Some parts of Pakistan history have been thoroughly suppressed. One such episode is the attempted coup of 1951. Popularly known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy case.
After 1947 defeat in Kashmir, a few officers driven by post independence idealism planned a coup. Kashmir was lost thanks to incompetence of our leaders along with our Army refusal to follow orders of the country founders.
Our "independence" was being exposed for the sham it was in reality. Some one had to act. A few did and failed.
You may not agree with their secular outlook their communist underpinning but it was clear the coup makers were driven mostly by patriotism.
A missed opportunity no doubt. I am not one for supporting Military take overs. But the 1951 coup was the only instance where such a path could have changed the country destiny.
Below is a detailed account of the coup by Yasmeen Ali in Naveed Tajammal blog.
In all fairness, as is seen no distinction is given between a conspiracy case and punishments awarded, to a few officers, for their Nationalist aspirations, and the conspiracy engineered by the Commander In Chiefs of our Army, as one should realize, that, The ‘Coup d’etat’ is merely the final execution phase of any conspiracy and its success does not convert it with, shall we say greater legitimacy, than a conspiracy that fails to mature into a Coup d’etat? If really seen now in hindsight, the conspiracies as were executed by the Commander in Chief’ [C-in-C] in 1958,1977 and 1999, are the worst examples because in all three instances each one of them had been dismissed by the same competent authority which had appointed them on the very same post, and all three, Generals in order to save their own skins, committed the very institution of our Army into a unconstitutional Act, whereas a conspiracy by a few officers in the lower rank’s, remains an Act of individuals. It should be kept in mind, that, ‘Conspiracy to overthrow by force the Government established by Law, as was seen in three instances, quoted above is a Capital Offence under the Pakistan Penal Code, However Conspiracy to subvert the constitution is High Treason, the penalty for which is vague, and not specific. The 1951 Conspiracy had its origins in the ineptness of the GOP[Govt. of Pakistan] then, in dealing with Kashmir War of 1947-48,when the War had been won, and the GOP choose to go for a cease-fire, secondly the presence of British Officers in the Armed Forces-who were running their own agenda. The Fact remains Pakistan had a golden chance of taking over Kashmir between 22 October-28 October-1947,However later, after the Indian Army Landed at the Srinagar Air port-in the Air Bridge created by the efforts of Lord Mountbatten, The war had been lost, the GOP, under Liaqat Ali khan’s influence never really wanted this war in the first place, As Liaqat khan in his myopic mind wanted,
Hyderabad in lieu of Kashmir, whereas Indians had offered Kashmir, if Pakistan withdrew its stance/claim, over Hyderabad then.
Brigadier Habibullah [later promoted to the rank of Lieut-General] who had come as a prosecution witness against, Major- General Akbar Khan the Arch-Conspirator of 1951 Conspiracy, in his cross-examination by the defence had conceded, that, The British Officers in Pakistan army were pre-occupied with the protection of British interests in Iran and containment of Soviet Russia, rather than addressing the looming Indian threat on our Eastern Front-that, in October/November 1948, Major-General Loftus Tottenham had prepared an appreciation under the orders from GHQ, on deployment of a brigade of Pakistan Army in Iran to protect the British Anglo-Iranian oil fields.
Lieut-Colonel Gul Mowaz [later promoted to the rank of Brigadier],likewise under cross-examination also admitted, that Brigadier Latiff Khan [accused] Commander of 52 Brigade at Quetta, had told him that the primary task assigned to his brigade was to prepare defences against Russian’s along the Khojak Pass, and his secondary task were the Indians across the eastern border-[Hyderabad Sindh sector] -on further questioning , he agreed that, on the visit of C N C to Quetta in middle of Feb.1950,where he too was present, Brig. Latiff Khan, had pointedly asked Gen. Gracey as to why priority was being given to Khojak Pass. also during his cross-examination Lt. Col. Mowaz further agreed that British C N C of Pakistan Army had fixed Exercise-Stalin for November 1950-’for studying problems against Russia”. The above brief narration, proves that the grudge of our Nationalist officers were well founded-The fact remains that, Gen. Akbar Khan keeping in view his convictions had started the work on his plan to overthrow this inept Government and its lackeys from the middle of 1949.
As one studies the proceedings of The Hyderabad Tribunal Given in, Hasan Zaheer’s book, ‘Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case 1951′ published by Oxford press in 1998, his own remark in the preface of the book is self defeating to the argument he gives by, saying it was sheer Bonapartism [and substantiates his argument by quoting the same term, also awarded to these officers by Ayub Khan in his book, 'friends not masters' p-37/38,and we all know that the real author who wrote that book, for his mentor and master] and Hasan Zaheer, attributes this term [Bonaparte] on those who undertook the task of conspiring in this conspiracy-
However, as one reads the proceedings one realizes that it was a fairly large scale affair-and that the distinction between the accused and the prosecution witnesses was rather arbitrary and based on extraneous considerations-The line between joining the conspiracy or merely having knowledge of it was rather thin-and one finds logic in the stance of the Defence during trial proceedings, that the prosecution witnesses corroborating the approvers [crown witnesses] were indeed accomplices in the same conspiracy and who had taken a U-Turn to save their own hides-And could in No way be termed as ‘Independent witnesses’ and each one of them could be charged under section 27 of the Indian Army Act of 1911-”For knowing or having reason to believe in the existence of an intention to mutiny, or a conspiracy against the State and Not giving without delay information thereof to his Commanding Officer or other superior Officer’.
The Hyderabad Tribunal as is seen in retrospective, paid no heed to the plea’s of Defence on behalf of the accused officers, but continued with its Kangaroo court proceedings.
A brief background of the each accused officer in this conspiracy is but required;
1] PA-25 Maj-Gen. Akbar Khan [1912-1994] was from the old Peshawar district from village Utmanzi in Tehsil Charsada.he had been commissioned from Sandhurst UK, in 1933 in the Hampshire Regiment and, later joined 6/13th FFR[First FF] located in Kohat then, and took active part in the Waziristan operations in 1936/37 later did his Staff College from Quetta and in the WW ll ,distinguished himself on the Burma Front in 1944/45 and was awarded a DSO-He was the main driving force behind the Kashmir liberation Forces due to which we have the present AJK [Azad Jammu and Kashmir] in 1947/48 in the rank of a Brigadier. in Jan,1950 he did his Joint services Staff College from UK and was appointed as the CGS [Chief of General Staff] in December 1950.
