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Decisive action against Baitullah
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Rahimullah Yusufzai
No military operation against Taliban militants in NWFP could be decisive without taking on and defeating the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) head, Baitullah Mehsud. The Pakistan army's action in Swat and the rest of Malakand division and even in Bajaur and Mohmand tribal regions was like a side-show. The major threat was none else but the TTP founder and the main battlefield was always going to be Waziristan. The military command realised it and so did the ruling politicians, particularly those from the Awami National Party in the Frontier who knew firsthand that their first peace accord with the Swat militants in May 2008 collapsed due to Baitullah Mehsud's intransigence.
It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the government has predictably and finally decided to launch a full-fledged battle against Baitullah Mehsud in his native South Waziristan. President Asif Ali Zardari had hinted that Waziristan was next even though his comment was unguarded and premature when it was made a few weeks ago. But he wasn't wrong as this must have been discussed by the army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, with him. After all the president of Pakistan is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
However, it is a bit intriguing that instead of the president the announcement for launching the military operation against the Taliban in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in general and Baitullah Mehsud in particular was made by the governor of NWFP, Owais Ahmad Ghani. There is no doubt that the governor runs the affairs of FATA but he does so on behalf of the president of Pakistan. Also, the launch of the military action in Swat, Buner, Lower Dir and other districts of Malakand division was made by Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, and not NWFP Chief Minister Ameer Haider Khan Hoti. Maybe the governor had to make the announcement Sunday night because the president by then had left for yet another foreign visit, this time to Russia and Belgium.
In fact, the military action against Baitullah Mehsud was launched even before a formal announcement was made about it. The air force used jet-fighters to bomb his positions in Makeen, Ladha and Kotki in South Waziristan on June 13 and the army's long-range artillery guns deployed in Razmak in North Waziristan shelled his strongholds the same day. The security forces explained the assault as retaliation against Baitullah Mehsud for ordering the assassination of the anti-Taliban religious scholar, Maulana Dr Sarfaraz Naeemi, in Lahore and then claiming responsibility for the suicide bombing that killed him and four others. The army command until now has been insisting that it was merely responding to attacks rather than launching a new offensive. But it seems it will now go all-out and tackle Baitullah Mehsud and the TTP after having received the orders from the civilian government.
Though the military has already carried out a build-up of forces in the Waziristan area and reinforcements are being sent to the new frontline, it can still take some time in launching a full-scale ground offensive. More importantly, the army is already fighting on a number of fronts and it cannot afford to spread its forces thin. The battle for Swat is far from over even if the troops now control the major population centres and the main roads and supply lines. Taliban militants after having retreated from Mingora and other big towns and villages are now resorting to guerrilla strikes, ambushes and improvised explosives device (IED) attacks. They have attacked the troops in Kabal, Charbagh and the Matta area, including their former stronghold Peochar where the Pakistan army airdropped its commandoes to secure mountain peaks and escape routes.
In neighbouring Buner, the militants have been pushed back to Swat and Shangla almost from the whole district, but it will take a while for durable peace to return and for the internally displaced persons (IDPs) to feel confident enough to come back to their deserted homes and villages. The situation in the twin Dir districts, named Upper and Lower by some dim-witted bureaucrats fascinated with English words instead of continuing with the Pashto equivalent of Bala and Payeen, is uncertain and unpredictable. The government-backed lashkar, or armed force, in Dir Bala is struggling to defeat the outnumbered and besieged pro-Taliban villagers in Dhog Darra after having pushed them towards their last mountain hideouts. In Dir Payeen, the militants remain defiant despite suffering losses. They are still able to launch attacks on security forces' outposts and convoys and copy the Taliban from Swat, Bajaur, Mohmand and Darra Adamkhel in blowing up government schools.
For a while, Shangla district became the base of militants escaping the army assault in Swat and Buner and alarmed the local population. But the surrender of Maulana Waliullah, an influential cleric from Kabulgram village aligned to Maulana Sufi Mohammad's TNSM, to the security forces has raised hopes that Shangla will not become a fresh battleground between the military and the militants. Some displacement did take place from Shangla and the people suffered from long hours of curfew and shortages of food and goods. But Shangla has been spared of the large-scale dislocation of people and suffering that was witnessed in Swat, Buner and Dir. The government also will have to ensure that Maulana Sufi Mohammad, reportedly in protective custody of the intelligence agencies, isn't harmed. This is important not to push his largely peaceful followers into the arms of the Taliban militants. Already, many TNSM activists are angry over the mysterious deaths of two of their top leaders, Maulana Mohammad Alam and Maulana Amir Izzat, who were in custody of the security forces.
With the Malakand division military offensive entering a decisive phase, it was surprising that the armed forces opened a new front in the Frontier Region Bannu to punish the militants in the Janikhel and Bakkakhel areas for assisting Baitullah Mehsud's men in kidnapping students of Cadet College, Razmak, and also indulging in roadside bombings and kidnappings. The action provoked Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the commander of the North Waziristan militants, to send hundreds of his fighters to the Janikhel and Bakkakhel areas to stop the advancing army troops. Though he hasn't formally ended his peace accord with the government, it will come under strain as the two sides face off in the wilderness of the Frontier Region Bannu, which serves as the entry-point to North Waziristan. It can be a matter of time before their peace agreement meets a familiar fate and ends without any formal announcements. This can push Hafiz Gul Bahadur to join forces with Baitullah Mehsud and form a formidable front to stop the armed forces from regaining control of the two Waziristans.
The increasingly confident and determined armed forces also opened two more fronts, one in Bajaur's Charmang area where aerial strikes and artillery shelling was followed by a ground offensive, and in Orakzai Agency and the adjoining Hangu district. Bajaur is thus once more on fire after repeated claims that the militants have been defeated and that IDPs can return home. If displaced again, this will be probably the third time that the unfortunate Bajauris from the Mamond and Charmang areas will be uprooted and exposed to an uncertain future. In Orakzai Agency, the air force was used again to strike at TTP targets, but there were reports of a number of civilian casualties and displacement. There was also 'collateral damage' in neighbouring Hangu district, where respected religious scholar Maulana Mohammad Amin was killed in an airstrike along with his nephew. Men and women and children belonging to the family of JUI-F head for Hangu, Maulana Din Asghar, were also killed in the air raid. Attiqur Rahman, the provincial assembly member from Hangu affiliated to former interior minister Aftab Sherpao's PPP-S, has alleged that the police high-ups in Kohat provided wrong information to the security forces about the presence of militants in the madressah that led to the aerial bombardment and death of Maulana Amin and other innocent civilians.
By fighting on so many fronts, the security forces already appear over-stretched. This will increase dependence on air power, which invariably causes civilian casualties and displacement and isn't the most effective way to fight shadowy and fast-moving guerrilla fighters. Without forces on the ground to clear and hold captured locations, there is always the possibility that the militants may stage a comeback. There have already been two major military operations against Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan and in both cases the government and the army had to accept his power and make peace deals with him in February 2005 and January 2009 and agree to an exchange of prisoners and compensation for losses suffered by his tribe. Baitullah Mehsud is the most powerful Pakistani Taliban commander. He is capable of carrying out suicide bombings and terrorist attacks in all major cities of Pakistan, kidnapping important people and using them as bargaining chip, and activating fighters from TTP units all over NWFP and his jihadi allies in Punjab and Sindh to put pressure on the government to once again seek peace with him. He has done this in the past and will try to do so again.
The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar.
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Rahimullah Yusufzai
No military operation against Taliban militants in NWFP could be decisive without taking on and defeating the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) head, Baitullah Mehsud. The Pakistan army's action in Swat and the rest of Malakand division and even in Bajaur and Mohmand tribal regions was like a side-show. The major threat was none else but the TTP founder and the main battlefield was always going to be Waziristan. The military command realised it and so did the ruling politicians, particularly those from the Awami National Party in the Frontier who knew firsthand that their first peace accord with the Swat militants in May 2008 collapsed due to Baitullah Mehsud's intransigence.
It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the government has predictably and finally decided to launch a full-fledged battle against Baitullah Mehsud in his native South Waziristan. President Asif Ali Zardari had hinted that Waziristan was next even though his comment was unguarded and premature when it was made a few weeks ago. But he wasn't wrong as this must have been discussed by the army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, with him. After all the president of Pakistan is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
However, it is a bit intriguing that instead of the president the announcement for launching the military operation against the Taliban in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in general and Baitullah Mehsud in particular was made by the governor of NWFP, Owais Ahmad Ghani. There is no doubt that the governor runs the affairs of FATA but he does so on behalf of the president of Pakistan. Also, the launch of the military action in Swat, Buner, Lower Dir and other districts of Malakand division was made by Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, and not NWFP Chief Minister Ameer Haider Khan Hoti. Maybe the governor had to make the announcement Sunday night because the president by then had left for yet another foreign visit, this time to Russia and Belgium.
In fact, the military action against Baitullah Mehsud was launched even before a formal announcement was made about it. The air force used jet-fighters to bomb his positions in Makeen, Ladha and Kotki in South Waziristan on June 13 and the army's long-range artillery guns deployed in Razmak in North Waziristan shelled his strongholds the same day. The security forces explained the assault as retaliation against Baitullah Mehsud for ordering the assassination of the anti-Taliban religious scholar, Maulana Dr Sarfaraz Naeemi, in Lahore and then claiming responsibility for the suicide bombing that killed him and four others. The army command until now has been insisting that it was merely responding to attacks rather than launching a new offensive. But it seems it will now go all-out and tackle Baitullah Mehsud and the TTP after having received the orders from the civilian government.
Though the military has already carried out a build-up of forces in the Waziristan area and reinforcements are being sent to the new frontline, it can still take some time in launching a full-scale ground offensive. More importantly, the army is already fighting on a number of fronts and it cannot afford to spread its forces thin. The battle for Swat is far from over even if the troops now control the major population centres and the main roads and supply lines. Taliban militants after having retreated from Mingora and other big towns and villages are now resorting to guerrilla strikes, ambushes and improvised explosives device (IED) attacks. They have attacked the troops in Kabal, Charbagh and the Matta area, including their former stronghold Peochar where the Pakistan army airdropped its commandoes to secure mountain peaks and escape routes.
In neighbouring Buner, the militants have been pushed back to Swat and Shangla almost from the whole district, but it will take a while for durable peace to return and for the internally displaced persons (IDPs) to feel confident enough to come back to their deserted homes and villages. The situation in the twin Dir districts, named Upper and Lower by some dim-witted bureaucrats fascinated with English words instead of continuing with the Pashto equivalent of Bala and Payeen, is uncertain and unpredictable. The government-backed lashkar, or armed force, in Dir Bala is struggling to defeat the outnumbered and besieged pro-Taliban villagers in Dhog Darra after having pushed them towards their last mountain hideouts. In Dir Payeen, the militants remain defiant despite suffering losses. They are still able to launch attacks on security forces' outposts and convoys and copy the Taliban from Swat, Bajaur, Mohmand and Darra Adamkhel in blowing up government schools.
For a while, Shangla district became the base of militants escaping the army assault in Swat and Buner and alarmed the local population. But the surrender of Maulana Waliullah, an influential cleric from Kabulgram village aligned to Maulana Sufi Mohammad's TNSM, to the security forces has raised hopes that Shangla will not become a fresh battleground between the military and the militants. Some displacement did take place from Shangla and the people suffered from long hours of curfew and shortages of food and goods. But Shangla has been spared of the large-scale dislocation of people and suffering that was witnessed in Swat, Buner and Dir. The government also will have to ensure that Maulana Sufi Mohammad, reportedly in protective custody of the intelligence agencies, isn't harmed. This is important not to push his largely peaceful followers into the arms of the Taliban militants. Already, many TNSM activists are angry over the mysterious deaths of two of their top leaders, Maulana Mohammad Alam and Maulana Amir Izzat, who were in custody of the security forces.
With the Malakand division military offensive entering a decisive phase, it was surprising that the armed forces opened a new front in the Frontier Region Bannu to punish the militants in the Janikhel and Bakkakhel areas for assisting Baitullah Mehsud's men in kidnapping students of Cadet College, Razmak, and also indulging in roadside bombings and kidnappings. The action provoked Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the commander of the North Waziristan militants, to send hundreds of his fighters to the Janikhel and Bakkakhel areas to stop the advancing army troops. Though he hasn't formally ended his peace accord with the government, it will come under strain as the two sides face off in the wilderness of the Frontier Region Bannu, which serves as the entry-point to North Waziristan. It can be a matter of time before their peace agreement meets a familiar fate and ends without any formal announcements. This can push Hafiz Gul Bahadur to join forces with Baitullah Mehsud and form a formidable front to stop the armed forces from regaining control of the two Waziristans.
The increasingly confident and determined armed forces also opened two more fronts, one in Bajaur's Charmang area where aerial strikes and artillery shelling was followed by a ground offensive, and in Orakzai Agency and the adjoining Hangu district. Bajaur is thus once more on fire after repeated claims that the militants have been defeated and that IDPs can return home. If displaced again, this will be probably the third time that the unfortunate Bajauris from the Mamond and Charmang areas will be uprooted and exposed to an uncertain future. In Orakzai Agency, the air force was used again to strike at TTP targets, but there were reports of a number of civilian casualties and displacement. There was also 'collateral damage' in neighbouring Hangu district, where respected religious scholar Maulana Mohammad Amin was killed in an airstrike along with his nephew. Men and women and children belonging to the family of JUI-F head for Hangu, Maulana Din Asghar, were also killed in the air raid. Attiqur Rahman, the provincial assembly member from Hangu affiliated to former interior minister Aftab Sherpao's PPP-S, has alleged that the police high-ups in Kohat provided wrong information to the security forces about the presence of militants in the madressah that led to the aerial bombardment and death of Maulana Amin and other innocent civilians.
By fighting on so many fronts, the security forces already appear over-stretched. This will increase dependence on air power, which invariably causes civilian casualties and displacement and isn't the most effective way to fight shadowy and fast-moving guerrilla fighters. Without forces on the ground to clear and hold captured locations, there is always the possibility that the militants may stage a comeback. There have already been two major military operations against Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan and in both cases the government and the army had to accept his power and make peace deals with him in February 2005 and January 2009 and agree to an exchange of prisoners and compensation for losses suffered by his tribe. Baitullah Mehsud is the most powerful Pakistani Taliban commander. He is capable of carrying out suicide bombings and terrorist attacks in all major cities of Pakistan, kidnapping important people and using them as bargaining chip, and activating fighters from TTP units all over NWFP and his jihadi allies in Punjab and Sindh to put pressure on the government to once again seek peace with him. He has done this in the past and will try to do so again.
The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar.
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
This is a long war
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Raza Rumi
This is a critical moment in our history perhaps unmatched for its severity and its brutal reality. The experiential nightmare that our country is passing through is perhaps unparalleled for the enemy is neither foreign nor fully identifiable. At the same time, never has there been a clear backing of a military campaign against domestic agents of subversion and anarchy. Forget the doctored samples of opinion polls, often conducted by foreign agencies. That by itself should make us ashamed for our proclivity to accept what others have to analyse and determine for us. Even ignore the fringe voices of dissent led by those who neither have credibility or sagacity to comprehend the existential crisis faced by Pakistan. The army has shown vision and displayed courage in tackling a menace that alas is a home-grown cancer due to our short-sighted strategies in pursuit of phantom depths. The battle to be won is now the country itself.
