farazah82
Councller (250+ posts)
It is good read.
From Akbar Babar
Half Baked Policy:
The PTIs stated policy on the war on terror revolves around four pillars; (1) withdraw from the US led war on terror, (2) negotiations, (3) truth and reconciliation, and (4) force as the last option.
Now that the US is on the verge of withdrawing from Afghanistan and leaving behind some strategic assets in place, the PTI policy appears time barred. For example, demanding a formal dissociation from the US led war at a time when the US itself is on the verge of dissociating from it makes little practical sense. Similarly, at a time when the warring sides have yet to commence negotiations, leave alone the chances of its success, does it make any sense for the KPK government to announce the withdrawal of the military from Malakand Division?
Keeping aside for a moment the debate whether it was right or wrong for the military to enter FATA or Malakand, the fact is the military is there in strength. It was more important now to factor in the militarys presence in Malakand and FATA and use its withdrawal as leverage for gains towards a comprehensive settlement. The critical questions that appear to have no resonance in the PTI KPK governments announcement of the withdrawal of the military from Malakand Division are: (1) was the timing of the announcement right? (2) Is the civil administration capable of governing Malakand without the military? (3) What message does the timing of the announcement give to the militants and finally (4) are the police and the para military forces capable of providing security to the residents once the military withdraws?
The stated PTI policy was conceived almost 10 years ago when General Musharraf was in power and in league with the demands of the US at that time. For General Musharraf, his survival in power demanded that we plunge deeper into this war. While I was the main architect of the original PTI policy on war on terror including opposing military actions but that policy had a context. The most lethal and strategic context was to stop facilitating the US policy to expand the war zone from Afghanistan to Pakistan. A policy that evolved after the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the US conclusion that without destroying the home base, the revived insurgency in Afghanistan could not be subdued. Fanning internal militancy in Pakistan through Pakistani militants taking sanctuary in Afghanistan is an open secret now. The political objective of this US policy was to convert the entire perspective of a war from their war into our war. Thus, galvanizing the full strength of the Pakistani nation and the state to act as a US proxy without most even knowing about it. And, as a side effect, the more insecure Pakistan gets, the more insecure its strategic nuclear assets in international perspective, thus further building international pressure for Pakistan to forego its nuclear capability. The Syrian example of using internal strife to achieve the strategic objective of disarming it from weapons of mass destruction is a classic example of this policy.
I think, to a large extent, the US and its proxies in the political, military, and the media establishment of Pakistan were successful in transforming an alien war into our war.
Now that it is widely considered our war, does that mean that we should plunge deeper or try and extricate ourselves? Obviously, the overarching goal should remain to end the war as soon as possible. But the more important question for PTI to consider is that the entire context has changed from the time the original PTI policy evolved. The essential principles of the original policy were that; we must not act as mercenaries, protect our sovereignty, respect and value fundamental rights of our citizens whether in Lahore or Wana, support international efforts to curb terrorism, and improve governance in FATA to ensure greater writ of the state.
While the principles remain the same, the present context demands formulating a revised policy that is responsive to the changed circumstances.
In my opinion, a revised PTI policy should keep in perspective the following seven main parameters; (1) Negotiations with a credible military option on the table, (2) improving governance, (3) revamping the police and the para military apparatus as they say in Pakistan on a war footing, (4) carrot and stick policy for weaning smaller militant groups from the mainstream, carrot for those willing to seriously negotiate and wagging the stick selectively, for those with other agendas, (5) investing heavily in the improving the physical and social infrastructure, (6) developing a strong and proactive coordination mechanism with the federal government on the war on terror, and (7) demanding a quid pro quo for facilitating US withdrawal from Afghanistan and negotiations with the Afghan Taliban with cessation of all US and Indian financial and military support to militants fighting against Pakistan.
The timing of the announcement to withdraw troops from Malakand Division is ominous and probably a reflection that the PTI policy makers remain jammed to the older version of the PTI policy on war on terror. Assuming the military does withdraw, lock, stock, and barrel from Malakand, an unlikely scenario, has anyone thought through the consequences if militancy returns with a vengeance in areas now in relative peace albeit under the threat of lethal force?
In a violence stricken society, when ordinary citizens or soldiers die, it has diminished news value. But when a serving two star general is killed commanding troops in an area soon to be vacated by the army on the orders of the PTI government, it is headline news.
At the very least, on sensitive matters of life and death, the PTI should think through before making public half-baked initiatives that may be construed by some as putting the cart before the horse. Any policy that remains static and does not evolve with changing ground realities is as unfit for consumption as the water from a lake that has no fresh water intake.
