A
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
Reflecting the overindulged mindset
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Shireen M Mazari
The budget revealed the continuing disconnect between the rulers and the ruled despite the advent of civilian rule and apparent democracy. Why else would the government have put even more burden on the poor through growing indirect taxation and actions that will make the basics of survival ever more expensive? The carbon surcharge is going to make Pakistanis pay more than any other citizen in the world for POL and CNG despite the temporary freeze on POL prices imposed later! But then, Shaukat Tarin is clearly living in his own world with no connect to the reality that is Pakistan.
Why else would he have suggested, Marie Antoinette style, that "the masses (he did not say we Pakistanis) should use the fuel efficiently and rationally," including travelling on buses? What a cruel joke, since if there had been a proper public transport system everyone would be using it! But, then, Mr Tarin, in his tinted-glass, official gas-guzzling vehicle and its escort, would hardly know that there is no proper public transport system; so people are compelled to risk their lives by carrying the whole family on motor bikes, by riding atop overloaded buses, and so on. Tarin's statement only reflected the overindulged decaying mindset of the rulers. After all, why raise the pays of MNAs, MPAs and the cabinet? Even more questionable is the need to have a huge cabinet that really gives little inputs into decision-making at a time of economic crisis. Again, why raise travel allowances of our leaders when they achieve little on their foreign trips that they cannot do through their diplomats or through inviting the foreign leaders to this country? In any case, why not cut the travel allowances and compel the leaders to stay in cheaper accommodation when abroad? Even the hosts are often scandalised by the display of opulence by our leaders in foreign lands.
The assumption that this is an agriculture-friendly budget is laughable, since agriculturalists are being deprived of water and basic electricity for 10 to 12 hours a day, so tube wells cannot be used at all. Moreover, water from the canals is still not being distributed fairly and southern Punjab continues to find itself deprived of its share of this water. So, with no water, how will agriculture survive? Would it not have been more rational to divide the power cuts more equitably between the rural and urban areas? As for the increase in the BISP, it will be countered by the increase in cost of living, especially of basic foodstuff, as a result of the indirect taxes and the carbon surcharge despite a temporary retreat on that count two days later. So what "relief" the government is supposedly giving to the poor with one hand, it is taking away with the other.
All in all, the budget has no "human face" to redeem it although it has shown the human face of our politicians and their ingrained lotaism when Ms Khar went on to rubbish the very same economic policies she had supported while a minister in the Shaukat Aziz government! What was truly offensive was Mr Tarin's arrogant conduct at his press conference. But to understand Mr Tarin, one needs to look closer into where he is coming from. It appears that there is an interesting linkage between our present ruler and Citibank bankers Tarin and Salim Raza, now governor of the State Bank of Pakistan. The linkage is described in detail in "The US Senate's Minority Staff Report for Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Private Banking and Money Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities," Nov 9, 1999. Amongst other things, the Report makes an interesting reading of the way multinational banks work in developing states. On checking up, it seems that Shaukat Tarin was the Dubai banker not mentioned by name in the Report while Salim Raza is mentioned by name. Now, a man like Mr Tarin cannot be expected to have a genuine interest in the poor people of Pakistan when he is occupying the position he is in purely as a reward for services rendered earlier.
Why blame Tarin, though, when our civilian leadership continues on its merry way, bloated cabinet and all? Bullet-proof cars continue to find space in the budget as do the over-stuffed bureaucracies. Ministers battle each other and their bureaucrats, many of whom are accused of working for "foreign friends" as was revealed by the prime minister's adviser on petroleum and natural resources in connection with the Iran pipeline issue. Fifth columnists loyal to the US and some of our Arab friends are desperately seeking to destroy this strategic agreement, but who will take them to task? No wonder there seems to be no governance at all visible to the person on the street.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in relation to the ongoing military operation in Swat, which has now expanded to the FATA area timed with the impending US military surge in Afghanistan. With no political strategy visible, the military is effectively being left on its own to clear and hold areas as well as hunt out the militants, while the civil order continues to abdicate its responsibility. While the military leadership goes to the front to sustain the morale of the soldiers, the political leadership seeks continuing jaunts abroad giving legitimate nightmares to the professional diplomats of our whimsical leader straying off the script. As for the provincial leadership, it is also barely visible in the troubled areas or in "cleared" areas.
So the military operations continue with no timelines in the offing, the indiscriminate strategy of heavy bombardment and aerial attacks is also revealing the growing civilian destruction and, despite a self-imposed media censorship, some accounts are filtering through, such as the woeful lament of Shahryar Khan of Lakki Marwat. Such accounts will increase over a period of time, especially when one sees no effort by the civil authorities to immediately move in with a well-planned strategy immediately after an area has been "cleared" by the military, so that a conducive environment is created for the displaced Pakistanis to return to their homes at least what is left of them.
Now that the state has declared its intent of taking out the TTP leadership, specifically Baitullah Mehsud, a more discriminatory and targeted strategy for FATA relying on more effective human intelligence and local tribal support would not only be more effective in the long run but would have more sustainability and less negative fallout in terms of civilian casualties and material destruction all of which have their own long-term debilitating impact. Already we are seeing the spread of terrorism across the country with an increasing intensity as well.
We also need to ensure that the growing number of displaced Pakistanis should not become a tinderbox of ethnic conflicts for the future. After all, it serves no purpose to rid ourselves of one group of brutal militants and their leaders only to find a new breed arising from the disaffected and angered amongst the populace. According to a report doing the rounds on the Internet, more than 130 Pakhtoon students of Sindh University in Jamshoro have had to leave because of violence, abuse and life threats by Sindhi ethnic parties, some of which stormed the Allama Iqbal Hostel where the Pakhtoon students were staying. May 28 was the deadline given to these students to leave. The majority of students who were forced to leave the university were from Swat, Dir and Buner.