The political consensus of sorts that has accompanied the military action against the Taliban is also remarkable. Notwithstanding the spin doctors posing as analyst-anchors on the idiot box, the political class has recognised that its survival is embedded in the battle against extremism that predicates itself on elimination of sane, moderate and secular politics itself. This was the Swat model blow the polity to bits and create a vacuum for a takeover. An age-old recipe employed by the hordes from Central Asia that invaded Muslim Delhi again and again during Sultanate and Mughal periods of our common histories which refuse to be partitioned.
Now, the brutal assassination of Mufti Naeemi in Lahore is nothing but a clear message of how a minority school of thought within Sharia-mongers wants to impose its version of politics, religion and culture on this diverse and vibrant country. The danger, after the relentless use of violence by the forces of darkness, is that the public opinion that swung against the Taliban after Swat brutalities and the political consensus that emerged around that, might be cracked. After all, military resolve has not taken place in isolation nor under foreign pressure only. The international pressure on Pakistan has remained unabated since 9/11 and has intensified with each passing year. But it was only when we faced the spectre of annihilation as a society and polity that we have decided to wage a war.
The military operation is just the beginning. It is going to be a war, if the consensus is further deepened and nurtured, for the next few years given the way it is spilling into big cities, engulfing sectarian and ethnic tensions germane to Pakistan's society. It has to be fought not just militarily either. It has to be waged within the media, within the education system and above all with a credible ideological alternative to suicidal anti-Americanism and vague notions of tribal justice founded on misogyny.
The challenges are immense but not insurmountable. And, historic opportunities exist for reversal of three decades of adventurism we, as a state, followed by fanning the worst of hatreds, pernicious ideologies that the vast majority of the country does not relate to. Rural Pakistan is intrinsically secular. The working classes in the rural environs of Punjab and Sindh cannot afford to accept Islamism that excludes women from the livelihood arrangements. The Baloch have always been secular in their orientation despite problematic elements of their tribal codes. The Pakhtun culture is another story: its narratives are viewed through the eyes of colonial historians and commentators. The essential cultural metaphor of scepticism about the mullah in Pakhtun folklore and poetry has been grossly underreported and distorted. The fit between tribal codes and Taliban Islam is also a misnomer. This is why in a fair election, ordinary Pakistanis despite their deep love for their faith refuse to vote for self-styled Islamist agendas.
But the misleading currents of analyses that this is an American war, and somehow the Taliban have public support in pockets of Pakistan, are inherently dangerous propaganda tools deliberately cultivated to suit certain interests. The refugees in NWFP camps tell a different story: of harrowing harassment, violence, disruption and crime. There is neither a political ideology nor any moral basis in the operations of those who are touted as anti-imperial harbingers of justice and equality.
The government must now embark on five major missions. First, a massive public campaign within and outside the confines of the media to sustain the momentum of this war and its complexity ought to be launched. Second, effective and quick reconstruction of the war-affected areas should be achieved preferably outside the government ambit as the existing red-tapism will only bolster the myth of Taliban quick fix. Third, a government of national unity ought to be in charge of this war and the recent divisive party-politics needs to be packed and trashed if the political elites want to survive. Fourth, the madressah reform programme that could not be implemented by a military regime needs to be implemented with the involvement of Deobandi leaders and Barelvi schools that are now patently mobilised against the Taliban version of Islam. Finally, the abandoned police reforms of 2002 need to be pulled out of the cabinets of expediency and reviewed on an emergency basis. With the current abysmal levels of police operations, we will not be able to complement or win the military operations.
Pakistan has survived many rough patches. It is not an ordinary country that will dissipate nor will it be a walkover. Provided its state reinvents itself and traditional politics of opportunism is replaced by a people-oriented vision, and a programme of redistributive justice. A tall order indeed but is there any other option?
The writer is a development professional and a writer based in Lahore. He blogs at www.razarumi.com and edits Pak Tea House and Lahorenama e-zines.
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Raza Rumi
This is a critical moment in our history perhaps unmatched for its severity and its brutal reality. The experiential nightmare that our country is passing through is perhaps unparalleled for the enemy is neither foreign nor fully identifiable. At the same time, never has there been a clear backing of a military campaign against domestic agents of subversion and anarchy. Forget the doctored samples of opinion polls, often conducted by foreign agencies. That by itself should make us ashamed for our proclivity to accept what others have to analyse and determine for us. Even ignore the fringe voices of dissent led by those who neither have credibility or sagacity to comprehend the existential crisis faced by Pakistan. The army has shown vision and displayed courage in tackling a menace that alas is a home-grown cancer due to our short-sighted strategies in pursuit of phantom depths. The battle to be won is now the country itself.
The political consensus of sorts that has accompanied the military action against the Taliban is also remarkable. Notwithstanding the spin doctors posing as analyst-anchors on the idiot box, the political class has recognised that its survival is embedded in the battle against extremism that predicates itself on elimination of sane, moderate and secular politics itself. This was the Swat model blow the polity to bits and create a vacuum for a takeover. An age-old recipe employed by the hordes from Central Asia that invaded Muslim Delhi again and again during Sultanate and Mughal periods of our common histories which refuse to be partitioned.
Now, the brutal assassination of Mufti Naeemi in Lahore is nothing but a clear message of how a minority school of thought within Sharia-mongers wants to impose its version of politics, religion and culture on this diverse and vibrant country. The danger, after the relentless use of violence by the forces of darkness, is that the public opinion that swung against the Taliban after Swat brutalities and the political consensus that emerged around that, might be cracked. After all, military resolve has not taken place in isolation nor under foreign pressure only. The international pressure on Pakistan has remained unabated since 9/11 and has intensified with each passing year. But it was only when we faced the spectre of annihilation as a society and polity that we have decided to wage a war.
The military operation is just the beginning. It is going to be a war, if the consensus is further deepened and nurtured, for the next few years given the way it is spilling into big cities, engulfing sectarian and ethnic tensions germane to Pakistan's society. It has to be fought not just militarily either. It has to be waged within the media, within the education system and above all with a credible ideological alternative to suicidal anti-Americanism and vague notions of tribal justice founded on misogyny.
The challenges are immense but not insurmountable. And, historic opportunities exist for reversal of three decades of adventurism we, as a state, followed by fanning the worst of hatreds, pernicious ideologies that the vast majority of the country does not relate to. Rural Pakistan is intrinsically secular. The working classes in the rural environs of Punjab and Sindh cannot afford to accept Islamism that excludes women from the livelihood arrangements. The Baloch have always been secular in their orientation despite problematic elements of their tribal codes. The Pakhtun culture is another story: its narratives are viewed through the eyes of colonial historians and commentators. The essential cultural metaphor of scepticism about the mullah in Pakhtun folklore and poetry has been grossly underreported and distorted. The fit between tribal codes and Taliban Islam is also a misnomer. This is why in a fair election, ordinary Pakistanis despite their deep love for their faith refuse to vote for self-styled Islamist agendas.
But the misleading currents of analyses that this is an American war, and somehow the Taliban have public support in pockets of Pakistan, are inherently dangerous propaganda tools deliberately cultivated to suit certain interests. The refugees in NWFP camps tell a different story: of harrowing harassment, violence, disruption and crime. There is neither a political ideology nor any moral basis in the operations of those who are touted as anti-imperial harbingers of justice and equality.
The government must now embark on five major missions. First, a massive public campaign within and outside the confines of the media to sustain the momentum of this war and its complexity ought to be launched. Second, effective and quick reconstruction of the war-affected areas should be achieved preferably outside the government ambit as the existing red-tapism will only bolster the myth of Taliban quick fix. Third, a government of national unity ought to be in charge of this war and the recent divisive party-politics needs to be packed and trashed if the political elites want to survive. Fourth, the madressah reform programme that could not be implemented by a military regime needs to be implemented with the involvement of Deobandi leaders and Barelvi schools that are now patently mobilised against the Taliban version of Islam. Finally, the abandoned police reforms of 2002 need to be pulled out of the cabinets of expediency and reviewed on an emergency basis. With the current abysmal levels of police operations, we will not be able to complement or win the military operations.
Pakistan has survived many rough patches. It is not an ordinary country that will dissipate nor will it be a walkover. Provided its state reinvents itself and traditional politics of opportunism is replaced by a people-oriented vision, and a programme of redistributive justice. A tall order indeed but is there any other option?
The writer is a development professional and a writer based in Lahore. He blogs at www.razarumi.com and edits Pak Tea House and Lahorenama e-zines.
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
Dilemmas of expanding the war
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Dr Maleeha Lodhi
The writer is a former envoy to the US and the UK, and a former editor of The News.
The decision to launch a military operation against Baitullah Mehsud, the powerful leader of the Pakistani Taliban, comes as no surprise. The announcement to extend the war to South Waziristan on the back of an effective two-month old military offensive in Swat seems to reflect a calculation that this is the most opportune moment to strike at the strategic centre of gravity of the Taliban threat to the country.
But opening a new front while the Swat operation is still in progress will pose tough challenges including the danger of military overstretch.
The operation will also test the army's preparedness to negotiate much tougher terrain and confront more hardened insurgents, factors that in past operations have trumped the military's principally conventional fighting skills. The risk that the new offensive could compound the refugee crisis will also have to be managed and minimised.
In an unusual announcement on Sunday, the governor of NWFP, Awais Ahmed Ghani said that a "comprehensive operation" would soon be undertaken in South Waziristan. The details of this operation would be determined by the army. Accusing Baitullah Mehsud of providing sanctuary to anti-Pakistan terrorists and foreign fighters, training suicide bombers and killing innocent people, the governor declared that this left the government with no option but to flush out the Taliban from the tribal areas.
Even before the governor's announcement there were growing indications of an expanding operation as military forces moved days before to establish control of the entry and exit points from South Waziristan. Last Saturday an air strike on Mukeen village, known to be a Mehsud stronghold, reportedly destroyed two compounds used for terrorist training.
This indicated preparatory actions to take on Mehsud's fighters and soften up their positions. These manoeuvres seemed aimed at containing Baitullah Mehsud in his redoubt by seizing control of the supply lines into his base of operation. A strategy to militarily "choke" the leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) seemed to have been in play weeks before the announcement to pursue a full fledged operation. These "chocking" moves have sought to confine Mehsud to his bastion while engaging his militant supporters in theatres beyond South Waziristan.
Sandwiched between the Waziri tribes in the south and north, Baitullah is said to be in a potentially vulnerable position, even as he has, over the past several months, been activating a loose but formidable network of supporters and teaming up with breakaway groups of Punjab-based jihadi organizations to spread mayhem across the country.
The decision to take the fight to Waziristan has come in the wake of a mounting reign of terror unleashed by militants. Violence last week included the high-profile assassination of Allama Sarfraz Naeemi, an outspoken critic of the Taliban, and the targeting of foreign workers associated with the international humanitarian effort.
The June 9 and 11 attacks on the Peshawar Pearl Continental and mosques in Nowshera and Lahore respectively took violence, that surged in the past month, to a new peak. Since May 27 over a hundred people have been killed in a series of terrorist incidents. The first six months of 2009 may turn out to be the country's bloodiest ever, surpassing the violence in the comparable period of 2008, a year that saw a record number of suicide bombings, IED explosions, kidnappings and casualties in terrorist attacks.
The spate of terrorist bombings, for which the TTP claimed responsibility was but the latest surge in violence directed by its top commander in response to the Swat operation. These counter assaults raised the stakes by not just taking the war into the cities but widening it by striking out at new targets, including the moderate ulema who had vociferously denounced the Taliban's activities and judged them as a stigma on Islam. The aim was to intimidate and silence those who could drain away political and ideological support for the militants.
The role of the Barelvi clergy especially Allama Naeemi, in helping to transform the public view of the Taliban from a political actor to a criminal one, had been crucial. Dr Naeemi's killing marked a dangerous new trend as it was intended as a warning to any prominent cleric who opposed the Taliban. Allama Naeemi had emerged as a potent symbol of religious resistance to the Taliban, a mission that his son has now vowed to carry on.
The Taliban leadership was also seeking to disrupt the humanitarian enterprise in a vain effort to impede relief for people displaced by the fighting .The aim was clearly to sow discord and shift the public mood against the military operation.
These multi-pronged tactics seemed designed to relieve increasing pressure on Baitullah Mehsud, and spread fear and confusion to wear down the public will to weather the attacks. But these tactics seemed to backfire as the intensified wave of bombings fuelled public anger and reinforced the antipathy for the Taliban. In Lahore, for example, enraged crowds marched in protest in the immediate aftermath of Allama Neemi's killing chanting "death to the Taliban".
If the Taliban's aim in raising the stakes was to deter any military assault to dislodge Baitullah Mehsud from his stronghold, the escalation had a completely opposite effect, reinforcing the resolve of the authorities to pursue action against him and his associates.
Expanding the military offensive on the heels of a so far effective but ongoing Swat operation holds both risks and opportunities. The biggest risk in engaging on multiple fronts is that of military over stretch. Swat has yet to be fully secured and stabilised when another front is to be opened. Bajaur is also not entirely under control while restiveness in Mohmand Agency continues to pose a challenge. In this backdrop pursuing a new offensive could strain the army's resources and morale.
Opening a new theatre of combat also risks another influx of refugees at a time when the government is struggling to manage the relief and rehabilitation operation for the two million displaced people of Swat. Additional disruption will present an added challenge to the onerous task of putting in place efficient arrangements for the orderly and safe repatriation of Swat's displaced residents.
Moreover the challenges of a full-fledged operation in South Waziristan are fundamentally different from one in a settled area like Swat. This relates as much to the huge differences in terrain, location, and infrastructure, as to issues of logistical vulnerability and constraints on mobility and the vastly different political and tribal environment. Neutralizing the militant power symbolized by a man with whom two peace deals were forged in the past will be a formidable task, fraught with all the risks posed by a challenging environment.
Against these risks the military momentum attained by the operation in Swat and before that in Bajaur, offers opportunities to leverage this in the most crucial battleground. Improved tactics, higher morale and greater confidence to fight insurgency are all important elements of this military momentum.
As important is the momentum of public opinion. The public support that has been building up for a decisive crackdown on militants provides a crucial enabling political environment to expand the military operation.
Capitalising on these advantageous factors while minimising the awesome number of risks will require a coherent plan and well-thought out strategy. It will also require implementation of this strategy in accordance with a time table drawn up by the military and not one dictated by the militants, whose aim may well be to lure the army into a premature engagement.
This strategy will also have to address the deficits of previous operations including last year's military foray into South Waziristan. It was claimed after that operation that the TTP leader had been marginalized when the reality subsequently indicated otherwise. Factoring into future strategy the lessons learnt from past mistakes is the only way to avoid repeating them.
