The fall of Allepo has increased the chances of civil war in lebanon to ignite again. The Hizbollah will be tempted to benefit from the situation and lebanon being coastal is very easy to intervene for Sunni powers as well . The recipe is set for disaster.
Lebanon — the ‘post-Aleppo’ government
Preventing civil war was the pretext to justify a political settlement that brought Gen. Michel Aoun to the presidency. Now the same excuse is used to justify the contradictory formation of the government, which was announced by Prime Minister Saad Hariri.
We can debate endlessly how accurate this pretext was, especially in terms of the many concessions made, and the deep differences and contradictory visions of the new Cabinet’s members. There is no guarantee that they will not fall out even before the new government begins work.
How will it draft its ministerial statement? What policy will it adopt toward the international tribunal investigating the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and toward Hezbollah’s weapons and its fighting in Syria? These issues represent the first month’s challenges for the government.
Regional circumstances have not given Hariri enough time to form a better government, as he realizes that he is entering a new phase that is critical for him and his movement. In addition, consensus will likely remain a requirement for the formation of any government in Lebanon. Opposition will be only allowed under the confines of loyalty to the ruling party. Therefore, the country’s weakness and impasse will continue.
Since the end of Lebanon’s civil war, the country has failed to establish an authority and institutions that are independent of power-sharing among different sects and beliefs, in a way that paralyzed the state. This has been driven by a regional Syrian-Iranian push.
The mission of this interim government, which will only stay for a few months, is to prepare for a new election law and hold parliamentary elections in spring. However, several names in the Cabinet do not suggest that elections will be its mission. This raises the possibility of a new political vacuum.
It is very hard to overlook all these clear-cut facts surrounding the new government. Hariri, the most prominent opposition leader against Hezbollah and its Syrian ally, and head of the largest bloc in Parliament, has made major concessions. This includes his acceptance that Hezbollah has veto power and a set of names in government that are a major provocation to him and the legacy of his father.
Hariri’s government comprises many of his opponents: Hezbollah, Amal and Aoun’s party. It also includes a bloc loyal to former President Emile Lahoud, a very close ally of Hezbollah and of Syrian President Bashar Assad.
The March 8 alliance, consisting mainly of Hezbollah and Aoun’s party, welcomed the new government, considering it a “post-Aleppo” government. This comes in light of the major concessions made by Hariri to appoint some figures in the government.
The status quo will not improve in Lebanon without regional change, which seems unlikely. The regional situation is getting more complicated, especially after the fall of Aleppo and the military progress achieved by the Syrian-Russian-Iranian alliance.
This means the government is making dysfunctional political balances, especially when tested by the most crucial task. This government was invited by Assad to contribute to the “post-Aleppo liberation” phase, in a blatant challenge to Hariri, and to pressure him to submit to Syrian-Iranian influence in Lebanon. The ministerial statement is the first test of the government’s — specifically Hariri’s — ability to counter the Syrian-Iranian alliance. It will not be the last test.
Source
Lebanon — the ‘post-Aleppo’ government
Preventing civil war was the pretext to justify a political settlement that brought Gen. Michel Aoun to the presidency. Now the same excuse is used to justify the contradictory formation of the government, which was announced by Prime Minister Saad Hariri.
We can debate endlessly how accurate this pretext was, especially in terms of the many concessions made, and the deep differences and contradictory visions of the new Cabinet’s members. There is no guarantee that they will not fall out even before the new government begins work.
How will it draft its ministerial statement? What policy will it adopt toward the international tribunal investigating the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and toward Hezbollah’s weapons and its fighting in Syria? These issues represent the first month’s challenges for the government.
Regional circumstances have not given Hariri enough time to form a better government, as he realizes that he is entering a new phase that is critical for him and his movement. In addition, consensus will likely remain a requirement for the formation of any government in Lebanon. Opposition will be only allowed under the confines of loyalty to the ruling party. Therefore, the country’s weakness and impasse will continue.
Since the end of Lebanon’s civil war, the country has failed to establish an authority and institutions that are independent of power-sharing among different sects and beliefs, in a way that paralyzed the state. This has been driven by a regional Syrian-Iranian push.
The mission of this interim government, which will only stay for a few months, is to prepare for a new election law and hold parliamentary elections in spring. However, several names in the Cabinet do not suggest that elections will be its mission. This raises the possibility of a new political vacuum.
It is very hard to overlook all these clear-cut facts surrounding the new government. Hariri, the most prominent opposition leader against Hezbollah and its Syrian ally, and head of the largest bloc in Parliament, has made major concessions. This includes his acceptance that Hezbollah has veto power and a set of names in government that are a major provocation to him and the legacy of his father.
Hariri’s government comprises many of his opponents: Hezbollah, Amal and Aoun’s party. It also includes a bloc loyal to former President Emile Lahoud, a very close ally of Hezbollah and of Syrian President Bashar Assad.
The March 8 alliance, consisting mainly of Hezbollah and Aoun’s party, welcomed the new government, considering it a “post-Aleppo” government. This comes in light of the major concessions made by Hariri to appoint some figures in the government.
The status quo will not improve in Lebanon without regional change, which seems unlikely. The regional situation is getting more complicated, especially after the fall of Aleppo and the military progress achieved by the Syrian-Russian-Iranian alliance.
This means the government is making dysfunctional political balances, especially when tested by the most crucial task. This government was invited by Assad to contribute to the “post-Aleppo liberation” phase, in a blatant challenge to Hariri, and to pressure him to submit to Syrian-Iranian influence in Lebanon. The ministerial statement is the first test of the government’s — specifically Hariri’s — ability to counter the Syrian-Iranian alliance. It will not be the last test.
Source
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