1971 War: The First Missile Attack on Karachi

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On the afternoon of 4 December 1971, when the Indain Navy Strike Group was on its way to Karachi,

The Pakistan Navys Account of the First Missile Attack
The First Missile Attack
The Story of the Pakistan Navy has given a detailed account of the first missile attack on Karachi as seen from their end.
On the morning of 4 December the three ships joined the flotilla and at 0700 KHAIBAR was despatched for the outer patrol. She arrived at the western edge of the patrol area at 1030 and commenced her patrol; the day remained uneventful. After darkness had set in. KHAIBAR intercepted an HF radio transmission at 1905 emanating from a south-easterly direction. This radio transmission could well have originated from the missile force.


The attacking force was first picked up by the surveillance radar on Manora at 2010 more than two hours before the attack at the range of 75 miles to the south (bearing 165 degrees) of Karachi and tracked. Detection of the missile force more than an hour before it detected KHAIBAR and MUHAFIZ-which was not until 2130-by our shore radar station was a creditable performance. No better warning could be expected in the circumstances. The radar contact obtained by the shore station was reported to Maritime Headquarters as an unidentified contact approaching Karachi on a northerly course (345 degrees) at speed 20 knots.


Another radar contact was detected at 2040 by the tracker radar at a range of 101 miles south of Karachi on a northerly course. Long ranges are possible under conditions of anomalous propagation of radio waves prevalent in winter months in this area. These radar detections led to the issue of a signal by NHQ at 2158 to ships at sea warning them of the presence of two groups of surface contacts approaching Karachi from the south. KHAIBAR was ordered to investigate these contacts but she never received the message.


In KHAIBAR, a bright light was observed approaching from her starboard beam at 2245 when she was on a course of 125 degrees and her speed was 20 knots. Action stations were sounded immediately and the approaching missile thought to be an aircraft was engaged by Bofors guns. The first impression of the Commanding Officer soon after arrival on the bridge was that the bright white light was a flare dropped by an aircraft. But observing the speed of approach, he appreciated it to be an aircraft.


The deadly missile struck KHAIBAR on the starboard side, below the aft galley in the Electricians messdeck at about 2245. The ship immediately lost propulsion and power and was plunged into darkness. A huge flame shot up in Number One Boiler Room and thick black smoke poured out of the funnel. When the fire was observed spreading towards the torpedo tubes, a sailor was sent to train the torpedo tubes and jettison the torpedoes. But the torpedo tubes were jammed in the fore and aft position and could not be moved.

After the ship was hit, a message was immediately sent by hand of the Yeoman to the Radio Office for transmission to MHQ by means of the emergency transmitter. The voice pipe between the bridge and the Radio Office had been damaged and could not be used to pass the message. The message read: Enemy aircraft attacked ship in position 020 FF 20. No 1 Boiler hit. Ship stopped. The transmission of this message in total darkness and prevailing chaos, reflects creditably on the part of the staff. It was unfortunate that the position of the ship indicated in the message was incorrect; this caused considerable hardship to ships survivors later.


It was after evaluation of the extensive damage, for the first time appreciated that the ship was hit by a missile. But no attempt was made to amend the previous signal to avoid delaying its transmission.


A few minutes later, another missile was seen approaching the ship at about 2249 and was engaged by Bofors. The second missile, a few moments after it was sighted, hit No 2 Boiler Room on the starboard side. The ship, which till then had been on an even keel, began to list to port. The ships boats were shattered by the explosion. At 2300, it was decided to abandon ship when the list to port had become dangerous and the ship had become enveloped in uncontrollable fires. By 2315, it had been abandoned by all those who could leave the ship. More explosions, possibly of bursting of ammunition, continued to rock the ship as men jumped overboard from the sinking ship. The ship went down at about 2320 stern first with a heavy list to port.

MUHAFIZ had sailed on the evening of 4 December to relieve ZULFIQAR on the inner patrol in compliance with orders from the Task Force Commander. She arrived at her patrol area at 2245, just in time to witness the missile attack on KHAIBAR and to become a victim of the next. The trajectories of the two missiles fired at KHAIBAR were observed on board from MUHAFIZ plunging into the outer patrol area to her south. The wavering white lights, when first observed by the Commanding Officer, were thought to be star shells but later evaluated as aircraft-impressions which were very similar to those of Commanding Officer PNS KHAIBAR. It appears that none of those who saw the missiles that night recognised them as such.