2] Air Commodore. Mohammad Khan Janjua, was from village Malot- Chakwal District, he was the senior-most Muslim Officer in Pakistan Air Force till March 1951 [when arrested].
3] PA-14 Maj-Gen Nazier Ahmed, belonged to Durnal in Chakwal District and, had been commissioned from Sandhurst UK, he had been awarded a MBE in the Second world war,and was the first Indian Muslim to command 4/13 FFR[First FF],in 1947 he was commanding 114 Brigade at Lahore and as GOC 9 Div. commanded the Uri sector forces against the Indian Army in Kashmir war 1947/48.
4]Brigadier Sadiq Khan was from Kotli Sattian Rawalpindi District-he had been commissioned from Dehra Dun in 1936,he had commanded a battalion in the Kashmir war on the Poonch Sector, and was commanding 102 Brigade at Bannu in February 1951. He was from later 9 FF.
5] Brigadier. Muhammad Abdul Latiff Khan was from Bhopal and commissioned from Dehra Dun in 1936-and had joined Baloch Regiment, was also on the Burma Front during the Second world War, was awarded a Military-Cross [MC],later joined 5/12 FF[ 2 Guides FF ] and had fought the Kashmir War under the Brigade of Gen. Akbar, in Feb.1950 was posted as GSO-1 of 9 Division, and was promoted Brigadier in December 1950,and took over 52 Brigade at Quetta and was also Station Commander Quetta, when arrested in march 1951.
6] Lieut-Colonel. Ziauddin was commissioned in 1942,belonged to Mirpur AJK, and had been awarded MBE during the second world War, He remained the senior staff officer Sector 2 in the Kashmir War, in early 1951 was the Officiating Brigadier ,heading the AK-Forces Co-ordination Committee.
7] Lieut-Colonel. Niaz Muhammad Arbab, Was Commissioned from Dehra Dun, & was commanding 2/1 Punjab at Thal,and was part of the 102 Brigade under Brig. Sadiq Khan.
8] Major. Hassan Khan, belonged to Gilgit, and had joined Kashmir Forces in 1937-In August 1938 he joined Military Academy Dehra Dun,and fought on the Burma Front and was awarded Military Cross [MC] on revision was posted at Gilgit, he played the main role in the revolt of Gilgit Scouts, It were his efforts due to which by November 1947 the entire areas of Gilgit, Hunza, Bunji, Astor had declared themselves free from the Dogra state Rule and had joined Pakistan, after routing the Dogra Garrison and putting the Dogra Governor under arrest. in 1948 he was absorbed in the Pakistan Army, and sent back to Gilgit, in march 1950 was posted in the AK-Co-Ordination Committee, in Early 1951 he was Commanding the Poonch sector.
9] Major-Ishaq Muhammad belonged to Jullandhar and had won a Military Cross, in the Second world war-and was the Brigade-Major under Gen. Akbar and was covering the Baramula sector [march 1948-march 1949] from march-1949 onward was at the Kotli-Sector.
10] Captain. Khizer Hayat belonged to Jhelum, he was GSO-lll under Gen. Akbar, and later joined 2/1 Punjab, under Colonel Arbab which was part of the brigade under Brigadier Sadiq Khan.
11] Captain. Zaffarulah Poshni- Belonged to Amritsar, he was from the Signals and was posted in his unit in Rawalpindi-in March 1951.
12]Mrs. Nasim Akbar Khan was the wife of Gen. Akbar Khan and the daughter of Begum Shahnawaz a member of Muslim League. She had a leading role along with her husband in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case.
13] Faiz Ahmad Faiz, he belonged to Sialkot, and had joined ‘Moral Welfare Directorate ‘ of the British Indian Army in 1942, with a rank of a Captain and later was promoted Major and posted in Burma in the same Brigade as was Gen. Akbar in, and later became a lieut-colonel, in ISPR [inter services public relations] and resigned in 1947, to join Pakistan Times, and was the Editor Pakistan Times when arrested in March 1951.
14] Sajjad Zaheer belonged to Lucknow, he was member of Central Committee of the Communist Party of India, and was heading the Communist Party of Pakistan, and was arrested later in April 1951.
15] Muhammad Hussain Atta, belonged to Hazara [Abbottabad] he was the Secretary of the Provincial Communist Party of NWFP ,He evaded arrest and absconded till he was apprehended at the last in July 1951,from the Chittagong port, trying to escape from police.
[To be continued.....]
Naveed Tajammal Part 1 can be read at: http://pakpotpourri2.wordpress.com/2014/02/01/the-coup-of-1951-part-1/ Major General Akbar Khan
During the period Brig.Akbar Khan commanded the Kashmir Operations in his sector, he remained unhappy with the way things developing, he was facing countless intrigues against himself in the GHQ, even though assigned on his task by the Prime Minister, he was deprived of three months command pay, on the grounds that he was absent from service, and too add insult to the injury he was also passed over in his promotion to the next rank by the GHQ during his absence in the Kashmir war.
In the middle of Feb 1948,he requested the Prime Minister to be relieved of his duties in Kashmir and be allowed to revert to his Army assignment as earlier to his delegation on the Kashmir Front Brig.Akbar Khan had been posted as the Director. Weapons in the Equipment Directorate at GHQ. Where he had come across from the records that 4000 [.303] rifles were lying in the stores for the Police, which he had sent to the Kashmir Freedom fighters based on his subsequent plan called, ‘Armed Revolt inside Kashmir”-The objective being to strengthen the Kashmiri freedom fighter within the than Dogra state against the Maharaja’s army of 9000; out of which 2000 were Muslims and were sympathetic to the cause of Liberation-The major portion[2800] of these rifles were allocated for this role, the other 1000 rifles were for the guerrilla bands who were to raise obstructions on the Jammu-Kathua road,and 200 rifles were for the small guerrilla bands to cover the Srinagar Airport. And that all co-ordinations be done through the former INA officers ,JCO & NCO’s,using the numerous de-mobbed ex-servicemen from First world war and second world wars,which numbered around 70,000 men, mainly, all from Poonch, Bagh and Mirpur; the frontier districts of the Dogra State.