The fate of the Taliban may well rest on the outcome of the new offensive planned for South Waziristan as well as on the successful conclusion of the Swat operation, measured as much in political and humanitarian terms as in its military dimensions. An ill-planned intervention in the tribal areas can unravel the gains in Swat. The stakes could not be higher. Meeting the heightened challenge to the country's security may depend on how multiple military engagements are pursued and on their crucial political aftermath.
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Dr Maleeha Lodhi
The writer is a former envoy to the US and the UK, and a former editor of The News.
The decision to launch a military operation against Baitullah Mehsud, the powerful leader of the Pakistani Taliban, comes as no surprise. The announcement to extend the war to South Waziristan on the back of an effective two-month old military offensive in Swat seems to reflect a calculation that this is the most opportune moment to strike at the strategic centre of gravity of the Taliban threat to the country.
But opening a new front while the Swat operation is still in progress will pose tough challenges including the danger of military overstretch.
The operation will also test the army's preparedness to negotiate much tougher terrain and confront more hardened insurgents, factors that in past operations have trumped the military's principally conventional fighting skills. The risk that the new offensive could compound the refugee crisis will also have to be managed and minimised.
In an unusual announcement on Sunday, the governor of NWFP, Awais Ahmed Ghani said that a "comprehensive operation" would soon be undertaken in South Waziristan. The details of this operation would be determined by the army. Accusing Baitullah Mehsud of providing sanctuary to anti-Pakistan terrorists and foreign fighters, training suicide bombers and killing innocent people, the governor declared that this left the government with no option but to flush out the Taliban from the tribal areas.
Even before the governor's announcement there were growing indications of an expanding operation as military forces moved days before to establish control of the entry and exit points from South Waziristan. Last Saturday an air strike on Mukeen village, known to be a Mehsud stronghold, reportedly destroyed two compounds used for terrorist training.
This indicated preparatory actions to take on Mehsud's fighters and soften up their positions. These manoeuvres seemed aimed at containing Baitullah Mehsud in his redoubt by seizing control of the supply lines into his base of operation. A strategy to militarily "choke" the leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) seemed to have been in play weeks before the announcement to pursue a full fledged operation. These "chocking" moves have sought to confine Mehsud to his bastion while engaging his militant supporters in theatres beyond South Waziristan.
Sandwiched between the Waziri tribes in the south and north, Baitullah is said to be in a potentially vulnerable position, even as he has, over the past several months, been activating a loose but formidable network of supporters and teaming up with breakaway groups of Punjab-based jihadi organizations to spread mayhem across the country.
The decision to take the fight to Waziristan has come in the wake of a mounting reign of terror unleashed by militants. Violence last week included the high-profile assassination of Allama Sarfraz Naeemi, an outspoken critic of the Taliban, and the targeting of foreign workers associated with the international humanitarian effort.
The June 9 and 11 attacks on the Peshawar Pearl Continental and mosques in Nowshera and Lahore respectively took violence, that surged in the past month, to a new peak. Since May 27 over a hundred people have been killed in a series of terrorist incidents. The first six months of 2009 may turn out to be the country's bloodiest ever, surpassing the violence in the comparable period of 2008, a year that saw a record number of suicide bombings, IED explosions, kidnappings and casualties in terrorist attacks.
The spate of terrorist bombings, for which the TTP claimed responsibility was but the latest surge in violence directed by its top commander in response to the Swat operation. These counter assaults raised the stakes by not just taking the war into the cities but widening it by striking out at new targets, including the moderate ulema who had vociferously denounced the Taliban's activities and judged them as a stigma on Islam. The aim was to intimidate and silence those who could drain away political and ideological support for the militants.
The role of the Barelvi clergy especially Allama Naeemi, in helping to transform the public view of the Taliban from a political actor to a criminal one, had been crucial. Dr Naeemi's killing marked a dangerous new trend as it was intended as a warning to any prominent cleric who opposed the Taliban. Allama Naeemi had emerged as a potent symbol of religious resistance to the Taliban, a mission that his son has now vowed to carry on.
The Taliban leadership was also seeking to disrupt the humanitarian enterprise in a vain effort to impede relief for people displaced by the fighting .The aim was clearly to sow discord and shift the public mood against the military operation.
These multi-pronged tactics seemed designed to relieve increasing pressure on Baitullah Mehsud, and spread fear and confusion to wear down the public will to weather the attacks. But these tactics seemed to backfire as the intensified wave of bombings fuelled public anger and reinforced the antipathy for the Taliban. In Lahore, for example, enraged crowds marched in protest in the immediate aftermath of Allama Neemi's killing chanting "death to the Taliban".
If the Taliban's aim in raising the stakes was to deter any military assault to dislodge Baitullah Mehsud from his stronghold, the escalation had a completely opposite effect, reinforcing the resolve of the authorities to pursue action against him and his associates.
Expanding the military offensive on the heels of a so far effective but ongoing Swat operation holds both risks and opportunities. The biggest risk in engaging on multiple fronts is that of military over stretch. Swat has yet to be fully secured and stabilised when another front is to be opened. Bajaur is also not entirely under control while restiveness in Mohmand Agency continues to pose a challenge. In this backdrop pursuing a new offensive could strain the army's resources and morale.
Opening a new theatre of combat also risks another influx of refugees at a time when the government is struggling to manage the relief and rehabilitation operation for the two million displaced people of Swat. Additional disruption will present an added challenge to the onerous task of putting in place efficient arrangements for the orderly and safe repatriation of Swat's displaced residents.
Moreover the challenges of a full-fledged operation in South Waziristan are fundamentally different from one in a settled area like Swat. This relates as much to the huge differences in terrain, location, and infrastructure, as to issues of logistical vulnerability and constraints on mobility and the vastly different political and tribal environment. Neutralizing the militant power symbolized by a man with whom two peace deals were forged in the past will be a formidable task, fraught with all the risks posed by a challenging environment.
Against these risks the military momentum attained by the operation in Swat and before that in Bajaur, offers opportunities to leverage this in the most crucial battleground. Improved tactics, higher morale and greater confidence to fight insurgency are all important elements of this military momentum.
As important is the momentum of public opinion. The public support that has been building up for a decisive crackdown on militants provides a crucial enabling political environment to expand the military operation.
Capitalising on these advantageous factors while minimising the awesome number of risks will require a coherent plan and well-thought out strategy. It will also require implementation of this strategy in accordance with a time table drawn up by the military and not one dictated by the militants, whose aim may well be to lure the army into a premature engagement.
This strategy will also have to address the deficits of previous operations including last year's military foray into South Waziristan. It was claimed after that operation that the TTP leader had been marginalized when the reality subsequently indicated otherwise. Factoring into future strategy the lessons learnt from past mistakes is the only way to avoid repeating them.
The fate of the Taliban may well rest on the outcome of the new offensive planned for South Waziristan as well as on the successful conclusion of the Swat operation, measured as much in political and humanitarian terms as in its military dimensions. An ill-planned intervention in the tribal areas can unravel the gains in Swat. The stakes could not be higher. Meeting the heightened challenge to the country's security may depend on how multiple military engagements are pursued and on their crucial political aftermath.
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
Analysing budget 2009-10
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Dr Ashfaque H Khan
The government has presented its second budget in the backdrop of a difficult economic situation. Like the previous fiscal, fiscal year 2008-09 has also been a challenging year. The government was faced with unsustainable fiscal and current-account deficits, rising inflation, rapidly declining foreign-exchange reserves and the rupee coming under severe pressures.
The government had two choices to make in the 2008-09 budgeteither to go for promotion of economic growth and job creation, or for stabilising the macroeconomic situation; that is, reducing fiscal and current account deficits, reducing inflation, building foreign-exchange reserves and stabilising the exchange rate. The government went for the second option, and rightly so, because macroeconomic stability is vital for promoting growth and poverty reduction.
Accordingly, the government pursued tight fiscal and monetary policies to reduce aggregate demand, and reduce imports and thus reduce the current-account deficit. The government was pursuing these policies when the rest of the world was doing the oppositeexpansionary fiscal and easy monetary policies. The government was, in fact, criticised for pursuing tight fiscal and monetary policies at the cost of slowing economic activity. The critiques were wrong. Pakistan pursued tight policies as it was facing problems of excess demand while rest of the world was facing lack of demand. The policies pursued by the government paid handsome dividends, with budget and current-account deficits being sharply reduced and inflation starting to ease.
But it is too early to declare victory. Though macroeconomic imbalances have been reduced to some extent, both budget and current-account deficits remain at unsustainable levels and inflation is double-digit. Meanwhile, world oil prices are on the rise, touching over $72 per barrel and projected to reach $85 by the end of December.
Since the government believes that macroeconomic stabilisation has done its job well and it is the time to go for promotion of growth, it has prepared Budget 2009-10 in such a perspective. The new budget has been presented with a view to promoting growth with equity. An overly expansionary fiscal policy will be pursued in 2009-10 and adequate resources have also been allocated to promote equity to give a human face to them.
The government has lost patience. Total consolidated expenditure (including that in the provinces) is estimated at Rs2,897 billion and total revenue is targeted at Rs2,175 billion, thus leaving a budget deficit of Rs722 billion, or 4.9 percent of the projected GDP. Total current expenditure is amounted at Rs2,104 billion and development expenditure adjusted for net lending amounted to Rs793 billion. In development expenditure, the much celebrated Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) the "symbol" of growth and development has been targeted at Rs626 billion an increase of almost 50 percent over last year. Perhaps in the government's view this is going to ignite growth in 2009-10, as if there is a relationship between the PSDP and economic growth. No one should be against the PSDP if its size is consistent with a stable macroeconomic framework. I am afraid that the present size of the PSDP may become the root cause of enhancing macroeconomic imbalance in 2009-10.
It is not clear why the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) and the allocation for the internally displaced people (IDPs) have been put under the development programme. Development spending is spending which creates assets like schools, colleges, hospitals, roads, highways and dams. What assets are these two allocations going to create? These are for social protection and intended to provide relief to deserving people. By definition, these two allocations should have been part of current expenditure. It has unnecessarily raised the size of development expenditure to Rs793 billion. One reason that I can think of is that the allocations for the BISP and the IDPs have been shifted from current to development expenditure is to meet one element of the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act 2005. The Act had required that revenue deficit should be zero by June 2008, and the government should have maintained a surplus thereafter. This element of the Act was violated in the last two years as the revenue deficit remained in the negative zone. The government accordingly decided to change the definition of development expenditure by shifting the BISP and IDPs relief in it and as such recorded a surplus to the tune of Rs71 billion in revenue balance in 2009-10. The government could have achieved this target in 2010-11.
The financing plan of the Rs722 billion fiscal deficit is interesting. Financing from external sources amounts to Rs312 billion and Rs391 billion is targeted to be financed from domestic sources. Within domestic sources, Rs145 billion will be financed from banks and the remaining Rs246 billion from non-bank sources. Privatisation proceeds of Rs19.0 billion will also be used for financing fiscal deficit. The heavy reliance on external sources (43 percent) to finance the fiscal deficit has become a source of anxiety and a major risk to the new budget. The advisor to the prime minister on finance, Shaukat Tarin, clearly stated in his post-budget press conference that he is confident that Rs228 billion in external assistance will be coming in 2009-10 to finance the budget deficit (Rs178 billion from FODP and Rs50 billion for the IDPs). And if, God forbid, these resources are not forthcoming, then the government will seek further assistance from the IMF to meet the budgetary gap. Why have we undertaken such a massive spending based on either uncertain sources or further borrowing from the IMF? It is strange that the IMF has allowed its resources to be used for budgetary purposes. The IMF is meant to provide balance of payments support to member-countries. This is a major departure from the past as the IMF appears to have changed its religion. We may see inflation becoming a fiscal phenomenon rather than a monetary one, the balance of payments becoming a fiscal rather than a monetary phenomenon from the IMF perspective. In my view, the government should have announced clearly in Budget 2009-10 that its fiscal deficit target is 3.4 percent of GDP (or Rs504 billion), additional spending on physical and human infrastructure would be undertaken as such and when the resources from the FODP and grants for the IDPs be available. The government could have kept the projects ready and as the money started flowing in, and activities on the new projects could have started. In other words, additional spending could have been made conditional on receiving money from external sources. In doing so, the government could have maintained financial discipline in its second budget as well.
Nevertheless, the new budget has several positive elements, such as: The allocation of Rs70 billion to the BISP, Rs50 billion for the relief and rehabilitation of the IDPs, doubling of the salaries of army personal fighting on the western borders; extending the same benefits to the entire armed forces from January 1, 2010; launching health insurance for the poor and vulnerable; promising to train and employ one person from each poor household, launching of small public works programmes to provide employment; enhancing the allocation for the People's Work Programme; social security protection for haris; widening the scope of the workers' welfare programme; and increasing the outreach of the borrowers for microfinance. These programmes will indeed help in alleviating the sufferings of the poor and vulnerable sections of society. In the real sector, the agriculture and water sectors have received much greater attention, for which the government should be commended. But at the same time, the livestock and dairy sector, which accounts for 50 percent of agriculture, have been ignored.
Budget makers make efforts to create a balance between limited resources and unlimited demand. This work demands patience on the part of the budget makers. Have the budget makers lost their patience? Have they succeeded in creating a balance between limited resourced and unlimited demand and expectations? I leave it to the readers to decide.
The writer is dean and professor at the NUST Business School, Islamabad,
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Dr Ashfaque H Khan
The government has presented its second budget in the backdrop of a difficult economic situation. Like the previous fiscal, fiscal year 2008-09 has also been a challenging year. The government was faced with unsustainable fiscal and current-account deficits, rising inflation, rapidly declining foreign-exchange reserves and the rupee coming under severe pressures.
The government had two choices to make in the 2008-09 budgeteither to go for promotion of economic growth and job creation, or for stabilising the macroeconomic situation; that is, reducing fiscal and current account deficits, reducing inflation, building foreign-exchange reserves and stabilising the exchange rate. The government went for the second option, and rightly so, because macroeconomic stability is vital for promoting growth and poverty reduction.
Accordingly, the government pursued tight fiscal and monetary policies to reduce aggregate demand, and reduce imports and thus reduce the current-account deficit. The government was pursuing these policies when the rest of the world was doing the oppositeexpansionary fiscal and easy monetary policies. The government was, in fact, criticised for pursuing tight fiscal and monetary policies at the cost of slowing economic activity. The critiques were wrong. Pakistan pursued tight policies as it was facing problems of excess demand while rest of the world was facing lack of demand. The policies pursued by the government paid handsome dividends, with budget and current-account deficits being sharply reduced and inflation starting to ease.
But it is too early to declare victory. Though macroeconomic imbalances have been reduced to some extent, both budget and current-account deficits remain at unsustainable levels and inflation is double-digit. Meanwhile, world oil prices are on the rise, touching over $72 per barrel and projected to reach $85 by the end of December.
Since the government believes that macroeconomic stabilisation has done its job well and it is the time to go for promotion of growth, it has prepared Budget 2009-10 in such a perspective. The new budget has been presented with a view to promoting growth with equity. An overly expansionary fiscal policy will be pursued in 2009-10 and adequate resources have also been allocated to promote equity to give a human face to them.
