What is Democracy in Islam, how democracy works, like what ingrediants needed? Please elaborate Pros

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[h=3]Variants[/h] [h=4]Republic[/h] Main article: Republicanism
In contemporary usage, the term democracy refers to a government chosen by the people, whether it is direct or representative.[SUP][85][/SUP] The term republic has many different meanings, but today often refers to a representative democracy with an elected head of state, such as a president, serving for a limited term, in contrast to states with a hereditary monarch as a head of state, even if these states also are representative democracies with an elected or appointed head of government such as a prime minister.[SUP][86][/SUP]
The Founding Fathers of the United States rarely praised and often criticised democracy, which in their time tended to specifically mean direct democracy, often without the protection of a Constitution enshrining basic rights; James Madison argued, especially in The Federalist No. 10, that what distinguished a democracy from a republic was that the former became weaker as it got larger and suffered more violently from the effects of faction, whereas a republic could get stronger as it got larger and combats faction by its very structure.
What was critical to American values, John Adams insisted,[SUP][87][/SUP] was that the government be "bound by fixed laws, which the people have a voice in making, and a right to defend." As Benjamin Franklin was exiting after writing the U.S. constitution, a woman asked him "Well, Doctor, what have we got—a republic or a monarchy?". He replied "A republic—if you can keep it."[SUP][88][/SUP]
[h=4]Constitutional monarchy[/h] Main article: Constitutional monarchy

Queen Elizabeth II, a constitutional monarch.


Initially after the American and French revolutions, the question was open whether a democracy, in order to restrain unchecked majority rule, should have an lite upper chamber, the members perhaps appointed meritorious experts or having lifetime tenures, or should have a constitutional monarch with limited but real powers. Some countries (as The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Scandinavian countries, Thailand, Japan and Bhutan) turned powerful monarchs into constitutional monarchs with limited or, often gradually, merely symbolic roles.
Often the monarchy was abolished along with the aristocratic system (as in France, China, Russia, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Greece and Egypt). Many nations had lite upper houses of legislatures which often had lifetime tenure, but eventually these lost power (as in Britain) or else became elective and remained powerful (as in the United States).[SUP][citation needed][/SUP]
[h=4]Socialist[/h] Socialist thought has several different views on democracy. Social democracy, democratic socialism, and the dictatorship of the proletariat (usually exercised through Soviet democracy) are some examples. Many democratic socialists and social democrats believe in a form of participatory democracy and workplace democracy combined with a representative democracy.
Within Marxist orthodoxy there is a hostility to what is commonly called "liberal democracy", which they simply refer to as parliamentary democracy because of its often centralised nature. Because of their desire to eliminate the political elitism they see in capitalism, Marxists, Leninists and Trotskyists believe in direct democracy implemented through a system of communes (which are sometimes called soviets). This system ultimately manifests itself as council democracy and begins with workplace democracy. (See Democracy in Marxism.)

Democracy cannot consist solely of elections that are nearly always fictitious and managed by rich landowners and professional politicians.
—Che Guevara, Speech, Uruguay, 1961[SUP][89][/SUP]
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[h=4]Anarchist[/h] Anarchists are split in this domain, depending on whether they believe that a majority-rule is tyrannic or not. The only form of democracy considered acceptable to many anarchists is direct democracy. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon argued that the only acceptable form of direct democracy is one in which it is recognised that majority decisions are not binding on the minority, even when unanimous.[SUP][90][/SUP] However, anarcho-communist Murray Bookchin criticised individualist anarchists for opposing democracy,[SUP][91][/SUP] and says "majority rule" is consistent with anarchism.[SUP][92][/SUP]
Some anarcho-communists oppose the majoritarian nature of direct democracy, feeling that it can impede individual liberty and opt in favour of a non-majoritarian form of consensus democracy, similar to Proudhon's position on direct democracy.[SUP][93][/SUP] Henry David Thoreau, who did not self-identify as an anarchist but argued for "a better government"[SUP][94][/SUP] and is cited as an inspiration by some anarchists, argued that people should not be in the position of ruling others or being ruled when there is no consent.
Anarcho-capitalists, voluntaryists and other libertarian anarchists oppose institutional democracy as they consider it in conflict with widely held moral and ethical principles and their notion of individual rights. Their main argument is that the state is a coercive institution that violates the Non-aggression principle (NAP). Libertarian anarchists also criticise democracy on economic grounds in terms of inefficiency or disability in bringing about maximisation of individual liberty. They also claim that the people that make up the democratic institutions are foremost driven by their own self-interest. [SUP][95][/SUP][SUP][96][/SUP]
[h=4]Demarchy[/h] Main article: Demarchy
Sometimes called "democracy without elections", demarchy uses sortition to choose decision makers via a random process. The intention is that those chosen will be representative of the opinions and interests of the people at large, and be more fair and impartial than an elected official. The technique was in widespread use in Athenian Democracy and is still used in modern jury selection.
[h=4]Consociational[/h] Main article: Consociational democracy
A consociational democracy allows for simultaneous majority votes in two or more ethno-religious constituencies, and policies are enacted only if they gain majority support from both or all of them.
[h=4]Consensus democracy[/h] Main article: Consensus democracy
A consensus democracy, in contrast, would not be dichotomous. Instead, decisions would be based on a multi-option approach, and policies would be enacted if they gained sufficient support, either in a purely verbal agreement, or via a consensus vote - a multi-option preference vote. If the threshold of support were at a sufficiently high level, minorities would be as it were protected automatically. Furthermore, any voting would be ethno-colour blind.
[h=4]Supranational[/h] Qualified majority voting is designed by the Treaty of Rome to be the principal method of reaching decisions in the European Council of Ministers. This system allocates votes to member states in part according to their population, but heavily weighted in favour of the smaller states. This might be seen as a form of representative democracy, but representatives to the Council might be appointed rather than directly elected.
Some might consider the "individuals" being democratically represented to be states rather than people, as with many others. European Parliament members are democratically directly elected on the basis of universal suffrage, may be seen as an example of a supranational democratic institution.
[h=4]Inclusive[/h] Main article: Inclusive Democracy
Inclusive democracy is a political theory and political project that aims for direct democracy in all fields of social life: political democracy in the form of face-to-face assemblies which are confederated, economic democracy in a stateless, moneyless and marketless economy, democracy in the social realm, i.e. self-management in places of work and education, and ecological democracy which aims to reintegrate society and nature. The theoretical project of inclusive democracy emerged from the work of political philosopher Takis Fotopoulos in "Towards An Inclusive Democracy" and was further developed in the journal Democracy & Natureand its successor The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy.
The basic unit of decision making in an inclusive democracy is the demotic assembly, i.e. the assembly of demos, the citizen body in a given geographical area which may encompass a town and the surrounding villages, or even neighbourhoods of large cities. An inclusive democracy today can only take the form of a confederal democracy that is based on a network of administrative councils whose members or delegates are elected from popular face-to-face democratic assemblies in the various demoi. Thus, their role is purely administrative and practical, not one of policy-making like that of representatives in representative democracy.
The citizen body is advised by experts but it is the citizen body which functions as the ultimate decision-taker . Authority can be delegated to a segment of the citizen body to carry out specific duties, for example to serve as members of popular courts, or of regional and confederal councils. Such delegation is made, in principle, by lot, on a rotation basis, and is always recallable by the citizen body. Delegates to regional and confederal bodies should have specific mandates.

 

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[h=4]Participatory politics[/h] Main article: Participatory politics
A Parpolity or Participatory Polity is a theoretical form of democracy that is ruled by a Nested Council structure. The guiding philosophy is that people should have decision making power in proportion to how much they are affected by the decision. Local councils of 25–50 people are completely autonomous on issues that affect only them, and these councils send delegates to higher level councils who are again autonomous regarding issues that affect only the population affected by that council.
A council court of randomly chosen citizens serves as a check on the tyranny of the majority, and rules on which body gets to vote on which issue. Delegates may vote differently from how their sending council might wish, but are mandated to communicate the wishes of their sending council. Delegates are recallable at any time. Referendums are possible at any time via votes of most lower-level councils, however, not everything is a referendum as this is most likely a waste of time. A parpolity is meant to work in tandem with a participatory economy.
[h=4]Cosmopolitan[/h] Main article: Cosmopolitan democracy
Cosmopolitan democracy, also known as Global democracy or World Federalism, is a political system in which democracy is implemented on a global scale, either directly or through representatives. An important justification for this kind of system is that the decisions made in national or regional democracies often affect people outside the constituency who, by definition, cannot vote. By contrast, in a cosmopolitan democracy, the people who are affected by decisions also have a say in them.[SUP][97][/SUP]
According to its supporters, any attempt to solve global problems is undemocratic without some form of cosmopolitan democracy. The general principle of cosmopolitan democracy is to expand some or all of the values and norms of democracy, including the rule of law; the non-violent resolution of conflicts; and equality among citizens, beyond the limits of the state. To be fully implemented, this would require reforming existing international organisations, e.g. the United Nations, as well as the creation of new institutions such as a World Parliament, which ideally would enhance public control over, and accountability in, international politics.
Cosmopolitan Democracy has been promoted, among others, by physicist Albert Einstein,[SUP][98][/SUP] writer Kurt Vonnegut, columnist George Monbiot, and professors David Held and Daniele Archibugi.[SUP][99][/SUP] The creation of the International Criminal Court in 2003 was seen as a major step forward by many supporters of this type of cosmopolitan democracy.
[h=3]Non-governmental[/h] Aside from the public sphere, similar democratic principles and mechanisms of voting and representation have been used to govern other kinds of groups. Many non-governmental organisations decide policy and leadership by voting. Most trade unions and cooperatives are governed by democratic elections. Corporations are controlled by shareholders on the principle of one share, one vote.
[h=2]Theory[/h]
A marble statue of Aristotle


[h=3]Aristotle[/h] Aristotle contrasted rule by the many (democracy/polity), with rule by the few (oligarchy/aristocracy), and with rule by a single person (tyranny or today autocracy/monarchy). He also thought that there was a good and a bad variant of each system (he considered democracy to be the degenerate counterpart to polity).[SUP][100][/SUP][SUP][101][/SUP]
For Aristotle the underlying principle of democracy is freedom, since only in a democracy the citizens can have a share in freedom. In essence, he argues that this is what every democracy should make its aim. There are two main aspects of freedom: being ruled and ruling in turn, since everyone is equal according to number, not merit, and to be able to live as one pleases.