Brig.Akbar Khan along with other minor details within this plan above mentioned, handed it over to Mian Iftikhar ud din,who was in Murree coordinating meetings with freedom fighter leaders of Kashmir- in the second week of September 1947.On 12 September 1947 Brig.Akbar Khan was asked to attend a meeting with the Prime minister on his invitation. However earlier in the morning he was invited for another meeting under the chair of Sardar.Shaukat Hyat who had been designated, as a minister for Kashmir war, on at the provincial level. Here Brig.Akbar Khan was surprised to see a new plan, as thought out by Shaukat Hyat himself, whom he found totally unaware of the ground realities, This plan focused on just two sectors-one across Jammu-Punjab border to be commanded by M.Z.Kiani a former INA officer who had joined the British Indian Army in the ranks 1927,and later, had topped the entry test of for Military Academy Dehra Dun and had joined it in 1933 and been commissioned from Dehra Dun in 1935,He was awarded the Sword of Honour and a Gold Medal for having stood First in all the Papers and had joined 1st/14th Punjab Regiment [later 5 Punjab]taken prisoner on the Burma front and had joined INA [Indian national army of Subhas Chandra Bose],was appointed the First INA Division GOC and fought General Gracey at Imphal and designated as the Head of Provisional Azad Hind in the absence of Bose. Later after 1945, seeing the evil designs of congress he left INA and reverted back to his village at Atial near Bara Kau, Rawalpindi, ,another sector being north of Rawalpindi was to be under the command of Maj. Khurshid Anwar a near relation of Ghulam Mohammad[central finance minister] and was currently the Commander of the Muslim League National Guards, he had been commissioned during the 2nd world war emergency recruitment in the ‘Supply corps’.
However Shaukat Hyat blames Maj.Khurshid Anwar for spoiling the surprise in the Kashmir war as he went soon after the meeting to raise Lashkars from NWFP and had contacted Brig.Iftikhar Khan [later Major-General] who was then posted in Nowshera and had asked him to provide him with Machine Guns for the fourth planned covert action in Kashmir-who the same hour had reported these plans to the British C in C Pakistan Army-who without loss of time reported the same to Field Marshal Auchinleck the Joint Commander of both forces-India & Pakistan who reported the matter to Lord Mountbatten the Governor General of India. So a breach of security was done by Brig.Iftikhar Khan.
Later at 6 PM on 12 Oct, the Prime minister held his meeting. However this again was based on the morning plan of action as envisaged by Shaukat Hyat. This meeting was attended by Ghulam Mohammad,Mian Iftikhar ud din,Akbar Khan; the sector commanders and Shaukat hHyat the overall Commander. However Akbar Khan was not pleased with the proceedings of this meeting, according to him, ”This conference was even more informal than the one in the morning no serious discussion took place on the operational details of the proposed plan” Not once were the views of Akbar Khan asked ,as he was the sole professional soldier present in the meeting.[Raiders in Kashmir-1992.Akbar Khan-p-21/3].
In the post 14 Aug 1947 period up to the third week of October 1947,the GOP made no efforts in this war except for providing volunteer’s from the de-mobbed British Army or material in a limited way,
However the progress made by the purely internal revolt led by de-mobbed British Indian army men of WW 1 and WW 2 under INA officers and JCO’s made a slow but steady progress and was resulting in more and more areas going out of Dogra’ state control.
It was the sheer ineptness on the part of GOP under Liaqat Ali Khan which after accepting the standstill agreement, continued to focus on Hyderabad, which if seen now in hindsight cost us Kashmir. On 29 September Sh.Abdullah was released from the prison along with other National Conference leaders. However, Ghulam Abbas and the Muslim Conference leaders were not released. That should have been a signal enough for Liaqat Ali Khan but he in his befuddled mind continued to live in his fool’s paradise of getting Hyderabad. Ghulam Abbas was released only in March 1948[Saraf-Kashmiris fight for freedom,'p-1290 Vol 2,] by then the war had been lost. The pro-India Sh.Abdullah party further helped India and Nehru in their Quest to take over Kashmir-henceforth the role of Sh.Abdullah was that of a tutored parrot perched on Nehru’s shoulder.
Meanwhile Gen.Akbar returned back to GHQ as he had not been assigned any task in this approved plan [Shaukat Hyat version plan] however once back on duty he took in confidence the DMI- Brig.Sher Khan so kept him informed of the latest developments through the intelligence reports. However quite a few army officers in their own ways possible without the British senior officers coming aware of were helping the freedom fighters by secretly supplying ammunition condemned by the supporting Ordnance officers, handling the Army Ammunition depots[p-94 Rawalpindi conspiracy case].From the Air force side-Air Commodore. Mohammad Khan Janjua had provided, winter clothing ,ammunition, and some weapons from the Air force stores to the freedom fighters.
The population of Kashmir as per the 1941- census was 4 million out of which, only 8 lakh were non-Muslims of different faiths as Ladakh was still Buddhist. Rest of 3.2 million were Muslims. even Jammu, the smallest of the three, Kashmir state provinces had 60 % Muslim population in 1941.however the Hindu retained 80 % of the state jobs as per the arms act of this state , a, Hindu need not apply for a weapon license.
All lands had been parcelled out to Hindu land owners. the condition of the Muslim peasantry was worse than the Russian, “serf”. Of the Czar days in the last 100 years or so till 1947 the Muslim had, lived the life in squalor, penury and terror. Forced labour, extortionist methods of tax collection were a norm. Police state it was, the judiciary was too, of Hindu. a Muslim could appeal to none.
During, 1946 and early, 1947, Top ranking. Congress leaders, including khan Ghaffar khan, Dr. Sinha, Chaman Lal, Asif Ali, Acharya Kirpalani, and Ghandi had vested Kashmir on their own agenda’s. None paid any attention to the condition of the Muslim. The RSSS had been allowed by the maharaja, to recruit volunteers, in Kashmir since 1942. Besides Srinagar, it had branches in Mirpur, Kotli, Sambha, Udhampur and Kathua.
