Rare "Jihadi" Seeks Bhagwan's Forgiveness in "Mumbai Confession"

[RiazHaq]

http://www.riazhaq.com/2015/01/mumbai-attack-confession-rare-jihadi.html


I recently had the opportunity to view the "confession video" of a man alleged to be Ajmal Kassab. Kassab was reported to be a young Pakistani from Southern Punjab and the lone survivor of Mumbai terrorist attacks on November 26, 2008. These videos are said to have been made the same day the accused was captured after the attacks.

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I am sharing the "confession video" with my readers with the following questions:

1. When you hear the soundtrack of this video, does this man sound like a person born and raised in the town of Faridkot in Okara District of Pakistan's Punjab province? This question is particularly addressed to people of Pakistani Punjab who are familiar with the local Seriaki accent.

2. Have you ever heard of a "jihadi" seeking "Bhagwan's forgiveness" (at 3:07 min in Dailymotion video clip below) as the man in the "confession video" does?

3. Were these two above questions raised during the trial by the defense attorney assigned to defend Kassab?

4. If you were on a jury called to hear evidence in this case, would you find the man in the video alleged to be "Ajmal Kassab" guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

http://www.riazhaq.com/2015/01/mumbai-attack-confession-rare-jihadi.html

 

[iltaf]

yes this ws a slap to the propaganda of India for Ajmal Qasab's episode.

 

[jaggu]

And that 'kia jehad saab' just before bhagwaan bit, then there"s 'kidar b ni gaya', 'hoynga' , 'paisa deta ay baho'. Everyday terms I hear used by indians all the time.

 

[ngenius]

Hindu pretending to be Muslim. He doesn't have Pakistani accent. His mother tongue is not Punjabi and urdu.

 

[lurker]

He isn't Pakistani for sure. There is no place in Pakistan that people speak in the accent and dialect he is using. Maybe indian people don't know this little tidbit.

 

[syedzaf]

he sounds like bengali/nepali ... false allegation on pakistan ..

 

[Rashna]

What about this accent?

 

[gZionist]

He isn't Pakistani for sure. There is no place in Pakistan that people speak in the accent and dialect he is using. Maybe indian people don't know this little tidbit.

LeT terrorist who were involved in 26/11 were given special training of Hindi language.

The Karachi Project[edit]

The Karachi Project was created by Pakistani intelligence agency I.S.I. along with Lashkar-e-Taiba to train Indians in Pakistan on bomb blasts. The scheme receives funds from Pakistan and Gulf countries. According to Abu Jundal the scheme continues to be a threat. Accordingly, the Delhi Policehas registered a criminal case of conspiracy to launch another terror attack on India.[SUP][40][/SUP][SUP][41][/SUP][SUP][42][/SUP]

You should read the NewYork times report. ISI wanted to project the attack as Hindu RSS conspiracy. The plan has been under work since 2005.
IF you look at those terrorist who attacked mumbai, all had red strings which hindu wear. The aim was to confuse the enemy, kill them and die.

On 25 June 2012, the Delhi Police arrested Zabiuddin Ansari alias Abu Hamza, one of the key suspects in the attack at the Indira Gandhi International Airport in New Delhi. His arrest was touted as the most significant development in the case since Kasab's arrest.[SUP][155][/SUP] Security agencies had been chasing him for three years in Delhi. Ansari is a Lashker-e-Taiba ultra and the Hindi tutor of the 10 attackers who were responsible for the Mumbai attacks in 2008.[SUP][156][157][/SUP] He was apprehended, after he was arrested and deported to India by Saudi Intelligence officials as per official request by Indian authorities.[SUP][158][/SUP]After Ansari's arrest, investigations revealed that in 2009 he allegedly stayed for a day in a room in Old Legislators's Hostel, belonging to Fauzia Khan, a former MLA and minister in Maharashtra Government. The minister, however, denied having any links with him. Home Minister P. Chidambaram, asserted that Ansari was provided a safe place in Pakistan and was present in the control room, which could not have been established without active State support. Ansari's interrogation further revealed that Sajid Mir and a Pakistani Army major visited India under fake names as cricket spectators to survey targets in Delhi and Mumbai for about a fortnight.[SUP][159][/SUP][SUP][160][/SUP][SUP][161][/SUP]

ngenius

albanova
lurker
jaggu
​

iltaf

RiazHaq ​

syedzaf

 

[gZionist]

In 2008 Mumbai Attacks, Piles of Spy Data, but an Uncompleted Puzzle

By JAMES GLANZ, SEBASTIAN ROTELLA and DAVID E. SANGERDEC. 21, 2014


Photo

Indian police on guard outside the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel on Nov. 28, 2008.CreditSajjad Hussain/Agence France-Presse Getty Images