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Akbar-S-Babar-PTI-official/180101955416268
From Akbar Babar
Half Baked Policy:
The PTIs stated policy on the war on terror revolves around four pillars; (1) withdraw from the US led war on terror, (2) negotiations, (3) truth and reconciliation, and (4) force as the last option.
Now that the US is on the verge of withdrawing from Afghanistan and leaving behind some strategic assets in place, the PTI policy appears time barred. For example, demanding a formal dissociation from the US led war at a time when the US itself is on the verge of dissociating from it makes little practical sense. Similarly, at a time when the warring sides have yet to commence negotiations, leave alone the chances of its success, does it make any sense for the KPK government to announce the withdrawal of the military from Malakand Division?
Keeping aside for a moment the debate whether it was right or wrong for the military to enter FATA or Malakand, the fact is the military is there in strength. It was more important now to factor in the militarys presence in Malakand and FATA and use its withdrawal as leverage for gains towards a comprehensive settlement. The critical questions that appear to have no resonance in the PTI KPK governments announcement of the withdrawal of the military from Malakand Division are: (1) was the timing of the announcement right? (2) Is the civil administration capable of governing Malakand without the military? (3) What message does the timing of the announcement give to the militants and finally (4) are the police and the para military forces capable of providing security to the residents once the military withdraws?
The stated PTI policy was conceived almost 10 years ago when General Musharraf was in power and in league with the demands of the US at that time. For General Musharraf, his survival in power demanded that we plunge deeper into this war. While I was the main architect of the original PTI policy on war on terror including opposing military actions but that policy had a context. The most lethal and strategic context was to stop facilitating the US policy to expand the war zone from Afghanistan to Pakistan. A policy that evolved after the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the US conclusion that without destroying the home base, the revived insurgency in Afghanistan could not be subdued. Fanning internal militancy in Pakistan through Pakistani militants taking sanctuary in Afghanistan is an open secret now. The political objective of this US policy was to convert the entire perspective of a war from their war into our war. Thus, galvanizing the full strength of the Pakistani nation and the state to act as a US proxy without most even knowing about it. And, as a side effect, the more insecure Pakistan gets, the more insecure its strategic nuclear assets in international perspective, thus further building international pressure for Pakistan to forego its nuclear capability. The Syrian example of using internal strife to achieve the strategic objective of disarming it from weapons of mass destruction is a classic example of this policy.
I think, to a large extent, the US and its proxies in the political, military, and the media establishment of Pakistan were successful in transforming an alien war into our war.
Now that it is widely considered our war, does that mean that we should plunge deeper or try and extricate ourselves? Obviously, the overarching goal should remain to end the war as soon as possible. But the more important question for PTI to consider is that the entire context has changed from the time the original PTI policy evolved. The essential principles of the original policy were that; we must not act as mercenaries, protect our sovereignty, respect and value fundamental rights of our citizens whether in Lahore or Wana, support international efforts to curb terrorism, and improve governance in FATA to ensure greater writ of the state.
While the principles remain the same, the present context demands formulating a revised policy that is responsive to the changed circumstances.
In my opinion, a revised PTI policy should keep in perspective the following seven main parameters; (1) Negotiations with a credible military option on the table, (2) improving governance, (3) revamping the police and the para military apparatus as they say in Pakistan on a war footing, (4) carrot and stick policy for weaning smaller militant groups from the mainstream, carrot for those willing to seriously negotiate and wagging the stick selectively, for those with other agendas, (5) investing heavily in the improving the physical and social infrastructure, (6) developing a strong and proactive coordination mechanism with the federal government on the war on terror, and (7) demanding a quid pro quo for facilitating US withdrawal from Afghanistan and negotiations with the Afghan Taliban with cessation of all US and Indian financial and military support to militants fighting against Pakistan.
The timing of the announcement to withdraw troops from Malakand Division is ominous and probably a reflection that the PTI policy makers remain jammed to the older version of the PTI policy on war on terror. Assuming the military does withdraw, lock, stock, and barrel from Malakand, an unlikely scenario, has anyone thought through the consequences if militancy returns with a vengeance in areas now in relative peace albeit under the threat of lethal force?
In a violence stricken society, when ordinary citizens or soldiers die, it has diminished news value. But when a serving two star general is killed commanding troops in an area soon to be vacated by the army on the orders of the PTI government, it is headline news.
At the very least, on sensitive matters of life and death, the PTI should think through before making public half-baked initiatives that may be construed by some as putting the cart before the horse. Any policy that remains static and does not evolve with changing ground realities is as unfit for consumption as the water from a lake that has no fresh water intake.
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Akbar-S-Babar-PTI-official/180101955416268