The government has lost patience. Total consolidated expenditure (including that in the provinces) is estimated at Rs2,897 billion and total revenue is targeted at Rs2,175 billion, thus leaving a budget deficit of Rs722 billion, or 4.9 percent of the projected GDP. Total current expenditure is amounted at Rs2,104 billion and development expenditure adjusted for net lending amounted to Rs793 billion. In development expenditure, the much celebrated Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) the "symbol" of growth and development has been targeted at Rs626 billion an increase of almost 50 percent over last year. Perhaps in the government's view this is going to ignite growth in 2009-10, as if there is a relationship between the PSDP and economic growth. No one should be against the PSDP if its size is consistent with a stable macroeconomic framework. I am afraid that the present size of the PSDP may become the root cause of enhancing macroeconomic imbalance in 2009-10.
It is not clear why the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) and the allocation for the internally displaced people (IDPs) have been put under the development programme. Development spending is spending which creates assets like schools, colleges, hospitals, roads, highways and dams. What assets are these two allocations going to create? These are for social protection and intended to provide relief to deserving people. By definition, these two allocations should have been part of current expenditure. It has unnecessarily raised the size of development expenditure to Rs793 billion. One reason that I can think of is that the allocations for the BISP and the IDPs have been shifted from current to development expenditure is to meet one element of the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act 2005. The Act had required that revenue deficit should be zero by June 2008, and the government should have maintained a surplus thereafter. This element of the Act was violated in the last two years as the revenue deficit remained in the negative zone. The government accordingly decided to change the definition of development expenditure by shifting the BISP and IDPs relief in it and as such recorded a surplus to the tune of Rs71 billion in revenue balance in 2009-10. The government could have achieved this target in 2010-11.
The financing plan of the Rs722 billion fiscal deficit is interesting. Financing from external sources amounts to Rs312 billion and Rs391 billion is targeted to be financed from domestic sources. Within domestic sources, Rs145 billion will be financed from banks and the remaining Rs246 billion from non-bank sources. Privatisation proceeds of Rs19.0 billion will also be used for financing fiscal deficit. The heavy reliance on external sources (43 percent) to finance the fiscal deficit has become a source of anxiety and a major risk to the new budget. The advisor to the prime minister on finance, Shaukat Tarin, clearly stated in his post-budget press conference that he is confident that Rs228 billion in external assistance will be coming in 2009-10 to finance the budget deficit (Rs178 billion from FODP and Rs50 billion for the IDPs). And if, God forbid, these resources are not forthcoming, then the government will seek further assistance from the IMF to meet the budgetary gap. Why have we undertaken such a massive spending based on either uncertain sources or further borrowing from the IMF? It is strange that the IMF has allowed its resources to be used for budgetary purposes. The IMF is meant to provide balance of payments support to member-countries. This is a major departure from the past as the IMF appears to have changed its religion. We may see inflation becoming a fiscal phenomenon rather than a monetary one, the balance of payments becoming a fiscal rather than a monetary phenomenon from the IMF perspective. In my view, the government should have announced clearly in Budget 2009-10 that its fiscal deficit target is 3.4 percent of GDP (or Rs504 billion), additional spending on physical and human infrastructure would be undertaken as such and when the resources from the FODP and grants for the IDPs be available. The government could have kept the projects ready and as the money started flowing in, and activities on the new projects could have started. In other words, additional spending could have been made conditional on receiving money from external sources. In doing so, the government could have maintained financial discipline in its second budget as well.
Nevertheless, the new budget has several positive elements, such as: The allocation of Rs70 billion to the BISP, Rs50 billion for the relief and rehabilitation of the IDPs, doubling of the salaries of army personal fighting on the western borders; extending the same benefits to the entire armed forces from January 1, 2010; launching health insurance for the poor and vulnerable; promising to train and employ one person from each poor household, launching of small public works programmes to provide employment; enhancing the allocation for the People's Work Programme; social security protection for haris; widening the scope of the workers' welfare programme; and increasing the outreach of the borrowers for microfinance. These programmes will indeed help in alleviating the sufferings of the poor and vulnerable sections of society. In the real sector, the agriculture and water sectors have received much greater attention, for which the government should be commended. But at the same time, the livestock and dairy sector, which accounts for 50 percent of agriculture, have been ignored.
Budget makers make efforts to create a balance between limited resources and unlimited demand. This work demands patience on the part of the budget makers. Have the budget makers lost their patience? Have they succeeded in creating a balance between limited resourced and unlimited demand and expectations? I leave it to the readers to decide.
The writer is dean and professor at the NUST Business School, Islamabad,
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
Militancy and the budget
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Tasneem Noorani
The militants have broadened the ongoing war by killing Dr Sarfraz Naeemi, a moderate belonging to Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamaat. The next day a newspaper carried the facsimile of a letter to the country's Imam Bargahs, blatantly threatening all Shias, including women and children.
This is a change from the existing strategy, when mainly the law enforcement agencies, the armed forces and so-called spies were targeted.
Whatever vague sympathies religious parties and sects had with the Taliban about their cause will evaporate.
The lessons we have learnt from supporting the Kashmiri freedom fighters and the Mujahideen and then the Taliban are that an organised militant group, even if it is friendly, can turn against the state once it has felt the strength of its power. So, after the assassination and the threatening letter, the government should provide effective security to non-Deodandi groups and Shias, rather than having them arm themselves to fend for themselves.
Talibanisation has made deep inroads into Punjab. Some of the significant members of the rank and file of the TTP are from Punjab. The six terrorist strikes in Lahore this year are reported to have been executed by groups with membership mainly from Punjab. So a practical strategy by the government of Punjab regarding religious institution, combined with intelligence gathering for pre-emptive actions, is appears absolutely essential.
To fight the militancy and keep the army both on the east and now the western borders effective, the country needs resources. The new budget indicates how messed up we are after a seven-year run of "prosperity" under Musharraf. Against a total expenditure of Rs2.9 trillion during the next year, we are only going to get Rs2.17 trillion from all kinds of taxes and non-tax receipts (which are inflated). This means we have actually only 75 percent of the money required to run the country. To meet our expenditure, we are planning, according to the budget, to finance Rs722 billion by printing more currency notes. More currency chasing the same commodities will means increase in prices. Who will suffer? The poor wage-earner, whose earnings of, say, Rs5,000 a month will be worth only Rs4,000 by the end of the year at the expected inflation rate of 20 percent. To help the poor, as the finance advisor said in his budget press conference, the government has allocated Rs100 billion, including Rs70 billion for the BISP. If 50 percent of the 160 million people of Pakistan fall into the category of the poor (although according to government figures about 20 percent earn less that Rs2,400 per month) and the Rs100 billion is equally distributed amongst 80 million Pakistanis, they may end up getting Rs104 per month, against a loss of Rs1,000 to inflation and thus being poorer by Rs894 against the meagre income of Rs5,000. So much for the poor-friendly budget.
On the foreign exchange side, there was not much mention of steps to increase exports in order to give a spur to industry. Against last year's exports of $18.9 billion, this year the expected exports are about the same with a likely import figure of $28 billion. As a nation we earn about 67 percent of foreign exchange against what we spend. This will get worse as petrol prices go up.
Fortunately, some of this shortfall is made up by remittance from abroad. But despite this imbalance, there is no significant increase in duties on luxury goods. Our rich will, therefore, continue to drive their BMWs and drink their Perrier water, and crib about the bomb blasts, blame the government and plan their relocation to other countries.
The poverty alleviation strategy is centred on dishing out cash under the BISP and planning an unrealistically large PSPP. While the actual expenditure last year on development was around Rs350 billion, this year the government plans to spend Rs642 billion hoping that the shortfall will be met by printing of currency notes or doles from abroad.
Surprisingly one sees hardly any initiative to restart the stalled industry, or any other measure which will create jobs, which is the only sustainable poverty alleviation measure and one which keeps unemployed young men from joining the militants.
A discussion on the budget may seem a bit farfetched in the midst of the growing insurgency, but a strong economy is the only guarantee for a strong army and a strong law enforcement force. It is also the economy which stands between a mass of youths choosing a normal path of employment or a path to militancy.
The writer is a former federal secretary.
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Tasneem Noorani
The militants have broadened the ongoing war by killing Dr Sarfraz Naeemi, a moderate belonging to Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamaat. The next day a newspaper carried the facsimile of a letter to the country's Imam Bargahs, blatantly threatening all Shias, including women and children.
This is a change from the existing strategy, when mainly the law enforcement agencies, the armed forces and so-called spies were targeted.
Whatever vague sympathies religious parties and sects had with the Taliban about their cause will evaporate.
The lessons we have learnt from supporting the Kashmiri freedom fighters and the Mujahideen and then the Taliban are that an organised militant group, even if it is friendly, can turn against the state once it has felt the strength of its power. So, after the assassination and the threatening letter, the government should provide effective security to non-Deodandi groups and Shias, rather than having them arm themselves to fend for themselves.
Talibanisation has made deep inroads into Punjab. Some of the significant members of the rank and file of the TTP are from Punjab. The six terrorist strikes in Lahore this year are reported to have been executed by groups with membership mainly from Punjab. So a practical strategy by the government of Punjab regarding religious institution, combined with intelligence gathering for pre-emptive actions, is appears absolutely essential.
To fight the militancy and keep the army both on the east and now the western borders effective, the country needs resources. The new budget indicates how messed up we are after a seven-year run of "prosperity" under Musharraf. Against a total expenditure of Rs2.9 trillion during the next year, we are only going to get Rs2.17 trillion from all kinds of taxes and non-tax receipts (which are inflated). This means we have actually only 75 percent of the money required to run the country. To meet our expenditure, we are planning, according to the budget, to finance Rs722 billion by printing more currency notes. More currency chasing the same commodities will means increase in prices. Who will suffer? The poor wage-earner, whose earnings of, say, Rs5,000 a month will be worth only Rs4,000 by the end of the year at the expected inflation rate of 20 percent. To help the poor, as the finance advisor said in his budget press conference, the government has allocated Rs100 billion, including Rs70 billion for the BISP. If 50 percent of the 160 million people of Pakistan fall into the category of the poor (although according to government figures about 20 percent earn less that Rs2,400 per month) and the Rs100 billion is equally distributed amongst 80 million Pakistanis, they may end up getting Rs104 per month, against a loss of Rs1,000 to inflation and thus being poorer by Rs894 against the meagre income of Rs5,000. So much for the poor-friendly budget.
On the foreign exchange side, there was not much mention of steps to increase exports in order to give a spur to industry. Against last year's exports of $18.9 billion, this year the expected exports are about the same with a likely import figure of $28 billion. As a nation we earn about 67 percent of foreign exchange against what we spend. This will get worse as petrol prices go up.
Fortunately, some of this shortfall is made up by remittance from abroad. But despite this imbalance, there is no significant increase in duties on luxury goods. Our rich will, therefore, continue to drive their BMWs and drink their Perrier water, and crib about the bomb blasts, blame the government and plan their relocation to other countries.
The poverty alleviation strategy is centred on dishing out cash under the BISP and planning an unrealistically large PSPP. While the actual expenditure last year on development was around Rs350 billion, this year the government plans to spend Rs642 billion hoping that the shortfall will be met by printing of currency notes or doles from abroad.
Surprisingly one sees hardly any initiative to restart the stalled industry, or any other measure which will create jobs, which is the only sustainable poverty alleviation measure and one which keeps unemployed young men from joining the militants.
A discussion on the budget may seem a bit farfetched in the midst of the growing insurgency, but a strong economy is the only guarantee for a strong army and a strong law enforcement force. It is also the economy which stands between a mass of youths choosing a normal path of employment or a path to militancy.
The writer is a former federal secretary.
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
Annual jugglery
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Mir Jamilur Rahman
Every year the government presents budgets claiming that the new budget is people-friendly and will raise the living standard of the poor. The finance minister raises taxes on some items and reduces them on some others. The net outcome of this annual jugglery is that things remain the same and there is hardly any visible change in the life of the common man.
Revenue collection in Pakistan is not as bad as it is made to look. Pakistan was 65th in the last fiscal year in revenue collection, which is quite impressive in the list of 192 countries. We have been facing deficit budgets not because of supposedly meagre revenue collection. In fact, it is government expenditure that every year produces the huge deficit. In other words, a budget deficit occurs when a country spends more money then it takes in. The country that is chronically addicted to overspending in non-developmental sectors had to borrow from the IMF to offset the annual deficit. However, the debt continues to grow because governments are seldom inclined to adopt austerity measures or tight financial controls. In fact, the debt is essentially an accumulation of a country's recurring deficits. Pakistan now owes nearly $50 billion to world financial institutions and will be paying Rs660 billion in debt-servicing this fiscal year. It has happened more than once that we had to go back to the lender to borrow more from him to pay off loans taken from him.
Budgets are not made entirely on economic basis; they have a political basis as well. Unlike pure economic budgets, they are not entirely designed to allocate resources for best economic use. Consequently, different interests push and pull in an attempt to obtain benefits. That is the reason why our privatisation programme has come to a standstill. The employees of industrial and service units lined up for privatisation are aggressively opposed to the sale of public-sector assets because they fear their jobs would be lost. The result: the government is stuck with units which are operating at great loss. People have to pay Rs200 billion every year to keep themselves alive. There are many units which have been shut but cannot be dismantled or sold because of political pressure.
It is a wrong notion that the tax base here is too narrow. Maybe we lag behind in direct taxes. Well, one cannot expect high collection of income tax when one-third of Pakistanis are living under the poverty line. But in the imposition and collection of indirect taxes we are tops. Here even newborns are taxpayers: they drink taxed milk. The aged continue to pay indirect taxes until death frees them from tax net. It is an unjust tax system where a high proportion of taxes are paid by lower-income groups, or by the poor who hardly have any income. At least, there is exemption in income tax for those who earn less than a certain limit, but there is no such exemption in indirect taxation. The citizen, whether a millionaire or a pauper, pays the indirect tax at the same rate. There is no exemption for the pauper.
It is difficult to keep track of the nomenclature of indirect taxes. The layman has no way of knowing why a tax is given the name of GST and another is named FED. Let us attempt to find out the number of indirect taxes people are paying: 1) General Sales Tax (GST). 2) Federal Excise Duty (FED). 3) Value Added Tax (VAT). 4) Carbon Tax. 5) PTV Fee. The most unjustified and comical tax belongs to PTV. This tax Rs25 per month -- is collected by the local power company through its electricity bills. It is unjustified because cable operators are also charging for providing PTV channels. It is comical because one has to pay th PTV Fee even if he does not wish to watch PTV.
The budget is bound to be rewritten if the Friends of Democratic Pakistan and our Muslim brother countries do not help Pakistan in the rehabilitation of the nearly three million IDPs. If grants are not forthcoming soon, then the government would have to slap more taxes.
The writer is a freelance columnist.