The chief of the RSSS, in Kashmir was ”Swami Sant Dev” the spiritual Guru of the maharaja had been termed by people as the ”Rasputin” of the Kashmir court.
As Hazara, had already been ear marked part of new Pakistan, by the RSSS, by early, 1946,already a considerable, number of Hindu’s and Sikhs, had sold out and shifted to Kashmir. Out of the first batch, 2000 youth of this lot had become members of the RSSS. The Sikh evacuee’s, of Hazara, had organized themselves, as ”Singh Naujawan Sabhas.” and were located at Muzzafarabad and Srinagar.
From March 1947 onwards, a further influx of RSSS, workers, members of Punjab. United provinces and other parts of British India had been called in Kashmir. In July 1947, Basant Rao Agrekor, one of the provincial organizers, had visited Kashmir to inspect and advice his force. The Sikhs too, had sent in gangs from, the Sikh states of, Nabha, Faridkot and Patiala.
The pathetic condition of the Muslim of Poonch, can be visualized, by reading the report, of Richard Symonds, who wrote for the”statesman” new Dehli. On 4th February 1948, he wrote”60,000 Poonchi’s, had served in the British Indian army in 2nd world war. When the war ended they returned home (bulk being Muslims) to find that the old Raja of Poonch, had been disposed of his state, by a law suit. and the direct rule of the Maharaja had been imposed on the Poonchi’s.
Now there was a tax, on every hearth, every window for the sunlight, each buffalo, goat or a cow, cat or a dog, not even the wife was exempted. He, who had more than one, was most grieved to top it the zaildari tax was levied” To pay for the charges incurred in the collection of tax’s”. The first revolt started on 27 august 1947 at Nila Butt. When Abdul Quyyum, a young zamindar and his friends started it. soon after, the bulk of the ex-service men too, joined in, the Dogra state troops now re-sought to burning down complete villages, and rendering the people homeless, earlier as per the plan, in June the state had ensured that no weapon, not even long knives, where left with the Muslims, and the house searches had ensured this. Two small boys, who seen their mothers being molested by the RSSS and troops, had tried to hit them with their fists, in the village, ”Ali Sojar”, on 15th august 1947,both, Mohammad Saidu and Lal Hussain, where shot dead, in front of the raped women, and hung on the nearest tree.
Just to name a few villages where this routine continued, and men and boys hung, who reacted, Nar, Bagh, Khas BAGH, Sar Saddhan, Beerut, Jheri, Sangola and Rawli. All these reports, could, even to a bystander conjure a picture of a gunpowder trail, blazed across the country side, village after village went up in flames, the Dogra and RSSS, with their ”BREN GUNS”, killed and raped whom they pleased, it was a sport time for this lot.
In Jammu province of the state, a similar tragic chain of events unfolded, all attempts were to push out as many excess Muslims out, to upcoming Pakistan territory, as they possibly could. They had been directed to proceed to Sialkot unofficially, and a slow line of miserable, old and young, wounded and injured people came. The young girls never made it. they had been abducted much earlier in the other regions the state had created ”camps; which became the death traps.12000.muslim refugees, had assembled at the Jammu, aerodrome (airport).in the first week of November, they were machine gunned, by Dogra and RSSS men, 4000 died. Later at night 2000 died on account of the grenades, thrown in the crowds of compact men, women and children. Before this incident, on 17 October, the Muslim population of ”Ranbir Singhpura Tehsil”, had sought shelter at the state ”electric power house, at ”Miran Sahib.” numbering 25,000.and soon after ”Mehr Chand Majhan” the Dewan of the Maharajah, arrived in a convoy, accompanied by ‘Bharat Bhusan”, the local ‘tehsildar’, and an active member of RSSS.
The women and children were asked to move towards the trucks, as they may be transported out. After their departure’ hell broke loose” as all were butchered. the convoy stopped ahead, presentable girls and women were segregated, rest too met the fate of a bullet and were thrown in the ravines. On 19 October, a convoy of 30,000 travelling on foot, where halted at ”Jammu-Tawi”, station, all were blocked in, and machine gunned by the RSSS and the state troops at night times, (as people now had started this time) all places where a movement of Muslim was reported, jeeps, mounted with machine guns, where launched, who surrounded them girls where first removed for the nights fun, rest butchered. A slight resistance or reluctance to obey the orders was met by a bullet or a bayonet.
Reverting back to the events unfolding-At the end of September 1947,a meeting was called by Hameed ullah khan-at Murree [fair view hotel] which was attended by Sardar. Ibrahim, Mrs.Nasim Akbar [accused in 1951 coup] & sardar Shariff. Major.Khurshid anwar briefed them about the tribal Lashkar plans.
What most remain unaware off is that the bulk of area which is now AJK had already been acquired through the efforts of the freedom fighters-Liaqat Ali Khan or Shaukat Hyat were either by design or sheer incompetence unaware of these facts, as all sectors and their HQ were fully functional by 13 September 1947,mainly through the efforts of Gen. M.Z.Kiani, Col.R.M.Arshad, Col.M.A.Khan ,Col. Taj Mohammad Khanzada, Col. Tajammal Hussain and Capt. Saif-ullah.
The Wanton part played by Liaqat Ali Khan’s lackeys was seen, when the promised 4000, .303 bolt action rifles were handed over by GHQ for the Freedom fighters through the civil administration. Mr. Qurban Ali Khan the Inspector General of Police who was responsible for this transfer, with-held the British made rifles and replaced them with Dara-made rifles.[p-885,Kashmiris Fight for Freedom,VOL.2, by.Chief Justice [r] AJK High Court. M.Y. Saraf.