In the fall of 2008, a 30-year-old computer expert named Zarrar Shah roamed from outposts in the northern mountains of Pakistan to safe houses near the Arabian Sea, plotting mayhem in Mumbai, Indias commercial gem.
Mr. Shah, the technology chief of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistani terror group, and fellow conspirators used Google Earth to show militants the routes to their targets in the city. He set up an Internet phone system to disguise his location by routing his calls through New Jersey. Shortly before an assault that would kill 166 people, including six Americans, Mr. Shah searched online for a Jewish hostel and two luxury hotels, all sites of the eventual carnage.
But he did not know that by September, the British were spying on many of his online activities, tracking his Internet searches and messages, according to former American and Indian officials and classified documents disclosed by Edward J. Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor.
They were not the only spies watching. Mr. Shah drew similar scrutiny from an Indian intelligence agency, according to a former official briefed on the operation. The United States was unaware of the two agencies efforts, American officials say, but had picked up signs of a plot through other electronic and human sources, and warned Indian security officials several times in the months before the attack.
Photo

From left: Zarrar Shah, Sajid Mir and the American David Coleman Headley. Mr. Shah was the technology chief of the terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba.CreditProPublica/Frontline, left and right; Department of JusticeWhat happened next may rank among the most devastating near-misses in the history of spycraft. The intelligence agencies of the three nations did not pull together all the strands gathered by their high-tech surveillance and other tools, which might have allowed them to disrupt a terror strike so scarring that it is often called Indias 9/11.
No one put together the whole picture, said Shivshankar Menon, who was Indias foreign secretary at the time of the attacks and later became the national security adviser. Not the Americans, not the Brits, not the Indians. Mr. Menon, now retired, recalled that only once the shooting started did everyone share what they had, largely in meetings between British and Indian officials, and then the picture instantly came into focus.
The British had access to a trove of data from Mr. Shahs communications, but contend that the information was not specific enough to detect the threat. The Indians did not home in on the plot even with the alerts from the United States.
Clues slipped by the Americans as well. David Coleman Headley, a Pakistani-American who scouted targets in Mumbai, exchanged incriminating emails with plotters that went unnoticed until shortly before his arrest in Chicago in late 2009. United States counterterrorism agencies did not pursue reports from his unhappy wife, who told American officials long before the killings began that he was a Pakistani terrorist conducting mysterious missions in Mumbai.
That hidden history of the Mumbai attacks reveals the vulnerability as well as the strengths of computer surveillance and intercepts as a counterterrorism weapon, an investigation by The New York Times,ProPublica and the PBS series Frontline has found.
Although electronic eavesdropping often yields valuable data, even tantalizing clues can be missed if the technology is not closely monitored, the intelligence gleaned from it is not linked with other information, or analysis does not sift incriminating activity from the ocean of digital data.
This account has been pieced together from classified documents, court files and dozens of interviews with current and former Indian, British and American officials. While telephone intercepts of the assault teams phone calls and other intelligence work during the three-day siege have been reported, the extensive espionage that took place before the attacks has not previously been disclosed. Some details of the operations were withheld at the request of the intelligence agencies, citing national security concerns. We didnt see it coming, a former senior United States intelligence official said. We were focused on many other things Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistans nuclear weapons, the Iranians. Its not that things were missed they were never put together.
After the assault began, the countries quickly disclosed their intelligence to one another. They monitored a Lashkar control room in Pakistan where the terror chiefs directed their men, hunkered down in the Taj and Oberoi hotels and the Jewish hostel, according to current and former American, British and Indian officials.
That cooperation among the spy agencies helped analysts retrospectively piece together a complete operations plan for the attacks, a top-secret N.S.A. document said.
The Indian government did not respond to several requests for official comment, but a former Indian intelligence official acknowledged that Indian spies had tracked Mr. Shahs laptop communications. It is unclear what data the Indians gleaned from their monitoring.
Photo