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
Mir Jamilur Rahman
Every year the government presents budgets claiming that the new budget is people-friendly and will raise the living standard of the poor. The finance minister raises taxes on some items and reduces them on some others. The net outcome of this annual jugglery is that things remain the same and there is hardly any visible change in the life of the common man.
Revenue collection in Pakistan is not as bad as it is made to look. Pakistan was 65th in the last fiscal year in revenue collection, which is quite impressive in the list of 192 countries. We have been facing deficit budgets not because of supposedly meagre revenue collection. In fact, it is government expenditure that every year produces the huge deficit. In other words, a budget deficit occurs when a country spends more money then it takes in. The country that is chronically addicted to overspending in non-developmental sectors had to borrow from the IMF to offset the annual deficit. However, the debt continues to grow because governments are seldom inclined to adopt austerity measures or tight financial controls. In fact, the debt is essentially an accumulation of a country's recurring deficits. Pakistan now owes nearly $50 billion to world financial institutions and will be paying Rs660 billion in debt-servicing this fiscal year. It has happened more than once that we had to go back to the lender to borrow more from him to pay off loans taken from him.
Budgets are not made entirely on economic basis; they have a political basis as well. Unlike pure economic budgets, they are not entirely designed to allocate resources for best economic use. Consequently, different interests push and pull in an attempt to obtain benefits. That is the reason why our privatisation programme has come to a standstill. The employees of industrial and service units lined up for privatisation are aggressively opposed to the sale of public-sector assets because they fear their jobs would be lost. The result: the government is stuck with units which are operating at great loss. People have to pay Rs200 billion every year to keep themselves alive. There are many units which have been shut but cannot be dismantled or sold because of political pressure.
It is a wrong notion that the tax base here is too narrow. Maybe we lag behind in direct taxes. Well, one cannot expect high collection of income tax when one-third of Pakistanis are living under the poverty line. But in the imposition and collection of indirect taxes we are tops. Here even newborns are taxpayers: they drink taxed milk. The aged continue to pay indirect taxes until death frees them from tax net. It is an unjust tax system where a high proportion of taxes are paid by lower-income groups, or by the poor who hardly have any income. At least, there is exemption in income tax for those who earn less than a certain limit, but there is no such exemption in indirect taxation. The citizen, whether a millionaire or a pauper, pays the indirect tax at the same rate. There is no exemption for the pauper.
It is difficult to keep track of the nomenclature of indirect taxes. The layman has no way of knowing why a tax is given the name of GST and another is named FED. Let us attempt to find out the number of indirect taxes people are paying: 1) General Sales Tax (GST). 2) Federal Excise Duty (FED). 3) Value Added Tax (VAT). 4) Carbon Tax. 5) PTV Fee. The most unjustified and comical tax belongs to PTV. This tax Rs25 per month -- is collected by the local power company through its electricity bills. It is unjustified because cable operators are also charging for providing PTV channels. It is comical because one has to pay th PTV Fee even if he does not wish to watch PTV.
The budget is bound to be rewritten if the Friends of Democratic Pakistan and our Muslim brother countries do not help Pakistan in the rehabilitation of the nearly three million IDPs. If grants are not forthcoming soon, then the government would have to slap more taxes.
The writer is a freelance columnist.
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
Evaluating the orders
By Kamran Shafi
Tuesday, 16 Jun, 2009
Governor NWFP, Owais Ghani, on Sunday, June 14, 2009: The government has decided to launch an operation against militants in Fata.
It has been decided that a comprehensive and decisive operation will be launched to eliminate Baitullah Mehsud and dismantle his network we have repeatedly warned the Mehsud tribe through tribal elders to give up their miscreant activities and advised them not to shelter foreign militants. The government will not tolerate any act against the security of the peoples lives and property at any cost.
They kept on their miscreant activities and continued to harbour terrorists. As a result, many people have lost their lives in suicide attacks in Lahore, Peshawar, Islamabad and today in Dera Ismail Khan.
Dawn reported, Governor Ghani said the army had been ordered to launch a crackdown on militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
Army spokesman Maj-Gen Athar Abbas on Sunday, June 14, 2009 to the news agency Associated Press: The government has made the announcement. We will give a comment after evaluating the orders reported in all the main newspapers of the country.
Are we, the hapless people of Pakistan, right, then, to be confused, rattled, scared out of our wits, petrified, perplexed and baffled by what is going on? How possibly can the spokesman of an agency of state, the army, say that it will give a comment after evaluating the direct orders of the Government of Pakistan through its agent in the Frontier, the governor himself? What comments will the army give, please?
Were we always right when we thought that the army and the elected government are at odds over how to handle the murderous Yahoos? Were we right in thinking that there are wheels within independently-powered wheels within the security establishment, some propelling the Pakistani state forwards and some forcing it backwards? Are there still powerful interests within the army/what is increasingly referred to as the elite agency aka the Mother of All Agencies that, even now, consider some of the Yahoos their strategic assets?
Well, the double whammy of the release of the Red Mosque prayer leader Maulana Abdul Aziz whose cohorts brought so much misery to Islamabad the Beautiful, and of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed of the Falah-i-Insaniyat formerly the Jamaatud Daawa ne the Lashkar-i-Taiba (whose antics have brought such a lot of opprobrium on to our country) because of lackadaisical prosecution by government prosecutors certainly points to that.
Be which as it may, what the elected Government of Pakistan gets by buckling to pressure from the security establishment escapes me, specially when it will all redound to the bloody civilians own utter detriment. Could one, then, take this opportunity to once again implore President Zardari to ignore the bad advice he has been getting from his various hangers-on and dogsbodies and flunkies, those who have put him in one tight spot after another? He must remove all the stops in repealing the dictatorial aspects of the 17th Amendment; and implement the Charter of Democracy immediately.
Only this will block the way for future army interventions: is it too much to say that the political forces must come together at the earliest to deflate the hot-air balloons even now being floated by some of the tight buddies of the establishment who are advocating an early return to army rule because of the most outlandish conspiracies that only they can see?
The conspiracies range from an American plot to push more Taliban into Pakistan so as to tie up the army in Fata while they take out our nuclear weapons and missiles, and thence to break up Pakistan. Here is one published in a daily on May 28, 2009, verbatim: Once Pakistan is de-nuclearised the USA would encourage Pakistans Balkanisation into a Baloch US satellite, a city state of MQM in Karachi, a Pakhtunistan badly bombed and in tatters and a Punjab stripped of nuclear potential, kicked and bullied by India. A Northern Area republic which is a US lackey unless China decides to call the US bluff by occupying the Northern Area.
What is the answer to this: an immediate clean break with USA/Nato and closing all Nato/US supply lines to Afghanistan; mining and barbed wiring the Afghan Pakistan border; allowing the Fata agencies to import goods for Afghanistan duty free and scrapping the old Afghan Transit Trade Accord thus economically boosting the Fata. A military alliance with China with a Chinese naval base at Gwadar; rapprochement with Russia and offering the Russians free port facilities at Gwadar; creation of a maritime province in Gwadar and Lasbela districts insulating these areas from the Baloch sardars on payroll of US intelligence; creation of a Pashtun province in the Pashtun districts of Balochistan with Quetta as its capital.
I ask you.
These brilliant thoughts end thus: Everything is not inevitable in history. The ablest navigators can defeat the worst sea storms. Pakistan needs strategic and political vision. It may be necessary to have a military government to do all this in case the civilians prove inept.
Now does the Peoples Party see what madness is out there? Now will it get its act together? Now do the people at large, my hapless and helpless countrymen and women, realise the complete craziness that is out there? Now is it clear that we must stand shoulder to shoulder and say with one voice, good, bad, or ugly, we stand by democracy and our democratically elected leaders?
Let me end by alluding to another thought now making waves on the Internet. And that is the impossibility of the Yahoos taking over Islamabad the Beautiful when Pakistan has the seventh largest army in the whole wide world. Whilst some would argue that the seventh largest army in the world has Pakistan and not the other way around, what does it take for murderous Yahoos to take over any place and its people?
Remember Swat, seventh largest army and all? All it took was three slaughtered and headless bodies displayed upside down on electric poles every morn three days running. That is all. For Khooni (Bloody) Chowk, Mingora, Swat; read F-7 Markaz, Islamabad the Beautiful.
There is no reason at all to be sanguine we are well and truly up the proverbial creek.
By Kamran Shafi
Tuesday, 16 Jun, 2009
Governor NWFP, Owais Ghani, on Sunday, June 14, 2009: The government has decided to launch an operation against militants in Fata.
It has been decided that a comprehensive and decisive operation will be launched to eliminate Baitullah Mehsud and dismantle his network we have repeatedly warned the Mehsud tribe through tribal elders to give up their miscreant activities and advised them not to shelter foreign militants. The government will not tolerate any act against the security of the peoples lives and property at any cost.
They kept on their miscreant activities and continued to harbour terrorists. As a result, many people have lost their lives in suicide attacks in Lahore, Peshawar, Islamabad and today in Dera Ismail Khan.
Dawn reported, Governor Ghani said the army had been ordered to launch a crackdown on militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
Army spokesman Maj-Gen Athar Abbas on Sunday, June 14, 2009 to the news agency Associated Press: The government has made the announcement. We will give a comment after evaluating the orders reported in all the main newspapers of the country.
Are we, the hapless people of Pakistan, right, then, to be confused, rattled, scared out of our wits, petrified, perplexed and baffled by what is going on? How possibly can the spokesman of an agency of state, the army, say that it will give a comment after evaluating the direct orders of the Government of Pakistan through its agent in the Frontier, the governor himself? What comments will the army give, please?
Were we always right when we thought that the army and the elected government are at odds over how to handle the murderous Yahoos? Were we right in thinking that there are wheels within independently-powered wheels within the security establishment, some propelling the Pakistani state forwards and some forcing it backwards? Are there still powerful interests within the army/what is increasingly referred to as the elite agency aka the Mother of All Agencies that, even now, consider some of the Yahoos their strategic assets?
Well, the double whammy of the release of the Red Mosque prayer leader Maulana Abdul Aziz whose cohorts brought so much misery to Islamabad the Beautiful, and of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed of the Falah-i-Insaniyat formerly the Jamaatud Daawa ne the Lashkar-i-Taiba (whose antics have brought such a lot of opprobrium on to our country) because of lackadaisical prosecution by government prosecutors certainly points to that.
Be which as it may, what the elected Government of Pakistan gets by buckling to pressure from the security establishment escapes me, specially when it will all redound to the bloody civilians own utter detriment. Could one, then, take this opportunity to once again implore President Zardari to ignore the bad advice he has been getting from his various hangers-on and dogsbodies and flunkies, those who have put him in one tight spot after another? He must remove all the stops in repealing the dictatorial aspects of the 17th Amendment; and implement the Charter of Democracy immediately.
Only this will block the way for future army interventions: is it too much to say that the political forces must come together at the earliest to deflate the hot-air balloons even now being floated by some of the tight buddies of the establishment who are advocating an early return to army rule because of the most outlandish conspiracies that only they can see?
The conspiracies range from an American plot to push more Taliban into Pakistan so as to tie up the army in Fata while they take out our nuclear weapons and missiles, and thence to break up Pakistan. Here is one published in a daily on May 28, 2009, verbatim: Once Pakistan is de-nuclearised the USA would encourage Pakistans Balkanisation into a Baloch US satellite, a city state of MQM in Karachi, a Pakhtunistan badly bombed and in tatters and a Punjab stripped of nuclear potential, kicked and bullied by India. A Northern Area republic which is a US lackey unless China decides to call the US bluff by occupying the Northern Area.
What is the answer to this: an immediate clean break with USA/Nato and closing all Nato/US supply lines to Afghanistan; mining and barbed wiring the Afghan Pakistan border; allowing the Fata agencies to import goods for Afghanistan duty free and scrapping the old Afghan Transit Trade Accord thus economically boosting the Fata. A military alliance with China with a Chinese naval base at Gwadar; rapprochement with Russia and offering the Russians free port facilities at Gwadar; creation of a maritime province in Gwadar and Lasbela districts insulating these areas from the Baloch sardars on payroll of US intelligence; creation of a Pashtun province in the Pashtun districts of Balochistan with Quetta as its capital.
I ask you.
These brilliant thoughts end thus: Everything is not inevitable in history. The ablest navigators can defeat the worst sea storms. Pakistan needs strategic and political vision. It may be necessary to have a military government to do all this in case the civilians prove inept.
Now does the Peoples Party see what madness is out there? Now will it get its act together? Now do the people at large, my hapless and helpless countrymen and women, realise the complete craziness that is out there? Now is it clear that we must stand shoulder to shoulder and say with one voice, good, bad, or ugly, we stand by democracy and our democratically elected leaders?
Let me end by alluding to another thought now making waves on the Internet. And that is the impossibility of the Yahoos taking over Islamabad the Beautiful when Pakistan has the seventh largest army in the whole wide world. Whilst some would argue that the seventh largest army in the world has Pakistan and not the other way around, what does it take for murderous Yahoos to take over any place and its people?
Remember Swat, seventh largest army and all? All it took was three slaughtered and headless bodies displayed upside down on electric poles every morn three days running. That is all. For Khooni (Bloody) Chowk, Mingora, Swat; read F-7 Markaz, Islamabad the Beautiful.
There is no reason at all to be sanguine we are well and truly up the proverbial creek.
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A new beginning
By Dr Ahmad Rashid Malik | Published: June 16, 2009
United States is the world's leading player. Its policies do affect the globe in many fundamental ways. The change of leadership in the White House in November 2008 election, brought a sea change in US global policy. President Barack Obama's 55-minute address at the Cairo University, Egypt, delivered on 4 June to 3000 jam-packed auditorium, significantly reflect such notable changes in US policy in particular toward the Muslim world. For many people, therefore, President Obama's speech at Cairo University is not a surprise rather it reflected changes in US policy, an admission of guilt as well as building good relations with the Muslim world. This new beginning would replace the decade-long awe and shock era of President Obama's predecessor.
President Obama's much-anticipated speech was welcomed in all Muslim capitals as his address was reverberated, resounding, unflinching, and created a positive balance with the Muslim world. There is going to be a new US-Muslim world engagement. Therefore, the speech received mostly a favourable response. His tone was based on optimism and peace and not on scepticism. He came with a clear-cut message of reconciliation. He eloquently praised Islam and the Muslims. He offered long-term cooperation. He made a breakthrough with the Muslim world. This was never mentioned by any US leadership in it's over 400 years of history which President Obama mentioned in his Cairo speech. Let's also not forget that Muslim Morocco was the first country that recognised US as an independent country under the treaty of Tripoli signed in 1796, and the second US President, John Adams, wrote that America has not been against the religion of Islam, its laws, and its tranquility, as President Obama reminded the audience.
