1. (C) Summary: In a November 9 meeting with Ambassador
Patterson, Interior Minister Rehman Malik requested that the
USG issue a public statement in support of Pakistani
democracy. He suggested that such a statement would be
useful in protecting President Asif Ali Zardari from
military-induced pressure for Zardari to leave office. In
addition, it would help dispel persistent charges from the
Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) that the United States and the
United Kingdom had urged it to withdraw support for the
National Reconciliation Ordinance, thereby placing Zardari
at-risk. Malik assessed that Saudi Arabia and the Pakistan
Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N) were cooperating with the
military and MQM to bring down President Zardari. Despite
these charges, Malik was optimistic that the Supreme Court
would not/not strip Zardari of his presidential immunity and
suggested that even if it did, the government would simply
cease prosecution of Zardari's cases, thereby allowing him to
continue to hold office. End Summary.
2. (C) Interior Minister Rehman Malik met November 9 with
Ambassador Patterson to provide a read-out of his meetings
with senior officials of the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM)
in Dubai. Throughout the meeting, Malik was clearly nervous
that the USG was distancing itself both from him and
President Zardari. Malik claimed that during the course of
his Dubai meetings, the MQM had repeatedly stated that both
the United States and the United Kingdom had urged the party
to oppose the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) -- a
move that led the government to withdraw the legislation from
parliamentary consideration and placed the future of
President Zardari at-risk. Malik claimed that the MQM stated
it had received this message during the Sindh Governor's
recent trip to the United States and that Altaf Hussain had
been approached by the British government in London.
Ambassador strongly denied these allegations, stating that
the USG had not/not had any such discussions with the Sindh
Governor.
3. (C) Interior Minister Malik further expressed concern that
the Secretary was displeased with the civilian government
upon her return from her recent trip to Pakistan. Malik
attributed this impression to rumors from unspecified
sources. Ambassador emphasized to Malik that she had heard
no such thing and that in contrast, she was confident that
the Secretary had been very pleased both with her visit and
with her meetings with Pakistan government counterparts.
4. (C) Minister Malik inquired as to whether the Ambassador
was aware that the "establishment" -- local short-hand for
the military and the intelligence services -- was involved in
working against the NRO and for President Zardari's
departure. Ambassador told Rehman that we were aware of such
allegations. Minister Malik reported that the MQM had told
him directly in the Dubai meetings that the military was
involved, although Malik personally did not/not believe that
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani was involved
in the plotting. Malik also claimed that the MQM was meeting
regularly with the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N) and
that PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif was, in turn, pressuring Chief
Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to disqualify President Zardari.
Malik also assessed that Saudi Arabia was working to unseat
President Zardari. Malik intended to visit Prince Muqrin bin
Abdul Aziz, Chief of Saudi General Intelligence, in Saudi
Arabia and then travel on to London to meet with MQM Convener
Altaf Hussain.
5. (C) Malik suggested that the best way to deal with
military pressure would be for President Zardari to make
internal changes within the military hierarchy. Malik
proposed that Zardari recreate the Deputy Chief of Army Staff
position and move Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Director
General Ahmad Shuja Pasha into that position in March 2010.
Zardari could then commit to elevating Pasha to COAS in
October 2010 on the expiration of Kayani's term. Malik
suggested that Kayani could then be moved to Chairman of the
Joint Staff. Comment: Malik seemed to believe that ISI DG
Pasha was unilaterally behind the push to oust Zardari --
which we know is not/not the case. End Comment.
6. (C) Despite these concerns, Malik reiterated the
government's line that Zardari is not in any real danger on
expiration of the NRO. He asserted that the Chief Justice
would not/not revoke Zardari's presidential immunity. Even
if he did, Malik claimed that the Interior Minister can
instruct prosecutors to dismiss charges in any court case.
He shared that, in one of his own corruption cases, this had
been done, and that in another case, the Supreme Court had
ruled his imprisonment illegal. Malik also added that
President Zardari had the ability to pardon anyone.
7. (C) Malik pressed the Ambassador for issuance of a strong
statement from the United States. Ambassador inquired as to
the content and the audience. Malik suggested that it be a
public statement saying that the United States supported
democracy in Pakistan.
8. (C) Comment: Malik was clearly worried that President
Zardari and his inner circle of advisors -- including Malik
-- had lost the support of the international community.
Malik appeared to believe that such support was essential for
their survival in the face of military plotting against them.
Malik's view that ISI DG Pasha is behind the moves against
President Zardari and that COAS Kayani is not involved is
either naive or intentionally misleading. It would be
impossible for Pasha to move without Kayani's acquiescence.
Malik's views on Zardari's legal troubles presuppose that
Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry will be bound by normal
interpretations of the law and precedent. Such an assumption
ignores Chaudhry's penchant for ignoring both in recent
rulings and his personal animosity towards Asif Ali Zardari.
End Comment.
PATTERSON
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ISLAMABAD2716_a.html