Meanwhile, as to the puzzling question of why Baitullah Mehsud has survived for as long as he has, could it be old US links, especially through his spokesman Muslim Khan, who spent eight years in the US and still has relatives there? And is there now a deliberate attempt to fan sectarian violence and intra-Muslim hatred within Pakistan through brutal acts of terrorism and threats to Shia imambargahs across the country at the behest of Baitullah Mehsud and his followers similar to what the US did in Iraq? There are strange linkages between our militants, criminal elements and our external detractors who seek to spread instability across the country which is what is happening if we see the situation even in Karachi where the nature of the threat is political fascism rather than religious extremism. We are confronting a multiple-headed monster of terrorism which requires a subtle, multi-faceted strategy, not simply indiscriminate military action being conducted in a political void. For the short term, the terrorised population will go along, but in the long run such a strategy, functioning in a political vacuum, cannot be sustained without a growing backlash. With a dysfunctional government, a mindless economic tsar cosseted from the ravages of terrorism and budgetary hardships, the people of Pakistan face a long hot summer filled with mirages of public transport.
The writer is a defence analyst.
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Shireen M Mazari
The budget revealed the continuing disconnect between the rulers and the ruled despite the advent of civilian rule and apparent democracy. Why else would the government have put even more burden on the poor through growing indirect taxation and actions that will make the basics of survival ever more expensive? The carbon surcharge is going to make Pakistanis pay more than any other citizen in the world for POL and CNG despite the temporary freeze on POL prices imposed later! But then, Shaukat Tarin is clearly living in his own world with no connect to the reality that is Pakistan.
Why else would he have suggested, Marie Antoinette style, that "the masses (he did not say we Pakistanis) should use the fuel efficiently and rationally," including travelling on buses? What a cruel joke, since if there had been a proper public transport system everyone would be using it! But, then, Mr Tarin, in his tinted-glass, official gas-guzzling vehicle and its escort, would hardly know that there is no proper public transport system; so people are compelled to risk their lives by carrying the whole family on motor bikes, by riding atop overloaded buses, and so on. Tarin's statement only reflected the overindulged decaying mindset of the rulers. After all, why raise the pays of MNAs, MPAs and the cabinet? Even more questionable is the need to have a huge cabinet that really gives little inputs into decision-making at a time of economic crisis. Again, why raise travel allowances of our leaders when they achieve little on their foreign trips that they cannot do through their diplomats or through inviting the foreign leaders to this country? In any case, why not cut the travel allowances and compel the leaders to stay in cheaper accommodation when abroad? Even the hosts are often scandalised by the display of opulence by our leaders in foreign lands.
The assumption that this is an agriculture-friendly budget is laughable, since agriculturalists are being deprived of water and basic electricity for 10 to 12 hours a day, so tube wells cannot be used at all. Moreover, water from the canals is still not being distributed fairly and southern Punjab continues to find itself deprived of its share of this water. So, with no water, how will agriculture survive? Would it not have been more rational to divide the power cuts more equitably between the rural and urban areas? As for the increase in the BISP, it will be countered by the increase in cost of living, especially of basic foodstuff, as a result of the indirect taxes and the carbon surcharge despite a temporary retreat on that count two days later. So what "relief" the government is supposedly giving to the poor with one hand, it is taking away with the other.
All in all, the budget has no "human face" to redeem it although it has shown the human face of our politicians and their ingrained lotaism when Ms Khar went on to rubbish the very same economic policies she had supported while a minister in the Shaukat Aziz government! What was truly offensive was Mr Tarin's arrogant conduct at his press conference. But to understand Mr Tarin, one needs to look closer into where he is coming from. It appears that there is an interesting linkage between our present ruler and Citibank bankers Tarin and Salim Raza, now governor of the State Bank of Pakistan. The linkage is described in detail in "The US Senate's Minority Staff Report for Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Private Banking and Money Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities," Nov 9, 1999. Amongst other things, the Report makes an interesting reading of the way multinational banks work in developing states. On checking up, it seems that Shaukat Tarin was the Dubai banker not mentioned by name in the Report while Salim Raza is mentioned by name. Now, a man like Mr Tarin cannot be expected to have a genuine interest in the poor people of Pakistan when he is occupying the position he is in purely as a reward for services rendered earlier.
Why blame Tarin, though, when our civilian leadership continues on its merry way, bloated cabinet and all? Bullet-proof cars continue to find space in the budget as do the over-stuffed bureaucracies. Ministers battle each other and their bureaucrats, many of whom are accused of working for "foreign friends" as was revealed by the prime minister's adviser on petroleum and natural resources in connection with the Iran pipeline issue. Fifth columnists loyal to the US and some of our Arab friends are desperately seeking to destroy this strategic agreement, but who will take them to task? No wonder there seems to be no governance at all visible to the person on the street.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in relation to the ongoing military operation in Swat, which has now expanded to the FATA area timed with the impending US military surge in Afghanistan. With no political strategy visible, the military is effectively being left on its own to clear and hold areas as well as hunt out the militants, while the civil order continues to abdicate its responsibility. While the military leadership goes to the front to sustain the morale of the soldiers, the political leadership seeks continuing jaunts abroad giving legitimate nightmares to the professional diplomats of our whimsical leader straying off the script. As for the provincial leadership, it is also barely visible in the troubled areas or in "cleared" areas.
So the military operations continue with no timelines in the offing, the indiscriminate strategy of heavy bombardment and aerial attacks is also revealing the growing civilian destruction and, despite a self-imposed media censorship, some accounts are filtering through, such as the woeful lament of Shahryar Khan of Lakki Marwat. Such accounts will increase over a period of time, especially when one sees no effort by the civil authorities to immediately move in with a well-planned strategy immediately after an area has been "cleared" by the military, so that a conducive environment is created for the displaced Pakistanis to return to their homes at least what is left of them.