The venue of address at Cairo was symbolic. Al-Azhar and Cairo universities represent liberal Islamic approaches. The European enlightenment and renaissance owe to the Muslim world especially the scholars in North Africa with Egypt in centre. The Cairo University represents Muslim liberal thought and advancement for over a century, offering a mix blend of both traditions and modernity. The post-Nasir Egypt advocates strong ties with the West. The country also normalised ties with Israel. United States played a neutral and decent role over the Suez Canal nationalisation in 1956 and penalised Great Britain and France over their conflict with Egypt. This is what people expect from the United States to play a role in the Middle East. Now United States is probably coming close to Egyptian-type of foreign policy toward the issue of peace in the Middle East and the Islamic World. It was Cairo where President Obama reached out to the Muslim world - a centre of pragmatic Islam free of sectarianism, theocracy, and extremism. His admission that the world of Islam and the United States are at tension is a bold initiative to cultivate a trust-based relations in future. Cold War and globalisation did not serve the interests of the Muslims, President Obama admitted in his speech. It is a realism now appearing in US foreign policy. He wants to make an end to tension especially the post-9/11-led tension as he wishes to bring a new beginning between the United States and the Muslim world. President Obama has shown that he has a great respect for Islam, its traditions, and values. He even went on to quote from the Holy Quran several times in his speech. He offered to fight against negative stereotype anti- Islamic propaganda. President Obama's speech at Cairo University is the most prominent and eloquent speech after his Inaugural speech on 20 January this year.
President Obama made an outline of crises in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan's bordering areas with Afghanistan. He reiterated the need for the creation of a Palestinian State and negotiations with Iran to end nuclear rift with the latter. 'We would not turn our back to the demands of establishing a Palestinian State', President Obama committed. The Palestinian Authority praised President Obama's remarks as 'nice beginning'. It is expected that these crises will be over with better expectations under President Obama's leadership and foreign policy new initiatives.
He came up with the conclusion that political will and human rights traditions cannot be imposed on other people. This seems to be radical shit in US human rights policy toward the Islamic and developing world adopted in the 1970s by the Carter Administration. The policy only damaged relations with the countries that were having weak democratic traditions. On other issues such as development, globalisation, women and children rights, education, science, technology, and tolerance there seems to be more consensus generated through President Obama's address.
The are long-term strategic gains attached to Obama's speech. It would provide a sound and workable US policy toward the Islamic world. Other than the idea, his tone was extremely accommodating and helps shun extremism and anti-Americanism. The speech was an outline of the basic guidelines and principles of coming US foreign policy toward the Muslim world. Probably the message was not well received in anti-Muslim capitals especially Tel Aviv, New Delhi, and a host of others. Muslims fundamentals also unable to grasp the essence of Obama's speech. For them, there was nothing as simply they hate US President's speech. If they listen to President Obama's Speech carefully, a meaningful essence of future good ties between the United States and the Muslim world was strongly prevalent in the speech. President Obama is trying to accord a soft power status to the United States in order to improve its image in the Muslim world.
In short, President Obama made a new beginning with the Muslim world and laid down a milestone for future cooperation. A new chapter of US-Muslim world has been heralded by President Obama. He went extra thousands of miles bringing the United States and the Islamic world closer. There is nothing wrong if Muslims put expectations too high on President Obama's new diplomacy toward the Muslim world. Let's be optimistic. It is just the beginning. A ray of hope is beaconing and changes will follow and we expect that actions will be speaking louder than the words expressed by President Obama at Cairo University.
The writer is a Research Fellow (East Asia) at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI).
By Dr Ahmad Rashid Malik | Published: June 16, 2009
United States is the world's leading player. Its policies do affect the globe in many fundamental ways. The change of leadership in the White House in November 2008 election, brought a sea change in US global policy. President Barack Obama's 55-minute address at the Cairo University, Egypt, delivered on 4 June to 3000 jam-packed auditorium, significantly reflect such notable changes in US policy in particular toward the Muslim world. For many people, therefore, President Obama's speech at Cairo University is not a surprise rather it reflected changes in US policy, an admission of guilt as well as building good relations with the Muslim world. This new beginning would replace the decade-long awe and shock era of President Obama's predecessor.
President Obama's much-anticipated speech was welcomed in all Muslim capitals as his address was reverberated, resounding, unflinching, and created a positive balance with the Muslim world. There is going to be a new US-Muslim world engagement. Therefore, the speech received mostly a favourable response. His tone was based on optimism and peace and not on scepticism. He came with a clear-cut message of reconciliation. He eloquently praised Islam and the Muslims. He offered long-term cooperation. He made a breakthrough with the Muslim world. This was never mentioned by any US leadership in it's over 400 years of history which President Obama mentioned in his Cairo speech. Let's also not forget that Muslim Morocco was the first country that recognised US as an independent country under the treaty of Tripoli signed in 1796, and the second US President, John Adams, wrote that America has not been against the religion of Islam, its laws, and its tranquility, as President Obama reminded the audience.
The venue of address at Cairo was symbolic. Al-Azhar and Cairo universities represent liberal Islamic approaches. The European enlightenment and renaissance owe to the Muslim world especially the scholars in North Africa with Egypt in centre. The Cairo University represents Muslim liberal thought and advancement for over a century, offering a mix blend of both traditions and modernity. The post-Nasir Egypt advocates strong ties with the West. The country also normalised ties with Israel. United States played a neutral and decent role over the Suez Canal nationalisation in 1956 and penalised Great Britain and France over their conflict with Egypt. This is what people expect from the United States to play a role in the Middle East. Now United States is probably coming close to Egyptian-type of foreign policy toward the issue of peace in the Middle East and the Islamic World. It was Cairo where President Obama reached out to the Muslim world - a centre of pragmatic Islam free of sectarianism, theocracy, and extremism. His admission that the world of Islam and the United States are at tension is a bold initiative to cultivate a trust-based relations in future. Cold War and globalisation did not serve the interests of the Muslims, President Obama admitted in his speech. It is a realism now appearing in US foreign policy. He wants to make an end to tension especially the post-9/11-led tension as he wishes to bring a new beginning between the United States and the Muslim world. President Obama has shown that he has a great respect for Islam, its traditions, and values. He even went on to quote from the Holy Quran several times in his speech. He offered to fight against negative stereotype anti- Islamic propaganda. President Obama's speech at Cairo University is the most prominent and eloquent speech after his Inaugural speech on 20 January this year.
President Obama made an outline of crises in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan's bordering areas with Afghanistan. He reiterated the need for the creation of a Palestinian State and negotiations with Iran to end nuclear rift with the latter. 'We would not turn our back to the demands of establishing a Palestinian State', President Obama committed. The Palestinian Authority praised President Obama's remarks as 'nice beginning'. It is expected that these crises will be over with better expectations under President Obama's leadership and foreign policy new initiatives.
He came up with the conclusion that political will and human rights traditions cannot be imposed on other people. This seems to be radical shit in US human rights policy toward the Islamic and developing world adopted in the 1970s by the Carter Administration. The policy only damaged relations with the countries that were having weak democratic traditions. On other issues such as development, globalisation, women and children rights, education, science, technology, and tolerance there seems to be more consensus generated through President Obama's address.
The are long-term strategic gains attached to Obama's speech. It would provide a sound and workable US policy toward the Islamic world. Other than the idea, his tone was extremely accommodating and helps shun extremism and anti-Americanism. The speech was an outline of the basic guidelines and principles of coming US foreign policy toward the Muslim world. Probably the message was not well received in anti-Muslim capitals especially Tel Aviv, New Delhi, and a host of others. Muslims fundamentals also unable to grasp the essence of Obama's speech. For them, there was nothing as simply they hate US President's speech. If they listen to President Obama's Speech carefully, a meaningful essence of future good ties between the United States and the Muslim world was strongly prevalent in the speech. President Obama is trying to accord a soft power status to the United States in order to improve its image in the Muslim world.
In short, President Obama made a new beginning with the Muslim world and laid down a milestone for future cooperation. A new chapter of US-Muslim world has been heralded by President Obama. He went extra thousands of miles bringing the United States and the Islamic world closer. There is nothing wrong if Muslims put expectations too high on President Obama's new diplomacy toward the Muslim world. Let's be optimistic. It is just the beginning. A ray of hope is beaconing and changes will follow and we expect that actions will be speaking louder than the words expressed by President Obama at Cairo University.
The writer is a Research Fellow (East Asia) at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI).
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
Role of leadership in Swat
Published: June 16, 2009
Anwaar Rasul Khan
So far over 1000 militants, or still better mercenaries, fighting the war of terror in Swat have been killed and scores arrested. The social, humanitarians and financial cost has been staggering. The outcome of this military operation is predictable and so is the aftermath. In the future, the militants' power is expected to melt down and become non affective as a terror weapon in the day-to-day living of the people in the valley. However, skirmishes and suicide bombing will continue in Swat and other parts of the country. The main reason for this is that we have allowed the situation to deteriorate to this point because of lack of proper government involvement. In addition there is involvement of three outside powers viz India, Afghanistan and Russia, who wish to see Pakistan destabilized for their own reasons.
The events of last one month would have shown to the militant fighting that they have considerable cost to pay for their illegitimate activities. They were holding power on vast tracts of lands by sheer fear factor. The local of population has been suffering for a considerable length of time, lost innocent lives and their livelihood. Hundreds of schools were burnt. This is enough cause to turn the people against them. Intelligently exploited by giving relief, food and shelter, constructing houses, providing medical aid etc. the sentiment would serve as a bulwark against the militants re-establishing their foot hold in the areas from where they are expelled by the army. The ball is squarely in the court of the provincial government. The role of leadership assumes overwhelming importance that would determining the future security and development in NWFP. Needless to add the security in rest of Pakistan is also linked with it.
However, if track record of NWPF government has any bearing, leadership is perhaps the weakest point in the present situation. The government has mismanaged the entire situation by giving wrong signals and indecision. The law and order has deteriorated in the province beyond acceptable limits. Capital city Peshawar is not safe and abductions for ransom have become common occurrence. People like us are advised not to go to the mosque. In Hayatabad barely four miles from the provincial metropolis the situation is even worse. They are rumours that even women have been abducted. After all this situation was not there one year ago. People need security and confidence in the law enforcement apparatus of the government. If Peshawar is not safe, how can any other part of NWFP could be safe. The local administration seems to be under fear to the point of paranoia and unable to act responsibly. Sooner or later, the federal government has to assume responsibility since the provincial government is not up to the mark. A most disconcerting thing is that an average person would get the impression that the provincial government gave signals to the militants that it was acting against them because of the federal government. The military action has to be taken to its logical conclusion of eliminating militancy. The fact is that the operation in Swat was unnecessarily delayed. The common feeling is that the NWFP government was scared to act or ask for help of the military and dodged the issue by trying to buy cheap peace. If fear dominates the leadership, the entire machinery under its command gets caught in indecisiveness and inertia. The action should have started when the first few schools were burnt down and a clear message sent that it was intolerable. Burning of hundreds of schools was a shameful surrender. Instead the provincial government opened dialogue with Sufi Muhammad. Nothing could have been worse. Predictably, the demands and threats of the Fazalullah group continued to mount. The peace agreement gave them powers of state within a state. How can a state sign an agreement with a group that is not elected? How can such an agreement be given legal sanction when it is in conflict with the Constitution and different from the rest of the country? How can the institution of Qazi courts be introduced without clearly laying down procedure? How can the punishment be different in a penal court or CRPC in one part of the country from the other. What was the modus operandi under which Qazis were to be selected, not to mention whether they had necessary education to adjudicate legal cases? So on and so forth.
The Western powers watched the scenario with anguish. They were expecting that the leadership would act in the interest of the country. Rather, the National Assembly endorsed the Swat deal, Belatedly, Mian Nawaz Sharif tried to change PML stance, but the damage was done internationally. President Obama openly criticized lack of leadership in Pakistan for the first time in history of Pak-American relations. Secretary Clinton came out with the remark that the Pakistan government was abdicating responsibility and surrendering to Taliban. The West feared domino effec", (and they would have been right, if the Swat deal went through in the shape it was presented. This deal was ill advised and ill timed. The writ of the state, our ability to manage statecraft and handle nuclear weapons became questionable. If this suspicion remained unchecked, it could have become an excuse of major powers such as U.S / Nato to physically occupy Pakistan. Fortunately for us, the militants started exceeding the limit, thereby inviting direct military action. Our reputation has been salvaged to a large extent and before long the writ of the state would be enforced in Swat. But have we learnt our lessons? What is our future planning to ensure that we are nor overrun again? Are we planning to establish cantonments in key locations of Swat? Are we reinforcing F.C Jawaans with more training and better weapons? Are we going to punish the culprits who have been arrested? Most importantly are we making efforts to ensure the IDPs' quick return to their homes, restoring their properties and giving them means of livelihood?
Administratively, the federal government has to decide once and for all whether it would like to act if the NWFP government is not functioning as it should, and consider dismissing it and imposing the Governor Rule till such time Swat and other areas are fully under control and law and order has been firmly established. After all the country's stability, and its reputation, is more important than carrying on association with NAP. The leadership in the Centre would have to rise above the petty consideration of keeping the collation intact and act in the overall interest of the country.
Now to the way forward. The army needs clear command with legal sanction for its acts. It acted clearly, aggressively in forthright manner. We can be optimistic of the outcome because the operation has the support of the entire country. The elimination of terrorist groups may take time and success could be painful in terms of causalities but it is bound to succeed. The leadership at centre and province has to give unstinted and clear support to the army. Powers though legislation for speedy trial is the first step. Secondly, the security situation in the province has to improve. Thirdly, the arduous task of looking after IDPs and their resettlement. It should not be left to the province.. The centre should give clear timelines for the completion of task. We should look into the possibility of handling this task through an organization set up for this purpose and running on multinational lines, with transparency. Regular presentations of progress monthly and quarterly should be made at the centre as well as province. Paradigm shift for accomplishing task by this manner would meet resistance, but regardless of obstructions, it needs to be done for better utilization of foreign aid and other expenditures incurred by the government. Full publicity of the progress on resettlement should be given.
The writer is retired Director of Pakistan International Airlines
Published: June 16, 2009
Anwaar Rasul Khan
So far over 1000 militants, or still better mercenaries, fighting the war of terror in Swat have been killed and scores arrested. The social, humanitarians and financial cost has been staggering. The outcome of this military operation is predictable and so is the aftermath. In the future, the militants' power is expected to melt down and become non affective as a terror weapon in the day-to-day living of the people in the valley. However, skirmishes and suicide bombing will continue in Swat and other parts of the country. The main reason for this is that we have allowed the situation to deteriorate to this point because of lack of proper government involvement. In addition there is involvement of three outside powers viz India, Afghanistan and Russia, who wish to see Pakistan destabilized for their own reasons.
The events of last one month would have shown to the militant fighting that they have considerable cost to pay for their illegitimate activities. They were holding power on vast tracts of lands by sheer fear factor. The local of population has been suffering for a considerable length of time, lost innocent lives and their livelihood. Hundreds of schools were burnt. This is enough cause to turn the people against them. Intelligently exploited by giving relief, food and shelter, constructing houses, providing medical aid etc. the sentiment would serve as a bulwark against the militants re-establishing their foot hold in the areas from where they are expelled by the army. The ball is squarely in the court of the provincial government. The role of leadership assumes overwhelming importance that would determining the future security and development in NWFP. Needless to add the security in rest of Pakistan is also linked with it.