A redacted document contained an analysis of intelligence gathered from Zarrar Shahs online activities.Asked if Government Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ, Britains eavesdropping agency, should have had strong suspicions of a looming attack, a government official responded in a statement: We do not comment on intelligence matters. But if we had had critical information about an imminent act of terrorism in a situation like this we would have shared it with the Indian government. So the central allegation of this story is completely untrue.
The attacks still resonate in India, and are a continuing source of tension with Pakistan. Last week, a Pakistani court granted bail to a militant commander, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, accused of being an orchestrator of the attacks. He has not been freed, pending an appeal. India protested his release, arguing it was part of a Pakistani effort to avoid prosecution of terror suspects.
The story of the Mumbai killings has urgent implications for the Wests duel with the Islamic State and other groups. Like Lashkar, the Islamic States stealthy communications and slick propaganda make it one of the worlds most technologically sophisticated terror organizations. Al Qaeda, which recently announced the creation of an affiliate in India, uses similar tools.
Although the United States computer arsenal plays a vital role against targets ranging from North Koreas suspected assault on Sony to Russian cyberthieves and Chinese military hacking units, counterterrorism requires a complex mix of human and technical resources. Some former counterterrorism officials warn against promoting billion-dollar surveillance programs with the narrow argument that they stop attacks.
That monitoring collects valuable information, but large amounts of it are never meaningfully reviewed or analyzed, said Charles (Sam) Faddis, a retired C.I.A. counterterrorism chief. I cannot remember a single instance in my career when we ever stopped a plot based purely on signals intelligence.
The targeting of Mr. Shahs communications also failed to detect Mr. Headleys role in the Mumbai attacks, and National Security Agency officials did not see for months that he was pursuing a new attack in Denmark.
There are small successes in all of this that dont make up for all the deaths, said Tricia Bacon, a former State Department intelligence analyst, referring to intelligence and broader efforts to counter Lashkar. Its a massive failure and some small successes.
Lashkars Computer Chief

Zarrar Shah was a digitally savvy operative, a man with a bushy beard, a pronounced limp, strong ties to Pakistani intelligence and an intense hatred for India, according to Western and Indian officials and court files. The spy agencies of Britain, the United States and India considered him the technology and communications chief for Lashkar, a group dedicated to attacking India. His fascination with jihad established him as something of a pioneer for a generation of Islamic extremists who use the Internet as a weapon.
According to Indian court records and interviews with intelligence officials, Mr. Shah was in his late 20s when he became the emir, or chief, of the Lashkar media unit. Because of his role, Mr. Shah, together with another young Lashkar chief named Sajid Mir, became an intelligence target for the British, Indians and Americans.
Lashkar-e-Taiba, which translates as the Army of the Pure, grew rapidly in the 1990s thanks to a powerful patron: the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI), the Pakistani spy agency that the C.I.A. has worked with uneasily for years. Lashkar conducted a proxy war for Pakistan in return for arms, funds, intelligence, and training in combat tactics and communications technology. Initially, Lashkars focus was India and Kashmir, the mountainous region claimed by both India and Pakistan.
Continue reading the main storyGRAPHIC

Missed Signals Before the Mumbai Attacks

Intelligence agencies in three countries tracked conspirators and deployed high-tech surveillance tools in advance of the Mumbai attacks, but they did not put the pieces together.

OPEN GRAPHIC

But Lashkar became increasingly interested in the West. A Qaeda figure involved in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center was arrested in a Lashkar safe house in 2002. Investigators dismantled a Lashkar network as it plotted a bombing in Australia in 2003 while recruiting, buying equipment and raising funds in North America and Europe. In 2007, a French court convicted in absentia the ringleader, Mr. Mir. He remained at large in Pakistan under ISI protection, investigators say.
Lashkars alliance with the ISI came under strain as some of the militants pushed for a Qaeda-style war on the West.
As a result, some ISI officers and terror chiefs decided that a spectacular strike was needed to restore Lashkars cohesion and burnish its image, according to interviews and court files. The plan called for a commando-style assault in India that could also hit Americans, Britons and Jews there.
The target was the centerpiece of Indian prosperity: Mumbai.
Hatching a Plot

Lashkars chiefs developed a plot that would dwarf previous operations.
The lead conspirators were alleged to be Mr. Mir and Mr. Lakhvi, according to interviews and Indian court files, with Mr. Shah acting as a technical wingman, running the communications and setting up the hardware.
In early 2008, Indian and Western counterterrorism agencies began to pick up chatter about a potential attack on Mumbai. Indian spy agencies and police forces gathered periodic leads from their own sources about a Lashkar threat to the city.
Starting in the spring, C.I.A. warnings singled out the iconic Taj Mahal Palace Hotel and other sites frequented by Westerners, according to American and Indian officials. Those warnings came from electronic and human sources, not from tracking Mr. Shah, other officials said.
The U.S. intelligence community on multiple occasions between June and November 2008 warned the Indian government about Lashkar threats in Mumbai, said Brian Hale, a spokesman for the director of the Office of National Intelligence. The information identified several potential targets in the city, but we did not have specific information about the timing or the method of attack.
United States spy agencies also alerted their British counterparts, according to a senior American intelligence official. It is unclear if the warnings led to the targeting of Mr. Shahs communications, but by the fall of 2008, the British had found a way to monitor Lashkars digital networks.
So had the Indians. But until the attacks, one Indian official said, there was no communication between the two countries on the matter.
Western spy agencies routinely share significant or actionable intelligence involving threats with allies, but sometimes do not pass on less important information. Even friendly agencies are typically reluctant to disclose their sources of intelligence.
Britain and India, while cooperative, were not nearly as close as the United States and Britain. And India is not included in the tightest intelligence-sharing circles of international, eavesdropping agencies that the two countries anchor.
Intelligence officials say that terror plots are often discernible only in hindsight, when a pattern suddenly emerges from what had been just bits of information. Whatever the reason, no one fully grasped the developing Mumbai conspiracy.
They either werent looking or didnt understand what it all meant, said one former American official who had access to the intelligence and would speak only on the condition of anonymity. There was a lot more noise than signal. There usually is.
Leaving a Trail

