Questions about an appointment
The blame for the Centre’s unnecessary and dangerous effort to scuttle the long-held convention of appointing the most senior among eligible officers as Chief of the Army Staff cannot be laid at the doorstep of the political executive alone. A significant part of it should go to the Army leadership, which has been betraying significant nepotism and lack of conviction on a range of issues in recent times.
The government has justified the appointment of Lt. Gen. Bipin Rawat superseding two commanders saying he had superior professional capabilities. It argues that the prerogative to select the military chief lies with the executive and the decision has been taken purely on merit. Those close to the present government also argue that a factor taken into consideration was the ease of doing business with the new chief.
None of those arguments, however, addresses the concern that the decision could be seen as an unnecessary and dangerous political meddling in the working of a professional military. Arguments in favour of merit do not hold much water here.
Disparity within the Army
The impending political intervention, with excuse of merit, was in the air for sometime. The appointment of Lt. Gen. Rawat suits not just the political leadership but also the present chief, Gen. Dalbir Suhag, and his comrades from the infantry. Both are from the Gorkha Rifles. The two officers who are senior to Lt. Gen. Rawat and lost out to him — Lt. Gen. Praveen Bakshi and Lt. Gen. P.M. Hariz — are from armoured corps and mechanised infantry, respectively.
The unwritten part of the Indian Army’s contemporary history is the deep divisions among the senior leadership between infantry and other arms. This has worsened under the outgoing chief, who has aggressively promoted those from infantry, especially from the Gorkha regiments.
Gorkha Rifles officers today occupy an unusually large number of crucial posts at the senior level. And the recent promotion list from Major General to Lieutenant General also saw had a noticeably large number of officers from Gorkha regiments. This situation finally reflects on the force, even if it is not intended.
The Army leadership has been unusually silent, or at least according to available public records, as the Kashmir situation began to spin out of control in recent times after years of steady improvement. The Army has lost at least 63 soldiers in Jammu and Kashmir this year so far, which is more than the casualty figures of the last two years and among the highest in a decade.
The relative peace attained in Kashmir since heavier Army deployment in the late 1980s had come at the cost of thousands of lives — at least 6,000 security personnel deaths, according to reliable databases. The Army leadership has a responsibility to ensure that its men do not end up being cannon fodder to myopic security perspectives and unwise political moves. Leading the Indian Army is a privilege as well as a heavy responsibility.
Mediocrity and merit
It might sound Orwellian, but perceived mediocrity is sometimes better than merit. It is true especially when it comes to military promotions in a political system like ours. At all levels of military promotions, mediocrity has several chances to creep in, and it makes regular appearances. Sometimes they appear as deliberate conspiracies, at other times as an incompetent leadership playing safe.
Under the existing norms, the Vice Chief and the seven Army Commanders are eligible to be considered for the post of Chief of the Army Staff. The Ministry of Defence sends a panel of the three most senior among them to the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, chaired by the Prime Minister, which finally decides the successor.
In recent memory, except on one occasion in 1983, the most senior eligible officer has been appointed. In 1983, the Indira Gandhi government decided to make Lt. Gen. A.S. Vaidya the Army chief, superseding Lt. Gen. S.K. Sinha. Among the reasons speculated was the latter’s firm professional mind, and his rumoured advice against an armed intervention against Sikh militants lodged in Amritsar’s Golden Temple. A few months after Lt. Gen. Sinha resigned, the Army under Gen. Vaidya launched Operation Blue Star, with disastrous consequences that played out over several years.
The professional and apolitical nature of the Indian military has played a vital role — a role that has not been documented enough — in India’s stability as the world’s largest democracy. While its neighbours have struggled with military dictatorships and the constant undermining of civilian governments by Army HQ, in India the very professional and skilled military has helped in the creation of a unique template of democratic governance despite the country’s huge economic and sociopolitical challenges.
Unlike in Pakistan and Bangladesh, in India the military has never aspired to be an arbitrator of power. One of the factors for the politicisation of the military in these countries has been meddling by the political class in its professional running. India’s civilian governments, and its political class at large, on the other hand, have studiously heeded the military’s professionalism.
Military officers have not felt the need to pay extra-constitutional obeisance to political leaders to secure the top post. It is against this backdrop that the appointment of Lt. Gen. Rawat, by all accounts a highly competent officer, must be explained by the Narendra Modi government.
As disconcerting as a professional military losing a battle must be its senior Generals queuing up for a rendezvous with wily politicians.