But one factor of liberty is to govern and be governed in turn; for the popular principle of justice is to have equality according to number, not worth, ... And one is for a man to live as he likes; for they say that this is the function of liberty, inasmuch as to live not as one likes is the life of a man that is a slave.
—Aristotle, Politics 1317b (Book 6, Part II)
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[h=3]Rationale[/h] Among modern political theorists, there are three contending conceptions of the fundamental rationale for democracy: aggregative democracy, deliberative democracy, and radical democracy.[SUP][102][/SUP]
[h=4]Aggregative[/h] The theory of aggregative democracy claims that the aim of the democratic processes is to solicit citizens' preferences and aggregate them together to determine what social policies society should adopt. Therefore, proponents of this view hold that democratic participation should primarily focus on voting, where the policy with the most votes gets implemented.
Different variants of aggregative democracy exist. Under minimalism, democracy is a system of government in which citizens have given teams of political leaders the right to rule in periodic elections. According to this minimalist conception, citizens cannot and should not "rule" because, for example, on most issues, most of the time, they have no clear views or their views are not well-founded. Joseph Schumpeter articulated this view most famously in his book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.[SUP][103][/SUP] Contemporary proponents of minimalism include William H. Riker, Adam Przeworski, Richard Posner.
According to the theory of direct democracy, on the other hand, citizens should vote directly, not through their representatives, on legislative proposals. Proponents of direct democracy offer varied reasons to support this view. Political activity can be valuable in itself, it socialises and educates citizens, and popular participation can check powerful elites. Most importantly, citizens do not really rule themselves unless they directly decide laws and policies.
Governments will tend to produce laws and policies that are close to the views of the median voter– with half to his left and the other half to his right. This is not actually a desirable outcome as it represents the action of self-interested and somewhat unaccountable political elites competing for votes. Anthony Downs suggests that ideological political parties are necessary to act as a mediating broker between individual and governments. Downs laid out this view in his 1957 book An Economic Theory of Democracy.[SUP][104][/SUP]
Robert A. Dahl argues that the fundamental democratic principle is that, when it comes to binding collective decisions, each person in a political community is entitled to have his/her interests be given equal consideration (not necessarily that all people are equally satisfied by the collective decision). He uses the term polyarchy to refer to societies in which there exists a certain set of institutions and procedures which are perceived as leading to such democracy. First and foremost among these institutions is the regular occurrence of free and open elections which are used to select representatives who then manage all or most of the public policy of the society. However, these polyarchic procedures may not create a full democracy if, for example, poverty prevents political participation.[SUP][105][/SUP]
[h=4]Deliberative[/h] Deliberative democracy is based on the notion that democracy is government by deliberation. Unlike aggregative democracy, deliberative democracy holds that, for a democratic decision to be legitimate, it must be preceded by authentic deliberation, not merely the aggregration of preferences that occurs in voting. Authentic deliberation is deliberation among decision-makers that is free from distortions of unequal political power, such as power a decision-maker obtained through economic wealth or the support of interest groups.[SUP][106][/SUP][SUP][107][/SUP][SUP][108][/SUP] If the decision-makers cannot reach consensus after authentically deliberating on a proposal, then they vote on the proposal using a form of majority rule.
[h=4]Radical[/h] Radical democracy is based on the idea that there are hierarchical and oppressive power relations that exist in society. Democracy's role is to make visible and challenge those relations by allowing for difference, dissent and antagonisms in decision making processes.
[h=3]Criticism[/h] Main article: Criticism of democracy

Protests.


[h=4]Inefficiencies[/h] Economists like Milton Friedman have strongly criticised the efficiency of democracy. They base this on their premise of the irrational voter. Their argument is that voters are highly uninformed about many political issues, especially relating to economics, and have a strong bias about the few issues on which they are fairly knowledgeable.
[h=4]Popular rule as a faade[/h] The 20th-century Italian thinkers Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca (independently) argued that democracy was illusory, and served only to mask the reality of elite rule. Indeed, they argued that elite oligarchy is the unbendable law of human nature, due largely to the apathy and division of the masses (as opposed to the drive, initiative and unity of the elites), and that democratic institutions would do no more than shift the exercise of power from oppression to manipulation.[SUP][109][/SUP] As Louis Brandeis once professed, "We may have democracy, or we may have wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can't have both."[SUP][110][/SUP]
All political parties in Canada are now cautious about criticism of the high level of immigration, because, as noted by The Globe and Mail, "in the early 1990s, the old Reform Party was branded 'racist' for suggesting that immigration levels be lowered from 250,000 to 150,000."[SUP][111][/SUP] As Professor of Economics Don J. DeVoretz pointed out, "In a liberal democracy such as Canada, the following paradox persists. Even though the majority of respondents answer yes to the question: 'Are there too many immigrant arrivals each year?' immigrant numbers continue to rise until a critical set of economic costs appear."[SUP][112][/SUP][SUP][113][/SUP]
[h=4]Mob rule[/h] Plato's The Republic presents a critical view of democracy through the narration of Socrates: "Democracy, which is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequaled alike."[SUP][114][/SUP] In his work, Plato lists 5 forms of government from best to worst. Assuming that the Republic was intended to be a serious critique of the political thought in Athens, Plato argues that only Kallipolis, an aristocracy led by the unwilling philosopher-kings (the wisest men), is a just form of government.[SUP][115][/SUP]
James Madison critiqued direct democracy (which he referred to simply as "democracy") in Federalist No. 10, arguing that representative democracy—which he described using the term "republic"—is a preferable form of government, saying: "... democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths." Madison offered that republics were superior to democracies because republics safeguarded against tyranny of the majority, stating in Federalist No. 10: "the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic".
[h=4]Political instability[/h] More recently, democracy is criticised for not offering enough political stability. As governments are frequently elected on and off there tends to be frequent changes in the policies of democratic countries both domestically and internationally. Even if a political party maintains power, vociferous, headline grabbing protests and harsh criticism from the mass media are often enough to force sudden, unexpected political change. Frequent policy changes with regard to business and immigration are likely to deter investment and so hinder economic growth. For this reason, many people have put forward the idea that democracy is undesirable for a developing country in which economic growth and the reduction of poverty are top priorities.[SUP][116][/SUP]
This opportunist alliance not only has the handicap of having to cater to too many ideologically opposing factions, but it is usually short lived since any perceived or actual imbalance in the treatment of coalition partners, or changes to leadership in the coalition partners themselves, can very easily result in the coalition partner withdrawing its support from the government.

 

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[h=4]Fraudulent elections[/h] In representative democracies, it may not benefit incumbents to conduct fair elections. A study showed that incumbents who rig elections stay in office 2.5 times as long as those who permit fair elections.[SUP][117][/SUP] In countries with income above per capita, democracies have been found to be less prone to violence, but below that threshold, more prone violence.[SUP][117][/SUP] Election misconduct is more likely in countries with low per capita incomes, small populations, rich in natural resources, and a lack of institutional checks and balances. Sub-Saharan countries, as well as Afghanistan, all tend to fall into that category.[SUP][117][/SUP]
Governments that have frequent elections tend to have significantly more stable economic policies than those governments who have infrequent elections. However, this trend does not apply to governments that hold fraudulent elections.[SUP][117][/SUP]
[h=4]Opposition[/h] Main article: Anti-democratic thought
Democracy in modern times has almost always faced opposition from the previously existing government, and many times it has faced opposition from social elites. The implementation of a democratic government within a non-democratic state is typically brought about by democratic revolution. Monarchy had traditionally been opposed to democracy, and to this day remains opposed to the abolition of its privileges, although often political compromise has been reached in the form of shared government.
Post-Enlightenment ideologies such as Fascism, Nazism and Neo-Fundamentalism oppose democracy on different grounds, generally citing that the concept of democracy as a constant process is flawed and detrimental to a preferable course of development.
[h=2]Development[/h] Several philosophers and researchers outlined historical and social factors supporting the evolution of democracy. Cultural factors like Protestantism influenced the development of democracy, rule of law, human rights and political liberty (the faithful elected priests, religious freedom and tolerance has been practiced).
Others mentioned the influence of wealth (e.g. S. M. Lipset, 1959). In a related theory, Ronald Inglehart suggests that the increase in living standards has convinced people that they can take their basic survival for granted, and led to increased emphasis on self-expression values, which is highly correlated to democracy.[SUP][118][/SUP]
Carroll Quigley concludes that the characteristics of weapons are the main predictor of democracy:[SUP][119][/SUP][SUP][120][/SUP] Democracy tends to emerge only when the best weapons available are easy for individuals to buy and use.[SUP][121][/SUP] By the 1800s, guns were the best weapon available, and in America, almost everyone could afford to buy a gun, and could learn how to use it fairly easily. Governments couldn't do any better: It became the age of mass armies of citizen soldiers with guns[SUP][121][/SUP] Similarly, Periclean Greece was an age of the citizen soldier and democracy.[SUP][122][/SUP]
Recently established theories stress the relevance of education and human capital and within them of cognitive ability to increasing tolerance, rationality, political literacy and participation. Two effects of education and cognitive ability are distinguished: a cognitive effect (competence to make rational choices, better information processing) and an ethical effect (support of democratic values, freedom, human rights etc.), which itself depends on intelligence.[SUP][123][/SUP][SUP][124][/SUP][SUP][125][/SUP]
Evidence that is consistent with conventional theories of why democracy emerges and is sustained has been hard to come by. Recent statistical analyses have challenged modernisation theory by demonstrating that there is no reliable evidence for the claim that democracy is more likely to emerge when countries become wealthier, more educated, or less unequal.[SUP][126][/SUP] Neither is there convincing evidence that increased reliance on oil revenues prevents democratisation, despite a vast theoretical literature called "The Resource Curse" that asserts that oil revenues sever the link between citizen taxation and government accountability, the key to representative democracy.[SUP][127][/SUP] The lack of evidence for these conventional theories of democratisation have led researchers to search for the "deep" determinants of contemporary political institutions, be they geographical or demographic.[SUP][128][/SUP][SUP][129][/SUP]
In the 21st century, democracy has become such a popular method of reaching decisions that its application beyond politics to other areas such as entertainment, food and fashion, consumerism, urban planning, education, art, literature, science and theology has been criticised as "the reigning dogma of our time".[SUP][130][/SUP] The argument is that applying a populist or market-driven approach to art and literature for example, means that innovative creative work goes unpublished or unproduced. In education, the argument is that essential but more difficult studies are not undertaken. Science, which is a truth-based discipline, is particularly corrupted by the idea that the correct conclusion can be arrived at by popular vote.
Robert Michels asserts that although democracy can never be fully realised, democracy may be developed automatically in the act of striving for democracy: "The peasant in the fable, when on his death-bed, tells his sons that a treasure is buried in the field. After the old man's death the sons dig everywhere in order to discover the treasure. They do not find it. But their indefatigable labor improves the soil and secures for them a comparative well-being. The treasure in the fable may well symbolise democracy."[SUP][131][/SUP]
Dr. Harald Wydra, in his book Communism and The Emergence of Democracy, maintains that the development of democracy should not be viewed as a purely procedural or as a static concept but rather as an ongoing "process of meaning formation".[SUP][132][/SUP] Drawing on Claude Lefort's idea of the empty place of power, that "power emanates from the people […] but is the power of nobody", he remarks that democracy is reverence to a symbolic mythical authority as in reality, there is no such thing as the people or demos. Democratic political figures are not supreme rulers but rather temporary guardians of an empty place. Any claim to substance such as the collective good, the public interest or the will of the nation is subject to the competitive struggle and times of for gaining the authority of office and government. The essence of the democratic system is an empty place, void of real people which can only be temporarily filled and never be appropriated. The seat of power is there, but remains open to constant change. As such, what "democracy" is or what is "democratic" progresses throughout history as a continual and potentially never ending process of social construction.[SUP][citation needed][/SUP]
In 2010 a study by a German military think tank has analyzed how peak oil might change the global economy. The study raises fears for the survival of democracy itself. It suggests that parts of the population could perceive the upheaval triggered by peak oil as a general systemic crisis. This would create "room for ideological and extremist alternatives to existing forms of government".[SUP][133][/SUP]


[h=2]See also[/h]

• Democratic peace theory
• E-democracy
• Empowered democracy
• Foucault-Habermas debate
• Types of democracy
• Rule of law
• Recall election
• Cryptocracy
• Liberal Democracy
• Constitutional liberalism
• Totalitarianism

 

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Sep 12, 2003


Why the Developing World Needs and Wants Democracy

by Carl Gershman, President
The National Endowment for Democracy
On the occasion of India’s 50th anniversary in 1997, the New Delhi-based Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) conducted a national survey assessing popular attitudes toward Indian democracy. The results constituted a stunning rejection of the common belief that the Indian people had lost faith in the country’s democratic system. On the contrary, wrote Ashis Nandy, the director of the CSDS, “The democratic system enjoys greater legitimacy today than in the past. The poor and the deprived defend democracy more vigorously than the elite.” Democracy’s appeal, he said, owed a great deal to the Indians’ belief that its inclusiveness offered the best way to deal with the country’s staggering ethnic, religious, linguistic, and regional diversities. The poor especially valued democracy, according to Nandy, because they are convinced that “their votes matter,” and they seem to relish exercising their franchise in defiance of their professional well-wishers among the more affluent classes who have their own ideas about what the poor need.