Not long after the British gained access to his communications, Mr. Shah contacted a New Jersey company, posing online as an Indian reseller of telephone services named Kharak Singh, purporting to be based in Mumbai. His Indian persona started haggling over the price of a voice-over-Internet phone service also known as VoIP that had been chosen because it would make calls between Pakistan and the terrorists in Mumbai appear as if they were originating in Austria and New Jersey.
its not first time in my life i am perchasing in this VOIP business, Mr. Shah wrote in shaky English, to an official with the New Jersey-based company when he thought the asking price was too high, the GCHQ documents show. i am using these services from 2 years.
Mr. Shah had begun researching the VoIP systems, online security, and ways to hide his communications as early as mid-September, according to the documents. As he made his plan, he searched on his laptop for weak communication security in Europe, spent time on a site designed to conceal browsing history, and searched Google News for indian american naval exercises presumably so the seagoing attackers would not blunder into an overwhelming force.
Ajmal Kasab, the only terrorist who would survive the Mumbai attacks, watched Mr. Shah display some of his technical prowess. In mid-September, Mr. Shah and fellow plotters used Google Earth and other material to show Mr. Kasab and nine other young Pakistani terrorists their targets in Mumbai, according to court testimony.
Photo

Ajmal Kasab, the only terrorist who would survive the Mumbai attacks, at a railway station in Mumbai on Nov. 26, 2008.CreditSebastian D'souza/Mumbai Mirror, via Associated PressThe session, which took place in a huge media room in a remote camp on the border with Kashmir, was part of an effort to chart the terrorists route across the Arabian Sea, to a water landing on the edge of Mumbai, then through the chaotic streets. Videos, maps and reconnaissance reports had been supplied to Mr. Mir by Mr. Headley, the Pakistani-American who scouted targets. The gunmen were shown all this data from the reconnaissance, said Deven Bharti, a top Mumbai police official who investigated the attacks, adding that the terrorists were trained to use Google Earth and global positioning equipment on their own. Kasab was trained to locate everything in Mumbai before he went.
If Mr. Shah made any attempt to hide his malevolent intentions, he did not have much success at it. Although his frenetic computer activity was often sprawling, he repeatedly displayed some key interests: small-scale warfare, secret communications, tourist and military locations in India, extremist ideology and Mumbai.
He searched for Sun Tzus Art of War, previous terror strikes in India and weather forecasts in the Arabian Sea, typed 4 star hotel in delhi and taj hotel, and visited mapsofindia.com to pore over sites in and around Mumbai, the documents show.
Still, the sheer scale of his ambition might have served as a smokescreen for his focus on the city. For example, he also showed interest in Kashmir, the Indian Punjab, New Delhi, Afghanistan and the United States Army in Germany and Canada. He constantly flipped back and forth among Internet porn and entertainment sites while he was carrying out his work. He appeared to be fascinated with the actor Robert De Niro, called up at least one article on the singer Taylor Swift, and looked at funny cat videos. He visited unexplainable.net, a conspiracy theory website, and conducted a search on barak obama family + muslim.
In late September and again in October, Lashkar botched attempts to send the attackers to Mumbai by sea. During that period, at least two of the C.I.A. warnings were delivered, according to American and Indian officials. An alert in mid-September mentioned the Taj hotel among a half-dozen potential targets, causing the facility to temporarily beef up security. Another on Nov. 18 reported the location of a Pakistani vessel linked to a Lashkar threat against the southern coastal area of Mumbai, where the attack would occur.
Continue reading the main storyRECENT COMMENTS

rayrodg

14 days agoGreat reporting along with PBS's Frontline. This is just another example of Pakistan's treachery. Along with North Korea, they should be...
j. von hettlingen

14 days agoIt was nothing new that Laskar-e-Toiba (LeT) launched attacks in India. Unprecedented was the scale, which is said to be "India's 9/11"....
GKC

14 days agoEven if there were specific information on the attack after thorough analysis, there is not much use as long as the Indians work for any one...