Now that the state has declared its intent of taking out the TTP leadership, specifically Baitullah Mehsud, a more discriminatory and targeted strategy for FATA relying on more effective human intelligence and local tribal support would not only be more effective in the long run but would have more sustainability and less negative fallout in terms of civilian casualties and material destruction all of which have their own long-term debilitating impact. Already we are seeing the spread of terrorism across the country with an increasing intensity as well.
We also need to ensure that the growing number of displaced Pakistanis should not become a tinderbox of ethnic conflicts for the future. After all, it serves no purpose to rid ourselves of one group of brutal militants and their leaders only to find a new breed arising from the disaffected and angered amongst the populace. According to a report doing the rounds on the Internet, more than 130 Pakhtoon students of Sindh University in Jamshoro have had to leave because of violence, abuse and life threats by Sindhi ethnic parties, some of which stormed the Allama Iqbal Hostel where the Pakhtoon students were staying. May 28 was the deadline given to these students to leave. The majority of students who were forced to leave the university were from Swat, Dir and Buner.
Meanwhile, as to the puzzling question of why Baitullah Mehsud has survived for as long as he has, could it be old US links, especially through his spokesman Muslim Khan, who spent eight years in the US and still has relatives there? And is there now a deliberate attempt to fan sectarian violence and intra-Muslim hatred within Pakistan through brutal acts of terrorism and threats to Shia imambargahs across the country at the behest of Baitullah Mehsud and his followers similar to what the US did in Iraq? There are strange linkages between our militants, criminal elements and our external detractors who seek to spread instability across the country which is what is happening if we see the situation even in Karachi where the nature of the threat is political fascism rather than religious extremism. We are confronting a multiple-headed monster of terrorism which requires a subtle, multi-faceted strategy, not simply indiscriminate military action being conducted in a political void. For the short term, the terrorised population will go along, but in the long run such a strategy, functioning in a political vacuum, cannot be sustained without a growing backlash. With a dysfunctional government, a mindless economic tsar cosseted from the ravages of terrorism and budgetary hardships, the people of Pakistan face a long hot summer filled with mirages of public transport.
The writer is a defence analyst.
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
Catastrophic results
Part II(Random thoughts)
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Dr A Q Khan
In continuation of last week's article on the same topic, the first unfortunate episode I would like to mention here is a decision made by Field Marshal Ayub Khan. Right from the time he was made commander-in-chief of the Army, he was reported to have been conspiring to usurp government powers. Lord Cockcroft, head of the British Atomic Energy Commission and father of Britain's nuclear weapons programme, mentions in his autobiography that once, while passing through Karachi in the early fifties on his way to Australia, he met Ayub Khan at a state banquet.
He wrote that he was shocked to hear Ayub Khan openly declaring that all the local politicians were incompetent and unfit to rule the country, and that he had no option but to do something about it. All the facts about his intrigues with Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza are now well-documented. His ungrateful and insulting treatment of his benefactor, Iskander Mirza, is given in detail in Shahabnama written by Qudratullah Shahab, one time ambassador to Holland (and my witness at our marriage at the Embassy in The Hague in March 1964). When Ayub Khan took over, the Army had its heyday and many persons became rich overnight.
The particular decision of long-lasting consequences to the history of our country that I am referring to happened in 1962 when India and China went to war in NEFA. China and India had previously been bosom buddies and members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Nehru's arrogance ("I have asked the Army to throw out the Chinese from our territory") led to full-scale war. The Indians were defeated and demoralised and fled. China occupied a large part of Assam, which it later peacefully vacated. It was at this point that Ayub Khan made a major mistake. Many people had asked him to grasp this golden opportunity, send troops into Kashmir and close that chapter once and for all by presenting a fait accompli.
Our Army was very strong at that time and we could have taken Kashmir in a week; but to do something like that you need a Bulent Ecevit of Turkey or a Khalid Bin Walid (RA) type of personality. Instead of taking immediate action, Ayub Khan is reported to have sent a message to Nehru asking him to withdraw Indian troops from our borders and promising not to take any hostile action in return. Pakistan lost the golden chance and would not get another one like it. Had there been a democratically elected government, things would have been different, as we saw during the decision on the nuclear tests. According to international analysts, we would then not have suffered defeat in 1965, would not have faced the ignominious defeat in East Pakistan and would not have been forced into surrender on Dec 16, 1971. When the Indians got a chance in 1971, they used it efficiently and ruthlessly, and inflicted the humiliating surrender of 92,000 troops. The Indians openly bragged that when Pakistan got a golden chance, they foolishly failed to utilise it, while when they got such a chance, they used it most efficiently and wisely.
The debacle of 1971 was a direct result of Ayub Khan's follies, the appointment of Yahya Khan as his successor and the corrupting of the Army by bringing it into politics. Since then many adventurists have usurped power and got away with it without being held responsible. Ayub Khan was the son of a Subedar Major and was only a matriculate. Military training in England was just that military training it had nothing to do with wisdom and maturity. The results are there for everyone to see.
Equally unfortunate for democracy in Pakistan is Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's decision, upon the advice of his close aids, to appoint Pervez Musharraf as COAS. When the topic came up with the father of Mr Nawaz Sharif and myself once while I was there, I even told him that it would be Mr Nawaz Sharif's undoing. Mian Sahib had no plausible answer. Sorry to say, but my forecast came true and Mian Sahib paid heavily for that decision. The penalty was paid not only by him but by the whole country. The dictatorial rule that was subsequently enforced led to the disintegration of the national fabric, ever-growing corruption and nepotism. One telephone call from US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage was enough to lead to unilateral submission resulting in Pakistan becoming a partner in the death of almost two million Afghans and thousands of our own nationals.