While the CSDS survey and Nandy’s commentary focused only on India, they contained an important message about the importance of democracy to the peoples of other countries in the developing world. At the time the survey of Indian opinion appeared, Lee Kwan Yew and some other political leaders were advancing the argument that democracy was a Western system unsuited to Asian culture. This “Asian values” thesis was given a respectful hearing in elite circles in Asia and in Foreign Affairs and other Western publications. Its credibility was buttressed by the strength of East Asian economies that seemed to suggest that systems based on dominant parties, unaccountable elites, and large corporations favored by the state offered a rapid route to development for non-Western countries. This thesis quickly went out of fashion with the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the chief cause of which was the absence of democratic accountability and transparency in the principal institutions of government and finance. Suddenly, the views put forth by Nandy and other proponents of democracy in the developing world gained new force and a wider hearing. Democracy was seen to have as much relevance in Asian and other developing countries as in the West, not just as an effective system of governance but also as the way to achieve a better life for ordinary people.

The idea that ordinary people in developing countries benefit from democracy and, therefore, desire it and are willing to sacrifice to achieve it is still not widely understood or accepted in the established democracies of the West. Though we live in a period of globalization, most people in established democracies have little contact with the developing world. What they read about in the press or see on television are often disasters of one kind or another, leading to the view that many countries may not be “fit” for democracy. The economist and philosopher Amartya Sen has a ready answer for this view: “A country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy,” he writes in an essay entitled “Democracy as a Universal Value” (Journal of Democracy, July, 1999); “rather, it has to become fit through democracy.”

How democracy can help a country become “fit” is a complex and subtle process that doesn’t lend itself to news-bites. Let me suggest seven ways that democracy contributes to this process. The first is by offering the means by which the citizenry can hold governments accountable for their policies and integrity. The political scientist Larry Diamond has written that “predatory, corrupt, wasteful, abusive, tyrannical, incompetent governance is the bane of development.” There is simply no way to control or eliminate corruption if people don’t have access to the fundamental institutions of democracy: a free media that can expose corruption, an independent judiciary that can punish its perpetrators, and a system of free and fair elections that can hold political leaders accountable and, where appropriate, kick the rascals out. This doesn’t mean that democracy will automatically reduce corruption or produce good governance. Responsible governance requires political will, effective institutions, professional officials, and an informed, alert, and aroused citizenry. But without democracy none of these things are possible, and the absence of political and legal restraints leads inevitably to abusive and corrupt behavior.

The second way is by promoting economic development and prosperity. In the past, the conventional wisdom has held that development and prosperity encourage democracy, as better off citizens become more educated and have the ability to participate in politics and government. More recent analysis shows that the causal effect also works the other way around – democracy fosters development. This is a principal conclusion of the Human Development Report 2002, published by the United Nations Development Program, which notes that “democratic governance can trigger a virtuous cycle of development – as political freedom empowers people to press for policies that expand social and economic opportunities, and as open debates help communities shape their priorities.”

In fact, research has shown that democracy not only helps people influence government policy but aids development in even more fundamental ways by fostering productive economic activity. Richard Roll and John R. Talbott, in a study published in the Journal of Democracy (July 2003), conclude that more than 80 percent of the cross-country variation in per capita income growth among developing countries (using date compiled for 1995-99) can be explained by factors that are aspects of democracy, among them the presence of strong property rights, political rights, civil liberties, and press freedom. They also found that dramatic increases in per capita income in developing countries have tended to follow democratic events (such as the removal of a dictator), and that antidemocratic events have tended to be followed by a reduction in economic growth.

The variables that contribute to economic growth share two characteristics. The first is that they represent institutions and policies that establish a rule of law enforced with fairness and justice. This encourages economic participants to work, take risks, save, and engage in other forms of productive economic activity. The second characteristic is that the variables constitute forms of collective action at the level of government – the enforcement of contracts, the protection of political and property rights, and the collection of taxes that can be used for public services. Such actions constitute important components of democratic governance, which explains why developing societies have so much to gain by establishing democratic systems.

The third way democracy helps the people in developing societies is by giving them the means to influence the actions of their respective governments in countering the effects of economic and social disasters. Here we are especially indebted to the work of Amartya Sen, who has shown that “in the terrible history of famines in the world, no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press.” The reason is that democracy, by empowering people at the grass roots, gives governments the political incentive to guard against famines or to take preventive measures to relieve human suffering if there is a danger of mass hunger. Precisely because famine or other kinds of disasters would be fatal to the citizens, not taking protective measures would be fatal to any government in a situation where the people are in a position to register their views. The protective power of democracy, Sen points out, might not be missed when things are going smoothly, but it becomes critically important to the most vulnerable parts of the population when a calamity looms that may arise from changed economic circumstances or accumulated policy mistakes.

The fourth way democracy helps developing societies become “fit” is by stimulating governments to promote the health, education, and overall well-being of their citizens. A study conducted by Patricio Navia and Thomas D. Zweifel (Journal of Democracy, July 2003) shows that since the end of the Cold War, the infant mortality rate in democracies (45.9 per 1,000 live births) is significantly lower than in nondemocracies (50.5). Navia and Zweifel conclude that “at an equal level of development, on average five out of every one thousand newborns will die only and needlessly because the land of their birth is not democratically governed.” Even benevolent dictatorships, they find, are always outperformed by democracies, for the simple reason that democratic governments are naturally more responsive than dictatorships to the needs of the people and are thus prepared to invest in social services to improve the citizens’ quality of life.

The fifth way democracy enriches the life of people in developing societies is by promoting peace, both between states and within them. The idea that democracy is a pacifying force owes a great deal to the work of R.J. Rummel, whose multi-volume work, Understanding Conflict and War (published between 1975-81), concluded that “Violence does not occur between free societies.” Immanuel Kant had reached the same conclusion nearly two centuries earlier in his essay “Perpetual Peace,” where he noted that if “the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, it is natural that they consider all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game.” Greater sensitivity to the cost of war is just one of the reasons that democracy fosters peace. James Lee Ray, in an essay entitled “The Democratic Path to Peace” (Journal of Democracy, April 1997), has also emphasized democracy’s capacity to moderate the day-to-day relations among states, thereby preventing crises from developing to the point where they have to be peacefully resolved. We have also seen from the Indian case that democracy is an inclusive system that offers a way of accommodating ethnic and religious differences that are a principal source of conflict in the contemporary world.

The sixth way democracy helps people in developing societies is by making it possible for them to learn from one another through public discussion, thereby facilitating the definition of needs, priorities, and duties. Sen calls this the constructive role of democracy since it involves the formation of values and the generation of “informed and considered choices.” Through public discussion, he notes, the people of the Indian states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu have come to understand and internalize the harmful effects of high fertility rates on the community and on the lives of young women. The result is that Kerala now has a fertility rate similar to that of Britain and France and lower than China’s, a result achieved without coercion. Having people take ownership of an approach to solving a social problem through the formation of new values is ultimately far more effective than having a solution imposed or mandated by the government or by international assistance agencies. But such constructive action can’t happen without democracy.

The seventh and final reason democracy is important to people in developing countries is that it enriches their lives as citizens and recognizes their dignity as human beings. Sen calls this the intrinsic value of democracy. People value political participation in the life of the community for its own sake, not because it advances a practical purpose. To be denied such participation, Sen writes, is “a major deprivation” since “exercising political rights is a crucial part of good lives of individuals as social beings.” As we have seen, freedom serves many purposes since it makes it possible for people to defend their interests, expand their potential, and create new opportunities for themselves, their families, and their communities. This is what is meant by “the pursuit of happiness.” But human freedom does not require an instrumental justification. It is important in itself.

Throughout the developing world there are people and organizations that are prepared to make great sacrifices in the pursuit of democracy, human rights, and political freedom. The courage and perseverance of democracy activists in Africa, women’s rights activists in the Middle East, and human rights defenders in Burma and other Asian autocracies refutes the notion that democracy is a Western system without appeal to people in the developing world. In fact, the very opposite is true. Not only is democracy needed and desired by people in developing countries, but their devotion to democracy often puts to shame citizens of the established democracies, who too often take democracy for granted and have become somewhat jaded in their appreciation of democracy’s benefits to their own lives. It is not surprising that democracy’s most impassioned advocates today should come from countries where democracy is least secure. Perhaps this will remind those who are fortunate enough to live in secure democracies to value what they have – and also to help those living where freedom is less secure to fulfill their aspirations for a democratic future.





National Endowment for Democracy
1025 F Street NW, Suite 800
Washington, DC 20004 / (202) 378-9700
[email protected]
[ NED Staff Access]

 

[abdlsy]

SEE IF PAKISTAN FALLS IN ANY OF THE CATEGORIES BELOW:



[h=1]10 Reasons Why Democracy Doesn’t Work[/h] A. J. Simonson June 16, 2013


It is an accepted fact that liberal democracy is the worst possible political system—except for all others (thank you, Sir Winston). This list doesn’t aim to advocate tyranny, but to review the flaws and failures of the democratic process.