• SEE ALL COMMENTS

Eventually Mr. Shah did set up the VoIP service through the New Jersey company, ensuring that many of his calls to the terrorists would bear the area code 201, concealing their actual origin. But in November, the companys owner wrote to the fictitious Indian reseller, Mr. Singh, complaining that no traffic was running on the digital phone network. Mr. Shahs reply was ominous, according to Indian law enforcement officials, who obtained evidence from the companys communications records with F.B.I. assistance after the attack."Dear Sir, Mr. Shah replied, i will send trafic by the end of this month.
By Nov. 24, Mr. Shah had moved to the Karachi suburbs, where he set up an electronic control room with the help of an Indian militant named Abu Jundal, according to his later confession to the Indian authorities. It was from this room that Mr. Mir, Mr. Shah and others would issue minute-by-minute instructions to the assault team once the attacks began. On Nov. 25, Abu Jundal tested the VoIP software on four laptops spread out on four small tables facing a pair of televisions as the plotters, including Mr. Mir, Mr. Shah and Mr. Lakhvi, waited for the killings to begin.
In a plan to pin the blame on Indians, Mr. Shah typed a statement of responsibility for the attack from the Hyderabad Deccan Mujahadeen a fake Indian organization. Early on Nov. 26, Mr. Shah showed more of his hand: he emailed a draft of the phony claim to an underling with orders to send it to the news media later, according to American and Indian counterterrorism officials.
Before the attacks started that evening, the documents show, Mr. Shah pulled up Google images of the Oberoi Hotel and conducted Wikimapia searches for the Taj and the Chabad House, the Jewish hostel run by an American rabbi from Brooklyn who would die in the strike along with his pregnant wife. Mr. Shah opened the hostels website. He began Googling news coverage of Mumbai just before the attacks began.
An intercept shows what Mr. Shah was reading, on the news website NDTV, as the killings proceeded.
Mumbai, the city which never sleeps, was brought to its knees on Wednesday night as it came under an unprecedented multiple terror attack, the article said. Even as heavily armed police stormed into Taj Hotel, just opposite the Gateway of India where suspected terrorists were still holed up, blood-soaked guests could be seen carried out into the waiting ambulances.
A Trove of Data

In the United States, Nov. 26 was the Wednesday before Thanksgiving. A long presidential election fight was over, and many officials in Washington had already drifted away for their long weekend. Anish Goel, director for South Asia at the National Security Council in the White House, left around 6 a.m. for the eight-hour drive to his parents house in Ohio. By the time he arrived, his BlackBerry was filled with emails about the attacks.
The Pakistani terrorists had come ashore in an inflatable speedboat in a fishermens slum in south Mumbai about 9 p.m. local time. They fanned out in pairs and struck five targets with bombs and AK-47s: the Taj, the Oberoi Hotel, the Leopold Cafe, Chabad House, and the citys largest train station.
Continue reading the main storyCalls During the Attacks

These Internet-based phone calls were recorded in the control room in Karachi as Zarrar Shah and others directed the terrorists in Mumbai.Translated from Urdu.

• play

• 
  [*=left]The control room gives tactical advice to the terrorists in Mumbai. (0:40)
• Control Room: Hello, Salam?
• Kasha?

• play

• 
  [*=left]The terrorists in Mumbai exchange fire with security forces. (0:31)
• Terrorists in Mumbai: Peace be unto you.
• Control room: And peace be unto you.