Again we see the results of the background (the son of a clerk promoted to a section officer at the fag end of his career) and limited formal education (Intermediate) leading to lack of political acumen and wisdom. It is quite clear that there is no substitution for good, solid education. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, Gen Yahya Khan, Gen Zia-ul-Haq and Gen Musharraf, all confirmed the rule that army training is no substitute for a good university education. However, even university education is no substitute for wisdom, good character and a solid family background. Leadership, wisdom and foresight are gifts from Almighty Allah and good manners and good character come from family background.
One by one, personal decisions had devastating consequences, each in its own way, but all to the detriment of the country. Ayub Khan's decision led to a missed opportunity to solve the Kashmir problem once and for all. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's decision led to the breakdown of democratic institutions and complete submission to the US. Unfortunately, we cannot always foresee what dire consequences our decisions might have. All the more reason for politicians to stop and think and take well-considered decisions for the benefit of the country.
Part II(Random thoughts)
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Dr A Q Khan
In continuation of last week's article on the same topic, the first unfortunate episode I would like to mention here is a decision made by Field Marshal Ayub Khan. Right from the time he was made commander-in-chief of the Army, he was reported to have been conspiring to usurp government powers. Lord Cockcroft, head of the British Atomic Energy Commission and father of Britain's nuclear weapons programme, mentions in his autobiography that once, while passing through Karachi in the early fifties on his way to Australia, he met Ayub Khan at a state banquet.
He wrote that he was shocked to hear Ayub Khan openly declaring that all the local politicians were incompetent and unfit to rule the country, and that he had no option but to do something about it. All the facts about his intrigues with Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza are now well-documented. His ungrateful and insulting treatment of his benefactor, Iskander Mirza, is given in detail in Shahabnama written by Qudratullah Shahab, one time ambassador to Holland (and my witness at our marriage at the Embassy in The Hague in March 1964). When Ayub Khan took over, the Army had its heyday and many persons became rich overnight.
The particular decision of long-lasting consequences to the history of our country that I am referring to happened in 1962 when India and China went to war in NEFA. China and India had previously been bosom buddies and members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Nehru's arrogance ("I have asked the Army to throw out the Chinese from our territory") led to full-scale war. The Indians were defeated and demoralised and fled. China occupied a large part of Assam, which it later peacefully vacated. It was at this point that Ayub Khan made a major mistake. Many people had asked him to grasp this golden opportunity, send troops into Kashmir and close that chapter once and for all by presenting a fait accompli.
Our Army was very strong at that time and we could have taken Kashmir in a week; but to do something like that you need a Bulent Ecevit of Turkey or a Khalid Bin Walid (RA) type of personality. Instead of taking immediate action, Ayub Khan is reported to have sent a message to Nehru asking him to withdraw Indian troops from our borders and promising not to take any hostile action in return. Pakistan lost the golden chance and would not get another one like it. Had there been a democratically elected government, things would have been different, as we saw during the decision on the nuclear tests. According to international analysts, we would then not have suffered defeat in 1965, would not have faced the ignominious defeat in East Pakistan and would not have been forced into surrender on Dec 16, 1971. When the Indians got a chance in 1971, they used it efficiently and ruthlessly, and inflicted the humiliating surrender of 92,000 troops. The Indians openly bragged that when Pakistan got a golden chance, they foolishly failed to utilise it, while when they got such a chance, they used it most efficiently and wisely.
The debacle of 1971 was a direct result of Ayub Khan's follies, the appointment of Yahya Khan as his successor and the corrupting of the Army by bringing it into politics. Since then many adventurists have usurped power and got away with it without being held responsible. Ayub Khan was the son of a Subedar Major and was only a matriculate. Military training in England was just that military training it had nothing to do with wisdom and maturity. The results are there for everyone to see.
Equally unfortunate for democracy in Pakistan is Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's decision, upon the advice of his close aids, to appoint Pervez Musharraf as COAS. When the topic came up with the father of Mr Nawaz Sharif and myself once while I was there, I even told him that it would be Mr Nawaz Sharif's undoing. Mian Sahib had no plausible answer. Sorry to say, but my forecast came true and Mian Sahib paid heavily for that decision. The penalty was paid not only by him but by the whole country. The dictatorial rule that was subsequently enforced led to the disintegration of the national fabric, ever-growing corruption and nepotism. One telephone call from US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage was enough to lead to unilateral submission resulting in Pakistan becoming a partner in the death of almost two million Afghans and thousands of our own nationals.
Again we see the results of the background (the son of a clerk promoted to a section officer at the fag end of his career) and limited formal education (Intermediate) leading to lack of political acumen and wisdom. It is quite clear that there is no substitution for good, solid education. Field Marshal Ayub Khan, Gen Yahya Khan, Gen Zia-ul-Haq and Gen Musharraf, all confirmed the rule that army training is no substitute for a good university education. However, even university education is no substitute for wisdom, good character and a solid family background. Leadership, wisdom and foresight are gifts from Almighty Allah and good manners and good character come from family background.
One by one, personal decisions had devastating consequences, each in its own way, but all to the detriment of the country. Ayub Khan's decision led to a missed opportunity to solve the Kashmir problem once and for all. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's decision led to the breakdown of democratic institutions and complete submission to the US. Unfortunately, we cannot always foresee what dire consequences our decisions might have. All the more reason for politicians to stop and think and take well-considered decisions for the benefit of the country.
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
What the president needs to do
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Zafar Hilaly
We know that politics is not Mr Zardari's preferred vocation; he is an entrepreneur who was compelled to enter politics following the tragic assassination of his wife. We also know that he has no great aptitude for politics. That too is obvious, often uncomfortably so. But, nor was politics Benazir Bhutto's first choice. She wanted to be a diplomat. However, when she discovered that fate and circumstances left her with no alternative she set about learning, nay, mastering, the profession. Similarly the last thing Mr Nawaz Sharif was cut out for was politics. And though he proved a slow learner few now doubt that he has come of age in his profession. To be fair to Mr Zardari his learning process has perforce been somewhat rushed though he did have the incomparable advantage of studying with the help of a great teacher, his late wife.