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We are not perfect—and neither are our governments, since they are made by humans too. It is most advisable to be skeptical, even of democracy itself. After all, even Thomas Jefferson was wary of the “tyranny of the masses”.
10 Aprioristic Equality

One of the foundations of democracy is the assumption that all votes are equal. Well, that’s the theory—but in fact it is rarely so (more on that later). It assumes that all opinions are worth the same, which is quite a big leap of faith, since we are putting the same value on the opinions of the educated and the ignorant, and the law-abiding citizens and crooks.
Even if you think that all people are created equal, it is obvious that their environments are very different—and as a result, so is their character. By assuming that all opinions are equal you are also assuming that most people are able to reach a rational, informed decision after seriously exploring all pros and cons.
9 Populism

A common criticism of democracy is that in the end it devolves into a popularity contest. Polls don’t decide who is right—that’s simply decided by whoever is most willing to say what people like to hear. As a result, many candidates to political office resort to populism, pursuing policies that focus on the immediate satisfaction of whims instead of long-term improvements.
Populist leaders focus on emotion before reason and “common sense” over more academic wisdom, which often produces bad ideas that will be defended with the stubbornness of a mule, regardless of whether they are good or bad.
8 Tribal Mentality

Let’s be honest here: mankind has not evolved much since the Stone Age. Yes, we have tamed the forces of nature and discovered a lot of things—and this Internet business is amazing. But human nature remains the same, more or less. We still think in tribal terms, “my people vs. your people”. Call it class struggle, xenophobia, nationalism, or whatever you like—the thing is that most of us identify with one group or another, and almost every meaningful group has alliances or enmities with other groups. This is part of human nature, and can work peacefully . . . or not.
In a democracy, tribal mentality is very dangerous, because it will make you vote “for your team” instead of voting according to issues. That means that whoever leads “your team” can rest assured that they have your vote, and instead of focusing on your interests, they can proceed to deal with their own. Unfair legislation can be passed if there are vocal groups in the majority (by oppressing the minority) or in the minorities (by entitling them to privileges that the majority can’t enjoy).
7 Corruption

This is not a specific flaw of democracy, and in fact it can be argued that democracy tends to be less prone to corruption than other systems, since it leaves open the possibility of ejecting someone from office. But that possibility also favors a very specific kind of corruption: machine politics, a political organization in which the bosses dole out rewards in exchange for the vote.
It can be as simple as paying money to someone in exchange for their vote, or giving someone a job in the office of the politician who commands the machine. A softer form of machine politics (or “clientelism”) involves the earmarking of federal funds for certain districts or states, so that Representatives and Senators vote for the programs those funds are allocated to.
6 Entitlements

Another side-effect of democracy is that if the State starts providing a service or a pay to someone, they begin to feel entitled to it. So if someone tries to stop providing it—well, they just made a large number of deadly foes. When Margaret Thatcher cut coal subsidies, for example, coal miners felt that their jobs had been threatened and became bitter enemies of Thatcher and her ilk. Most people will never vote for the party of someone who “took their jobs”, no matter how long ago this might have happened.



5 Mob Rule

An unrestricted democracy means that the majority decides over the minority. This leaves the minority relatively powerless—and the smaller it is, the less power it wields. Which means that the smallest minority of all—the individual—is effectively depending on his agreement with the majority.
To account for this problem, mature democracies have developed a set of checks and balances in an attempt to make sure that it doesn’t happen; chief among these is the separation of the powers of the State. But this actually makes a system less democratic, since it interferes with the principle of “people’s power.”
4 Complex Accountability

When a dictatorship falls, it is fairly easy to hold someone accountable for any crimes committed by the State. It is certainly easier than in a democracy, since in that case, officials have been elected by the people. If those officials have committed a crime in opposition to their official platform and without the knowledge of the public, it is simply their own fault and the people who voted for them are innocent. But if a candidate advocates curtailing human rights for a minority, and upon finding himself elected to office, carries out his plan . . . are not the voters also responsible in some degree?
3 State Secrets

All states have dirty skeletons in the cupboard. In a dictatorship they are just discreetly hidden, sometimes in plain sight. In a democracy, which tends to rely on moral superiority, this is difficult to carry out.
People have a right to know—at least in theory. Spying and covert operations are part of the daily workings of the state, admittedly sometimes for the greater good (such as when the police infiltrate a criminal organization to put their members on trial). But their efficiency runs against their transparency. A perfectly democratic system would be transparent, and as such, no covert operations could be effectively carried out.
2 Democracy Is Unsustainable

As seen in points three, four, and five, a perfect democracy is unsustainable—but a mostly democratic system can (and does) work. In many democratic countries, your vote only measures up against other votes in your district. So if your district runs a majority system and you vote for a losing runner, then your vote was useless. You can use a proportional system, but that doesn’t solve the problem: the issue still remains that large numbers of people can effectively “waste their vote.”

 

[zain786]

you need to contact the writer Aftab Ahmed for details

ab wo kahn mile ga ????

 

[abdlsy]

Islamic democracy

Islamic democracy refers to a political ideology that seeks to apply Islamic principles to public policy within a democratic framework. In practice, there are three kinds of political systems in the Muslim-majority countries today; the basis of the distinction between them has to do with how comprehensively Islam is incorporated into the affairs of the state:[SUP][1][/SUP]

1. A democratic secular state, such as Azerbaijan and Turkey, that does not recognize any religion as its state religion and, therefore, does not incorporate religious principles into its public policy and other state affairs.
2. A democratic nation state that recognizes Islam as its state religion and a source of legislation, such as Malaysia and Maldives. The application of religious principles into public policy varies from country to country, since Islam is not the only source of law.
3. A theocratic state that endeavors to institute Sharia, in full force,[SUP][1][/SUP] and offers more comprehensive inclusion of Islam into the affairs of the state. Presently, Afghanistan, Iran, Mauritania and Pakistan are the only examples of an Islamic state in the form of Islamic republics.

Not all of these states are recognized internationally as democratic under concepts of liberal democracy. There are also states in the Muslim world which are secular democracies rather than religious democracies.
The concepts of liberalism and democratic participation were already present in the medieval Islamic world.[SUP][2][/SUP][SUP][3][/SUP][SUP][4][/SUP] The Rashidun Caliphate is perceived by its proponents as an early example of a democratic state and it is claimed that the development of democracy in the Islamic world eventually came to a halt following to the Sunni–Shia split.[SUP][5][/SUP]

 

[abdlsy]

ab wo kahn mile ga ????

rozae hushur mein

 

[abdlsy]

SEE WHERE PAKISTAN WITH ITS DEMOGRAPHICS FALLS:



[h=5]Is Islam compatible with democracy?[/h] It can be. Millions of the world's 1.4 billion Muslims live in democracies, ample proof that there is no inherent discord between the two ideas, most scholars say. But Islam, like almost all religious traditions, can be interpreted in different ways, and some interpretations--such as those favored by al Qaeda and radical Islamists--conflict with democratic ideals. The validity of the different interpretations is a complex question debated by religious scholars.
[h=4]Share[/h] 7



[h=5]Is Islam the reason many Muslim countries are not democratic?[/h] Most scholars say no, and point to a mix of historical, cultural, economic, and political factors--and not Islam as a religion--to explain why democracy has failed to take root in many Muslim countries, especially in the Arab world. Recent Pew Global Attitudes surveys, in fact, show that majorities in the Arab world favor democracy as a form of government.
[h=5]Which Muslim nations are considered democracies?[/h] Most experts cite Turkey, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Mali, and Senegal as democracies. (Indonesia, with 196 million people, is the world's largest Muslim nation). Other countries, such as Malaysia, Nigeria, and Iran, are nominally democratic, but to a greater or lesser extent lack many of the attributes of fully functioning democracies, such as protections for civil liberties and legitimate opposition parties. Most of the world's 47 Muslim-majority nations conduct elections; some are relatively free and fair, some are not. In any case, elections alone do not make a country a democracy, according to most scholars.
[h=5]Which countries in the Arab world are democratic?[/h] The Arab world, home to 18 percent of the world's Muslims, is a democracy-free zone, according to many scholars. Syria, Libya, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia are the least democratic nations in the Arab world, according to a study by Daniel Brumbergof the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Other Arab nations fall somewhere between autocracy and democracy: they may have legislatures, labor unions, and political parties, but their ruling party, president, or king exercises final control. On a spectrum from most to least democratic, these countries are: Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, Algeria, Qatar, and Yemen. Lebanon was a fully functioning democracy in the early 1970's, but years of civil war and conflict have transformed it into a more repressive nation.
[h=5]How does the record of democracy in Muslim countries compare to that of other regions of the developing world?[/h] Poorly. According to Freedom House, a nonprofit organization that tracks democracy worldwide, "the last 30 years have seen a trend diametrically opposite to the global trend toward political liberalization" in Muslim nations. This is particularly true for nations in the Arab world, many of which have taken steps backward in terms of political liberties and electoral democracy in the last 10 years. However, some scholars argue that the "democracy gap" that appears to separate Muslim nations from the rest of the world applies only to the Arab world. In other regions, argues Alfred Stepan in the July 2003 issue of Journal of Democracy, Muslim nations are on par with--or outpace--comparable non-Muslim developing nations in terms of civil liberties and free and fair elections.
[h=5]What are the main reasons so few Muslim nations are democratic?[/h] There are many, says Marc Plattner, the co-director of the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy. In the Arab world, for example, oil has been a factor, entrenching elites and slowing the development of market economies and the political freedoms that can accompany them. Tribalism and patriarchal social systems also play a role. Political manipulation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which Muslim leaders channel domestic unrest into criticism of Israel and the West, is also a factor. Other scholars point to additional issues: repression by monarchies and military governments; the lack of independent secular political parties; traditional mindsets that consider Western-style democracy a foreign, non-Islamic invention; an ideological obsession with unity; and a long-standing policy of U.S. and Western support for many autocrats in the Arab world.
[h=5]Why have Western nations supported Arab autocrats?[/h] Because they are friendly to Western interests, which mainly have to do with oil and other national security concerns. Another key reason has been the fear that, if autocrats fell, they would be replaced by radical regimes. The most powerful opposition to entrenched leaders in many Arab nations are Islamists, groups that embrace a political view of Islam and reject secular forms of government. In many cases, these groups are anti-Western in outlook; some advocate the use of violence to bring about change.
[h=5]What are the religious ideals within Islam that could favor democracy?[/h] The Koran, the holy book of Islam, contains a number of ideas that some Islamic scholars say support democratic ideals. One is shura, or consultative decision making. The other is ijma, or the principle of consensus. However, Muslim scholars disagree about whether these terms have political applications. Is shura obligatory or merely desirable? Binding or non-binding? Another powerful argument for democracy emerges from the principles in the constitution of Medina, which was written by the prophet Mohammed in 622 A.D, according to Muqtedar Khan, the director of international studies at Adrian College in Michigan. The document sets down the rules of the community of Medina, as agreed to by Muslims and Jews of the city--and grants equal rights to Jews and Muslims who follow its laws.
[h=5]What are the religious ideals within Islam that may oppose democracy?[/h] At core is the fact that in Islam, God is the giver of laws, and men have only limited autonomy to implement and enforce God's laws. These laws, known as sharia, apply to all aspects of religious, political, social, and private life. Interpreted literally, they can clash with Western democratic ideals. An Islamic democracy has to navigate tensions created by Islam's traditional rules, such as those that give lesser weight to women's testimony in Islamic courts and those that dictate corporal punishment, such as death by stoning for female adulterers. Modern Islamic democracies have reinterpreted or chosen not to enforce some or all of these laws.
Some Muslim scholars argue against democracy because they see it as a system in which the whim of the majority is the source of law. The counterargument to this, says John O. Voll, professor of Islamic history at Georgetown University, is that all nations create laws--whether they are monarchies, dictatorships, or democracies. And in a democracy, more checks exist on man's whim than in an autocracy.
[h=5]Are these tensions delaying the acceptance of democracy?[/h] In some countries, yes. But scholars differ about whether democracy for the Muslim world can wait until these theological questions are better resolved. "There's an interesting argument happening among Muslims about sequencing," Plattner says. "Some say you first have to reinterpret Islam, then you can build a democracy. There are others who say that if you establish a democracy first, that's the best way to get a reformation in Islam. It's kind of a 'chicken and egg' problem."
[h=5]Are democratic interpretations of Islam gaining ground in the Muslim world?[/h] So far, it's difficult to know for sure. Among Muslim intellectuals, they are certainly having an impact, but "it's not a political trend," Brumberg says. Liberal Islamists have had problems building an organized political base in the Muslim world, he adds--in part because they are often restricted from participating in politics by the same laws that ban more radical Islamist political parties. "Clearly, they haven't been winning the population as a whole over," Plattner says.
[h=5]Is the desire for democracy gaining ground?[/h] It appears so, but at the same time support for organized Islamist parties with inherently anti-democratic views is also strong, Brumberg says. The complexity of the political situation in the Muslim world is reflected in the recent Pew survey, which found both that majorities in the nine predominately Muslim nations surveyed believe that democracy can work in their countries--and that Osama bin Laden is one of their three "most trusted" world leaders. Respondents also favored a prominent--in many cases expanded€” role for Islam and religious leaders in national politics, but majorities in most countries also said they valued ideals associated with democracy, such as freedom of the press.
In many Arab nations, Brumberg says, Islamist parties command the support of between 35 percent and 40 percent of the population. "When people say they want democracy," he says, "you have to ask, 'What would that mean? Whose interests would the democracy serve?'"