As MUHAFIZ altered course southward, the glow of light from the burning wreck of KHAIBAR could be seen on the horizon. Action stations were closed up as the ship headed towards the scene of action. She was on course 210 degrees, speed 9 knots, when at 2305, the third white light was observed heading straight for the ship. The fast approaching missile hit MUHAFIZ on the port side abaft the bridge. Upon being hit, the ship (which was of wooden construction) disintegrated instantly and some crew members were thrown into the water. The ships instantaneous collapse gave no time for the transmission of a distress message. The ships debris continued to burn for quite sometime while the survivors floated around the burning remains.

With the primacy of the missile threat recognised, a reappraisal of defence measures against this threat was done. It was obvious that the missile boats must be tackled at their base or during transit before they could launch their missiles. It was equally clear that this task could not be accomplished without the support of the PAF. The Navy had initially found it difficult to get firm commitments from the Air Force due to their involvement in Army operations. Once convinced of the necessity, after the missile attack on 4 December, the PAF responded by carrying out bombing raids over Okha harbour the forward base of missile boats. In one such attack, the fuelling facilities for missile boats at Okha were destroyed. The strikes would have been more effective had not the Indians, anticipating our reaction, dispersed the missile boats to less prominent locations along their coast.

Friendly fire:
In the early hours of 6 December, afalse alarm of a missile attack was raised by the circulation of a number of reports indicating the presence of missile boats in the area west of Cape Monze. MHQ asked the PAF to carry out an air strike on a ship which had been identified as a missile boat by Naval observers flown on a Fokker Friendship aircraft for this specific task. ZUIFIQAR was informed by MHQ that a PAF sortie was on its way to attack a missile boat in the area. Shortly afterwards, at 0640, an aircraft appeared and strafed ZULFIQAR. The attack was broken off only when the ships frantic efforts to get herself identified as a friendly unit succeeded. There was a loss of lives and some were iryured. The ship sustained minor damage on the upper deck and returned to harbour to effect repairs and land casualties.




Keamani oil Tanker Fire:
As to who set the oil tanks on fire on 4 December. The Story of the Pakistan Navy clearly states that it was the Indian Air Force.
In its account of the first missile attack on 4 December, it states:
The oil installations had also been subjected to an aerial attack earlier in the day at 0830 when two oil tanks at Keamari had caught fire.
In its account of the second missile attack on 8 December it states:
The first missile flew over the ships at the anchorage crossed Manora Island and crashed into an oil tank at the Keamari oil farm. There was a huge explosion and flames shot up so high that Qamar House-a multi-story building in the city- was clearly visible. The fire caused by the air attack on 4 December had been put out only a day earlier after three days of concerted efforts. Fires once again raged in the oilfarm after a short lived respite of a day. A distressing sight no doubt for everyone but particularly for those who had risked their lives in a tenacious battle against the oil farm fires earlier.


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No one in Karachi can forget the dark night of December 3rd, 1971 when two Indian naval warships have set Karachi Ablaze. Known as Operation Trident in India and celebrated as a Navy Day across that country till now, when two Indian Naval warships INS Talwar and Trishul have attacked Karachi.


Hostile Naval Ships fired four SS-N-2B Styx missiles on Pakistan's largest oil depot at Kemari with more than 50 percent of the total fuel requirement of the Karachi zone was blown up. The result was a crippling economic blow to Pakistan and $3 billion worth of damage, most of the oil reserves and ammunition were lost, warehouses and workshops destroyed and the Karachi port was left burning with flames seen from 60 miles away.


Another missile hit and sank a Panamian fuel tanker the Gulf Star. The third and fourth missiles hit the Pakistani Navy fleet tanker PNS Dacca and the British ship SS Harmattan. Shipping traffic to and from Karachi was ceased and Pakistan naval ships were either destroyed or forced to remain in port due to sea blockade.


More than 1790 people lost their lives and 200 were injured.
 

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