Perhaps the foremost requirement of any politician is to capture by word and gesture the mood of the people and then to shape it to his advantage. Hence how a politician speaks, as much as what he says, is important and this is the reason why Benazir Bhutto used to insist on being left alone whenever she needed to work on a speech for an important occasion. In fact my last recollection of her was stooped, pencil in hand immersed in revising the speech that she was to deliver an hour or so later at the Liaquat Bagh rally.
Sadly, Mr Zardari does not seem to feel the need to rehearse or prepare a speech before he steps up to the podium. Either because he feels he need not or simply can't be bothered. The first occasion when his lack of preparation became obvious was when he spoke to the Joint Session of Parliament in 2008. A "never again moment" was thus lost. The next when he addressed the UN General Assembly in the same year. A well crafted and well delivered speech on that occasion would have defined him, our priorities and the nation as a whole under his stewardship to the world at large. This too did not happen and thereafter his audience shrank considerably.
Nobody quite knows why Mr Zardari chose to appear on national television at 1 a.m. in the morning last week to curse the Taliban, praise the Jawans fighting them and announce that the Army planned to stay in Swat. Almost as puzzling as the reason and timing of the speech was its brevity. It was only slightly longer than the musical intro, in other words, the time it takes to play the national anthem twice. To compound the confusion and what, in retrospect, was more telling was the strange lack of public interest. "Who cares? Anyway, no one takes him seriously," was how one analyst attending a think tank session remarked.
Mr Zardari is in deep political trouble if these remarks accurately reflect public perception. Hardly has he gained any traction than he is being written off. A politician can overcome just about every charge hurled against him but never being ignored.
But not all the news is bad because judging by the spate of press releases emanating from the office of the presidential spokesman, the efficient, erudite and loyal Farhatullah Babar, Mr Zardari seems to have found a vocation other than travelling; and that is ministering to the IDPs. This is a welcome development. Having failed to protect them in their homes the least the state can do is to tend to their misery as refugees; or else we will deservedly have no claim on their loyalties.
To his credit Mr Zardari is trying to do just that. However, he must do more than hold meetings and issue orders. He must ensure that they are implemented and one way of doing so is to visit the camps frequently and stay there for longer than it takes to make a short speech. Of course, by mingling with the IDPs Mr Zardari would be risking his life; he is indeed a prime target. Not the usual number of houris, say the Taliban, but double that number await the maniac who may succeed in killing him, but he has to take that risk; it comes with his job. Or is staying alive all that counts? Not so, say the soldiers fighting the Taliban and the brave policemen who are returning to Swat notwithstanding the Taliban lurking in the neighbouring hills; and if Mr Zardari's wife was alive she would have told him, as she told me: "It matters not how you die but how you live."
Something for which Mr Zardari can make collective amends on behalf of our leaders is to travel abroad with a modest entourage as befits a state that is bankrupt. To land in Washington with as large a security detail as he did recently was fatuous. The Americans, as we know, are paranoiac about security; they provide sufficient protection to their guests to ward off a whole lashkar of militants. All Mr Zardari's guards must have done during the visit was to shop in relays.
On official visits the handful of "workers" in the entourage do all of the work, the rest are "drones" travelling purely as a reward for services rendered. A decade or more ago we could perhaps afford such pampering, today we cannot. So upset was the Norwegian prime minister at one conference when she discovered that her commercial airliner was instructed to "hold and circle" while Mr Nawaz Sharif's VVIP chartered flight was given priority to land that she turned around to the sole aide accompanying her to the same conference and directed: "Cut the aid we give them. They are just wasting our money."
The number of bullet-proof vehicles provided is another issue that could be revisited. The other day a politician who has been allotted such a vehicle ordered a spare set of bullet-proof tyres at a cost of $80,000. Although he paid for it himself, as his fortune is considerable, others are presumably entitled to spares at government cost. Considering that many of the VIPs issued with bullet-proof cars are not on the murder list of any organisation or group barring possibly irate wives, golf partners or tenant farmers the protection accorded seems excessive. There are numerous other examples where a modicum of common sense could save the exchequer billions.
The money so saved could be diverted to provide blackboards for some of the 15,000 government schools that have no blackboards; the 30,000 that have no textbooks; the 18,000 that have not sufficient furniture and the 20,000 that have no toilets. Of course it will not be able to build the 4,000 schools that have no structures but it would at least be able to buy the building materials for some of them. Or else savings could be diverted to provide transport to the nearly 2,000 pregnant women who die annually while on their way to a healthcare facility for want of transportation. Or help train more nurses and hence improve the present nurse-patient ratio which stands at an appalling 1 nurse to 30,000 people. This and much else lie in the power of Mr Zardari's government to do, hopefully he will, and inform us through a press release just how many benefited as a result.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Zafar Hilaly
We know that politics is not Mr Zardari's preferred vocation; he is an entrepreneur who was compelled to enter politics following the tragic assassination of his wife. We also know that he has no great aptitude for politics. That too is obvious, often uncomfortably so. But, nor was politics Benazir Bhutto's first choice. She wanted to be a diplomat. However, when she discovered that fate and circumstances left her with no alternative she set about learning, nay, mastering, the profession. Similarly the last thing Mr Nawaz Sharif was cut out for was politics. And though he proved a slow learner few now doubt that he has come of age in his profession. To be fair to Mr Zardari his learning process has perforce been somewhat rushed though he did have the incomparable advantage of studying with the help of a great teacher, his late wife.
Perhaps the foremost requirement of any politician is to capture by word and gesture the mood of the people and then to shape it to his advantage. Hence how a politician speaks, as much as what he says, is important and this is the reason why Benazir Bhutto used to insist on being left alone whenever she needed to work on a speech for an important occasion. In fact my last recollection of her was stooped, pencil in hand immersed in revising the speech that she was to deliver an hour or so later at the Liaquat Bagh rally.