The killing was indiscriminate, merciless, and seemingly unstoppable over three horrific days. In raw, contemporaneous notes by analysts, the eavesdroppers seem to be making a hasty effort to understand the clues from the days and weeks before.
Analysis of Zarrar Shahs viewing habits and other data yielded several locations in Mumbai well before the attacks occurred and showed operations planning for initial entry points into the Taj Hotel, the N.S.A. document said.
That viewing history also revealed a longer list of what might have been future targets. M.K. Narayanan, Indias national security adviser at the time, appeared to be concerned about that data from Mr. Shah in discussions with American officials shortly after the attacks, according to the WikiLeaks archive of American diplomatic cables.
A top secret GCHQ document described the capture of information on targets that Mr. Shah had identified using Google Earth. The analysts seemed impressed by the intelligence haul unprecedented real-time active access in place! one GCHQ document noted. Another agency document said the work to piece the data together was briefed at highest levels nationally and internationally, including the US National Security Adviser.
As early reports of many casualties came in, Mr. Goel said the focus in Washington shifted to a question already preoccupying the White House: Is this going to lead to a war between Pakistan and India? American officials who conducted periodic simulations of how a nuclear conflict could be triggered often began with a terror attack like this one.
On Nov. 30, Mr. Goel was back at his office, reading a stack of intelligence reports that had accumulated on his desk and reviewing classified electronic messages on a secure terminal.
Amid the crisis, Mr. Goel, now a senior South Asia Fellow at the New America Foundation, paid little attention to the sources of the intelligence and said that he still knew little about specific operations. But two things stood out, he said: The main conspirators in Pakistan had already been identified. And the quality and rapid pacing of the intelligence reports made it clear that electronic espionage was primarily responsible for the information. During the attacks, it was extraordinarily helpful, Mr. Goel said of the surveillance.
But until then, the United States did not know of the British and Indian spying on Mr. Shahs communications. While I cannot comment on the authenticity of any alleged classified documents, N.S.A. had no knowledge of any access to a lead plotters computer before the attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, said Mr. Hale, the spokesman for the Office of the director of National Intelligence. As N.S.A. and GCHQ analysts worked around the clock after the attacks, the flow of intelligence enabled Washington, London and New Delhi to exert pressure on Pakistan to round up suspects and crack down on Lashkar, despite its alliance with the ISI, according to officials involved. In the stacks of intelligence reports, one name did not appear, Mr. Goel clearly recalls: David Coleman Headley. None of the intelligence streams from the United States, Britain or India had yet identified him as a conspirator.
The Missing American

Mr. Headleys many-sided life three wives, drug-smuggling convictions and a past as an informant for the United States Drug Enforcement Administration would eventually collapse. But for now, he was a free man, watching the slaughter on television in Lahore, Pakistan, according to his later court testimony. At the time, he was with Faiza Outalha, his Moroccan wife, having reconciled with her after moving his Pakistani wife and four children to Chicago.
Mr. Headleys unguarded emails reflected euphoria about Lashkars success. An exchange with his wife in Chicago continued a long string of incriminating electronic communications by Mr. Headley written in a transparent code, according to investigators and case files. I watched the movie the whole day, she wrote, congratulating him on his graduation.
About a week later, Mr. Headley hinted at his inside information in an email to fellow alumni of a Pakistani military school. Writing about the young terrorists who carried out the mayhem in Mumbai, he said: Yes they were only 10 kids, guaranteed. I hear 2 were married with a daughter each under 3 years old. His subsequent emails contained several dozen news media photos of the Mumbai siege.
Almost immediately, Mr. Headley began pursuing a new plot with Lashkar against a Danish newspaper that had published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. He went to Denmark in January and cased the newspaper, meeting and exchanging emails with its advertising staff, according to his later testimony and court records. He sent messages to his fellow conspirators and emailed himself a reconnaissance checklist of sorts, with terms like Counter-Surveillance, Security (Armed?) and Kings Square the site of the newspaper.
Those emails capped a series of missed signals involving Mr. Headley. The F.B.I. conducted at least four inquiries into allegations about his extremist activity between 2001 and 2008. Ms. Outalha had visited the United States Embassy in Islamabad three times between December 2007 and April 2008, according to interviews and court documents, claiming that he was a terrorist carrying out missions in India.
Mr. Headley also exchanged highly suspicious emails with his Lashkar and ISI handlers before and after the Mumbai attacks, according to court records and American counterterrorism officials. The N.S.A. collected some of his emails, but did not realize he was involved in terrorist plotting until he became the target of an F.B.I. investigation, officials said.
That inquiry began in July 2009 when a British tip landed on the desk of a rookie F.B.I. counterterrorism agent in Chicago. Someone named David at a Chicago pay phone had called two suspects under surveillance in Britain, planning to visit. He had contacted the Britons for help with the plot, according to testimony. Customs and Border Protection used his flight itinerary to identify him while en route, and after further investigation, the F.B.I. arrested him at Chicago OHare Airport that October, as he was preparing to fly to Pakistan. For his role in the Mumbai attacks, he pleaded guilty to 12 counts and was sentenced to 35 years in prison.
After disclosures last year of widespread N.S.A. surveillance, American officials claimed that bulk collection of electronic communications led to Mr. Headleys eventual arrest. But a government oversight panel rejected claims giving credit to the N.S.A.'s program to collect Americans domestic phone call records. Case files and interviews with law enforcement officials show that the N.S.A. played only a support role in the F.B.I. investigation that finally identified Mr. Headley as a terrorist and disrupted the Danish plot.
The sole surviving attacker of the Mumbai attack, Mr. Kasab, was executed in India after a trial. Although Pakistan denies any role in the attacks, it has failed to charge an ISI officer and Mr. Mir, who were indicted by American prosecutors. Though Mr. Shah and other Lashkar chiefs had been arrested, their trial remains stalled six years after the attack. Mr. Menon, the former Indian foreign secretary, said that a lesson that emerged from the tragedy in Mumbai was that computer traffic only tells you so much. Its only a thin slice. The key is the analysis, he said, and we didnt have it.