[To be continued....]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]COUP OF 1951:PART III[/FONT][/h]Naveed Tajammal Part I can be read at: http://pakpotpourri2.wordpress.com/2014/02/01/the-coup-of-1951-part-1/ Part II can be read at: http://pakpotpourri2.wordpress.com/2014/02/09/coup-of-1951part-ii/ Major General Akbar Khan
Colonel Mirza Hassan Khan was the accused number nine in the Hyderabad Tribunal which was trying the accused in the coup of 1951.He had been assigned to bring troops for the Coup- d’tat from Kahuta where 3 A.K. Battalion was stationed under the command of Capt. Nur Hussain. Col. Hassan had been arrested in the second week of May 1951 and taken to Attock Fort and a few days later, Gen. Ayub Khan who was on a visit to Attock Fort along with a Turkish Army delegation, ,having sent a message to Col. Hassan khan through the Mian Anwar Ali DIG[CID] who was interrogating Col. Hassan at the Attock Fort to become a approver and cooperate with the government agencies. This offer was spurned by Col. Hassan Khan. The role of Col. Hassan was very vital in the execution phase of the operation-as the whole of 3 A.K. Battalion was to arrive from Kahuta to Rawalpindi before the appointed hour-the day the Prime Minister was to be in Rawalpindi in connection with the election campaign. That evening Gen. Akbar who was the CGS was to go to the GHQ and issue orders to pre-arranged parties of officers to arrest the Prime Minister, the C in C Gen. Ayub Khan, Major Gen. Hayaudddin GOC 7 DIV, Brig. Altaf Qadir; the local Brigade Commander in Rawalpindi-Lieut. Gen. Meckay, the Chief of Staff-as well as a wide range of civil & military officers whose lists had been prepared and locations marked-in addition to 3 AK Battalion, ,two companies under Lieut.Col. Arbab CO of 1st/2nd Punjab located at Thal was also to be called in. At the same period as 3 AK Battalion, a contingency had been catered for additional troops which were to be procured from 4/13 FFR-which was stationed also in Rawalpindi and the previous commander of this unit Lieu.-Col. Sidique Raja [who became approver number one] would make the necessary arrangements [rest of the operational plan I will discuss when the roles of other accused is highlighted.
Mirza Hassan Khan, as a Captain in the Dogra State Force had fought on the Burma Front-in the Second World War while serving in the 4th Jammu & Kashmir Rifles, which became part of the 9 Brigade under Brig. DFW Warren and the GOC-Maj. Gen. Evans, of the 5th Indian Division-toward the end of September 1944.This unit of J & K rifles had been sent to Burma to replace-3rd/14th Punjab which had suffered heavy losses and was in a bad shape and was being sent back to India for rest & reorganization. The 5th Indian Div. was on the axis-Imphal-Tiddim-Kalemyo-Kalewa Road and the progress was very slow due to Japanese resistance, The biggest hurdle en-route was the 'Kennedy peak' 2704 meters high and held tenaciously by the Japanese and INA troops. The 2nd/1st Punjab had tried its best but was held up. Later 3rd/2nd Punjab had tried to work its way up the ridge and had failed. On 26th Oct 1944,the CO of 4 J&K rifles assigned Lieutenant Banaras Dev to lead a Guerilla party and get vital information about the location of Japanese lethal 75mm guns sited all around the Ridge. His party came back with exact locations and this paved the capture of this salient feature.
Much later after many a battles on this axis-on the night of 22/23 March 1945,the Japanese attacked the entrenched forward positions of 4 J&K rifles at 'Meiktila' held by the 'C' Company-under Capt. Hassan Khan, as the Japanese advanced towards the trench positions of 7th and 8th platoons of the 'C' company-which held two important features. The Japanese were fearless they came in waves & in frontal attacks -the fighting continued the whole night-the Japanese were unable to dislodge the 'C' Company position, at Dawn the enemy withdrew leaving behind 257 dead. Captain Hassan Khan was awarded a Military-Cross for his gallant leadership due to which the men of his company struck on so stubbornly to their positions against determined Japanese Attacks.
Reverting to the subject of the liberation of Gilgit regions-and the role of Col. Hassan Khan; the British Govt. had taken on lease the whole of Gilgit Agency from Maharaja of Kashmir on 1st Aug 1935 for a period of 60 years which was to expire on 1st Aug 1995.As per the following major terms; that the entire Gilgit Agency was to be administrated on Civil & Military matters by the NWFP Govt, under the orders of the Viceroy of India, all Dogra forces were to be withdrawn-joint posts were however allowed to be maintained with the Dogra state forces at-Bunji-Leh-Kargil-and Skardu. The company posts at Leh were strengthened, in view of the influx of Turk refugees from Chinese Turkistan in 1937 and later of Kazak's from the Russian-Soviet State in 1942.
On 1st Aug 1947-The British played a dirty trick and handed back the Gilgit Agency to The Dogra Forces-The major pertinent point which Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan never raised at any forum was when the whole region had been actively controlled by the Govt of NWFP and a Referendum had finished on 17 July 1947-whereby the whole province and its agencies had voted in favor of joining Pakistan-Why was this territory and its lease still subsisting handed over so surreptitiously to Hari Singh on 1st Aug 1947 ??? Liaqat Ali Khan turned a blind eye to the whole affair in his usual callous manner-
After the Gilgit Agency previously part of NWFP and its agencies was handed back to Dogra state-Brig. Ghansara Singh was made the Governor of this region-he came along with 6 J&K rifles-and was further reinforced by two extra Sikh companies taken on loan from the Maharaja of Patiala state forces-The other paramilitary force in the region was of Gilgit-Scouts, under Maj. Brown & Capt. Mathieson and two local officers Lt. Sayeed and Lt. Ghulam Haider. The other important officers were Subedar Major Babar khan, Subedar Nadir Ali of C company, Muhammad Ali of D Company, OC of Adm. Company was Capt. Nek Alam from Mirpur. Other subedars were Bostan Khan, Ahmad Shah and Shafi of the Adm. Company.
Capt. Mathieson was located at Chilas-Subedar- Major Babar khan was the real uncle of the Mir of Nagar and Jemadar Shah Khan was the real uncle of the Mir of Hunza.