However, if track record of NWPF government has any bearing, leadership is perhaps the weakest point in the present situation. The government has mismanaged the entire situation by giving wrong signals and indecision. The law and order has deteriorated in the province beyond acceptable limits. Capital city Peshawar is not safe and abductions for ransom have become common occurrence. People like us are advised not to go to the mosque. In Hayatabad barely four miles from the provincial metropolis the situation is even worse. They are rumours that even women have been abducted. After all this situation was not there one year ago. People need security and confidence in the law enforcement apparatus of the government. If Peshawar is not safe, how can any other part of NWFP could be safe. The local administration seems to be under fear to the point of paranoia and unable to act responsibly. Sooner or later, the federal government has to assume responsibility since the provincial government is not up to the mark. A most disconcerting thing is that an average person would get the impression that the provincial government gave signals to the militants that it was acting against them because of the federal government. The military action has to be taken to its logical conclusion of eliminating militancy. The fact is that the operation in Swat was unnecessarily delayed. The common feeling is that the NWFP government was scared to act or ask for help of the military and dodged the issue by trying to buy cheap peace. If fear dominates the leadership, the entire machinery under its command gets caught in indecisiveness and inertia. The action should have started when the first few schools were burnt down and a clear message sent that it was intolerable. Burning of hundreds of schools was a shameful surrender. Instead the provincial government opened dialogue with Sufi Muhammad. Nothing could have been worse. Predictably, the demands and threats of the Fazalullah group continued to mount. The peace agreement gave them powers of state within a state. How can a state sign an agreement with a group that is not elected? How can such an agreement be given legal sanction when it is in conflict with the Constitution and different from the rest of the country? How can the institution of Qazi courts be introduced without clearly laying down procedure? How can the punishment be different in a penal court or CRPC in one part of the country from the other. What was the modus operandi under which Qazis were to be selected, not to mention whether they had necessary education to adjudicate legal cases? So on and so forth.
The Western powers watched the scenario with anguish. They were expecting that the leadership would act in the interest of the country. Rather, the National Assembly endorsed the Swat deal, Belatedly, Mian Nawaz Sharif tried to change PML stance, but the damage was done internationally. President Obama openly criticized lack of leadership in Pakistan for the first time in history of Pak-American relations. Secretary Clinton came out with the remark that the Pakistan government was abdicating responsibility and surrendering to Taliban. The West feared domino effec", (and they would have been right, if the Swat deal went through in the shape it was presented. This deal was ill advised and ill timed. The writ of the state, our ability to manage statecraft and handle nuclear weapons became questionable. If this suspicion remained unchecked, it could have become an excuse of major powers such as U.S / Nato to physically occupy Pakistan. Fortunately for us, the militants started exceeding the limit, thereby inviting direct military action. Our reputation has been salvaged to a large extent and before long the writ of the state would be enforced in Swat. But have we learnt our lessons? What is our future planning to ensure that we are nor overrun again? Are we planning to establish cantonments in key locations of Swat? Are we reinforcing F.C Jawaans with more training and better weapons? Are we going to punish the culprits who have been arrested? Most importantly are we making efforts to ensure the IDPs' quick return to their homes, restoring their properties and giving them means of livelihood?
Administratively, the federal government has to decide once and for all whether it would like to act if the NWFP government is not functioning as it should, and consider dismissing it and imposing the Governor Rule till such time Swat and other areas are fully under control and law and order has been firmly established. After all the country's stability, and its reputation, is more important than carrying on association with NAP. The leadership in the Centre would have to rise above the petty consideration of keeping the collation intact and act in the overall interest of the country.
Now to the way forward. The army needs clear command with legal sanction for its acts. It acted clearly, aggressively in forthright manner. We can be optimistic of the outcome because the operation has the support of the entire country. The elimination of terrorist groups may take time and success could be painful in terms of causalities but it is bound to succeed. The leadership at centre and province has to give unstinted and clear support to the army. Powers though legislation for speedy trial is the first step. Secondly, the security situation in the province has to improve. Thirdly, the arduous task of looking after IDPs and their resettlement. It should not be left to the province.. The centre should give clear timelines for the completion of task. We should look into the possibility of handling this task through an organization set up for this purpose and running on multinational lines, with transparency. Regular presentations of progress monthly and quarterly should be made at the centre as well as province. Paradigm shift for accomplishing task by this manner would meet resistance, but regardless of obstructions, it needs to be done for better utilization of foreign aid and other expenditures incurred by the government. Full publicity of the progress on resettlement should be given.
The writer is retired Director of Pakistan International Airlines
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
A state within a state
By Fauzia Qireshi | Published: June 16, 2009
Unfortunately, our leaders have now openly started taking dictation from American Administration. The situation has become so worse that we as a nation are being assured by these foreigners that our sovereignty will be respected by their troops. This is yet another lie as time and again, our territorial sovereignty has been violated by them and their 'false' promises have led us to see this day. But, whatever may be said about the American interference, the fact of the matter is that the fault lies with in us and our leaders, who have demonstrated their weaknesses and subjugation to American pressures and let down there nation.
Today, Pakistan is termed to be another Iraq and Afghanistan in the making. Who is responsible? The people? Yes, to some extent who tolerate such leaders and their anti-state policies. The leaders? Definitely, who come to the parliament by precious vote banks with the promises to serve the nation and the country but bow down to foreign pressures so easily that the internal state policies are also dictated by foreign hands. How can a 'foreigner' tell us that the terrorists will not enter the province of Balochistan?
It is no secret that our decisions are made in Washington. But the repercussions of such decisions are only felt by a Pakistani. We decided to fight the US-Afghan war against Russia and what did we get? Klashinkove culture and millions of Afghan refugees, whose burden is still on the Pakistani economy and who have no intention of returning home. Some who have returned have decided to keep dual nationalities and keep their families here and they themselves shuttle between the two countries. Then, we decided to fight the American war against 'terrorism' and have made our own beloved country a battlefield. After all, where are we heading? What are our leaders doing? Do they think that if Pakistan becomes a permanent battlefield will they be pardoned by the people?It is due to the negligent policies of our leadership that millions of people have been displaced from Swat, Buner and Malakand area. The living conditions provided to these internally displaced persons are below average and the international aid in their name is yet again being pocketed by the 'bigwigs'. How will these people be rehabilitated and when? How will their personal loss be accommodated? Will these people ever go back or will they be another story like the Afghan refugees? Many families have been separated from each other, who is going to relocate their loved ones and how? The disastrous earthquake of 2005 was still fresh in our minds when this present tragedy has presented us with yet another challenge. Leadership in Pakistan has stayed in the hands of few who belong to the elite class or are feudals.
They have only doubled their bank accounts and have no interest in the needs or problems of common man. It is only when the reigns of this country will be in the hands of an educated middle class leader will this country progress. A feudal who has foreign bank accounts and has children studying abroad has no stake at home and when the time will come, a comfortable living will be awaiting him abroad. What interest will such a person have in his country? Our former prime minister is a good example who was sent by foreign hands and after completing there task he has returned to his 'foreign' home base.
What kind of strategic planning is this, that in order to apprehend or kill a few hundred Taliban, you dislocate millions of your own people? And why have we accepted leaders who have succumbed to anti-state policies? Nothing seems to be changing for Pakistan, in fact, things are going worse. The Americans are increasing their demands, expressing dissatisfaction frequently and 'ordering' what needs to be done and how. With the result that resentment against Washington is increasing and extremists suicide attacks have reached our capital and Pakistan's security, honour and sovereignty has been jeopardized. Who is responsible?
It is time to really think seriously about our country. Where are we heading and what kind of future are we passing on to our new generation? How long can this situation last? Not long. Our leaders need to take situation into their hands and should stop pursuing policies which are anti-state. The first step should be to stop these drone attacks which are indiscriminating in nature and kill innocent along with the criminals. A clear-cut plan should be devised to give aid to the displaced persons and a rehabilitation plan should be chalked out with the aim to settle them back to their respective areas. National interest should be supreme or else we may be heading for a future where we will be creating a state within a state.
The writer is MSc in International relations from Quaid-e-Azam University, LLB(Hons) from London and a former research fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies
By Fauzia Qireshi | Published: June 16, 2009
Unfortunately, our leaders have now openly started taking dictation from American Administration. The situation has become so worse that we as a nation are being assured by these foreigners that our sovereignty will be respected by their troops. This is yet another lie as time and again, our territorial sovereignty has been violated by them and their 'false' promises have led us to see this day. But, whatever may be said about the American interference, the fact of the matter is that the fault lies with in us and our leaders, who have demonstrated their weaknesses and subjugation to American pressures and let down there nation.
Today, Pakistan is termed to be another Iraq and Afghanistan in the making. Who is responsible? The people? Yes, to some extent who tolerate such leaders and their anti-state policies. The leaders? Definitely, who come to the parliament by precious vote banks with the promises to serve the nation and the country but bow down to foreign pressures so easily that the internal state policies are also dictated by foreign hands. How can a 'foreigner' tell us that the terrorists will not enter the province of Balochistan?
It is no secret that our decisions are made in Washington. But the repercussions of such decisions are only felt by a Pakistani. We decided to fight the US-Afghan war against Russia and what did we get? Klashinkove culture and millions of Afghan refugees, whose burden is still on the Pakistani economy and who have no intention of returning home. Some who have returned have decided to keep dual nationalities and keep their families here and they themselves shuttle between the two countries. Then, we decided to fight the American war against 'terrorism' and have made our own beloved country a battlefield. After all, where are we heading? What are our leaders doing? Do they think that if Pakistan becomes a permanent battlefield will they be pardoned by the people?It is due to the negligent policies of our leadership that millions of people have been displaced from Swat, Buner and Malakand area. The living conditions provided to these internally displaced persons are below average and the international aid in their name is yet again being pocketed by the 'bigwigs'. How will these people be rehabilitated and when? How will their personal loss be accommodated? Will these people ever go back or will they be another story like the Afghan refugees? Many families have been separated from each other, who is going to relocate their loved ones and how? The disastrous earthquake of 2005 was still fresh in our minds when this present tragedy has presented us with yet another challenge. Leadership in Pakistan has stayed in the hands of few who belong to the elite class or are feudals.
They have only doubled their bank accounts and have no interest in the needs or problems of common man. It is only when the reigns of this country will be in the hands of an educated middle class leader will this country progress. A feudal who has foreign bank accounts and has children studying abroad has no stake at home and when the time will come, a comfortable living will be awaiting him abroad. What interest will such a person have in his country? Our former prime minister is a good example who was sent by foreign hands and after completing there task he has returned to his 'foreign' home base.
What kind of strategic planning is this, that in order to apprehend or kill a few hundred Taliban, you dislocate millions of your own people? And why have we accepted leaders who have succumbed to anti-state policies? Nothing seems to be changing for Pakistan, in fact, things are going worse. The Americans are increasing their demands, expressing dissatisfaction frequently and 'ordering' what needs to be done and how. With the result that resentment against Washington is increasing and extremists suicide attacks have reached our capital and Pakistan's security, honour and sovereignty has been jeopardized. Who is responsible?
It is time to really think seriously about our country. Where are we heading and what kind of future are we passing on to our new generation? How long can this situation last? Not long. Our leaders need to take situation into their hands and should stop pursuing policies which are anti-state. The first step should be to stop these drone attacks which are indiscriminating in nature and kill innocent along with the criminals. A clear-cut plan should be devised to give aid to the displaced persons and a rehabilitation plan should be chalked out with the aim to settle them back to their respective areas. National interest should be supreme or else we may be heading for a future where we will be creating a state within a state.
The writer is MSc in International relations from Quaid-e-Azam University, LLB(Hons) from London and a former research fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
Massive energy sector debt
Published: June 16, 2009
Munawar B. Ahmad
There have been several news items in the past few days about the growing circular debt in the oil/gas/power sector and the near default situation of PSO. The Prime Minister's Advisor on Petroleum, Dr. Asim Hussain has rightly raised the issue with the Ministry of Finance noting "We have 15 days left in being declared in default".
Meanwhile Mr. G.A. Sabri, Secretary Petroleum has stated that "this situation can be averted if the government arranges the immediate relief of Rs 50 billion for PSO to overcome the tremendous stress in the oil supply chain. I am sure Mr Sabri realizes that in such times of economic difficulties the government would be hard pressed to arrange for such an amount on short notice. So what is the solution?
Also the question that needs to be answered by the government is as to why no effective planning has been undertaken, nor workable solution formulated over the past 14 months, and why the that massive circular dept in the energy sector continues to threaten the foundations of the state's financial structure. Various numbers of the extent of circular debt attributable to the energy sector have been stated varying from about Rs 150 billion to as much as Rs 400 billion.
The people and the parliament must be told the real story, and what is being done to recover about Rs 82 billion from the private sector owners of KESC, and another Rs 81 billion power dues from the FATA region, which have been accumulating since the USA involved Pakistan in their War on Terror focusing primarily on the FATA region. Is this not a cost of the USA "War on Terror"?
The receivables by PEPCO/DISCOs from various sources including the above Rs 163 billion have been stated to be as high as Rs 300 billion. As a consequence PEPCO/GENCOs/DISCOs have not been able to pay the IPP's, oil and gas companies or make their debt payments to the banks (the power sector debt has been stated to be about Rs 350-Rs 400 billion) Such a situation demands an urgent and focussed attention and a debt restructuring and repayment plan along with an effective and forceful receivable collection plan to move the energy sector and Pakistan out of the mammoth financial crisis.
Emergency collections from Friends of Pakistan, hand-outs from the USA for its "War on Terror" and loans from the IMF can only avert a meltdown, but cannot make the mountain of $ 4 billion circular debt go away. A plan and strategy to pull the power sector out the crisis was presented by the undersigned to the then infant government in April 2008, but unfortunately it was brushed aside as a non-issue, as there were more important tasks at hand. As a consequence the undersigned moved on in May 2008, unfortunately the circular debt did not go away and in fact has further ballooned in the last fourteen (14) months. The energy sector debt crisis has now engulfed PSO, SSGC, SNGPL, the Refineries as well as the oil marketing companies (OMC's).
One can only sympathize with the Advisor on Petroleum, who has inherited this monster that the MW&P, MOF, EAD etc have treated like an unwanted child, hoping that it will go away. But the Monster is here to stay and will continue to grow and engulf all sectors of the economy with disastrous consequences. Will the Prime Minister and his Advisor on Finance take heed, or should the people brace for a worst energy and economic crisis.
The writer is CEO, EMR-Consult and former MD PEPCO, MD SSGC
Published: June 16, 2009
Munawar B. Ahmad
There have been several news items in the past few days about the growing circular debt in the oil/gas/power sector and the near default situation of PSO. The Prime Minister's Advisor on Petroleum, Dr. Asim Hussain has rightly raised the issue with the Ministry of Finance noting "We have 15 days left in being declared in default".