Source : http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/col...appointment/article16913382.ece?homepage=true
The blame for the Centre’s unnecessary and dangerous effort to scuttle the long-held convention of appointing the most senior among eligible officers as Chief of the Army Staff cannot be laid at the doorstep of the political executive alone. A significant part of it should go to the Army leadership, which has been betraying significant nepotism and lack of conviction on a range of issues in recent times.
The government has justified the appointment of Lt. Gen. Bipin Rawat superseding two commanders saying he had superior professional capabilities. It argues that the prerogative to select the military chief lies with the executive and the decision has been taken purely on merit. Those close to the present government also argue that a factor taken into consideration was the ease of doing business with the new chief.
None of those arguments, however, addresses the concern that the decision could be seen as an unnecessary and dangerous political meddling in the working of a professional military. Arguments in favour of merit do not hold much water here.
Disparity within the Army
The impending political intervention, with excuse of merit, was in the air for sometime. The appointment of Lt. Gen. Rawat suits not just the political leadership but also the present chief, Gen. Dalbir Suhag, and his comrades from the infantry. Both are from the Gorkha Rifles. The two officers who are senior to Lt. Gen. Rawat and lost out to him — Lt. Gen. Praveen Bakshi and Lt. Gen. P.M. Hariz — are from armoured corps and mechanised infantry, respectively.
The unwritten part of the Indian Army’s contemporary history is the deep divisions among the senior leadership between infantry and other arms. This has worsened under the outgoing chief, who has aggressively promoted those from infantry, especially from the Gorkha regiments.
Gorkha Rifles officers today occupy an unusually large number of crucial posts at the senior level. And the recent promotion list from Major General to Lieutenant General also saw had a noticeably large number of officers from Gorkha regiments. This situation finally reflects on the force, even if it is not intended.
The Army leadership has been unusually silent, or at least according to available public records, as the Kashmir situation began to spin out of control in recent times after years of steady improvement. The Army has lost at least 63 soldiers in Jammu and Kashmir this year so far, which is more than the casualty figures of the last two years and among the highest in a decade.
The relative peace attained in Kashmir since heavier Army deployment in the late 1980s had come at the cost of thousands of lives — at least 6,000 security personnel deaths, according to reliable databases. The Army leadership has a responsibility to ensure that its men do not end up being cannon fodder to myopic security perspectives and unwise political moves. Leading the Indian Army is a privilege as well as a heavy responsibility.
Mediocrity and merit
It might sound Orwellian, but perceived mediocrity is sometimes better than merit. It is true especially when it comes to military promotions in a political system like ours. At all levels of military promotions, mediocrity has several chances to creep in, and it makes regular appearances. Sometimes they appear as deliberate conspiracies, at other times as an incompetent leadership playing safe.
Under the existing norms, the Vice Chief and the seven Army Commanders are eligible to be considered for the post of Chief of the Army Staff. The Ministry of Defence sends a panel of the three most senior among them to the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, chaired by the Prime Minister, which finally decides the successor.
In recent memory, except on one occasion in 1983, the most senior eligible officer has been appointed. In 1983, the Indira Gandhi government decided to make Lt. Gen. A.S. Vaidya the Army chief, superseding Lt. Gen. S.K. Sinha. Among the reasons speculated was the latter’s firm professional mind, and his rumoured advice against an armed intervention against Sikh militants lodged in Amritsar’s Golden Temple. A few months after Lt. Gen. Sinha resigned, the Army under Gen. Vaidya launched Operation Blue Star, with disastrous consequences that played out over several years.
The professional and apolitical nature of the Indian military has played a vital role — a role that has not been documented enough — in India’s stability as the world’s largest democracy. While its neighbours have struggled with military dictatorships and the constant undermining of civilian governments by Army HQ, in India the very professional and skilled military has helped in the creation of a unique template of democratic governance despite the country’s huge economic and sociopolitical challenges.
Unlike in Pakistan and Bangladesh, in India the military has never aspired to be an arbitrator of power. One of the factors for the politicisation of the military in these countries has been meddling by the political class in its professional running. India’s civilian governments, and its political class at large, on the other hand, have studiously heeded the military’s professionalism.
Military officers have not felt the need to pay extra-constitutional obeisance to political leaders to secure the top post. It is against this backdrop that the appointment of Lt. Gen. Rawat, by all accounts a highly competent officer, must be explained by the Narendra Modi government.
As disconcerting as a professional military losing a battle must be its senior Generals queuing up for a rendezvous with wily politicians.
Source : http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/col...appointment/article16913382.ece?homepage=true
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