Correction: December 23, 2014
An article on Monday about the failure of Indian, British and American intelligence agencies to prevent an attack by the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba in Mumbai in 2008 misidentified a position once held by Shivshankar Menon, a retired Indian official who commented on the intelligence blunder. He was Indias foreign secretary at the time, not its foreign minister.
​

James Glanz reported from India, New York and Washington; Sebastian Rotella of ProPublica reported from Chicago, India, New York and Washington; and David E. Sanger reported from Washington. Reporting was contributed by Andrew W. Lehren from New York, Declan Walsh from London, and Jeff Larson of ProPublica and Tom Jennings and Anna Belle Peevey of Frontline from New York.

A version of this article appears in print on December 22, 2014, on page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Spy Data Failed to Stop 08 Mubai Terror. Order Reprints| Today's Paper|Subscribe

 

[gZionist]

Look at the final report published by CIA & MI5 in December 2014

http://www.propublica.org/article/mumbai-attack-data-an-uncompleted-puzzle

The web app presented by American intelligence describing the full series of eveent
http://apps.frontline.org/web-of-terror/

 

[Zain Itrat]

Yes These Seem Pakistani Accents But, What Were Indians Doing In This Video? Producing A False A Testimonial And Evidence? To Mae Their Case Strong?

What about this accent?

 

[gZionist]

Yes These Seem Pakistani Accents But, What Were Indians Doing In This Video? Producing A False A Testimonial And Evidence? To Mae Their Case Strong?

On 25 June 2012, the Delhi Police arrested Zabiuddin Ansari alias Abu Hamza, one of the key suspects in the attack at the Indira Gandhi International Airport in New Delhi. His arrest was touted as the most significant development in the case since Kasab's arrest.[SUP][155][/SUP] Security agencies had been chasing him for three years in Delhi. Ansari is a Lashker-e-Taiba ultra and the Hindi tutor of the 10 attackers who were responsible for the Mumbai attacks in 2008.[SUP][156][157][/SUP] He was apprehended, after he was arrested and deported to India by Saudi Intelligence officials as per official request by Indian authorities.[SUP][158][/SUP]After Ansari's arrest, investigations revealed that in 2009 he allegedly stayed for a day in a room in Old Legislators's Hostel, belonging to Fauzia Khan, a former MLA and minister in Maharashtra Government. The minister, however, denied having any links with him. Home Minister P. Chidambaram, asserted that Ansari was provided a safe place in Pakistan and was present in the control room, which could not have been established without active State support. Ansari's interrogation further revealed that Sajid Mir and a Pakistani Army major visited India under fake names as cricket spectators to survey targets in Delhi and Mumbai for about a fortnight.[SUP][159][/SUP][SUP][160][/SUP][SUP][161][/SUP]

 

[Rashna]

These audio conversations were recorded by intelligence agencies. These were aired by TV channels as part of their program. The indians are tv presenters and experts they called for discussing this event. It wasn't just indian agencies but american and british agencies who were monitoring the calls. There are live conversations between chabad house terrorists and jewish embassy negotiating release of the jews in chabad house.

Yes These Seem Pakistani Accents But, What Were Indians Doing In This Video? Producing A False A Testimonial And Evidence? To Mae Their Case Strong?

 

[Zain Itrat]

These audio conversations were recorded by intelligence agencies. These were aired by TV channels as part of their program. The indians are tv presenters and experts they called for discussing this event. It wasn't just indian agencies but american and british agencies who were monitoring the calls. There are live conversations between chabad house terrorists and jewish embassy negotiating release of the jews in chabad house.

I Am Talking About This Fake Ajmal Kasaab? He's Not Pakistani From Any Side. Why Indians Is Doing This? Strengthening their case from a false testimony

 

[Zain Itrat]

What I heard in this video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1PSauTty9LA, it sounds a typical Punjabi guys r talking ,,, as Indian army record that calls they must have clear proof of caller place/location(no doubt its easy to locate ) .... These videos, we never heard or seen any where in Pak ,,, no body know about these videos in Pak ... IF this a case it shows some Pakistani guys did attack on India but there is clear chance they did attack without Pak army permission as Talbian r doing attack on Pak army without ISI permission ..
Y u people not share these video with Our media and with Pakistani public?? these r very strong evidence u have if the caller location is PAk.

manZain Itrat but these two video have u watched?? if india has caller location of person talking in video, definitely they would have , if its Pak than it mean people from Pak r involved . Does they

"Non State Actors" The Some One Who Are Bombing Pak Army Now.