The arrival of 6 J&K rifles at Bunji had alarmed the men of the Gilgit Scouts-and their Subedar Major Babar Khan had represented the matter to Maj. Gen H.L. Scott Chief of Staff Dogra Forces who snubbed him by stating that the Gilgit Scouts could never be at Par with the Dogra-State forces, officers or even Jco's. The ring leaders of the takeover of the Dogra Governor's house and arresting and implementing the whole operation were-Babar Khan, Subedar Safiullah Beg[education JCO] Jemadar Fida Ali, Quarter master JCO and the platoon commanders, Shah Sultan, Shah Khan & Sultan Firoze Sufi.
Brig. Ghansara Singh had got a wind of the revolt and had ordered the CO of 6 J&K rifles, Lieut. Col. Majid Khan at Bunji to send in a company to Gilgit. Who accordingly detailed Maj. Hassan Khan and Capt. Ehsan Ali to move to Gilgit. However Subedar Major Babar khan becoming aware of this, moved in quicker and surrounded the Governors house on the night 31st Oct/1st Nov.1947.Babar Khan leading 100 picked men, encircled the compound of the residency and asked Ghansara Singh to surrender, who tried to delay it-as he was expecting a company of 6 J&K rifles from Bunji. Meanwhile Maj. Hassan Khan and Capt. Ehsan on the horseback reached ahead of the marching columns of the company-and on reaching both officers openly declared their loyalty to the cause. Brig. Ghansara Singh seeing this surrendered. On 1st Nov 1947 Pakistan Flag was hoisted at the Gilgit Residency.
Lieut. Col Majid Khan on hearing of this news rushed to Gilgit. Enroute he was ambushed along with his leading team members and put under arrest with Brig, Ghansara Singh. On hearing the news of the arrest of their CO Capt. Sikander Singh & Capt. Balder Singh Bajwa decided to move out of Bunji. However Gilgit scouts ambushed them enroute and took them prisoners-they and rest of other men of 6 J&K Rifles were later transferred along with Brig. Ghansara Singh to the Attock Fort and later repatriated to India in March 1950.
By Jan 1948-the total manpower of Gilgit Scouts was 500 rifles plus a HQ company. The Muslim elements of the defunct 6J&K rifles were 400 men under command of Major. Hassan khan, Maj.Ehsan Khan & Capt. Muhammad Khan Jaral. Lt. Nadir Khan and Lt. Bostan khan. At the same period a new Azad Force was also raised with each company of 120 men divided in three platoons.300 men each from Hunza-Nagar-and 100 each from Punial-Kuhi-Ghizer-Gilgit were also inducted-they were given training on a war footing. This force was divided in three wings-The main was the Tiger Force wing under Maj. Hassan Khan. The second was ‘Eskimo force under Lt. Shah Khan and the Ibex force came under Lt. Babar khan. The overall commander of the last two forces was Maj- Ehsan Ali Khan.
Capt. Muhammad Khan Jaral of later Zojila pass fame was made the overall commander of the defunct element of 6 J&K rifles. The Mir of Rondu on his own raised a force of 300 men, armed with local muzzle loaders and took up the position overlooking the Byicha pass gorge to check any Dogra Advances towards Skardu. The Ibex Column was sent to Haramosh-25 miles east of Gilgit later it moved to Tongas covering a snow decked region of 100 miles in just three days a admirable feat of human endurance done under the leadership Lt. Babar Khan.
The Tiger Force under Maj. Hassan Khan remained involved in the liberation war from March 1948 to Jan 1949.His four companies had the following composition-The punial company had 50 rifles of the Dogra era Gilgit scouts along with 60 rifles of new recruits, Subedar Shah Zaman of Punial was the company commander beside .303 rifles they had one two-inch mortar, one bren gun, two LMG’s. The same weapons were also held with other companies. The Kuhi-Ghizier company was under Subedar Akbar Hussain of Gupis, Yasin company was under subedar.Adina shah and the Gilgit company under Subedar Firdos Ali son of the Mir Shah Rais khan of Gilgit.
This force fought its way till ‘Tragbal’ the last frontier post enroute to Srinagar. The Tragbal post is on a plateau 11,800 feet above sea level-and it was a check on the conventional land route between Gilgit and Srinagar via Bandipur. The most important aspect of this feature was that it threatened the Indian Advance positions at Uri & Teetwal from the rear. Maj. Hassan khan with his limited resources advanced till Baba Shukar Din’s hillock a few miles short of Bandipur-heavily fortified by the Indians and covered by Artillery and daily Air Raids which came on the positions of Maj. Hassan Khan who was daily sending raid parties across the Indian side of defenses and had reached the Dak Bungalow in the Sundarwan forests. However, Indian Air Staffing kept him pinned down. The objective of Maj. Hassan Khan was to set up a base at Tragbal and launch a pincer movement towards Srinagar-However he had a limited force-in view of this he requested the GHQ to send in reinforcements of at the least 2000 men including a few companies of the Frontier rifles. However it much in the middle of June 1948 that this force/Lashkar of tribesmen and the companies of Frontier Rifles, reached his position-However here a new twist took place-the overall command was taken away from Maj. Hassan Khan, as he was still of the state forces-and he was called back to GHQ-the command came under a Maj. Ismail, Maj Queirshi and Lt. Anwar Khan of Frontier rifles. The result was a major fiasco. These officers, showed extreme cowardice and vacated the Tragbal and Gurez on the first attack on their positions by the Indian, Air & Artillery bombardment along with their troops. When this news reached the GHQ Brig Sher Khan DMO was livid and immediately sent for Maj. Hassan Khan who had been sent to Kohat to be inducted in the regular Army-On reaching GHQ -Maj Hassan Khan was told this distressing news-and forthwith put in a small Harvard Plan and sent back to take over the overall Command after being inducted on papers in the regular Army.
By the time Maj. Hassan Khan reached and trekked his way to his Command the previous leaders had not only retreated from Tragbal/Gurez, but had also lost the lands south of Burzil-pass. However the force of Maj. Hassan Khan was now augmented by another brave man-Colonel [INA] Prince Burhan ul Mulk of Chitral State, who had come with his 2000 volunteers from Chitral regions, barefooted with no beddings and bows and arrows, equipped with old muzzle-loaders but with very high spirits.