 

[abdlsy]

very interesting read this survey about pakistan:





ISLAMABAD // A larger number of young Pakistanis believe the country should be governed by Islamic law or military rule rather than democracy, according to a survey released yesterday, weeks before historic national elections.


Pakistan is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections on May 11 - the first transition between democratically elected governments in a country that has experienced three military coups and constant political instability since its creation in 1947. The parliament's ability to complete its five-year term has been hailed as a significant achievement.
But a survey by the British Council found that young Pakistanis - defined as those between the ages of 18 and 29 - have grown more pessimistic about the future over this period, as the country has struggled with a weak economy, high inflation, energy shortages and a Taliban insurgency.
About 94 per cent of young Pakistanis believe the country is going in the wrong direction, compared with 86 per cent in 2009, the study found. Less than a quarter believe democracy has benefited themselves or their families.
Given these figures, it is perhaps not surprising to find relatively low levels of support for democracy among the youth. Only 29 per cent of young Pakistanis believe democracy is the best political system for the country, according to the poll.
"Young people are losing confidence in the democratic system," the report said. "Leaders of all political persuasions have a duty to convince the youth that they remain committed to 'undiluted democracy' for Pakistan."
Around 38 per cent said Islamic law, or Sharia, is better suited for Pakistan - a reflection of the religious views of many young people in the majority Muslim country, the report said.
Military rule also came out ahead of democracy, with 32 per cent support, despite the turbulent history of the army toppling civilian governments in coups. The survey found that the army enjoys much higher levels of support among people, 77 per cent, than the civilian government, 14 per cent.
The three forms of government were offered as distinct choices in the survey, although in theory, Islamic law could be implemented in conjunction with either democracy or military rule.
Despite having a relatively low opinion of democracy, Pakistan's bulging youth population could be influential in the upcoming election. More than 30 per cent of registered voters, or more than 25 million people, are between the ages of 18 and 29, and many will be voting for the first time, the report said.
Many young Pakistanis have been drawn to a former cricket star turned politician, Imran Khan, who has railed against the country's main political parties as bastions of corrupt officials who care more about lining their pockets than dealing with the country's problems. His message has hit a chord, especially among the urban middle class, but the question is whether he can motivate young people to show up at the polls.
About 60 per cent of young people plan to vote, while another 10 per cent said they could still be persuaded to turn out, the survey said.
Young people actually identified democracy as the best system for economic growth, while Sharia was better for upholding morality, and military rule for providing security, the survey said.
"The costs of failing to harness the energies of youth are high," the report said. "If young people are starved of opportunities, they can wreak havoc on any society, turning a demographic dividend into a demographic disaster."
Pakistan is running out of time to give young people the education and jobs needed to take advantage of this demographic dividend. By midcentury, the proportion of workers in the population will be falling and the country will be ageing fast, making it harder to care for growing numbers of elderly, the report said, warning that the country could be one of the first ever to grow old before it had grown rich.
The British Council survey was carried out by talking to more than 5,000 young Pakistanis in December 2012 and January 2013. The poll has a margin of error of plus or minus 1.5 per cent.

Read more: http://www.thenational.ae/news/worl...-rule-to-democracy-survey-finds#ixzz2vmeU6Qt5
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​

 

[BrotherKantu]

جمہوریت کا مطلب ہے
جسے لوگ ویسے ان کے حکمران
او ڈاکو منصف کو تو ووٹ نہیں دے گا نا
چورجمہوریت میں چوروں کا جج بھی چور
​

 

[abdlsy]

The Verdict
[h=1]50 reasons Pakistan needs Musharraf[/h] By Syed Ali Raza Abidi Published: October 9, 2010




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The General is poised to return

Prime Minister Gilani said at the National Assembly session to leave former president Pervez Musharraf to himself and let him exercise his right to a political career in Pakistan. President Zardari said that if Musharraf wants to return, he will have to cross the same bumpy road as him to get to the presidency or premiership. Nawaz Sharif, Chaudhry Shujaat and the remaining politicians, including religious parties, want him tried for treason, Dr Aafia’s case and introducing extremism in the country.
Since the launch of his party on October 1, Musharraf has been on a political offensive. He has talked about the deal with Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. He has also reportedly accepted that the military trained jihadis to force India to the discussion table to resolve the Kashmir issue – a statement which he has now backtracked from.
His opinions and speeches have led most of his opponents to start wondering what he’s been smoking!
However, these are just some of the achievements of the man when he was in and out of uniform.
1. Nine world class engineering universities were developed and 18 public universities further developed.
2. Pakistan was ranked third in world banking profitability.
3. The IT industry was valued at around $2 billion, including $1 billion in exports and employed around 90,000 professionals.
4. The CNG sector attracted over $70 billion in investment in the past five years and created 45,000 jobs.
5. The telecommunications sector attracted around $10 billion in investments and created over 1.3 million jobs.
6. Industrial parks were set up throughout the country for the first time.
7. Mega projects such as the Saindak, Rekodiq, marble production, coal production, mining and quarrying were pursued.
8. Foreign reserves increased from $700 million to $17 billion.
9. The Karachi stock market went from 700 points to 15,000 points.
10. The literacy rate improved by 11 per cent.
11. Poverty decreased by 10 per cent.
12. Four dams were built: Mirani, Subakzai, Gomalzam, Khurram, and Tangi,
13. Seven motorways were completed or were under construction,
14. Gwadar, an advanced sea port, was developed,
15. 650 kilometres of coastal highways were constructed.
16. A historic 100% increase in tax collection (amounting to Rs1 trillion) was observed.
17. Large scale manufacturing was at a 30-year high, and construction at a 17-year high.
18. Copper and gold deposits were found in Chagai, worth about $600 million annually if sold.
19. A new oil refinery with the UAE that could process 300,000 oil barrels a day was established.
20. The industrial sector registered 26 per cent growth.
21. The economy was the third fastest growing economy after China and India .
22. The Institute of Space Technology was established.
23. Sardar Bahadur Khan Women University Quetta was established.
24. The University of Science and Technology, Bannu, was established.
25. The University of Hazara was founded.
26. The Malakand University in Chakdara was established.
27. The University of Gujrat was established
28. The Virtual University of Pakistan was established
29. Sarhad University of IT in Peshawar was established
30. The National Law University in Islamabad was established
31. The Media University in Islamabad was established
32. University of Education in Lahore was established
33. Lasbela University of Marine Sciences, Baluchistan, was established
34. Baluchistan University of IT & Management, Quetta (2002)
35. The Pakistan economy was worth $ 160 billion in 2007
36. GDP Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) was $ 475.5 billion in 2007
37. The GDP per Capita in 2007 was $ 1000
38. Revenue collection in 2007/08 was Rs1.002 billion
39. Exports in 2007were worth $18.5 billion
40. Textile exports in 2007 were worth $11.2 billion
41. Foreign direct investment in 2007 was $8.5 billion
42. Debt servicing in 2007 was 26 per cent of the GDP
43. The poverty level in 2007 was 24 per cent
44. The literacy rate in 2007 was 53 per cent
45. Pakistan development programs in 2007 were valued at Rs520 billion
46. The Karachi stock exchange in 2007 was $70 billion at 15,000 points
47. Exports in 2007: $18.5 billion
48. Pakistan now has a total of 245,682 educational institutions in all categories, including 164,579 in the public sector and 81,103 in the private sector, according to the National Education Census (NEC-2005).
49. There are now more than 5,000 Pakistanis doing PhDs in foreign countries on scholarship. 300 Pakistanis receive PhD degrees every year, in 1999, the number was just 20.
50. In total, 99,319 educational institutions increased in Musharraf’s era!
This was some of the good Musharraf delivered to Pakistan during his martially-democratic rule from 1999 to 2008. Strange how quickly we forget his foreign policy efforts, which helped elevate the image of Pakistan globally added acceptance value to our green passports. Even the Indians next door were ready to discuss Kashmir for a solution and praised the man for his sincerity, honesty and amicable handling of the issues.
Of course, he has the right to tell his opponents, “tameez say baat karo, warna munh toor jawab millayga” and it is true that most of them are keeping quiet since he said this in a recent interview with Express TV.
I feel he knows more than what he has already said so far, and may explode if not “handled with caution”. This goes for all the politicians cum armed forces of Pakistan. Hence, be careful everyone, the General is coming back as a civilian!

 

[abdlsy]

[h=1]Is there an effective economic argument for democracy?[/h] By Khurram Baig
Published: February 17, 2013





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Sadly, some of Pakistan’s best growth years have been in times of martial law. PHOTO: EXPRESS/FILE

KARACHI: Democracy and economic growth don’t go hand in hand. At least not in Pakistan. Throughout the more than 60 years that Pakistan has been in existence, the best growth years that we have seen, have predominantly been in the times of military rule.

I am not saying this to advocate martial law; rather, I am saying this to urge our political leadership to pay heed to their short-comings and count their blessings that we are not yet a true democracy where the people’s vote really is a harbinger of change, like it is in developed countries around the world.
For example after the country slipped into its first era of military rule, GDB growth rate jumped from an average of 2.5% in the 1950s to 6.8% in the 1960s. This is widely acknowledged as an era of unprecedented growth for the Pakistani economy. You can make many arguments for the political repercussions of this era, but I am just talking numbers here.