Sadly, Mr Zardari does not seem to feel the need to rehearse or prepare a speech before he steps up to the podium. Either because he feels he need not or simply can't be bothered. The first occasion when his lack of preparation became obvious was when he spoke to the Joint Session of Parliament in 2008. A "never again moment" was thus lost. The next when he addressed the UN General Assembly in the same year. A well crafted and well delivered speech on that occasion would have defined him, our priorities and the nation as a whole under his stewardship to the world at large. This too did not happen and thereafter his audience shrank considerably.
Nobody quite knows why Mr Zardari chose to appear on national television at 1 a.m. in the morning last week to curse the Taliban, praise the Jawans fighting them and announce that the Army planned to stay in Swat. Almost as puzzling as the reason and timing of the speech was its brevity. It was only slightly longer than the musical intro, in other words, the time it takes to play the national anthem twice. To compound the confusion and what, in retrospect, was more telling was the strange lack of public interest. "Who cares? Anyway, no one takes him seriously," was how one analyst attending a think tank session remarked.
Mr Zardari is in deep political trouble if these remarks accurately reflect public perception. Hardly has he gained any traction than he is being written off. A politician can overcome just about every charge hurled against him but never being ignored.
But not all the news is bad because judging by the spate of press releases emanating from the office of the presidential spokesman, the efficient, erudite and loyal Farhatullah Babar, Mr Zardari seems to have found a vocation other than travelling; and that is ministering to the IDPs. This is a welcome development. Having failed to protect them in their homes the least the state can do is to tend to their misery as refugees; or else we will deservedly have no claim on their loyalties.
To his credit Mr Zardari is trying to do just that. However, he must do more than hold meetings and issue orders. He must ensure that they are implemented and one way of doing so is to visit the camps frequently and stay there for longer than it takes to make a short speech. Of course, by mingling with the IDPs Mr Zardari would be risking his life; he is indeed a prime target. Not the usual number of houris, say the Taliban, but double that number await the maniac who may succeed in killing him, but he has to take that risk; it comes with his job. Or is staying alive all that counts? Not so, say the soldiers fighting the Taliban and the brave policemen who are returning to Swat notwithstanding the Taliban lurking in the neighbouring hills; and if Mr Zardari's wife was alive she would have told him, as she told me: "It matters not how you die but how you live."
Something for which Mr Zardari can make collective amends on behalf of our leaders is to travel abroad with a modest entourage as befits a state that is bankrupt. To land in Washington with as large a security detail as he did recently was fatuous. The Americans, as we know, are paranoiac about security; they provide sufficient protection to their guests to ward off a whole lashkar of militants. All Mr Zardari's guards must have done during the visit was to shop in relays.
On official visits the handful of "workers" in the entourage do all of the work, the rest are "drones" travelling purely as a reward for services rendered. A decade or more ago we could perhaps afford such pampering, today we cannot. So upset was the Norwegian prime minister at one conference when she discovered that her commercial airliner was instructed to "hold and circle" while Mr Nawaz Sharif's VVIP chartered flight was given priority to land that she turned around to the sole aide accompanying her to the same conference and directed: "Cut the aid we give them. They are just wasting our money."
The number of bullet-proof vehicles provided is another issue that could be revisited. The other day a politician who has been allotted such a vehicle ordered a spare set of bullet-proof tyres at a cost of $80,000. Although he paid for it himself, as his fortune is considerable, others are presumably entitled to spares at government cost. Considering that many of the VIPs issued with bullet-proof cars are not on the murder list of any organisation or group barring possibly irate wives, golf partners or tenant farmers the protection accorded seems excessive. There are numerous other examples where a modicum of common sense could save the exchequer billions.
The money so saved could be diverted to provide blackboards for some of the 15,000 government schools that have no blackboards; the 30,000 that have no textbooks; the 18,000 that have not sufficient furniture and the 20,000 that have no toilets. Of course it will not be able to build the 4,000 schools that have no structures but it would at least be able to buy the building materials for some of them. Or else savings could be diverted to provide transport to the nearly 2,000 pregnant women who die annually while on their way to a healthcare facility for want of transportation. Or help train more nurses and hence improve the present nurse-patient ratio which stands at an appalling 1 nurse to 30,000 people. This and much else lie in the power of Mr Zardari's government to do, hopefully he will, and inform us through a press release just how many benefited as a result.
The writer is a former ambassador.
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
COIN for dummies
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Lt-Gen (r) Asad Durrani
The writer is a former chief of the ISI
"One should see the whole before the parts" Fredrick the Great
Indeed, one should. The problem is that faced with imminent threats, the whole was of no use. If the Taliban were all set to break out for Islamabad, the only part that mattered was whether they would take the motorway or come over the Margalla Hills. Some in that case would have 'called-in the Marines', or the Drones. We have neither, so we yelled for the army. Well it is there, once again; this time to root out this evil once and for all. A reasonable desire, but coming from us sounds a bit strange. After all, we are the ones who have been reminding all the rest that insurgencies could not be wiped out by force, and the B-52s were ill-suited to chase the likes of Osama and Omar. I have no idea what chance Fazlullah and Muslim Khan have to escape the crosswire of the F-16s, but the military action does provide us with yet another chance to find out how the "COIN" (counterinsurgency) works.
It is a miracle that it works at all. A bungling state, which was at the root of the problem to start with, is now supposed to make it work- and that against an adversary not only more committed to its cause but also with enough support to challenge the writ of the state. It sill muddles through, succeeding only when the insurgents run out of steam, or by learning on the job.
COIN follows the classic strategic cycle of "battle and manoeuvre". Both the state and the insurgents battle against each other to create a favourable environment for the manoeuvre, which is essentially non-military. They may agree to hold fire to give "peace a chance" or because one of them needs a breather. Improving respective positions for the subsequent phase- fighting or talking remains a constant goal. The process continues till one side concedes defeat or both of them came to an arrangement that they can live with.