Meanwhile Mr. G.A. Sabri, Secretary Petroleum has stated that "this situation can be averted if the government arranges the immediate relief of Rs 50 billion for PSO to overcome the tremendous stress in the oil supply chain. I am sure Mr Sabri realizes that in such times of economic difficulties the government would be hard pressed to arrange for such an amount on short notice. So what is the solution?
Also the question that needs to be answered by the government is as to why no effective planning has been undertaken, nor workable solution formulated over the past 14 months, and why the that massive circular dept in the energy sector continues to threaten the foundations of the state's financial structure. Various numbers of the extent of circular debt attributable to the energy sector have been stated varying from about Rs 150 billion to as much as Rs 400 billion.
The people and the parliament must be told the real story, and what is being done to recover about Rs 82 billion from the private sector owners of KESC, and another Rs 81 billion power dues from the FATA region, which have been accumulating since the USA involved Pakistan in their War on Terror focusing primarily on the FATA region. Is this not a cost of the USA "War on Terror"?
The receivables by PEPCO/DISCOs from various sources including the above Rs 163 billion have been stated to be as high as Rs 300 billion. As a consequence PEPCO/GENCOs/DISCOs have not been able to pay the IPP's, oil and gas companies or make their debt payments to the banks (the power sector debt has been stated to be about Rs 350-Rs 400 billion) Such a situation demands an urgent and focussed attention and a debt restructuring and repayment plan along with an effective and forceful receivable collection plan to move the energy sector and Pakistan out of the mammoth financial crisis.
Emergency collections from Friends of Pakistan, hand-outs from the USA for its "War on Terror" and loans from the IMF can only avert a meltdown, but cannot make the mountain of $ 4 billion circular debt go away. A plan and strategy to pull the power sector out the crisis was presented by the undersigned to the then infant government in April 2008, but unfortunately it was brushed aside as a non-issue, as there were more important tasks at hand. As a consequence the undersigned moved on in May 2008, unfortunately the circular debt did not go away and in fact has further ballooned in the last fourteen (14) months. The energy sector debt crisis has now engulfed PSO, SSGC, SNGPL, the Refineries as well as the oil marketing companies (OMC's).
One can only sympathize with the Advisor on Petroleum, who has inherited this monster that the MW&P, MOF, EAD etc have treated like an unwanted child, hoping that it will go away. But the Monster is here to stay and will continue to grow and engulf all sectors of the economy with disastrous consequences. Will the Prime Minister and his Advisor on Finance take heed, or should the people brace for a worst energy and economic crisis.
The writer is CEO, EMR-Consult and former MD PEPCO, MD SSGC
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
Drawing a parallel
By Kuldip Nayar | Published: June 16, 2009
LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran can well be compared with Jarnail Singh Bhindrawala, a Sikh militant. Both were killed by the state because they wanted to break it up. Prabhakaran tried to convert eastern and northern provinces of Sri Lanka into Eelam, an independent country. Bhindrawala confined himself to Punjab, separating it from India to constitute an independent country of Khalistan. One waged war for 30 years, the other for 30 weeks. But both assassinated the people's right and left. Their primary purpose was to create fear so that their own community - Tamils in Sri Lanka and Sikhs in Punjab - would not dare to raise its voice against them. No Tamil or Sikh worth any status spoke out.
The reason why the two failed to achieve their purpose was the opposition which they encountered from the majority in their respective country. It was but natural. Tamils in Sri Lanka were an alienated community - it is still so - but it was in a minority. It preferred to stay silent because it knew the LTTE was an authoritarian and ruthless organisation which prided itself in the brutalities it committed. Bhindrawala failed because he would have no support in 80 per cent of the Indian population, the Hindus. His followers picked them up from buses and elsewhere and murdered them in cold blood. Even the Sikhs, the cause of whom Bhindrawala espoused felt guilty, particularly outside Punjab. Women and children suffered the most at the hands of the two.
Yet the beginnings of both movements led by the LTTE and the Bhindrawala brigade were motivated by a sense of injustice that members of their community carried over the years. Both waged protests against their state's cursory attitude and the treatment meted out to Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Sikhs in Punjab. Since both Prabhakaran and Bhindranwale were dictatorial, they dreamt of their own fiefdom, Eelam in Sri Lanka and Khalistan in India. The use of violence was the undoing of their movement which had attracted sympathy and even support of the liberals and human rights activists. The latter felt let down. Maybe, they read too much in their voice against the oppression of police and security forces. Disillusionment of the intelligentsia cut off criticism and introspection. There was no one to tell them to see their face in the mirror. They killed more and more people, tens of thousands at least in Sri Lanka.Prabhakaran had Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi killed because of India's armed intervention at the request of Sri Lanka to discipline the LTTE. Colombo offered Prabhakaran more or less an autonomous status in the eastern and northern provinces where the Tamils were in a majority. But he spurned the offer because he saw the ramparts of independent state. Since the Tamils in America and Europe came to have a vicarious pleasure of having an independent country, they helped the LTTE with money and weapons. They were there to defend Prabakharan and his dictates. When Colombo realised that the way to a political solution had to be gone through blood, it started a full-scale war and won it.
Prabhakaran had the Northern Province under his control. In contrast, Bhindrawala used the Golden Temple at Amritsar as his sanctuary. He collected arms and men to resist his arrest. New Delhi could have starved him out or used some other method to force Bhindrawala to quit the Golden Temple. But the Centre ran out of patience and stormed the temple which not only injured the feelings of Sikhs, but gave the state a long period of militancy and murder. Bhindrawala's death, more so the attack on the Golden Temple was 'avenged' by two Sikh guards of Indira Gandhi who assassinated her. Sri Lanka claimed Rajiv Gandhi and Punjab his mother. The dynasty paid heavily for the government's misdoings and for their own act of indiscretion.
Did Operation Blue Star put an end to the grievance of Sikhs? It is always difficult to retrieve every bit of alienation. But, by and large, the Sikhs feel satisfied, particularly after a Sikh, Manmohan Singh, becoming the Prime Minister. His apology on behalf of the government has assuaged the feeling of hurt. Yet the killing of 3,000 Sikhs at Delhi in daylight and the guilty going scot-free irritates the community. But the dust of time does come to obscure even the greatest tragedies.
The cycle of atonement is yet to begin in Sri Lanka. The Tamils there were not behind the LTTE. But they felt that its presence may assure them justice - an equal treatment - one day. The Sinhala prejudice is as deep as the Tamil's alienation. Colombo can start a new chapter by decentralising power. The Sri Lankan government has the example of Sikhs before them. But it requires patience, understanding and commitment to the principle that Tamils are co-partners in the nation's wellbeing.
By Kuldip Nayar | Published: June 16, 2009
LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran can well be compared with Jarnail Singh Bhindrawala, a Sikh militant. Both were killed by the state because they wanted to break it up. Prabhakaran tried to convert eastern and northern provinces of Sri Lanka into Eelam, an independent country. Bhindrawala confined himself to Punjab, separating it from India to constitute an independent country of Khalistan. One waged war for 30 years, the other for 30 weeks. But both assassinated the people's right and left. Their primary purpose was to create fear so that their own community - Tamils in Sri Lanka and Sikhs in Punjab - would not dare to raise its voice against them. No Tamil or Sikh worth any status spoke out.
The reason why the two failed to achieve their purpose was the opposition which they encountered from the majority in their respective country. It was but natural. Tamils in Sri Lanka were an alienated community - it is still so - but it was in a minority. It preferred to stay silent because it knew the LTTE was an authoritarian and ruthless organisation which prided itself in the brutalities it committed. Bhindrawala failed because he would have no support in 80 per cent of the Indian population, the Hindus. His followers picked them up from buses and elsewhere and murdered them in cold blood. Even the Sikhs, the cause of whom Bhindrawala espoused felt guilty, particularly outside Punjab. Women and children suffered the most at the hands of the two.
Yet the beginnings of both movements led by the LTTE and the Bhindrawala brigade were motivated by a sense of injustice that members of their community carried over the years. Both waged protests against their state's cursory attitude and the treatment meted out to Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Sikhs in Punjab. Since both Prabhakaran and Bhindranwale were dictatorial, they dreamt of their own fiefdom, Eelam in Sri Lanka and Khalistan in India. The use of violence was the undoing of their movement which had attracted sympathy and even support of the liberals and human rights activists. The latter felt let down. Maybe, they read too much in their voice against the oppression of police and security forces. Disillusionment of the intelligentsia cut off criticism and introspection. There was no one to tell them to see their face in the mirror. They killed more and more people, tens of thousands at least in Sri Lanka.Prabhakaran had Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi killed because of India's armed intervention at the request of Sri Lanka to discipline the LTTE. Colombo offered Prabhakaran more or less an autonomous status in the eastern and northern provinces where the Tamils were in a majority. But he spurned the offer because he saw the ramparts of independent state. Since the Tamils in America and Europe came to have a vicarious pleasure of having an independent country, they helped the LTTE with money and weapons. They were there to defend Prabakharan and his dictates. When Colombo realised that the way to a political solution had to be gone through blood, it started a full-scale war and won it.
Prabhakaran had the Northern Province under his control. In contrast, Bhindrawala used the Golden Temple at Amritsar as his sanctuary. He collected arms and men to resist his arrest. New Delhi could have starved him out or used some other method to force Bhindrawala to quit the Golden Temple. But the Centre ran out of patience and stormed the temple which not only injured the feelings of Sikhs, but gave the state a long period of militancy and murder. Bhindrawala's death, more so the attack on the Golden Temple was 'avenged' by two Sikh guards of Indira Gandhi who assassinated her. Sri Lanka claimed Rajiv Gandhi and Punjab his mother. The dynasty paid heavily for the government's misdoings and for their own act of indiscretion.
Did Operation Blue Star put an end to the grievance of Sikhs? It is always difficult to retrieve every bit of alienation. But, by and large, the Sikhs feel satisfied, particularly after a Sikh, Manmohan Singh, becoming the Prime Minister. His apology on behalf of the government has assuaged the feeling of hurt. Yet the killing of 3,000 Sikhs at Delhi in daylight and the guilty going scot-free irritates the community. But the dust of time does come to obscure even the greatest tragedies.
The cycle of atonement is yet to begin in Sri Lanka. The Tamils there were not behind the LTTE. But they felt that its presence may assure them justice - an equal treatment - one day. The Sinhala prejudice is as deep as the Tamil's alienation. Colombo can start a new chapter by decentralising power. The Sri Lankan government has the example of Sikhs before them. But it requires patience, understanding and commitment to the principle that Tamils are co-partners in the nation's wellbeing.
A
arshad_lahore
Guest
Poetry of leisure
By M. Abul Fazl | Published: June 16, 2009
They say Mahasti, the central Asian poetess of fiery passions, was, at one time, Omar Khayyam's mistress. Well, it is pleasant to know that the great scientist and mathematician, the creator of the Iranian calendar, could occasionally descend to the pleasures of the ordinary mortals. Otherwise, we are told, his hours of leisure were given to: "Ta zohra-o-meh dar asmanand pideed / Behtar zay mai-e-nab kasi heech na deed(Since the Venus and the moon have been shining in the sky, No one has seen anything better than wine.)
It is now generally accepted that all the quatrains attributed to Khayyam are not really his. The problem is to decide which ones are. A further complication is created by the absence of any reference to his poetry in the writings of his eminent contemporaries, who praise highly his scholarly and scientific accomplishments. But, only a few years after his death, his poetry started being quoted even by the scholars of the stature of Razi and Tusi. Professor Tabatabai sought, in the early twentieth century, to solve the problem by suggesting that there had actually been two Khayyams, one the eminent scientist, the other his contemporary, an ordinary poet. Gradually, the people began attributing the poet's works to the scientist and the former's name was lost.
Mohammad Ali Faroghi, in his introduction to Khayyam's collected works (1941), says that Khayyam gave importance to only his scientific works. Even so, his poetic works should not be taken lightly. They are of a different genre to those of other important poets and could properly be seen as Sufistic.It makes sense. But then, almost any work can be interpreted according to pantheistic philosophy. Why not Byron: "Mountains and seas divide us, but I claim/No tears but tenderness to answer mine:"
Sufism recognizes the limits of knowledge at a point of time but rejects the concept of unknowability over a period of time. Fair enough. However its procedural defect lies in its attempt to fill the resultant void by projecting the logic of the known into the unknown or simply filling the unknown with the imaginative replica of the known. This may create a conceptual frame-work for the poetic allusions but is not for all poetry. Thus assigning Khayyam to a kind of Sufism is beside the point.
He has written about wine. He has also written: "Yaran chu ba ittifaq deedar kuneed! Bayad kay zay dost yad bisyar kuneed/ Choon bada-e-khushgavar nosheed baham! Nobat chu ba ma rasad nugunsaar kuneed." (Friends, when you happily gather together, Think also of your friend, when you enjoy good wine, and miss me, lower your heads in remembrance).
By M. Abul Fazl | Published: June 16, 2009
They say Mahasti, the central Asian poetess of fiery passions, was, at one time, Omar Khayyam's mistress. Well, it is pleasant to know that the great scientist and mathematician, the creator of the Iranian calendar, could occasionally descend to the pleasures of the ordinary mortals. Otherwise, we are told, his hours of leisure were given to: "Ta zohra-o-meh dar asmanand pideed / Behtar zay mai-e-nab kasi heech na deed(Since the Venus and the moon have been shining in the sky, No one has seen anything better than wine.)
It is now generally accepted that all the quatrains attributed to Khayyam are not really his. The problem is to decide which ones are. A further complication is created by the absence of any reference to his poetry in the writings of his eminent contemporaries, who praise highly his scholarly and scientific accomplishments. But, only a few years after his death, his poetry started being quoted even by the scholars of the stature of Razi and Tusi. Professor Tabatabai sought, in the early twentieth century, to solve the problem by suggesting that there had actually been two Khayyams, one the eminent scientist, the other his contemporary, an ordinary poet. Gradually, the people began attributing the poet's works to the scientist and the former's name was lost.
Mohammad Ali Faroghi, in his introduction to Khayyam's collected works (1941), says that Khayyam gave importance to only his scientific works. Even so, his poetic works should not be taken lightly. They are of a different genre to those of other important poets and could properly be seen as Sufistic.It makes sense. But then, almost any work can be interpreted according to pantheistic philosophy. Why not Byron: "Mountains and seas divide us, but I claim/No tears but tenderness to answer mine:"
Sufism recognizes the limits of knowledge at a point of time but rejects the concept of unknowability over a period of time. Fair enough. However its procedural defect lies in its attempt to fill the resultant void by projecting the logic of the known into the unknown or simply filling the unknown with the imaginative replica of the known. This may create a conceptual frame-work for the poetic allusions but is not for all poetry. Thus assigning Khayyam to a kind of Sufism is beside the point.
He has written about wine. He has also written: "Yaran chu ba ittifaq deedar kuneed! Bayad kay zay dost yad bisyar kuneed/ Choon bada-e-khushgavar nosheed baham! Nobat chu ba ma rasad nugunsaar kuneed." (Friends, when you happily gather together, Think also of your friend, when you enjoy good wine, and miss me, lower your heads in remembrance).