Back to civilian rule
And once the country re-entered the democratic fold in 1971, which was a painful transition with tragic side-effects, the growth rate slumped to 4.8%. But democracy has always been short-lived in Pakistan. It wasn’t long before this fragile system once again got steam-rolled and Pakistan entered its most tumultuous era of all. Economic growth however in the 1980s once again went through the roof averaging 6.5%.
I do believe that the 1970s and the 1980s have been the two defining decades in Pakistan’s history. The 1970s ushered in an era of economic decay and mismanagement and bureaucratic stagnation the effects of which we have been unable to remove to this day.
In the same way the 1980s have forever left the dark shadow of war looming over Pakistan. It is no wonder that today we are mired in the clutches of both militancy and economic mismanagement.
In the 1990s, with the country once again under civilian rule, growth rate started to slide and by the time Pakistan entered its third and so far last military stint in 1999, it had fallen to historic lows, from an average of 6.5% in the 1980s to 2% in 2001. It was in Musharraf’s time that Pakistan saw some of its best growth years, with a high of 9% in 2004-5.
And one year into the present democratic setup, in 2008-9 the growth rate had slumped to 1.7%, the lowest in Pakistan’s history.
Dismal report card
The present government has had a dismal five years. The power crisis has gone from bad to worse. The circular debt has not been controlled.
The Debt Limitation Act has been breached every year and the debt to GDP ratio has surpassed all historic levels.
The rupee has set a record low of over 100 to the US dollar and Foreign Direct Investment has been on the decline. Sadly, the last year and subsequently the last budget prepared by this government was even more populist than ever. Subsidies have continued to rise and debt servicing has been eating a bigger and bigger slice of revenue every year.

Martial law is not the answer, but unless democratic governments give up their populist agendas, they won’t be able to give credence to the mantra, ‘Democracy is the best revenge’ either.
Published in The Express Tribune, February 18[SUP]th[/SUP], 2013.
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[h=1]PAKISTAN: How to Get Elected President
[/h] Monday, Jan. 18, 1960
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In his 14 months in power, Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan had done much to retrieve Pakistan from the misrule of her squabbling, corrupt politicians. But some of his supporters, including Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir, who is an able constitutional lawyer, were disturbed that all this progress should take place while Pakistan was still under martial law. Since Soldier-President Ayub is at the peak of his popularity, urged Qadir, why not take a leaf from De Gaulle and get himself formally recognized as head of state? Already elections were being held to choose 80,000 local members of Ayub's "basic...


Read more: PAKISTAN: How to Get Elected President - TIME http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,828561,00.html#ixzz2vmg0l3al

 

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[h=2] Understanding Pakistan's military
[/h] Anatol Lieven 9 August 2010
Subjects:

• Pakistan

A guided tour of Pakistan’s Army, from its role within Pakistani nationalism, prospects of mutiny, and the relationship of the ISI to the Jihadi world, to hostilities with India, suggests that some key ways of defusing the situation may be being neglected

Voltaire remarked of Frederick the Great’s Prussia that “Where some states have an army, the Prussian Army has a state.” In view of the sheer size, effectiveness and wealth of the Pakistan military and associated institutions compared to the rest of the state, much the same could be said of Pakistan.
The Pakistani military is the only Pakistani state institution which works as it is officially meant to – which means that it repeatedly does something that it is not meant to, which is to overthrow what in Pakistan is called “democracy” and seize control of the state from other institutions. The military has therefore been seen as extremely bad for Pakistan’s progress, at least if that progress is to be defined in standard western terms.
On the other hand, it has also always been true that without a strong military, Pakistan would most probably long since have disintegrated. That is more than ever true today, as the country faces the powerful insurgency of the Pakistani Taleban and their allies. The Taleban threat makes the unity and discipline of the Army of paramount importance to Pakistan and the world – all the more so because the deep unpopularity of US strategy among the vast majority of Pakistanis has made even the limited alliance between the Pakistani military and the US extremely unpopular in Pakistani society, and among many soldiers.
The Pakistani military owes its success as a modern institution to the fact that it has to a considerable extent separated itself from the political culture of the rest of the country, which revolves around kinship, factions, and patronage – which alas all too often shades over into corruption and even kleptocracy. Of course, corruption does exist within the military, but to nothing like the same extent as in the rest of society.
The military has been able to achieve this separation because of two deeply intertwined and mutually dependent factors: a collective ethos which promotes honest service to the military as an institution; and a great deal of money. Without the resources to reward the soldiers adequately and provide them with decent services, the collective ethos of service, honesty and discipline could not be maintained. On the other hand, without this collective ethos, many of the resources given to the military would simply be stolen, as they are in the rest of the state.
To put it another way, the military’s success as an institution and its power over the state comes from its immunity to kinship interests and the corruption they bring with them; but it has only been able to achieve this immunity by turning itself into a sort of giant kinship group, extracting patronage from the state and distributing it to its members.
The scale of military spending has severely limited funds available for education, development, medical services and infrastructure. If continued, this imbalance risks eventually crippling the country and sending Pakistan the way of the Soviet Union – another country which got itself into a ruinous military race with a vastly richer power. On the other hand, the rewards of loyal military service have also helped to prevent military mutinies and coups by junior officers – something that would plunge Pakistan overnight into African chaos, and usher in civil war and Islamist revolt.
[h=3]Our mad dog[/h]As a Lt Colonel fighting the Pakistani Taleban told me in July 2009:

“The soldiers, like Pakistanis in general, see no difference between the American and the Russian presences in Afghanistan. They see both as illegal military occupations by aliens, and that the Afghan government are just pathetic puppets. Today also, they still see the Afghan Taleban as freedom-fighters who are fighting these occupiers just like the Mujahedin against the Russians. And the invasion of Iraq, and all the lies that Bush told, had a very bad effect – soldiers think that the US is trying to conquer or dominate the whole Muslim world. But as far as our own Taleban are concerned, things are changing.
Before, I must tell you frankly, there was a very widespread feeling in the Army that everything Pakistan was doing was in the interests of the West and that we were being forced to do it by America. But now, the militants have launched so many attacks on Pakistan and killed so many soldiers that this feeling is changing…
But to be very honest with you, we are brought up from our cradle to be ready to fight India and once we join the Army this feeling is multiplied. So we are always happy when we are sent to the LOC [the Line of Control dividing Pakistani and Indian Kashmir] or even to freeze on the Siachen. But we are not very happy to be sent here to fight other Pakistanis, though we obey as a matter of duty. No soldier likes to kill his own people. I talked to my wife on the phone yesterday. She said that you must be happy to have killed so many miscreants. I said to her, if our dog goes mad we would have to shoot it, but we would not be happy about having to do this.”
​

Between 2004 and 2007 there were a number of instances of mass desertion and refusal to fight in units deployed to fight militants, though mostly in the Pathan-recruited Frontier Corps rather than in the regular Army. In these morally and psychologically testing circumstances, anything that helps maintain Pakistani military discipline cannot be altogether bad – given the immense scale of the stakes concerned, and the consequences if that discipline were to crack.
Fortunately, commitment to the Army, and to the unity and discipline of the Army, is drilled into every officer and soldier from the first hour of their joining the military. Together with the material rewards of loyal service, it constitutes a very powerful obstacle to any thought of a coup from below, which would by definition split the Army and would indeed very likely destroy it and the army altogether. Every military coup in Pakistan has therefore been carried out by the Chief of Army Staff of the time, backed by a consensus of the Corps Commanders and the rest of the High Command. Islamist conspiracies by junior officers against their superiors (of which there have been two over the past generation) have been penetrated and smashed by Military Intelligence.
[h=3]Morally superior[/h]The Pakistani military therefore, more even than most militaries, sees itself as a breed apart, and devotes great effort to inculcating in new recruits the feeling that they belong to a military family different from (and vastly superior to) Pakistani civilian society. The mainly middle-class composition of the officer corps increases contempt for the “feudal” political class. The Army sees itself as both morally superior to this class, and far more modern, progressive and better-educated.
This belief is also widely present in Pakistani society as a whole, and has become dominant at regular intervals. It is sadly true that whatever the feelings of the population later, every military coup in Pakistan when it happened was popular with most Pakistanis, including the Pakistani media, and was subsequently legitimized by the Pakistani judiciary. As Hasan-Askari Rizvi writes, “the imposition of martial law was not contested by any civilian group and the military had no problem assuming and consolidating power.”
It is possible that developments since 2001 have changed this pattern, above all because of the new importance of the independent judiciary and media, and the way that the military’s role both in government and in the unpopular war with the Pakistani Taleban has tarnished their image with many Pakistanis.
However, this change is not proven yet, and depends critically on how Pakistani civilian governments perform in future. On that score, by the summer of 2009, only a year after Musharraf’s resignation, many Pakistanis of my acquaintance, especially in the business classes, were once again calling for the military to step in to oust the civilian administration of President Zardari – not necessarily to take over themselves, but to purge the most corrupt politicians and create a government of national unity or a caretaker government of technocrats.
Military loathing for the politicians is strengthened by the fact that Pakistani politics is dominated by wealth and inherited status, whereas the officer corps has become increasingly socially egalitarian, and provides opportunities for social mobility which the Pakistani economy cannot, and a position in the officer corps is immensely prized by the sons of shopkeepers and big farmers across Punjab and the NWFP. This allows the military to pick the very best recruits, and increases their sense of belonging to an elite. In the last years of British rule and the first years of Pakistan, most officers were recruited from the landed gentry and upper middle classes. These are still represented by figures like former Chief of Army Staff General Jehangir Karamat, but a much more typical figure is the present COAS (as of 2010), General Ashfaq Kayani, son of an NCO. This social change reflects partly the withdrawal of the upper middle classes to more comfortable professions, but also the immense increase in the numbers of officers required.
Meanwhile, the political parties continue to be dominated by “feudal” landowners and wealthy urban bosses, many of them not just corrupt but barely educated. This increases the sense of superiority to the politicians in the officer corps – something that I have heard from many officers and which was very marked in General Musharraf’s personal contempt for Benazir Bhutto and her husband.
I have also been told by a number of officers and members of military families that “the officers’ mess is the most democratic institution in Pakistan, because its members are superior and junior during the day, but in the evening are comrades. That is something we have inherited from the British”.
This may seem like a ludicrous statement, until one remembers that in Pakistan, saying that something is the most spiritually democratic institution isn’t saying very much. Pakistani society is permeated by a culture of deference to superiors, starting with elders within the family and kinship group. Pakistan’s dynastically-ruled “democratic” political parties exemplify this deference to inheritance and wealth; while in the Army, as an officer told me:

“You rise on merit – well, mostly - not by inheritance, and you salute the military rank and not the sardar or pir who has inherited his position from his father, or the businessman’s money. These days, many of the generals are the sons of clerks and shopkeepers, or if they are from military families, they are the sons of havildars [NCOs]. It doesn’t matter. The point is that they are generals.”
​