During the battle- aptly described as a form of asymmetrical warfare- insurgents have an advantage: they can merge with the masses and are usually more familiar with the area. The state on the other hand is constrained in the use of force to avoid collateral damage. The insurgents have no qualms about offering a truce from a position of weakness. The state even when in trouble is reluctant to lose face and digs itself deeper into the hole. The manoeuvre phase- often merely a "lull in the battle"- is again more skilfully used by the non-state actors. They can position their assets for the ensuing battle more discreetly.
What however harms the state's ability to conduct a successful COIN the most is its propensity to seek truce, or battle, prematurely. Usually, it is because of public pressure; when the casualties start mounting, or if insurgents are seen to be taking undue advantage during the ceasefire.
The much maligned Nizam-e-Adl deal was struck because the military operation was taking too heavy a toll of civilian lives and property. As a stratagem it made plenty of sense, provided the state planned to reposition its assets for the battle that was inevitably to follow. The militants' forays in neighbouring districts were imprudent, but panic in Islamabad was endemic. On a small-scale map, Buner looks uncomfortably close, and the hills in between, or the Indus, not very daunting. Goethe once famously said: "No one ever deceives you; you deceive yourself". If alive, he would have said the same thing about "terrorism". Having terrorised ourselves, we scrambled the army without adequate groundwork, civil and military.
Some aspects of this operation can be debated ad infinitum: could we have organised the evacuation of the population any better? Did we have the right intelligence to use heavy weapons against the Taliban? One can, however, safely assume that many of the militants would escape to fight another day, and at another place. COIN continues.
Would that make us act more patiently in future? Not very likely. If all the conventional wisdom could not prevent us from making waste in haste, some strategic claptrap had no chance. Moreover, who wants to wait for years and decades? What we need is a "Quickie COIN". Let me try to evolve one.
Since we are pressed for time, we should cut the chase. "Whose war is this?" is a pointless debate. Those who have a war to fight do not fight over its "ownership". I suggest we settle this matter after the war. If we win, it was ours. Otherwise, we will dump it on someone else.
Waiting for this government to come and lead the war, is equally futile. Wars are not led from bunkers that add a protective layer every time there is an explosion. The only wait worth its while is for the bunkers or this government to collapse under their own weight.
Moaning and groaning over the root-causes of the insurgency again would be in vain. Root-causes are embedded in history that cannot be rolled back. Those who created the mujahideen rolled back a superpower, which became history. Their successors, the Taliban, are in the process of doing the same to its opposite number. We have to take care of their sidekick, the "Pakistani Taliban".
Now that we have decided to fight this war, we should not make any excuses. That 'our army is not trained for an unconventional war', is a pretty lame one. All armies are trained in conventional warfare and then adapt to the task at hand. No one trains for COIN and then awaits an insurgency.
And for God's sake do not threaten the world that if it did not come to our rescue we would go down the tube and take it along. It is dangerous to put a gun on our head, especially if it fired nuclear shots. What if we were dared to pull the trigger? Invoking external help to fight an internal war in any case was never a good idea. Incidentally, the US has neither the sway nor the intent to arm-twist India to resolve Kashmir. So, do not hold your breath on that account.
Having shed all the extra baggage that was holding us back, we should now get on with the war, which would indeed involve a bit of manoeuvring and some battling. The manoeuvring first.
There are many wars raging in and around Pakistan. Let us try and contain or outsource some of them. Baluchistan is part of the "New Great Game". While the external actors (and there are some big ones there) vie for influence, our spooks should know how to keep them engaged. The eastern front has been mercifully quiet the last few years. Don't let another Mumbai hot it up.
Many of the militants in the Northwest could be persuaded to join their kith and kin in Afghanistan. Some are small time criminals who have acquired the Taliban label to raise their price (I believe we have handled them reasonably well). The rest, including the "rogue groups" (always to be expected in this game) have to be fought down, possibly piecemeal and in the right order. (Bajaur followed by Mohmand, and now Malakand.)
The real battle - and that has to be waged by us, the people of Pakistan - is to 'check and rollback' the insurgency ('contain and counterattack' in military idiom). A few months back, some citizens in Peshawar sent a message to the militants threatening to take over the city. It simply stated that this time around they would be faced with people's power. It had the desired effect, but was not followed up by any solid steps. The locals response to the mosque carnage in Upper Dir again illustrates how best to deal with the insurgents. It can also serve another purpose.
Howard Zinn, an eminent historian of our time, had recently the following to say: "where progress has been made, wherever any kind of injustice has been overturned, it's been because people acted as citizens, and not as politicians. They didn't just moan. They worked, they acted, they organised, and they rioted if necessary to bring their situation to the attention of people in power".
We needed no Zinn to tell us the virtues of a mobilised community. This is precisely what we have experienced during the last two years, reaffirmed by the Peshawaris and the Diris. Any community that can organise a system of civil defence has the best chance of deterring the next sneak attack by the Taliban and, with a little pluck, to drag this leadership from behind their fortresses on to the battlefield.
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Lt-Gen (r) Asad Durrani
The writer is a former chief of the ISI
"One should see the whole before the parts" Fredrick the Great
Indeed, one should. The problem is that faced with imminent threats, the whole was of no use. If the Taliban were all set to break out for Islamabad, the only part that mattered was whether they would take the motorway or come over the Margalla Hills. Some in that case would have 'called-in the Marines', or the Drones. We have neither, so we yelled for the army. Well it is there, once again; this time to root out this evil once and for all. A reasonable desire, but coming from us sounds a bit strange. After all, we are the ones who have been reminding all the rest that insurgencies could not be wiped out by force, and the B-52s were ill-suited to chase the likes of Osama and Omar. I have no idea what chance Fazlullah and Muslim Khan have to escape the crosswire of the F-16s, but the military action does provide us with yet another chance to find out how the "COIN" (counterinsurgency) works.