This force now focused on the capture of the Kishanganga Valley [Neelum valley] and succeeded. Towards the middle of Aug 1948-Indians attacked the Durmat Post at mid-night-Maj. Hassan on receipt of the wireless message rushed with some men and LMG’s and held the post against extreme Indian bombing and morning Air Strafing. All Indian attacks were beaten back this post was situated on a hill 10,000 feet above sea level and controlled the Tilail Valley which overlooked the old route to the western fringes of the Zojila-Pass.
(To be continued)
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]COUP OF 1951:PART IV[/FONT][/h]Naveed Tajammal Part I can be read at: http://pakpotpourri2.wordpress.com/2014/02/01/the-coup-of-1951-part-1/ Part II can be read at: http://pakpotpourri2.wordpress.com/2014/02/09/coup-of-1951part-ii/ Part III can be read at https://pakpotpourri2.wordpress.com/2014/03/02/coup-of-1951part-iii/ Major General Akbar
In early December 1950-Akbar khan had been promoted to the rank of a Major-General and posted as the CGS at GHQ on assuming this important and sensitive post-the tempo of the conspiracy was accelerated-the post gave Akbar khan access to the levers of power and into the inner sanctum of the Army. All this reinforced the confidence of Akbar khan, in his planning to take over the government and so preparations & going over the minor details and planning counter moves if the coup d’tat failed, were meticulously worked out.
In a meeting in the third week of January 1951-at Major Sethi’s house, Brig.Ziauddin had introduced Colonel Hassan khan to General Akbar, who had explained the aims and objectives of the conspiracy to him. Colonel Hassan agreed with all the points raised and assured General Akbar of his all-out support in the proposed coup. After this meeting during the first three weeks of feb.1951 a hectic recruitment campaign was carried out-Brigadier Ziauddin played a pivotal role in these as he was the officiating brigadier and commander of around 25,000 men and officers who came under GHQ[Azad] mainly all Azad Kashmir regiment battalions. He was stationed at Rawalpindi- belonged to Kotli-and had been commissioned in 1942 and awarded a MBE during the second world war, in these three weeks. Zia Hassan and Sethi had series of meetings with Colonel Tassaduq Hussein who was commanding 2 AK battalion. In all these meetings the post-coup plan of launching a war on India also remained a vital subject. On 22 February, all four had met Captain Nur Hussein CO of 3 AK battalion at Kahuta and enlisted his full help in the planned coup.
Earlier on 04 February, Colonel Siddique Raja [approver number one] had called on General Akbar and also met Begum Nasim Akbar, Captain Poshni and Major Khadim Hussein at the CGS House. In the evening General Akbar gave a broad outline plan of his proposed coup-according to which all divisional commanders were to be called to GHQ and relieved of their commands and put under arrest. This new plan also envisaged that should the coup fail-the contingency plan catered for an armed struggle from Hazzarah, Azad Kashmir and Frontier regions, these were the people who had fought the Kashmir war as volunteers. Major Ishaq Mohammad was to be recalled from Kalat and was to take over 4/16th Punjab battalion at Abbottabad while Lieutenant Colonel Akbar Khan.; its Co was to take over the Abbottabad Brigade from Brigadier Jeelani who was to be recalled at GHQ and put under arrest-while Major General Majid and Brigadier Masood Khan who were considered reliable to the cause, as they had openly expressed the wish to bump of the Governor NWFP as he had mishandled the tribal areas by sending the army. The Abbottabad Brigade was the contingency formation which was to go in guerilla-fighting mode should the coup fail. After hearing these details Colonel Siddique Raja suggested minor changes in the plan, he suggested that Brigadier Sadique Khan who was commanding the Bannu Brigade should take over 9 division at Peshawar and Colonel Khurshid Ali khan GSO-1 of the division would help him control Peshawar. This arrangement would ensure two strong bases should the coup fail i.e Abbottabad and Peshawar. Colonel Siddique Raja also suggested here that Brigadier .Bakhtiar Rana should be approached to take over Lahore Division-Akbar Khan accepted these suggestions however he was very doubtful about the integrity of Brigadier Sidique Khan as he had found him of late, a very doubtful case. However Colonel Siddique Raja was adamant in his support of Brigadier Siddique Khan so General Akbar reluctantly agreed to these changes-however the date of the coup d’tat had not be fixed as yet but it had been decided that it would be one of the days when Liaqat Ali Khan visited Rawalpindi in connection with the forthcoming Punjab assembly elections. In same meeting General Akbar had also mentioned the role of Air-Commodore M.K.Janjua who was to handle Karachi affairs and if need be Brigadier Latif who was the Quetta region Brigade commander would send him some additional troops and he himself being the Quetta Station Commander could easily handle affairs at his end.
In Feb.1951,Gen Akbar as the CGS had visited Thal’ to distribute gallantry awards of the Kashmir war-later at the dinner in the 2nd/1st Punjab mess-which was also attended by Begum.Nasim Akbar,Ms.Mehr khan [sister of the communist worker-latif afghani who played a very conspicuous role in the march on srinagar and later in failed attack on srinagar airfield along with Major-Khurshid anwer.Ms mehr khan had been a Crypto-Stenographer in british intelligence-during the war] & brig.sidique khan the brigade commander bannu,the Co of 2nd/1st punjab and other officers of the same brigade.At the dinner Gen.Akbar had commented on the latest wrong action taken by the Govt.and through its Governor NWFP of sending Army in the tribal areas,he had said’The Govt.does not know anything about Frontier,and I wish somebody should bump off them off’ the prosecution during the trial made much ado about these remarks-which were further twisted by the testimony of a Major.Salim Ahmed Yazadani-a company commander in 2nd/1st Punjab,who stated,that the CGS while addressing the gathered troops of the brigade for the gallantry award distribution had said during his address,’The people in Karachi [meaning the Govt.] could never understand the problems of the troops nor cater for their comfort-that,the sole solution to Kashmir problem,was, in fighting it out with the Hindu-and not running after the UNO.He had shouted and asked the troops whether they were prepared to fight for Kashmir-and they had shouted back in one voice,that,they were ever ready !
It should be kept in mind that when ever conspiracies leading to coup d’etat have been detected and men caught-the governments in power have always downplayed the level of support behind each attempt,as here to the same is seen in this case,if you study the trial proceedings.
