskhan]

Re: Kargil adventure was four-man show: general

It,s quite logical all army operations are top secret,Do you think All american generals discussed before intrusion to Abbottabad.Thanedar also kep secret before raiding to arrest.What a stupid this crap Shahid Aziz for cheap publicity.Unfortunately Kargil Mission partially failed due to unfortunate death of Brig Sayal the main operational commander due to accidental crash of chopper,otherwise possibly world could see a different Geography ,everything in favour of Pakistan.Yet Partially failed but Indians got maximum loss more than 65 and 71,there was a shortage of coffins(famous Cffin Scandal)

 

[rana14801]

Re: Kargil adventure was four-man show: general

there r many if and buts in the post and that could be noticed by people who remained in uniform or from army. now i think it is an effort by this general to get some attention of HUKMARAANs so that he could get some benefits out of them specially fore seeing PML(N) coming into power in next elections. it is a very sensitive matter and i think there may come some reaction or statement from EX PRESIDENT GEN. PERVEZ MUSHARAF. just wait and see.

 

[awan4ever]

Re: Kargil adventure was four-man show: general

If an American General writes a book about the US failings in Iraq and Afghanistan we jump to embrace every word said and quote from such books over and over.

Now if the same level of openness is being practiced by a Pakistan General we are all coming up with conspiracy theories (our favorite national sport after cricket).

 

[staray khaatir]

Re: Kargil adventure was four-man show: general

BARI DAIR KE MEHRUBAAN AATAY AATAY.

As per planning of the operation,he was thinking and planning about it for more than a year if not more.yes as ARM CHAIR warrior and full of $h!t commando the planning was very poor.
Now whether this gen shahid aziz was consulted or not but must have been asked to help when the need arrived and these generals are good a grabbing lands/plots instead of fighting.to cut the long story short indian army kicked the $h!t out these generals.

 

[aneeskhan]

Re: Kargil adventure was four-man show: general

Planning of Kargil was absolutely right,thats why Indian Puzzled but in b/w some unfortunate things happened like crash of chopper ,Indian Mig was in no time ground to ashes in Pakistani,land and Pilot was POW,but definately some backouts possibly all time tested friend ?
Pakistan and India must resolved their disputed issues otherwise
Aaj Nahi To Kal
Yeah tu hona Hi Hai
it's in interest of both rather India to resolve disputed issues.

 

[aneeskhan]

Re: Kargil adventure was four-man show: general

Mush did for Pakistan.

 

[aneeskhan]

Re: Kargil adventure was four-man show: general

Sorry just typed wrongly.

 

[aneeskhan]

Re: Kargil adventure was four-man show: general

sorry wrongly typed

 

[sumisrar]

Re: Kargil adventure was four-man show: general

If something succeeds, everyone is in queue to get the appreciation but if fails blame game starts.

 

[zhohaq]

Re: Kargil Conflict according to Lt Gen Shahid Aziz

Brigadier Samson Simon Sharaf who served under him at the time responds,
its pretty hilarious:

---

Since the honorable General and my ex Director Military Operations and later Director General Military Operations has taken to print media and air waves, I see it befitting to respond to him in the context that I saw him as my senior in Military Operations Directorate Rawalpindi during those eventful days.
Soon after Kargil, Maj Gen Tauqeer Zia was promoted and sent to command a corps in Mangla. Maj Gen Shahid Aziz was posted from ISI to assume as the DGMO. [HI]I was appointed by Gen Tauqeer Zia as the lead team member as GSO1 Operations to write the post Kargil National Security Paper[/HI], the draft of which he had approved. He had taken the critical analysis objectively and fully approved of the Threat Dimensions and recommendations. After I returned from Singapore having addressed a Seminar on Pakistan's Future War and Defence Diplomacy at Pacific Army's Military Seminar, Maj Gen Aziz was at the helm.
[HI]While I was delivering the presentation in an in house discussion, he huffed, puffed and got restive. [/HI]I understood that he was not in concert with the views presented. [HI]Soon after, my name was removed from this assignment for reasons not known to me[/HI]. I live with the consolation that whatever I wrote was in the best interests of my institution and my country and the fact that in 13 years, all my assessments have proven correct. [HI]
As a DGMO, he was also instrumental in planning and executing Gen Musharraf's Coup in absentia. [/HI]I was then the officiating DMO assigned to set up the entire monitoring mechanism. Slowly, I saw Musharraf the reformer shift to an opportunist politician who embraced everyone and everything he once abhorred. We protested both to him and the then Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen Aziz. Slowly the reformist agenda drifted to anarchism and opportunist constitutionalism ratified in 2002. Why did he allow such a drift to take place and not protest despite his loud mouth staff officers who minced no words?
In between, Gen Shaid Aziz was posted to Murree to command an all important infantry division.
As Chief of General Staff, he oversaw Pakistan entering into the US sponsored War on Terror. [HI]As CGS, he oversaw one formation after another sucked into FATA. [/HI]WOT should have been his main worry and not write a post dated study on Kargil. Had he spent equal energies on WOT, Pakistan would never have blundered into a comedy of errors that has claimed over 6000 soldiers and 25,000 civilians in a conflict that was avoidable. It was also during his tenure that a study was sponsored on Kargil at the Institute of Strategic Studies to give a twist to Kargil issue.
Post Kargil time also saw number of officers sidelined with their promising careers over. Those who dared were slighted and faded away. Overnight heroes of Tolo Lng became cowards. Could the General name one individual he rescued from his thence high moral pedestal to vindicate that he was a principled soldier. [HI]
The General was awarded Sitara e Basalat for planning Pakistan's nuclear explosions.[/HI] The story below is worth a reading. I got it ratified from Gen Jehanghir Karamat and Gen taiqeer Zia before I published it. Read it and make your own assessments?
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakis...
The General is well advised to keep his beans to himself. He ought to look around and count how many blazing guns he silenced and not seek the laurels he never deserved. [HI]The time to speak out was then and not now.[/HI]