It is a miracle that it works at all. A bungling state, which was at the root of the problem to start with, is now supposed to make it work- and that against an adversary not only more committed to its cause but also with enough support to challenge the writ of the state. It sill muddles through, succeeding only when the insurgents run out of steam, or by learning on the job.
COIN follows the classic strategic cycle of "battle and manoeuvre". Both the state and the insurgents battle against each other to create a favourable environment for the manoeuvre, which is essentially non-military. They may agree to hold fire to give "peace a chance" or because one of them needs a breather. Improving respective positions for the subsequent phase- fighting or talking remains a constant goal. The process continues till one side concedes defeat or both of them came to an arrangement that they can live with.
During the battle- aptly described as a form of asymmetrical warfare- insurgents have an advantage: they can merge with the masses and are usually more familiar with the area. The state on the other hand is constrained in the use of force to avoid collateral damage. The insurgents have no qualms about offering a truce from a position of weakness. The state even when in trouble is reluctant to lose face and digs itself deeper into the hole. The manoeuvre phase- often merely a "lull in the battle"- is again more skilfully used by the non-state actors. They can position their assets for the ensuing battle more discreetly.
What however harms the state's ability to conduct a successful COIN the most is its propensity to seek truce, or battle, prematurely. Usually, it is because of public pressure; when the casualties start mounting, or if insurgents are seen to be taking undue advantage during the ceasefire.
The much maligned Nizam-e-Adl deal was struck because the military operation was taking too heavy a toll of civilian lives and property. As a stratagem it made plenty of sense, provided the state planned to reposition its assets for the battle that was inevitably to follow. The militants' forays in neighbouring districts were imprudent, but panic in Islamabad was endemic. On a small-scale map, Buner looks uncomfortably close, and the hills in between, or the Indus, not very daunting. Goethe once famously said: "No one ever deceives you; you deceive yourself". If alive, he would have said the same thing about "terrorism". Having terrorised ourselves, we scrambled the army without adequate groundwork, civil and military.
Some aspects of this operation can be debated ad infinitum: could we have organised the evacuation of the population any better? Did we have the right intelligence to use heavy weapons against the Taliban? One can, however, safely assume that many of the militants would escape to fight another day, and at another place. COIN continues.
Would that make us act more patiently in future? Not very likely. If all the conventional wisdom could not prevent us from making waste in haste, some strategic claptrap had no chance. Moreover, who wants to wait for years and decades? What we need is a "Quickie COIN". Let me try to evolve one.
Since we are pressed for time, we should cut the chase. "Whose war is this?" is a pointless debate. Those who have a war to fight do not fight over its "ownership". I suggest we settle this matter after the war. If we win, it was ours. Otherwise, we will dump it on someone else.
Waiting for this government to come and lead the war, is equally futile. Wars are not led from bunkers that add a protective layer every time there is an explosion. The only wait worth its while is for the bunkers or this government to collapse under their own weight.
Moaning and groaning over the root-causes of the insurgency again would be in vain. Root-causes are embedded in history that cannot be rolled back. Those who created the mujahideen rolled back a superpower, which became history. Their successors, the Taliban, are in the process of doing the same to its opposite number. We have to take care of their sidekick, the "Pakistani Taliban".
Now that we have decided to fight this war, we should not make any excuses. That 'our army is not trained for an unconventional war', is a pretty lame one. All armies are trained in conventional warfare and then adapt to the task at hand. No one trains for COIN and then awaits an insurgency.
And for God's sake do not threaten the world that if it did not come to our rescue we would go down the tube and take it along. It is dangerous to put a gun on our head, especially if it fired nuclear shots. What if we were dared to pull the trigger? Invoking external help to fight an internal war in any case was never a good idea. Incidentally, the US has neither the sway nor the intent to arm-twist India to resolve Kashmir. So, do not hold your breath on that account.
Having shed all the extra baggage that was holding us back, we should now get on with the war, which would indeed involve a bit of manoeuvring and some battling. The manoeuvring first.
There are many wars raging in and around Pakistan. Let us try and contain or outsource some of them. Baluchistan is part of the "New Great Game". While the external actors (and there are some big ones there) vie for influence, our spooks should know how to keep them engaged. The eastern front has been mercifully quiet the last few years. Don't let another Mumbai hot it up.
Many of the militants in the Northwest could be persuaded to join their kith and kin in Afghanistan. Some are small time criminals who have acquired the Taliban label to raise their price (I believe we have handled them reasonably well). The rest, including the "rogue groups" (always to be expected in this game) have to be fought down, possibly piecemeal and in the right order. (Bajaur followed by Mohmand, and now Malakand.)
The real battle - and that has to be waged by us, the people of Pakistan - is to 'check and rollback' the insurgency ('contain and counterattack' in military idiom). A few months back, some citizens in Peshawar sent a message to the militants threatening to take over the city. It simply stated that this time around they would be faced with people's power. It had the desired effect, but was not followed up by any solid steps. The locals response to the mosque carnage in Upper Dir again illustrates how best to deal with the insurgents. It can also serve another purpose.
Howard Zinn, an eminent historian of our time, had recently the following to say: "where progress has been made, wherever any kind of injustice has been overturned, it's been because people acted as citizens, and not as politicians. They didn't just moan. They worked, they acted, they organised, and they rioted if necessary to bring their situation to the attention of people in power".
We needed no Zinn to tell us the virtues of a mobilised community. This is precisely what we have experienced during the last two years, reaffirmed by the Peshawaris and the Diris. Any community that can organise a system of civil defence has the best chance of deterring the next sneak attack by the Taliban and, with a little pluck, to drag this leadership from behind their fortresses on to the battlefield.