On 07 feb.1951 Gen.Akbar had arranged a meeting between Air.Commodore M.K.Janjua and col.siddique raja,at 9 am at his office premises.As per the testimony of the approver-col.siddique raja-M.K.Janjua was very bitter about the British personnel who still dominated the Pakistan Airforce,and had blocked the promotions of Pakistani officers-however he had wanted time to coordinate all the tasks assigned to him at his end in the Karachi region.The same evening Siddique Raja met Gen.Akbar at the CGS House and requested that he maybe posted out of Infantry School Quetta to a good post in rawalpindi.
On 09 Feb. 1951 Siddique Raja returned back to Quetta and briefed Brig. Latif about the future plans and his meeting with M.K. Janjua on 12 Feb 1951 Siddique Raja got his new posting order to Rawalpindi. However, he was not happy about his new appointment and wanted the posting order to be cancelled which it never was-and had to come to Rawalpindi. Meanwhile Gen. Akbar told him to reach Rawalpindi latest by 21 Feb. as a major meeting was to be held on 23rd February. Maj.Gul Khan, Maj.Majid and Maj.Ishaq Mohammad were also to attend and they all are contacted and informed accordingly. Siddique Raja as one can make out remained the Trojan horse in this conspiracy-as were a few others who will be discussed later. Siddique Raja had already worked on Brig. Latif by planting idea in his mind that the time as yet was not ready for the coup and had he worked on others. He had likewise conveyed the message to Maj. Gul and Maj Majid but told them not to leave for Rawalpindi till he told them to do so-even if Gen.Akbar called them directly. However Major Ishaq who was the in charge of Kalat State forces could not come as he had just returned after a long leave and the budget of the state forces was being made-which only he could do so-however the profile of Major Ishaq was excellent and he was a devoted follower of Gen. Akbar having remained his brigade major during the Kashmir war and later served also in the Kotli sector, he had won a Military Cross during the second world war. Likewise PA-105 Brig. Abdul Latif had been commissioned in 1936 and had been awarded a Military Cross for Conspicuous Bravery at the Burma Front. He had commanded 5/12 FFR [Guides] during the Kashmir war and in the brigade of the then Brig. Akbar and the Brigade Major had been Maj. Ishaq earlier mentioned. Brig Latif was also very bitter on the way the government had handled the Kashmir war affair when Sardar Patel had time and again offered Liaqat Ali Khan to take Kashmir in lieu of Hyderabad. During this period in the middle of Feb. 1951 the New C in C Ayub Khan had visited Quetta and had met Latif in the evening at the house of Gen Adam Khan where he was staying. Brig.Latif had questioned Ayub Khan on certain orders passed on to him through the GHQ. One was the sore point, that why was the GHQ so soft on the British Officers serving in the Pakistan Army and why were they infesting the Staff College and why only those officers were being graded in above average class-who sided and supported the current pro-Anglo-American stance, whereas they had shown their true colors in the recent Kashmir War. Brig. Latif had also pointed in the same meeting about the massive corruption prevalent in the Army engineers’ corps and extravagant facilities being provided to British officer, serving along with Pakistani Officers who had much better war track records. Ayub Khan in this meeting was found to be at loss with words.
On 15 Feb.1951 Gen. Akbar took Maj. Sethi who too later became a approver, along with him on a visit the Sihala Camp facilities which were to house the arrested Generals and other senior officers after the Coup d’tat. However seeing the dilapidated condition of buildings and poor security arrangements he ordered Maj. Sethi to look for alternative location, who consulted Brig Ziauddin on this subject. The latter mentioned that the Generals could be accommodated in the C in C house and it was secure. The other officers could be put up in the Rawalpindi Circuit House; on this Gen. Akbar agreed.
To counter the Pro Anglo -American tilt of the Army and the government, keeping in view their callousness in the recent Kashmir war and the way corruption was rampart in the country. Gen. Akbar and Begum Nasim had approached the Communist party to create a bridge for them with the Soviets and as well the Chinese. Begum Nasim remained throughout the main coordinator in this operation, as she had been very active in the Kashmir operations earlier. On 31 Jan 1951 she took Major Sethi to Lahore who drove the car to see Faiz Ahmad Faiz. Later all three drove back to Rawalpindi to meet Gen. Akbar on 02 Feb. During the trial the prosecution had highlighted that beside this meeting, Faiz Ahmad had also gone to Karachi from 14 to 18 Feb and stayed with Col. Majid Malik who was the Principle Information Officer and later met Air-Commodore M.K. Janjua at the house of Major-Shams Arif. The statements of these two prosecution witnesses were also twisted and played by the state lawyers. In the same period of mid-Feb. Gen. Akbar visited Lahore on an official tour and met Maj. Haq Nawaz Malik at Wazirabad and Brig. Bakhtiar Rana at Lahore.
On 20th Feb. Begum Nasim Akbar drove to the house of Maj Sethi at around 11 pm along with three guests who were to stay at his house. Sethi recognized Faiz Ahmad but was at loss about the other two-who were introduced as Mahmud and Shaukat. Later it transpired after the arrests and trial proceedings that Mahmud was Sajjad Zaheer and Shaukat was Sibte Hassan. While these guests were at Sethi’s house Gen. Akbar would visit them in the evening while the whole day they spent writing papers. Later when they had left, Gen Akbar showed some of these drafted papers to Sethi which he found were proclamations regarding the new military order. The reforms which covered all facets to put an end to corruption and changes within the Armed forces hierarchy, all very elaborately worked out.
On the night before 23 Feb 1951 Gen Akbar had directed Sethi to bring along the guests to his house by 10 am latest as the meeting was to start. On reaching back he found ta fourth guest, who later turned out to be Muhammad Hussain Atta [accused number 15] and Secretary General of Communist Party NWFP. But in the morning Sethi found that Sibte Hassan had left without meeting him. He was arrested later on 19 April 1951-along with other communist party members-by 11 May 13 main members had been locked up by the police under the Punjab Public Safety Act but none of them were charged or tried for a substantive offence-the detention orders which were for six months continued to be extended every six months till the Hyderabad Tribunal lasted or continued.
[To be continued........]