[h=3]Pakistani nationalism[/h]The social change in the officer corps over the decades has led to longstanding Western fears that it is becoming “Islamized”, leading to the danger that either the Army as a whole might support Islamist revolution, or that there might be a mutiny by Islamist junior officers against the high command. These dangers do exist, but in my view only a direct and massive attack on Pakistan by the US could bring them to fruition.
It is obviously true that as the officer corps becomes lower middle class, so its members become less westernized and more religious – after all, the vast majority of Pakistan’s population are conservative Muslims. However, as the last chapter explained, they are many different kinds of conservative Muslim, and this is also true of the officer corps.
On the whole, by far the most important aspect of a Pakistani officer’s identity is that he (or sometimes she) is an officer. The Pakistani military is a profoundly shaping influence as far as its members are concerned. This can be seen amongst other things from the social origins and personal cultures of its chiefs of staff and military rulers over the years. It would be hard to find a more different set of men than Generals Ayub, Yahya, Zia, Musharraf, Beg, Karamat and Kayani in terms of their social origins, personal characters and attitudes to religion. Yet all have been first and foremost military men.
This means in turn that their ideology was first and foremost Pakistani nationalist. The military is tied to Pakistan, not the universal Muslim ummah of the radical Islamists’ dreams; tied not only by sentiment and ideology, but also by the reality of what supports the Army. If it is true, as so many officers have told me, that “No Army, no Pakistan”, it is equally true that “No Pakistan, no Army”.
In the 1980s General Zia did undertake measures to make the army more Islamic, and a good many officers who wanted promotion adopted an Islamic faade in the hope of furthering this. Zia also encouraged Islamic preaching within the army, notably by the Tabligh-e-Jamaat. However, as the careers of the generals Karamat and Musharraf indicate, this did not lead to known secular generals being blocked from promotion; and in the 1990s, and especially under Musharraf, most of Zia’s measures were rolled back. In recent years, preaching by the Tabligh has been strongly discouraged, not so much because of political fears (the Tabligh is determinedly apolitical) as because of instinctive opposition to any groups that might encourage factions among officers, and loyalties to anything other than the Army itself.
Of course, the Army has always gone into battle with the cry of Allahu Akbar (God is Great) – just as the old German army carried Gott mit Uns (God with Us) on its helmets and standards; but according to a moderate Islamist officer, Colonel (retd) Abdul Qayyum:

“You shouldn’t use bits of Islam to raise military discipline, morale and so on. I’m sorry to say that this is the way it has always been used in the Pakistani army. It is our equivalent of rum – the generals use it to get their men to launch suicidal attacks. But there is no such thing as a powerful jihadi group within the army. Of course, there are many devoutly Muslim officers and jawans, but at heart the vast majority of the army are nationalists, and take whatever is useful from Islam to serve what they see as Pakistan’s interests. The Pakistani army has been a nationalist army with an Islamic look.”
​

However, if the Army is not Islamist, its members can hardly avoid sharing in the bitter hostility to US policy of the overwhelming majority of the Pakistani population. To judge by retired and serving officers of my acquaintance, this includes the genuine conviction that either the Bush administration or Israel were responsible for 9/11. Inevitably therefore, there was deep opposition throughout the Army after 2001 to US pressure to crack down on the Afghan Taleban and their Pakistani sympathizers. “We are being ordered to launch a Pakistani civil war for the sake of America”, an officer told me in 2002. “Why on earth should we? Why should we commit suicide for you?”
[h=3]Mutineer scenarios[/h]In 2007-2008, this was beginning to cause serious problems of morale. The most dangerous single thing I heard during my visits to Pakistan in those years was that soldiers’ families in villages in the NWFP and the Potwar region were finding it increasingly difficult to find high-status brides for their sons serving in the military, because of the growing popular feeling that “the Army are slaves of the Americans”, and “the soldiers are killing fellow Muslims on America’s orders.”
By late 2009 the sheer number of soldiers killed by the Pakistani Taleban and their allies, and still more importantly the increasingly murderous and indiscriminate Pakistani Taleban attacks on civilians, seems to have produced a change of mood in the areas of military recruitment.
Nonetheless, if the Pakistani Taleban are increasingly unpopular, that does not make the US any more popular; and if the US ever put Pakistani soldiers in a position where they felt that honour and patriotism required them to fight America, many would be willing to do so.
The most dangerous moment in my visits to Pakistan since 9/11 came in August-September 2008, when on two occasions US forces entered Pakistan’s Tribal Areas on the ground in order to raid suspected Taleban and Al Qaeda bases. On the second occasion, Pakistani soldiers fired in the air to turn the Americans back. On September 19th 2008 the Chief of the Army Staff, General Kayani, flew to meet the US Chief of the Joint Staffs, Admiral Mike Mullen, on the US Aircraft Carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, and in the words of a senior Pakistani general “gave him the toughest possible warning about what would happen if this were repeated”.
Pakistani officers from Captain to Lt General have told me that the entry of US ground forces into Pakistan in pursuit of the Taleban and Al Qaeda is by far the most dangerous scenario as far as both Pakistani-US relations and the unity of the Army is concerned. As one retired general explained, drone attacks on Pakistani territory, though the ordinary officers and soldiers find them humiliating, are not a critical issue because they cannot do anything about them:

“US ground forces inside Pakistan are a different matter, because the soldiers can do something about them. They can fight. And if they don’t fight, they will feel utterly humiliated, before their wives, mothers, children. It would be a matter of honour, which as you know is a tremendous thing in our society. These men have sworn an oath to defend Pakistani soil. So they would fight. And if the generals told them not to fight, many of them would mutiny, starting with the Frontier Corps.”
​

At this point, not just Islamist radicals but every malcontent in the country would join the mutineers, and the disintegration of Pakistan would come a giant leap closer.
[h=3]India and Kashmir[/h]Traditionally, hostility to the US in Pakistan has stemmed from a mixture of anger at US policies in the Muslim world more widely (especially of course concerning Israel and Palestine) and a feeling that on specific occasions, the US has used and then abandoned Pakistan. More recently, however, hostility has been considerably strengthened by the growing alliance between the US and India. This is especially dangerous as far as the military is concerned, for fear of India is the military’s central raison d’etre.
Speaking of the average Pakistani officer of today, however, Lt General (retd) Tanvir Naqvi told me that:

“He has no doubt in his mind that the adversary is India, and that the whole raison d’etre of the Army is to defend against India. His image of Indians is of an anti-Pakistan, anti-Muslim, treacherous people. So he feels that he must be always ready to fight against India.”
​

Pakistan was born in horrendous bloodshed between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims; and within two months of its birth, fighting had broken out with India over the fate of the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir. This fighting has continued on and off ever since. Two out of Pakistan’s three wars with India have been fought over Kashmir, as have several smaller campaigns. These include the bitter, 25-year-long struggle for the Siachen Glacier (possibly the most strategically pointless fight in the entire history of human conflict) initiated by India in 1984. The vast majority of Pakistani soldiers have served in Kashmir at some point or other, and for many this service has played a formative role in their worldview.
The military’s obsession with India and Kashmir is not in origin Islamist, but Pakistani Muslim nationalist. With rare exceptions, this has been true even of those senior officers most closely involved in backing Islamist extremist groups to fight against India, like former ISI chief Lt General Hamid Gul. Most have used the Islamists as weapons against India without sharing their ideology.

The Islamist radical groups, madrasahs and networks which had served to raise Pakistani volunteers for the Afghan jihad had always hated India, and were only too ready to accept Pakistani military help, including funding, weapons supplies, provision of intelligence, and the creation of training camps run by the Pakistani military.
However, just as in Afghanistan first the Mujahedin and then the Taleban escaped from the US and Pakistani scripts and ran amok on their own accounts, so the militants in Kashmir began to alienate much of the native Kashmiri population with their ruthlessness and ideological fanaticism; to splinter and splinter again into ever-smaller groups and fight with each other despite ISI efforts to promote co-operation, and to prey on kashmiri civilians.
Finally – though it is not clear if this was really a departure from the script, as ISI officers claim in private, or was planned by the ISI as the Indian government believes – the militants began to carry out terrorist attacks on Indian targets outside Kashmir (starting with an attack on Indian soldiers at the Red Fort in Delhi in December 2000). This last development in particular ensured that in the wake of 9/11, Pakistan would come under irresistible US pressure to abandon its active support for the Kashmiri jihad and crack down on its militant allies.
In January 2002, Musharraf formally banned Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, and ordered an end to militant infiltration into Indian Kashmir from Pakistan. Due mainly to intense US pressure, from mid-2003 on this ban has been enforced, leading to a steep reduction in violence in Kashmir. Largely as a result, in November 2003 India and Pakistan agreed a ceasefire along the Line of Control in Kashmir, and initiated a dialogue on a possible settlement over Kashmir. However, the Pakistani military remained firmly convinced that India would never agree to terms even minimally acceptable to Pakistan unless at least the threat of future guerrilla and terrorist action remained present.
[h=3]The ISI[/h]By 2008, as the Taleban insurgency against Pakistan itself gathered pace and an increasing number of ISI officers and informants fell victim to it, the ISI itself began to see the need for a new and much tougher approach to some of its militant allies within Pakistan.
However, the military is genuinely concerned that if it attacks some of these groups it will drive them into joining the Pakistani Taleban – as has already occurred with Sipahi-Sabah, Lashkar-e-Janghvi and some sections of Jaish-e-Mohammed. The suspected involvement of JeM activists in the attempts to assassinate Musharraf in December 2003 (apparently with low level help from within the armed forces) led to a harsh crackdown on parts of the group by Pakistani intelligence.
The ISI’s long association with the militants, first in Afghanistan and then in Kashmir, had led some ISI officers into a close personal identification with the forces that they were supposed to be controlling. This leads to a whole set of interlocking questions: How far the Pakistani High Command continues to back certain militant groups; how far the command of the ISI may be following a strategy in this regard independent from that of the military; and how far individual ISI officers may have escaped from the control of their superiors and be supporting and planning terrorist actions on their own. This in turn leads to the even more vital question of how far the Pakistani military is penetrated by Islamist extremist elements, and whether there is any possibility of these carrying out a successful military coup from below, against their own high command.
Since this whole field is obviously kept very secret by the institutions concerned (including Military Intelligence, which monitors the political and ideological allegiances of officers), there are no definitive answers to these questions. What follows is informed guess-work based on numerous discussions with experts and off-the-record talks with Pakistani officers including retired ISI officers.
Concerning the ISI, the consensus of my informants is as follows: There is considerable resentment of the ISI in the rest of the military, due to their perceived arrogance and suspected corruption. However, when it comes to overall strategy, the ISI follows the line of the high command. It is after all always headed by a senior regular general, not a professional intelligence officer, and a majority of its officers are also seconded regulars. The present Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, was director of the ISI from 2004-2007, and ordered a limited crackdown on jihadi groups that the ISI had previously supported.
Concerning the Afghan Taleban, the military and the ISI are at one, and the evidence is unequivocal: The military and ISI continue to give them shelter, and there is deep unwillingness to take serious action against them on America’s behalf, both because it is feared that this would increase Pathan insurgency in Pakistan, and because they are seen as the only assets Pakistan possesses in Afghanistan. The conviction in the Pakistani security establishment is that the West will quit Afghanistan leaving civil war behind, and that India will then throw its weight behind the non-Pathan forces of the former Northern Alliance in order to encircle Pakistan strategically.
Concerning the Pakistani Taleban and their allies, however, like the military as a whole, the ISI is now committed to the struggle against them, and by the end of 2009 had lost more than seventy of its officers in this fight – some ten times the number of CIA officers killed since 9/11, just as Pakistani military casualties fighting the Pakistani Taleban have greatly exceeded those of the US in Afghanistan. Equally, however, in 2007-2008 there were a great many stories of ISI officers intervening to rescue individual Taleban commanders from arrest by the police or the army – too many, and too circumstantial, for these all to have been invented.
It seems clear therefore that whether because individual ISI officers felt a personal commitment to these men, or because the institution as a whole still regarded them as potentially useful, actions were taking place that were against overall military policy – let alone that of the Pakistani government. Moreover, some of these men had at least indirect links to Al Qaeda. This does not mean that the ISI knows where Osama bin Laden (if he is indeed still alive), Aiman al-Zawahiri and other Al Qaeda leaders are hiding. It does however suggest that they could probably do a good deal more to find out.
On the crucial question of support for terrorism against India, it is obvious that not just the ISI but the military as a whole are committed to keeping Lashkar-e-Taiba (under its cover as Jamaat-ut-Dawa) at least in existence, both as a potential future weapon against India and because they are genuinely scared of driving this very powerful and popular group to revolt.
Jamaat-ut-Dawa’s extensive international network in the Pakistani diaspora also leads Pakistani officers to fear that if they attempt seriously to suppress the group it will also launch successful terrorist attacks in the West, with disastrous results for Pakistan’s international position. Lashkar-e-Taiba members certainly have contacts with Al Qaeda, and helped Al Qaeda operatives escape from Afghanistan after the defeat of the Taleban and helped shelter them within Pakistan. As Stephen Tankel writes:

“Ideologically, for all of its strategic restraint following 9/11 Lashkar is, after all, a jihadi organization with a long history of waging pan-Islamic irredentist campaigns. Indian-controlled Kashmir may be the group’s primary ideological and strategic target, but it has never been the apotheosis of Lashkar’s jihad.”
​

[h=3]Blaming Pakistan[/h]All the groups and individuals within this net hate the US, Israel, India and indeed Russia alike, though they have different targets at different times. Despite LeT’s strategic decision to concentrate on India, therefore, there is no ideological barrier to its members taking part in actions against the West. The jihadi world could even be called a kind of cloud of gas in which individuals join some clump for one operation and then part again to form new ad hoc groups for other attacks. This also makes it extremely hard for the ISI to keep tabs on the individuals concerned, even when it wants to.
By far the biggest terrorist attack actually carried out by LeT itself was that in Mumbai in November 2008. The great majority of the Pakistani experts and retired officers whom I know do not think that the Pakistani high command, either of the ISI or the army, was involved in ordering Lashkar-e-Taiba’s terrorist attack on Mumbai in November 2008. They point out in particular that while deliberately targeting Westerners greatly boosted LeT’s prestige among international militants, it would have been an unprecedented, reckless and pointless strategy for the Pakistani high command, ensuring a furious reaction from the international community.
Equally, there is an overwhelming consensus that this operation could not have been planned without ISI officers having been involved at some stage and without the ISI knowing that some sort of operation was being planned. Whether the operation then continued as it were on autopilot, was helped only by retired officers, or whether the junior officers concerned deliberately decided to pursue it without telling their superiors, is impossible to say at this stage.
ISI help is however not necessary for Islamist terrorists who wish to carry out attacks against India (though it has certainly occurred in the past). The discontent of sections of India’s Muslim minority (increased by ghastly incidents like the massacres of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002, encouraged by the Hindu nationalist state government) gives ample possibilities of recruitment; the sheer size of India, coupled with the incompetence of the Indian security forces, gives ample targets of opportunity; and the desire to provoke an Indian attack on Pakistan gives ample motive. But whether or not the ISI is involved in future attacks, India will certainly blame Pakistan for them.
This creates the real possibility of a range of harsh Indian responses, stretching from economic pressure through blockade to outright war. Such a war would in the short term unite Pakistanis, and greatly increase the morale of the Army. The long term consequences for Pakistan’s (and possibly India’s) economic development could however be quite disastrous; while if the US were perceived to back India in such a war, anti-American feeling and extremist recruitment in Pakistan would soar to new heights.
All of this gives the US every reason to press the Pakistani military to suppress some extremist groups and keep others on a very tight rein. Washington also however needs to press India to seek reconciliation with Pakistan over Kashmir, and to refrain from actions which will create even more fear of India in the Pakistani military.
This article was first published in The National Interest, Washington DC, no.94, March/April 2008, under the title “All Kayani’s Men”.

 

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“The greatness of a leader is measured by the achievements of the led. This is the ultimate test of his effectiveness.” – Gen. Omar Bradley
We created this website to HONOR and CHERISH an honest Leader who has actually delivered for Pakistan – President Musharraf! The only Leader who had the guts to counter the international negative perception and he successfully projected a positive, moderate and progressing picture of Pakistan around the world!
President Musharraf led a great team of economists and professionals with ex-PM Shaukat Aziz, to mark their achievements. Their achievements caused Pakistan to emerge as a geo-strategic important country with a 100% better economy! His effectiveness shall be measured by the results produced by the led! In 2006, Pakistan was the 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] fastest growing economy of the world and world’s preferred destination for Investment! In President Musharraf’s era:
[h=4]Pakistan’s economy grew by 100% — to become $ 160 billion
Revenue grew by 100% — to become $ 11.4 billion[/h] [h=4]Per Capita Income grew by 100% — to become $ 925[/h] [h=4]Foreign Reserves grew by 500% — to become $ 17 billion
Exports grew by 100% — to become $ 18.5 billion
Textile exports grew by 100% — to become $ 11.2 billion
Karachi Stock Exchange grew by 500% — to become $ 75 billion
Foreign Direct Investment grew by 500% — to become $ 8 billion
Annual Debt servicing decreased by 35% — to become 26%
Poverty decreased by 10% — to become 24%
literacy rate grew by 10% — to become 54%
Public development Funds grew by 100% — to become Rs 520 billion [/h]
President Musharraf’s Vision and Policies helped Pakistan come out of the list of Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) while setting it on path of prosperity, growth and economic reforms. While the world institutions like the World Bank (source) & (source), IMF (source) and ADB (source) have been praising Pakistan for its reforms, fiscal policies and macro-economic policies – the biased & wicked TV channels GEO, ARY & AAJ – have been projecting a negative, bleak and a hopeless picture on purpose to serve their isolated vested interest. These SOLD-OUT channels are creating despondency to drive away the foreign investment and depress over-seas Pakistanis. The contribution by these over-seas Pakistanis is instrumental in heaping and accumulating Foreign Reserves to stabilize Pakistan’s economy. Recent rumor-mongering (source) by these channels, that President Musharraf has been confined by the Army Chief and will resign soon, crashed our Stock markets (source) by 500 points TWICE! KSE was the best performing Stock market of Asia. GEO, ARY and AAJ are benchmarks of ingratitude – for the leader who actually gave the freedom to come on air and express their views, and towards their own country!
Moreover, for those those consider President Musharraf as an unconstitutional President,

Chronological record of events, that validates President Musharraf’s election as President and subsequent endorsements by Supreme Court​

1- On 13 May 2000, Pakistan’s 12 member Supreme Court unanimously validated the October 1999 coup and granted Musharraf executive and legislative authority for 3 years from the coup date. Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was one of the judges that validated. (Link)
2- On 7 October 2002, the 5 member bench of Supreme Court validated LFO and amendments to constitution. Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was one of the judges that validated. (Link)
3- On 29 Dec 2004, PML-Q government passed the 17th constitutional amendment bill in National Assembly, with 2/3 majority, also approved by Senate that allowed President Musharraf to hold dual offices. (Link)
4- Constitution of Pakistan – Article 63 clause (1) paragraph (d), read with proviso to Article 41 clause (7) paragraph (b), allows the President to hold dual office.
5- On 13 April 2005, the 5 member bench of Supreme Court gave judgment in favor of 17[SUP]th[/SUP] amendment and President’s uniform. Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was one of the judges that validated. (Link)
6- On 28 September 2007, the Supreme Court cleared the way for President Pervez Musharraf to seek another five-year term, and stand for Presidential elections, when six of the nine judges, rejected a tangle of petitions against him and threw out a major legal challenge to his re-election plans. Presided by Justice Rana Bhagwandas. (Link)
7- President Musharraf was elected President of Pakistan, on 6th October 2007, by a combined electoral of the Senate, National Assembly and the FOUR Provincial Assembles.
8- President of Pakistan declared emergency on 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] November 2007, as per Article 232 of the constitution.
9- The 10 member bench of Supreme Court (SC) on 24 November 2007 directed the chief election commissioner and the government to declare Pervez Musharraf president for a second term. (Link)
10- On 24 November 2007, the Pakistan Election Commission confirmed Musharraf’s re-election as President. (Link)
11- President Musharraf won by 58% votes, declared in November 2007, as the constitutional President of Pakistan!
12- On 28 November 2007, Musharraf relinquished the office of Chief of Armed Staff, as per November 2007 verdict of the Supreme Court.
13- On 15 Feb 2008, the Supreme Court validated the proclamation of emergency of 3rd Nov 2007, PCO 2007 and oath of the judges. This full court judgment was written by Chief Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar. (Link)
Therefore, he may still be considered an unconstitutional President (unrealistic) by those that have no regard for the Constitution of Pakistan, the 2/3 majority of National Assembly that elected him as the President and the Supreme Court decision (under PCO ex-CJP Iftikhar Chaudhry) that allowed him to take part in the Presidential elections.

For us – President Musharraf is our HERO – Our Leader!
There are three kinds of people: Those who make things happen, those who watch things happen, and those who ask, ‘What happened?’” –Casey Stengel
President Musharraf made things happen for Pakistan!!!
The spirit who has seen the spectre of death cannot be scared by the faces of thieves; the soldier who has seen the swords glittering over his head and streams of blood under his feet, does not care about the rocks thrown at him by the children on streets — Khalil Jibran

[h=3]* * * This website is maintained by: Mirza Rohail B and Afreen Baig * * *[/h] [h=3]Share this:[/h]

 

[abdlsy]

 

[abdlsy]

The view that the Pakistanis masses are illiterate and do not know what is right for them and given the choice would choose inefficient, corrupt and self-serving politicians is a view held deeply by the military-civilian establishment. From this it follows that the military and technocratic elite are by education and temperament best suited to guide and lead Pakistan and protect it from its external and internal enemies. The Pakistani army strongly believes it is the guardian of Pakistan's territorial and ideological frontiers.The notion that "good dictatorship is better than bad democracy" arises from the need to have order and predictability.

 

[Raaz]

yahaan Musharaf kaa kahan Zikurr hae bhai urdu medium lalu khait walae tumhara raaz keeya hae kahan julun hae orr keeyon hae burnol lugaoe


KHALEE MUSALMAAN HOKAE SONCHOE ORR DEMOCRACY KAE BURRAE MEIN ISLAM KAE NUZREEAE KAE UNDERRR AA KURR JAWAB DOE

ایک ڈکٹیٹر مشرف کے چمچے نے ہمیشہ جمہوریت کی ہی مخلفت کرنی ہے

جو لوگ جمہوریت کی مخلفت کر رہے ہیں ، ان کو شاید یہ نہی پتہ کہ پاکستان جمہوریت کی وجہ سے ہی وجود میں آیا تھا

 

[Raaz]

جمہوریت کا مطلب ہے
جسے لوگ ویسے ان کے حکمران
او ڈاکو منصف کو تو ووٹ نہیں دے گا نا
چورجمہوریت میں چوروں کا جج بھی چور
​

یہ ایک پاگل آدمی کا تھریڈ ہے ...پاکستان میں ایسے بہت سے انتہا پسند ہیں

یہ اپنا تھریڈ خود ہی شروع کرتا ہے اور اس میں ساری پوسٹیں اس کی ہی ہوتی ہے .... اس کو انجواۓ کرو