 

[lurker]

I Am Talking About This Fake Ajmal Kasaab? He's Not Pakistani From Any Side. Why Indians Is Doing This? Strengthening their case from a false testimony

When such a tragedy takes place, the public want answers fast. They want to put the blame quickly and effectively on someone or some organization. And if you are India and you want a rallying cry then the best bet is to put the blame on Pakistan. This will assure you quick and solid support. With this support you can enact legislation quickly. As the saying goes strike the iron when it's hot. The US did the same after 9/11. Setting up department of homeland security, the TSA and the patriot act. All these would not have had popular support had 9/11 and the blame not been put on foreign Terrorists.

Ajmal Kasab's interview reveals the fact the man does not possess any known Pakistani dialect. It is alleged he got training to speak Hindi, but if you stop and think about it, this man does not have even the basic tenets of Islam down, but he had formal training in Hindi and yet no training in Islam?? What I find interesting is that India chose to play Ajmal Kasab as a Pakistani but didn't want to isolate and tarnish their own large Muslim Indian base, therefore they "chose" to downplay Islam with Kasab and overplay the Pakistani part. It seems like a bad Hindi Movie plot.

 

[Rashna]

How can they be heard? These calls were being made through satellite phones. The entire modus operandi was tracked. The fact is that intel agencies were on to this and the handlers . In pakistan people watch indian channels. They must have seen all this on indian channels perhaps. According to the intelligence and testimonies of david headley and ajmal kasab as well as abu jundal , this was an attack by Lashkar e toiba aided by ISI and had elements of pak army (maybe retired) involved in it. So this is based on some live evidence. What can be more incriminating than satellite calls which can be tracked? you can't fake your gps locations. Neither can u fake real time conversations. This is the real reason why pakistan got nailed. Kasab was just one person, you are forgeting the other 9 and the handlers in Pak. All the evidence is proven in a US court as well. So now its only about accepting it and giving justice by eliminating the mastermind of this massacre of innocent people.

What I heard in this video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1PSauTty9LA, it sounds a typical Punjabi guys r talking ,,, as Indian army record that calls they must have clear proof of caller place/location(no doubt its easy to locate ) .... These videos, we never heard or seen any where in Pak ,,, no body know about these videos in Pak ... IF this a case it shows some Pakistani guys did attack on India but there is clear chance they did attack without Pak army permission as Talbian r doing attack on Pak army without ISI permission ..
Y u people not share these video with Our media and with Pakistani public?? these r very strong evidence u have if the caller location is PAk.

manZain Itrat but these two video have u watched?? if india has caller location of person talking in video, definitely they would have , if its Pak than it mean people from Pak r involved . Does they

 

[Rashna]

@ zain itrat @lurker
You credit this ajmal kasab with too much intelligence perhaps. These are very poor people who are living a life of penury. They were doing as they were being told. If u listen to the videos u can see they have no real will of their own. They were completely "handled". Such a person with a poor background, no education, can be brainwashed easily in to things. It is also a fact that they were trained to speak in hindi lest they be caught before their operation was over.

When such a tragedy takes place, the public want answers fast. They want to put the blame quickly and effectively on someone or some organization. And if you are India and you want a rallying cry then the best bet is to put the blame on Pakistan. This will assure you quick and solid support. With this support you can enact legislation quickly. As the saying goes strike the iron when it's hot. The US did the same after 9/11. Setting up department of homeland security, the TSA and the patriot act. All these would not have had popular support had 9/11 and the blame not been put on foreign Terrorists.

Ajmal Kasab's interview reveals the fact the man does not possess any known Pakistani dialect. It is alleged he got training to speak Hindi, but if you stop and think about it, this man does not have even the basic tenets of Islam down, but he had formal training in Hindi and yet no training in Islam?? What I find interesting is that India chose to play Ajmal Kasab as a Pakistani but didn't want to isolate and tarnish their own large Muslim Indian base, therefore they "chose" to downplay Islam with Kasab and overplay the Pakistani part. It seems like a bad Hindi Movie plot.

 

[Suhana]

what about this accent?

samjhota express??????

 

[Zain Itrat]

@ zain itrat @lurker
You credit this ajmal kasab with too much intelligence perhaps. These are very poor people who are living a life of penury. They were doing as they were being told. If u listen to the videos u can see they have no real will of their own. They were completely "handled". Such a person with a poor background, no education, can be brainwashed easily in to things. It is also a fact that they were trained to speak in hindi lest they be caught before their operation was over.

Learning Hindi Or Hindi Accent Doesn't Make A Jihaadi Say "BHAGWAN mujhe Maaf Nahi Kary Ga"